Puer Tea

by Zhang, Jinghong. ,Project Muse.

  The report included several amazing figures:

  1 The fee that the distributors must pay to the big tea factories and companies for distribution rights ranged from ¥1 million to ¥30 million. The more they paid, the more Puer tea that they could order. According to the report, this was the key reason that Puer tea's price had become so extraordinarily high, since all the distributors had to find ways to recover their initial investment.

  2 Dealers had between 100 and 300 tons of Puer tea in stock that they could not resell since the price had collapsed.

  3 Almost all tea products (95 percent) were bought for speculation and storage, with only 5 percent purchased for actual consumption. One tea expert in Guangdong said that “even without buying another piece of Puer tea from the production area, Guangdong could not drink all of its stored tea for five to eight years.”

  The report drew the conclusion that Puer tea's rise and fall was due to improper speculation. It asked ordinary investors a rhetorical question: “If the quantity of a certain commodity in storage is far more than its actual consumption, would it be valued so high?” The report had great repercussions due to its national broadcasting impact. It became the hottest topic for discussion among people who cared about the Puer tea business.

  Another influential media report appeared in the magazine New Generations (Xinshengdai), published by the Sichuan Youth Newspaper, which said that the number of people in China involved in Puer tea speculation had reached thirty million. It argued that this large population had been tricked and that bankers, illegal traders, large tea companies, and government officials were all complicit (Guo Yukuan 2007a).

  Like the CCTV 2 report, the New Generations article also examined Puer tea's popularity as a focus of stock market–like speculation, taking as a case study the problematic business model of Zhongcha, the Chinese Tea Company brand in Yunnan. The Zhongcha Company had authorized private companies to “produce” Puer tea that was specially packaged as Zhongcha. What these private processors actually sold was their label, not any assurance of authentic technique or quality. As a result, fake Puer tea flooded the market (Guo Yukuan 2007a). Like my relative who asked me to collect Puer tea for him, many investors spent their money on brands like Zhongcha that were reputedly produced by famous Puer tea companies, thinking that these brands would increase in value. The actual downturn in the tea market, however, made it hard for them to resell their teas, and the report by New Generations further swayed people's faith in the authenticity of these products. The tea that my relative bought was, as far as I knew, still untouched. But these were just minor cases. There were additional reports about a more serious crisis among larger distributors.

  Media reports on Puer tea had flourished ever since the tea trade had begun to pick up. By 2007 there were thirteen Puer tea magazines, ten of them from Yunnan. Most had been established between 2005 and 2007, in print, television, or web form. There were also special columns in newspapers devoted to Puer tea (Yunnan Puer Cha 2007). Before the bubble burst, these media reports, especially those from Yunnan, had always carried “good news” about Puer tea, celebrating its value and reporting on events like Simao's name change and the new tea caravans. By contrast, national media, like CCTV 2, and media from other provinces, like New Generations, became the pioneers that spread “bad news” about Puer tea. In the face of recession, for the first time some of Puer tea's assets were deemed neutral or perhaps even negative factors. The production process, which had once been described as delicate and labor intensive, was now reported to be “not complex and mysterious at all” (CCTV 2007b), and the tea's medicinal function, which had been positively publicized before, was now pointed out to be “almost the same as other sorts of tea” (CCTV 2007b). One report said that “the special function of Puer tea still awaits further proof” and that “propaganda that Puer tea has a long-lasting quality is misguided” (Wang Xun 2007; CCTV 2007d).

  THE VOICES FROM YUNNAN

  I attended a symposium in Kunming at the end of June 2007, two weeks after the show about Puer tea's recession had been broadcast. The symposium was initiated by the Puer Tea Association of Yunnan and was attended by state government officials, local media, principals of several big tea companies, tea experts, and some self-invited tea traders. Most of the attendees were from Yunnan, though a few guests were invited from Beijing. A banner displayed the title of the conference: “Voices from Yunnan—The Clarification of Puer Tea's Current Situation.” The atmosphere was very serious, and the symposium sponsor adopted an attitude of hostility toward the central media report. It said informally that the CCTV 2 report was the result of bribery by groups who were hostile to Yunnan's Puer tea and that the symposium was a counterattack. Puer Tea Weekly, a weekly newspaper supported by the Puer Tea Association of Yunnan, described the purpose of the symposium:

  Puer tea has encountered fluctuation recently and its sales are at a temporary standstill. Some false reports, together with spiteful rumors, have seriously harmed this newly emergent industry. These are the conditions under which this symposium was organized. (Puer Tea Weekly 2007a)

  The “false reports” mentioned in this statement referred to the claims by media outlets such as CCTV 2 and New Generations. Some attendants at the symposium expressed their anger that the key feature of Puer tea—its longevity—was being undermined by these reports, and that the tea's medicinal function was being compared to that of other kinds of tea. One speaker surmised that these “negative” reports might have been plotted by groups whose interests had been harmed by Puer tea's popularity. An article published in the Kunming Evening News echoed this idea, and the author recalled several events in which Puer tea had been deliberately attacked, including a 2004 newspaper article that had said that not all Puer tea was worth storing, a 2005 story “created” by the Guangdong media that some Puer tea was fermented in a pigsty, and a 2006 report that twelve kinds of Puer tea produced in Yunnan were not quality products. The author of this article concluded that Puer tea had frequently been attacked by false or exaggerated reports. The falling price in 2007 actually affected only certain brands, such as Dayi and Zhongcha, but in media reports it had been described in exaggerated terms as the collapse of the entire Puer tea market (Lu Ming 2007).

  At the end of the symposium, despite some dissenting opinions, a manifesto was composed, calling for the “protection of Puer tea” and “defending Puer tea against any harm.” The manifesto also stressed that Yunnan was the original home of Puer tea, and that Puer tea had to be made from Yunnan's large-leaf tea variety.

  Soon after the symposium, in July 2007, the Tea Association of Yunnan launched the Puer tea geographical trademark. A production or trade unit could put the trademark on its tea products only after it had been certified and had paid certain fees.4 The function of the trademark was to assure the authenticity of Yunnan's Puer tea (Puer Tea Weekly 2007b).5 But it was not a compulsory regulation, and only a small number of traders registered to use it.

  In the following months, the Tea Association of Yunnan and several allied tea units organized a series of activities. Mass media outlets from Beijing were invited to Yunnan to report on the “truth” about Puer tea. At the same time, a panel from Yunnan went to local tea festivals and trade fairs in Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai to publicize Puer tea's positive image (Puer Tea Weekly 2007c). In November, the Yunnan Provincial Government organized more panels and encouraged private tea companies and traders to participate in the Tea Trade Fair in Guangzhou, the most important annual tea fair in China. Several of my informants who had attended this trade fair reported that other kinds of tea, such as oolong tea from Fujian and dark tea from Guangxi, were being promoted at the trade fair as being suitable for long-term storage. As one person said, “These people of other provinces criticized us, saying that we can't say that Puer tea could be stored for ages, but in fact they themselves were utilizing this long-lasting feature.”

  When the long-term value of Puer tea came into doubt during
the downturn, people in Yunnan began to advocate that it was time to drink rather than store the tea—that unless people did so, its value could not be fulfilled. This was clearly an attempt to address the claim on CCTV 2 that it would take more than five to eight years for Guangdong residents to drink all the Puer tea that was stored.

  OVERCOOKED OR TOO RAW?

  Although the provincial government had developed a series of events to “protect” Puer tea, criticism continued, both formally and informally, attempting to reflect upon the root cause of the recession. Multiple public opinions circulated, illustrating the cultural characteristics that shaped the rise and fall of Puer tea.

  Some said that Puer tea's downfall was due to excessive propaganda; metaphorically, it was overcooked. Others attributed the crisis to a lack of proper effort; metaphorically, it hadn't been cooked enough and was still too raw.

  For those making the “overcooked” argument, the government, whether at the provincial or district level, was the main culprit. Since 1993 there had been over ten conferences on Puer tea (some attached to trade fairs) inside and outside of Yunnan, all sponsored by local authorities. In April 2007 there were three in rapid succession, separately organized by the district governments of Simao, Xishuangbanna, and Lincang. The “welcoming” of the Golden Melon, Simao's name change, several caravan expeditions, the linking of Puer tea to the Götheborg, various celebrity performances, the auction of aged Puer tea, and even the elevation of the tea price were all criticized as deliberate overpackaging of Puer tea by the government. For instance, while the 2005 caravan from Puer successfully finished its trip, and the Puer tea it carried was auctioned at an amazing price in Beijing, the other caravan, setting out from Yiwu in 2006, was considered a failure and an ill-planned repetition. Those in Yiwu who had contributed Puer tea to this caravan were unhappy, because nobody told them where their products had ended up. In fact, due to a shortage of funds this caravan had to pause in Zhejiang (near Shanghai) before heading toward Beijing. While the participants were looking for further funds to continue the trip, their horses were stolen and they had to sell the remaining tea to cover the cost of their transport home. As Huang Bingsheng, the vice head of the Standing Committee of Yunnan Provincial People's Congress, commented, “Good things don't happen more than three times” (haoshi bu guo san). His words reflected a view that success could not be guaranteed, especially when it was based on imitation (CCTV 2008).

  The mass media was also criticized. According to one representative at the “Voices from Yunnan” symposium, exaggerated propaganda by various mass media outlets had been detrimental for Puer tea. He thought it was improper to publicize forest tea's superiority over terrace tea, for instance, or to exaggerate Puer tea's medicinal function. He believed that the price of Puer tea would have gone down if the tea had not been promoted by the media as a stock for speculation.

  When participants in the symposium began to discuss the “stock market value” of Puer tea, I suddenly realized that the meeting room we were in, situated in a wholesale tea market in Kunming, was the actual place where electronic transactions for Puer tea took place. The screen, which that day showed the CCTV 2 report, was normally used to display the latest information about Puer tea, such as the most recent price of a particular tea product. It functioned just like the electronic screen that displays interest rates in a bank.

  Critical commentators said that there were other kinds of “overdone” behavior; they blamed large tea companies that asked for excessive distribution fees and approved inauthentic production, skillful bankers who purposely tricked individual investors, and big traders who were hostile to Yunnan's Puer tea. Individual investors and consumers, who had been too greedy and now encountered bankruptcy, received both blame and some sympathy.

  Professor Di, an expert in microbiology, regarded it as inappropriate that the tea scholars of Yunnan had attempted to extricate Puer tea from the six established categories of Chinese tea. When I interviewed him he said that he thought it would still be better to include Puer tea in the category of dark tea, since they shared many similarities in production procedures, although not all. By way of comparison, he said that people were human beings first, and then could be further classified into certain races. Removing Puer tea from the established classification system, Di said, had isolated it and made it vulnerable to attack. Speaking from experience, he told me that dark tea produced in Hunan and stored for a long time was also drinkable. Therefore, he said that longevity was not a unique feature of Puer tea, but just that it had been overemphasized.

  Some comments I heard in the teahouses echoed Di's point of view. Tea drinkers complained that Puer tea's supporters should not have criticized other teas when promoting Puer tea. This, they said, had violated a rule of advertising and damaged the profitability of other teas. Criticizing the aggressive promotion of Puer tea, many people cited old Chinese sayings, such as: “Tall trees catch much wind” (shu da zhao feng) and “The bird that stands out is easily shot” (qiang da chu tou niao). To them, Puer tea's demise confirmed these commonly held old beliefs. In traditional Chinese philosophy, originating from Daoism and Confucianism and applied in daily life, the top position is dangerous because it is envied and easily attacked by others. This recalls the doctrines that are often suggested to a knight-errant wandering in the risky jianghu: he should not show off too much; he should hide his real thoughts and look humble even if he is a skilled martial artist, lest he attract too much attention and suffer from his distinction. When people reflected that Puer tea had been overspeculated, overpropagandized, and inappropriately redefined, they were suggesting that Puer tea had failed to obey a basic Chinese concept and was therefore attacked.

  Some also held the opposite opinion: that Puer tea hadn't been cooked enough and was still too raw. At the “Voices from Yunnan” symposium, a special guest from Beijing appeared, wearing sunglasses. He had never shown his face to the public, but his name, Wang Hai, was famous. He was known as “the pioneer of cracking down on counterfeits in China” (zhongguo da jia di yi ren). According to him, the report by the central media was true, and the crisis lay in the unclear value of Puer tea. He raised a series of questions: Was Puer tea a beverage or a medicinal tonic? Was it really a “drinkable antique”? What was fake and what was authentic? How could the exact age of a cake of Puer tea be known? Why didn't people report it when they chanced upon the production of fake tea? Was there a clear and scientific regulation to supervise all of these issues? He hinted that the answer to all the questions was “uncertain.” As everyone knew, these problems had been neither solved nor addressed by the authorities, the tea researchers, the tea companies and traders, or the consumers. As a result, identification of Puer tea usually depended upon individual experience.

  Wang Hai's speech and other similar statements called for clearer and stronger regulations on Puer tea. Likewise, the propaganda sponsored by the state and implemented by the mass media was thought to be insufficient; the publicity promoting Puer tea, according to some commentators, hadn't been related well to the “authentic” culture of Yunnan and hadn't sufficiently shown the contributions of multiple ethnic minorities; and it was not that Yunnan had produced excessive tea but that the market didn't have enough authentic Puer tea.

  These points of view, regarding “inadequacy” and “rawness,” actually responded to the “overcooked” argument in another way. They reflected the fact that the output of Puer tea and cultural packaging around it was increasing in quantity, but that not many of these products were authentic. They highlighted the importance of quality rather than quantity. When quality was bad, quantity was a waste. They implied that Puer tea had been overcooked as well as too raw, and they asked for a proper method to accurately identify the quality of Puer tea.

  In fact, appeals for accuracy and more powerful regulation had been made even before the Puer tea recession, but they had never been successful. For example, at the laboratory of a professor in an agricultural univer
sity, I was told that a scientific method was being developed to shape a specific flavor for Puer tea. This professor proposed “digitizing Puer tea” in order to artificially and quantitatively control the process of Puer tea production. However, there was great opposition to the development of such a scientific approach. At many teahouses, I heard traders and consumers saying that the charm of Puer tea lay in its endless variation; you never knew what a particular piece of Puer tea would taste like, and any attempt to fix or “digitize” it would be useless. A tea trader from Hong Kong responded sharply, telling me that he believed a quantitative method for establishing Puer tea's authenticity could be developed, “but then, you can imagine how boring the process of appreciating and distinguishing tea would become!” This man is considered a “super” tea expert. He tastes many tea samples each day to make decisions for his business. He told me that he tasted so much tea that, one time, he experienced stomach pain and had to go to the hospital for an injection. After recovering, he paid more careful attention to how much he drank but still continued to enjoy his own sensory tasting.

  In Xishuangbanna, a local governmental official told me that he wished the origin of tea material could be ascertained from the textural characteristic of the tea leaf, like the method used in police investigations to trace somebody's footprint or handprint. In this way, he said, people could identify whether the tea material was from Yiwu or Menghai, and whether it was made of forest tea or terrace tea. This idea was opposed, too. The opponents were not concerned about whether such a “scientific” method could actually work in technical terms, but they worried about whether it could be successfully implemented, as exemplified by the comments of another local official. This official expressed his concern very directly to me: “Even if there were a way to tell where tea material had originated, I think after all it would be up to the key person involved to divulge where it was from.”