DemocracyThe God That Failed

by Hans-Hermann Hoppe

  15On the history of the libertarian movement see Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America; Gottfried, The Conservative Movement; Raimondo, Reclaiming the American Right; for an interesting insider account of the early stages in the movement's development see Jerome Tuccille, It Usually Begins with Ayn Rand (San Francisco: Fox and Wilkes, [1972] 1997).

  16See Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press, [1982] 1997); idem, For A New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto (New York: Collier, [1973] 1978); idem, Power and Market: Government and the Economy (Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, [1970] 1977); idem, Man, Economy, and State (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, [1962] 1993); idem, Economic Thought Before Adam Smith (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1995); idem, Classical Economics (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1995).

  I do not want to further analyze or defend the libertarian theory of justice at this point. Let me only confess that I believe the theory to be true, indeed to be irrefutably true.17 Rather, I want to turn to the question of the relationship between libertarianism and conservatism (the belief in a natural social order based and centered on families). Some superficial commentators, mostly from the conservative side, such as Russell Kirk, have characterized libertarianism and conservatism as incompatible, hostile, or even antagonistic ideologies.18 In fact, this view is entirely mistaken. The relationship between libertarianism and conservatism is one of praxeological compatibility, sociological complementarity, and reciprocal reinforcement.

  17See Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty; Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property (Boston: Kluwer, 1993). Briefly, two central arguments have been advanced in defense of this claim. The first, initially outlined by Rothbard, proceeds via an argumentuma contrario. If, contrary to the principle of first or original appropriation, a person A were not considered the owner of his visibly (demonstrably, and intersubjectively ascertainably) appropriated body and the standing room and places originally (prior to everyone else) appropriated through him by means of his body, then only two alternative arrangements exist. Either another later-coming person B must be recognized as the owner of A's body and the places originally appropriated by A, or both Aand B must be considered equal co-owners of all bodies and places. (The third conceivable alternative, that no one should own any body and originally appropriated place, can be ruled out as an impossibility. Acting requires a body and standing room and we cannot not act; hence, to adopt this alternative would imply the instant death of all of mankind.) In the first case, A would be reduced to the rank of B's slave and subject of exploitation. B is the owner of the body and places originally appropriated by A, but A in turn is not the owner of the body and places so appropriated by B. Under this ruling, two categorically distinct classes of persons are constituted: slaves or Untermenschen such as A and masters or Ubermenschen such as B, to whom different "laws" apply. Hence, while such a ruling is certainly possible, it must be discarded from the outset as a human ethic, equally and universally applicable for everyone qua human being (rational animal). For a rule to aspire to the rank of a law—a just rule—it is necessary that it apply equally and universally to everyone. The rule under consideration manifestly does not fulfill this universalization requirement. Alternatively, in the second case of universal and equal co-ownership the universalization requirement is apparently fulfilled. However, this alternative suffers from another, even more severe deficiency, because if it were adopted all of mankind would perish immediately, for every action of a person requires the use of scarce means (at least his body and its standing room). However, if all goods were co-owned by everyone, then no one at any time or place would be allowed to do anything unless he had previously secured everyone else's consent to do so. Yet how could anyone grant such consent if he were not the exclusive owner of his own body (including its vocal chords) by means of which this consent would be expressed? Indeed, he would first need others' consent in order to be allowed to express his own, but these others could not give their consent without first having his, etc. Thus, only the first alternative—the principle of original appropriation—is left. It fulfills the universalization requirement and it is praxeologically possible.

  The second argument, first advanced by this author and yielding essentially the same conclusion, has the form of an impossibility theorem. The theorem proceeds from a logical reconstruction of the necessary conditions—Bedingungen der Moglichkeit—of ethical problems and an exact definition and delineation of the purpose of ethics. First, for ethical problems to arise conflict between separate and independent agents must exist (or must at least be possible); and a conflict can only emerge in turn with respect to scarce means or "economic" goods. A conflict is possible neither with respect to superabundant or "free" goods such as, under normal circumstances, the air that we breathe, nor with respect to scarce but non-appropriable goods such as the sun or the clouds, i.e., the "conditions," rather than the "means," of human action). Conflict is possible only with respect to controllable ("appropriable") means such as a specific piece of land, tree or cave situated in a specific and unique spatio-temporal relation vis-a-vis the sun and/or the rain clouds. Hence, the task of ethics is to propose rules regarding the "proper" versus the "improper" use of scarce means. That is, ethics concerns the assignment of rights of exclusive control over scarce goods, i.e., property rights, in order to rule out conflict. Conflict, however, is not a sufficient prerequisite for ethical problems, for one can come into conflict also with a gorilla or a mosquito, for instance, yet such conflicts do not give rise to ethical problems. Gorillas and mosquitoes pose merely a technical problem. We must learn how to successfully manage and control the movements of gorillas and mosquitoes just as we must learn to manage and control the inanimate objects of our environment. Only if both parties to a conflict are capable of prepositional exchange, i.e., argumentation, can one speak of an ethical problem; that is, only if the gorilla and/or the mosquito could, in principle, pause in their conflictuous activity and express "yes" or "no," i.e., present an argument, would one owe them an answer. The impossibility theorem proceeds from this proposition in clarifying, first, its axiomatic status. No one can deny, without falling into performative contradictions, that the common rationality as displayed by the ability to engage in propositional exchange constitutes a necessary condition for ethical problems because this denial would itself have to be presented in the form of a proposition. Even an ethical relativist who admits the existence of ethical questions, but denies that there are any valid answers, cannot deny the validity of this proposition (which accordingly has been referred to also as the "a priori of argumentation"). Second, it is pointed out that everything that must be presupposed by argumentation cannot in turn be argumentatively disputed without getting entangled in a performative contradiction, and that among such presuppositions there exist not only logical ones, such as the laws of propositional logic (e.g., the law of identity), but also praxeological ones. Argumentation is not just free-floating propositions but always involves also at least two distinct arguers, a proponent and an opponent, i.e., argumentation is a subcategory of human action. Third, it is then shown that the mutual recognition of the principle of original appropriation, by both proponent and opponent, constitutes the praxeological presupposition of argumentation. No one can propose anything and expect his opponent to convince himself of the validity of this proposition or else deny it and propose something else unless his and his opponent's right to exclusive control over their "own" originally appropriated body (brain, vocal chords, etc.) and its respective standing room were already presupposed and assumed as valid. Finally, if the recognition of the principle of original appropriation forms the praxeological presupposition of argumentation, then it is impossible to provide a propositional justification for any other ethical principle without running thereby into performative contradictions.

  In order to explain this, let me first point out that most, though not all, leading libertarian thi
nkers were, as a matter of empirical fact, socialcultural conservatives: defenders of traditional, bourgeois morals and manners. Most notably, Murray Rothbard, the single most important and influential libertarian thinker, was an outspoken cultural conservative. So was Rothbard's most important teacher, Ludwig von Mises. (Ayn Rand, another major influence on contemporary libertarianism, is a different matter, of course.)19 While this does not prove much (it does prove only that libertarianism and conservatism can be psychologically reconciled), it is indicative of a substantive affinity between the two doctrines. It is not difficult to recognize that the conservative and the libertarian views of society are perfectly compatible (congruent). To be sure, their methods are distinctly different. One is (or appears to be) empiristic, sociological, and descriptive, and the other rationalistic, philosophical, logical, and constructivist. This difference notwithstanding, both agree in one fundamental respect, however. Conservatives are convinced that the "natural" and "normal" is old and widespread (and thus can be discerned always and everywhere). Similarly, libertarians are convinced that the principles of justice are eternally and universally valid (and hence, must have been essentially known to mankind since its very beginnings). That is, the libertarian ethic is not new and revolutionary, but old and conservative. Even primitives and children are capable of grasping the validity of the principle of original appropriation, and most people usually recognize it as an unquestionable matter of fact.

  18See Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind (Chicago: Regnery, 1953); idem, A Program for Conservatives (Chicago: Regnery, 1955).

  19On Rothbard see the contributions to Murray N. Rothbard: In Memoriam, Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1995), especially the contribution by Joseph T. Salerno; on Mises see Murray N. Rothbard, Ludwig von Mises: Scholar, Creator, Hero (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1988); Jeff rey A. Tucker and Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., "The Cultural Thought of Ludwig von Mises," Journal of Libertarian Studies 10, no. 1 (1991); on Rand see Tuccille, It Usually Begins with Ayn Rand; Murray N. Rothbard, The Sociology of the Ayn Rand Cult (Burlingame, Calif.: Center for Libertarian Studies, [1972] 1990), and from the Randian side Barbara Branden, The Passion of Ayn Rand (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1986).

  Moreover, as far as the object on which conservatives and libertarians focus is concerned—on the one hand families, kinship relations, communities, authority and social hierarchy, and on the other hand property and its appropriation, transformation and transfer—it should be clear that while they do not refer to identical entities, they still speak about different aspects of one and the same object: human actors and social cooperation. Extensively, that is, their realm of inquiry (frame of reference) is identical. Families, authority, communities, and social ranks are the empirical-sociological concretization of the abstract philosophical-praxeological categories and concepts of property, production, exchange, and contract. Property and property relations do not exist apart from families and kinship relations. The latter shape and determine the specific form and configuration of property and property relations, while they are at the same time constrained by the universal and eternal laws of scarcity and property. In fact, as we have already seen, families considered normal by conservative standards are household families, and the family disintegration and moral and cultural decay which contemporary conservatives deplore is largely the result of the erosion and destruction of households (estates) as the economic basis of families by the modern welfare state. Thus, the libertarian theory of justice can actually provide conservatism with a more precise definition and a more rigorous moral defense of its own end (the return to civilization in the form of moral and cultural normalcy) than conservatism itself could ever offer. In doing so it can further sharpen and strengthen conservatism's traditional antistatist outlook.20

  IV

  While the intellectual creators of modern libertarianism were cultural conservatives, and while the libertarian doctrine is fully compatible and congruent with the conservative worldview (and does not, as some conservative critics claim, entail an "atomistic individualism" and "acquisitive egoism"), corrupted by the modern welfare state the libertarian movement has undergone a significant transformation. To a large extent (and completely so in the eyes of the media and the public), it has become a movement that combines radical antistatism and market economics with cultural leftism, counter and multiculturalism, and personal hedonism; that is, it is the exact opposite of the Buchananite program of culturally conservative socialism: countercultural capitalism.

  Earlier it was noted that the Buchananite program of social(ist) nationalism does not seem to have much mass appeal, at least not in the United States. This is true to an even larger extent for the libertarian attempt to synthesize market economics with counter- and multiculturalism. Yet as was the case with conservatism before, in this case, too, my central concern is not about mass appeal and whether or not certain ideas can be psychologically combined and integrated, but whether or not these ideas can be combined practically and effectively. It is my plan to show that they cannot, and that much of contemporary libertarianism is false, counterproductive libertarianism (much like Buchanan's conservatism is false and counterproductive).

  That much of modern libertarianism is culturally leftist is not due to any such leanings among the major libertarian theoreticians. As noted, they were for the most part cultural conservatives. Rather, it was the result of a superficial understanding of the libertarian doctrine by many of its fans and followers, and this ignorance has its explanation in a historical coincidence and the mentioned tendency, inherent in the social-democratic welfare state, of promoting a process of intellectual and emotional infantilization (decivilization of society).

  20On the relationship between (traditionalist) conservatism and (rationalist) libertarianism see Ralph Raico, "The Fusionists on Liberalism and Tradition," New Individualist Review 3, no. 3 (1964); M. Stanton Evans, "Raico on Liberalism and Religion," New Individualist Review 4, no. 2 (1966); Ralph Raico, "Reply to Mr. Evans," ibidem; also Freedom and Virtue: The Conservative-Libertarian Debate, George W. Carey, ed. (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1984).

  The beginnings of the modern libertarian movement in the United States go back to the mid-1960s. In 1971 the Libertarian party was founded, and in 1972 the philosopher John Hospers was nominated as its first presidential candidate. It was the time of the Vietnam War. Simultaneously, promoted by the major "advances" in the growth of the welfare state from the early and mid-1960s onward in the United States and similarly in Western Europe (the so-called civil rights legislation and the war on poverty), a new mass-phenomenon emerged. A new "Lumpenproletariat" of intellectuals and intellectualized youths—the products of an ever expanding system of socialist (public) education—"alienated" from mainstream "bourgeois" morals and culture (while living far more comfortably than the Lumpenproletariat of old off the wealth created by this mainstream culture) arose. Multiculturalism and cultural relativism (live and let live) and egalitarian antiauthoritarianism (respect no authority) were elevated from temporary and transitory phases in mental development (adolescence) to permanent attitudes among grown-up intellectuals and their students.

  The principled opposition of the libertarians to the Vietnam War coincided with the somewhat diffuse opposition to the war by the New Left. In addition, the anarchistic upshot of the libertarian doctrine appealed to the countercultural left.21 For did not the illegitimacy of the state and the nonaggression axiom (that one shall not initiate or threaten to initiate physical force against others and their property) imply that everyone was at liberty to choose his very own nonaggressive lifestyle? Did this not imply that vulgarity, obscenity, profanity, drug use, promiscuity, pornography, prostitution, homosexuality, polygamy, pedophilia or any other conceivable perversity or abnormality, insofar as they were victimless crimes, were no offenses at all but perfectly normal and legitimate activities and lifestyles? Not surprisingly, then, from the outse
t the libertarian movement attracted an unusually high number of abnormal and perverse followers. Subsequently, the countercultural ambiance and multicultural-relativistic "tolerance" of the libertarian movement attracted even greater numbers of misfits, personal or professional failures, or plain losers. Murray Rothbard, in disgust, called them the "nihilo-libertarians" and identified them as the "modal" (typical and representative) libertarians. They fantasized of a society where everyone would be free to choose and cultivate whatever nonaggressive lifestyle, career, or character he wanted, and where, as a result of free-market economics, everyone could do so on an elevated level of general prosperity. Ironically, the movement that had set out to dismantle the state and restore private property and market economics was largely appropriated, and its appearance shaped, by the mental and emotional products of the welfare state: the new class of permanent adolescents.22

  21While ultimately judged a failure by most of its former protagonists, the alliance between the fledgling libertarian movement and the New Left during the midand late-1960s can be understood as motivated by two considerations. On the one hand, by the mid-1960s American conservatism was almost completely dominated by William Buckley and his National Review. In contrast to the decidedly anti-interventionist (isolationist) conservatism of the Old Right, the "new conservatism" espoused by Buckley and the National Review and represented most visibly by the 1964 Republican presidential candidate, Barry Goldwater, was an ardently pro-war, pro-militaristic, and even imperialist movement. Based on this, any form of libertarian-conservative alliance had to be judged as simply out of the question. On the other hand, when the New Left began to emerge around 1965, it appeared far more libertarian on crucial issues than the conservatives for two reasons later summarized by Rothbard: