Ultimatum

by Antony Trew

  Kahn exhaled a cloud of blue smoke. He was enjoying this. ‘A girl. El Ka’ed’s girl. Salamander learnt about her last night. We didn’t know he had a girl friend. She lives up at Baabda in the hills outside Beirut. In her parents’ penthouse in the Miramar apartment block. Father’s a wealthy merchant. He and her mother are on a world cruise. Georgette has a phone.’ He leant forward, his eyes bright. ‘Salamander’s going to bug it. Today.’

  Ruth Meyer said, ‘I may be dumb but how’s that going to help in the forty-five hours we’ve got left?’

  Kahn shook his head in mock despair. ‘Ruth, don’t you know about love? Odds are Ka’ed phones her or she him every day. Salamander listens. Finds out where Ka’ed is. Then, maybe, we chip in on his exchanges with Barakat in London. We learn, maybe, where the nuke is. We don’t get anything if we don’t try. It’s the rule of the game. So we never stop trying.’

  She said, ‘Sorry, Jakob. But I think we have a better chance in Spender Street listening to the Mocal chat. Any minute now Shalom reckons they’ll give us a lead.’

  ‘Maybe Shalom’s right. Maybe we are. If we put an ear on Ka’ed’s girl there’s always a chance of a dividend.’

  ‘Hope you’re right, Jakob. What’s Knesset policy if we find the nuke?’

  ‘They haven’t discussed it. Maybe they won’t. Depends on the PM. I can tell you Cabinet policy. For the time being we don’t tell the Brits or anyone else anything. We’ve got to find that nuke ourselves. So far we’ve made all the play. We’ve found Mocal and we’ve got them under surveillance. We’re way ahead of the Brits, even if they’re really trying, which maybe they’re not. We’re not sure of them or the US. We reckon this thing may have been set up as a screen for a deal. You know. The Brits and the US regret that under pressure of the nuclear threat they had no option but – of course with the greatest reluctance and tears in their eyes – to sell Israel down the river in exchange for Arab goodwill which interprets as Arab oil. If we find that nuke – and our chances of doing that don’t look too bad right now – we bargain from a position of strength. There won’t be any selling of Israel down the river then, I can assure you.’

  ‘I can’t fault that,’ said Ruth. ‘Our reaction last night in Palace Green was along the same lines.’

  Kahn’s cheroot moved in small circles of approval. ‘You know, Ruth, ours is an intelligent race. It has to be to survive.’

  Going down in the lift after they’d left Kahn she said, ‘Salamander’s a code name, isn’t it?’

  ‘Of course,’ said Mordecai.

  ‘Do I know him?’

  ‘No, you don’t. And if you did I wouldn’t tell you.’

  ‘Sorry. I shouldn’t have asked.’

  ‘You know the rule. The more you know, the more you blow. Doing anything tonight?’

  She looked at him quizzically. ‘I’d like to phone the family in Galilee.’

  ‘Sorry. We don’t want them to know you’re here.’

  ‘In that case I’m not doing anything.’

  ‘Come and have something to eat with us. Lea would like to see you. I’ll drive you back in the moonlight.’

  ‘Thanks, Bar. I’ll come. But no stopping in the moonlight.’

  He laughed and she thought of Shalom Ascher and was sad.

  The man in blue overalls sitting in the small telephone department van enjoying the afternoon sunshine saw from his watch that it was five minutes to four. His was one of several vehicles parked beneath a clump of pines in a lay-by high up on the road which climbed the hill to Baabda. The stone-parapeted lay-by was a vantage point overlooking the whole spread of Beirut including the coastline from Jeideideh in the north to Shuneifat in the south. Beneath him, to his right, he could see the Miramar apartment block. He knew she was there because he’d phoned earlier. She’d answered and he’d said it was the telephone department. Defects in the automatic exchange. She said there was nothing wrong with her phone. He said the fault was in the exchange, not at the subscriber’s end. The relays on a number of lines in the Baabda area were, he explained, giving trouble on the board. Not releasing automatically when the handsets were replaced. Something to do with humidity. This meant that her calls could be overheard by other subscribers if the relays at the switchboard end of their lines were also defective.

  She expressed concern and hoped the fault would soon be rectified. He told her he would be working on the Baabda lines all day and would be calling at the Miramar apartment. She said she would be going into Beirut that afternoon at about four o’clock but would tell her servant to expect him if he’d not called by then.

  Soon after four he saw her come out of the front door of the Miramar and go to the garage space under the building. Minutes later she backed a red Alfa into the driveway, turned and made off down the hill. He waited ten minutes then drove the van down to the apartment block and parked in the driveway. He lifted out a satchel of tools, went into the building and took the elevator to the penthouse. An Arab man-servant opened the door in response to his ring.

  ‘Telephone department,’ said the man in blue overalls. ‘Is the occupier in?’

  ‘No. Madame has gone into Beirut. She told me you would be coming to fix the phone.’

  He went in, saw the instrument on a table in the hall. ‘Are there any extensions?’

  ‘Yes,’ said the servant. ‘There is one in the master bedroom.’

  ‘Show it to me.’ The telephone man was small and unimpressive but he spoke with the authority of minor officialdom. The servant took him to the master bedroom, showed him the phone on the bedside table. They went back into the hall together.

  ‘Good,’ said the telephone man. ‘I’ll start on this one.’ He opened the tool satchel, took out pliers and a screwdriver, lifted the handset, unscrewed the mouth and ear pieces. Within fifteen minutes he’d checked both handsets, carried out two imaginary conversations in Arabic with the faults supervisor at the central automatic exchange, re-packed the satchel and returned to the van.

  The servant had watched him at first, then lost interest and disappeared. A Jordanian himself, he’d concluded from the telephone man’s accent and light skin that he was Lebanese. The Jordanians didn’t much care for the Lebanese. Not that he would have seen the telephone man insert the ELX-Mk II Busch micro-transmitters in the handsets before replacing the mouth pieces. They were about half the size of the nail of an elegant woman’s little finger and easily concealed.

  Back at the van the man in the blue overalls put the satchel into the boot and drove up the hill to the lay-by under the pines. Several cars were already there and he parked well clear of them. He estimated that he was no more than two hundred metres from the penthouse, though the distance by road was a good deal greater.

  For some time he sat eating sandwiches, pretending to read a newspaper but watching the road beneath him. The Alfa would have to come up that way.

  The sun set a few minutes after five o’clock. Twilight would end an hour later. At five-thirty he switched on the van’s radio. From it a concealed output fed a recorder in the dash-box. That, too, he switched on. The recorder had a four-hour cassette and there were others beneath the driving seat. Ten minutes later, through a gap in the pines, he saw the Alfa coming up the hill in the gathering dusk.

  18

  By eight o’clock on the night of Tuesday, November 9th, it was evident to members of the ad hoc Committee that little progress had been made in the first thirty-two hours of the ultimatum. This was not for want of action. A great deal had been and was being done but the results were singularly disappointing.

  The Home Secretary reported that, notwithstanding searches taking place on an unprecedented scale, nothing positive had yet emerged. Promising leads had been pursued with energy but without avail. He apologized for the negative nature of his report, expressing the hope that the next twelve hours might bring results.

  The DGSS and the Head of Special Branch reported in more detail but in much the same vein.

&nbs
p; Sir Brian Parkes, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, said the appeal to the public for information had brought a flood of telephone calls, letters and callers. A large staff, reinforced by Army units, was dealing with these and useful leads were acted on immediately. So far nothing positive had emerged.

  The Chairman of the Port of London Authority said that the systematic search of shipping in the London Docks and other parts of the Thames was proceeding well, the PLA’s resources having been considerably augmented by RN personnel, patrol craft, launches and divers. So far the search had not produced anything, nor had the scrutiny of cargo manifests, bills of lading, passenger lists and customs and immigration records. But the task was far from complete and he, too, hoped the action being taken might bear fruit before long.

  The Home Secretary said that searches of the same sort at other major ports had yielded nothing so far.

  The Director of Civil Aviation, co-opted to the Committee, gave details of the search at airports, the checking of passenger/freight records and customs and immigration entries. But here, too, he said nothing worth while had eventuated.

  The Defence Secretary, reported on the steps being taken in the Ministry of Defence to deal with the situation which would arise if the warhead were detonated.

  Contingency planning for this, in consultation with the GLC, the London Fire Brigade, Scotland Yard, the Port of London Authority, the Metropolitan Hospital Board, the London Transport Board, British Rail and other authorities was, he said, well advanced. Much of it was standard procedure already laid down in the MOD’s anti-nuclear defence measures for the Metropolitan area.

  Sir Brian Wallace, Chairman of the GLC, commenting on public reaction, observed that the morale of Londoners remained remarkably high. He attributed this to the Prime Minister’s assurance that the threat to London would not be allowed to develop. This had been interpreted by the media as an admission that the Government, with the support of the United States, would accept the terms of the ultimatum unless the warhead was found and in some way neutralized within the time limit of seventy-two hours. With small exceptions the media had, he said, behaved well. There had been no panic, no interruption of the normal life of the metropolis, other than a certain measure of inconvenience arising from search operations. In these public co-operation had been admirable, notwithstanding the absence of search warrants.

  He admitted and regretted that people were leaving London in greater numbers than usual for the time of year. It appeared that most of those concerned were in the higher income brackets.

  At this juncture the Foreign Secretary was heard to remark in an aside to the Home Secretary, ‘That’s always been the jittery lot.’

  There was, continued the Chairman of the GLC, a considerable demand for hotel accommodation in the provinces, in Scotland and Wales, and in France and the Low Countries.

  ‘Foreign Secretary,’ said the Prime Minister, ‘may we hear from you?’

  The Foreign Secretary adjusted his glasses, looked at the faces round the table and shuffled his notes. ‘This morning I concluded discussions with our Ambassadors from the Middle East. They return to their posts today fully briefed on the task now confronting them. I have in the last twelve hours been in touch with the ambassadors and foreign secretaries of France, West Germany and Italy, and the secretaries-general of UNO and NATO.

  ‘There is agreement among them on the diplomatic strategy to be pursued in the time available. These countries, and soon I hope UNO and NATO, will exert diplomatic pressure upon the Arab states – including the PLO – to persuade those responsible to extend the time limit of the ultimatum and to meet representatives of the United States and United Kingdom to discuss and negotiate its terms.

  ‘The French and Germans – and of course ourselves – are hopeful that the United States will persuade Israel to announce immediate and meaningful territorial concessions. Not necessarily to the extent set out in the ultimatum but enough to make Soukour-al-Sahra’ feel they have in the main achieved their objective. If this sounds like capitulation let me remind you of two facts – somewhere in London at this moment there is a nuclear warhead to be detonated at noon on Thursday, November 11th – that is in forty hours – unless we accept the terms of the ultimatum. That is one fact. The other is that the Palestinians – and by that I mean the whole Palestine Liberation movement and not the gang of thugs behind this ultimatum – have a claim which the world regards as morally justifiable. They are and long have been a stateless, homeless people, and for that the United Kingdom must accept some measure of responsibility.

  ‘This afternoon I was also in touch with the Israeli Ambassador and Foreign Secretary. I’m sorry to say their attitude is predictably tough and unyielding. Their Foreign Secretary believes that this is a bluff. That the SAS will not risk detonation. Firstly, because to do so would make a nonsense of their objective, and secondly because the warhead is their most powerful bargaining weapon. With it they are a force to be reckoned with, even by powerful nations. Without it they are no more than a nuisance. They will not, he believes, destroy that weapon.

  ‘It is the Israeli view that if we make no move to meet the ultimatum’s demands, the Soukour-al-Sahra’ will – towards the end of the seventy-two hour period – offer to negotiate. The Israelis may be right. They are in a position to gamble with the fate of London. We are not.’

  The Defence Secretary said, ‘May I, Prime Minister, come in again?’

  ‘Please do.’

  ‘It does not require much imagination to understand the situation in which the Israelis find themselves. The Foreign Secretary says they are ready to gamble with the fate of London. Are we not, Prime Minister, ready to gamble with the fate of Israel? Seen as a moral issue, I doubt if there is much difference. Seen as a diplomatic one, of course there is. Nevertheless, I would not like us to fall into the easy but entirely false position of regarding Israel as the guilty party, and not the terrorists.’

  The Chief of the General Staff intervened to say that the Committee seemed already to have accepted that the issue was a clear-cut one between acceptance and rejection. ‘With respect, I suggest it is not. There is an area of manoeuvre between these two extremes. We may still find the warhead. I would remind the Committee that, if we do, there is more than a fair chance of rendering it safe if we use the resources available to us.

  ‘I agree with the Israeli view that Soukour-al-Sahra’ are unlikely to risk detonation. Our task is to find the warhead. Should we succeed, we will not be powerless even if they do intend to detonate on the expiry of the time limit. It is to be detonated by means of a pre-set timing device. In other words, the terrorists will leave the warhead before it is due to explode. We must assume they will give themselves sufficient time to get well clear of London. Say an hour or two. During that time our boffins can go in and make the warhead safe.’

  The Prime Minister’s face showed clearly enough his disagreement with the CGS’s contribution which he proceeded to ignore. ‘I must now inform you,’ he said, ‘of my talk by hot-line with the President of the United States. In doing so I shall refer also to his discussions with the Chairman of the Soviet Union.

  ‘I spoke to the President at six o’clock this evening. This was our second talk, for I had been in touch with him at midday. In the intervening period he’d had an opportunity for in-depth consultations with his advisers, particularly with Dr Kissinger and the Chairman of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee. The President’s views have changed. He now suggests we ignore the ultimatum altogether, but take certain other action without delay. He thinks our search programme should be abandoned or, at most, carried forward with a low profile. He considers the risk of pre-detonation to be as real as it is unacceptable.

  ‘That is the negative side of his policy. More positively he suggests that both Britain and the United States should issue communiqués announcing their determination to secure the early establishment of an independent Palestine. The communiqués should, he argu
es, ignore the ultimatum.

  ‘If this is done the Soukour-al-Sahra’ will, he believes, have the carpet pulled from under their feet. To proceed with their threat once such communiqués have been issued – in the form and with the guarantees the President has in mind – would destroy the chances of an independent Palestine at the very moment of its birth. This is something Ka’ed would certainly not want to do.

  ‘He went on to make it clear that it would well suit United States diplomacy at this juncture – he is much influenced by the US débacles in Vietnam, Cyprus and Turkey, and is bent on doing something to restore the prestige of the United States – as I was saying, it would well suit US policy if the present situation could be used as a valid reason for acceding to the Arabs’ long-standing demand for the return of the conquered territories and the establishment of an independent Palestine.

  ‘In the President’s view world opinion would accept that the demands themselves were morally well-founded, though the methods of the SAS were abhorrent. I find myself in agreement with his view that, since the October War, world opinion has swung in favour of the Arabs. It is now generally recognized that the balance of power in the Middle East lies with them, and there is a growing feeling that Israel should return the conquered territories – or a substantial part of them – since, only in that way, can the heat be taken out of the Middle East situation.

  ‘The President felt that these considerations would effectively counter accusations by Israel that we have, to use his phrase, “sold her down the river”. He had, he said, sounded out the Soviet Chairman on this strategy in the course of a hot-line conversation this afternoon. Not surprisingly Mr Brezhnev assured him that the Soviet Union regarded such a course of action as sensible and indeed inevitable. The Soviet Chairman stressed that, but for Israeli intransigence over the return of the conquered territories, peace in the Middle East would long since have been restored.