Works of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

  How vividly returns to me — your pardon, reader! — the first time I read “The Sorrows of Werter” in that little “Three-penny” edition published by Messrs. Cassell! It was in a Barge, towed by three Horses, on the River, between Langport and Bridgewater, in the County of Somerset! The majority of the company were as rowdy a set of good-humored Bean-Feasters as ever drank thin beer in a ramshackle tavern. But there was one of them — this is twenty-five years ago, reader! — a girl as fragile as a peeled Willow-wand — and teased by the rude badinage of our companions we sheltered — as the friendly mists rose — under a great Tarpaulin at the barge’s stern. Where is that girl now, I wonder? Is she alive? Will she ever blush with anger at being thus gently lifted up, from beneath the kind Somersetshire mists, into an hour’s publicity? Who can tell? We are all passing one another, in mist-darkened barges, swift or slow. She is a wraith, a shadow, a receding phantom; but I wave my hand to her over the years! I shall always associate her with Lotte; and I never smell the peculiar smell of Tarpaulin without thinking of “the Sorrows of Werter.”

  “Werter” has certainly the very droop and bewilderment of youth’s first passion. It is good to plunge one’s hands, when one has grown cynical and old, into that innocent, if somewhat turbid, fountain. When we pass to “Wilhelm Meister,” we are in quite a different world. The earlier part of this book has the very stamp of the Goethean “truth and poetry.” One can read it side by side with the great “Autobiography” and find the shrewd insight and oracular wisdom quite equally convincing in the invention and the reality. What an unmistakable and unique character all these imaginary persons of Goethe’s stories have! They are so different from any other persons in fiction! Wherein does the difference lie? It is hard to say. In a sense, they are more life-like and real. In another sense, they are more fantastic. Sometimes they seem mere dolls — like the figures in his own puppet-show — and we can literally “see the puppets dallying.”

  Jarno is a queer companion for a man to have. And what of the lady who, when she was asked whether she had ever loved, answered, “never or always”? Phillina is a very loving and an extremely vivacious wench. Goethe’s sublime unconsciousness of ordinary moral qualms is never better observed than in the story of this extravagant young minx. Then, in the midst of it all, the arresting, ambiguous little figure of poor Mignon! What does she do — a child of pure lyrical poetry — a thing out of the old ballads — in this queer, grave, indecent company? That elaborate description of Mignon’s funeral so carefully arranged by the Aesthetic “Uncle,” has it not all the curious qualities of the Goethean vein — its clairvoyant insight into the under-truth of Nature — its cold-blooded pre-occupation with “Art” — its gentle irony — its mania for exact detail? The “gentle irony” of which I speak has its opportunity in the account of the “Beautiful Soul” or “Fair Saint.” It reads, in places, like the tender dissection of a lovely corpse by a genial, elderly Doctor.

  But the passage which, for me, is most precious is that Apprentice’s “Indenture.” I suppose in no other single paragraph of human prose is there so much concentrated wisdom. “To act is easy — to think is hard!” How extraordinarily true that is! But it is not the precise tune of the strenuous preachers of our time! The whole idea of the “Pedagogic Province,” ruled over by that admirable Abbé, is so exquisitely in Goethe’s most wise and yet most simple manner! The passage about the “Three Reverences” and the “Creed” is as good an instance of that sublime Spinozistic way of dealing with the current religion as that amazing remark he made once to Eckerman about his own faith: “When I want scientific unity, I am a Pantheist. When I desire poetical multifariousness, I am a Polytheist. And when my moral nature requires a Personal God — there is room for That also?”

  When one comes to speak of Faust, it is necessary for us to remember the words the great man himself used to his follower in speaking of this masterpiece. Eckermann teased him for interpretations. “What,” said he to Goethe, “is the leading Idea in the Poem?” “Do you suppose,” answered the Sage, “that a thing into which I have put the Life-Blood of all my days is able to be summoned up in anything so narrow and limited as an Idea?”

  Personally, I do not hesitate to say that I think Faust is the most permanently interesting of all the works that have proceeded from the human brain.

  Its attitude to life is one which ultimately has more to strengthen and sustain and put courage — if not the Devil — into us than anything I know. When I meet a man who shall tell me that the Philosophy of his life is the Philosophy of Faust, I bow down humbly before him. I did meet such a man once. I think he was a Commercial Traveller from Buffalo.

  How wisely Goethe deals in Faust with the problem — if it be a problem — of Evil! His suggestion seems to be that the spirit of Evil in the world — “part of that Nothing out of which came the All” — plays an absolutely essential role. “By means of it God fulfils his most cherished purposes.” Had Faust not seduced poor little Gretchen, he would never have passed as far as he did along the road of Initiation, and the spirit of his Victim — in her translunar Apotheosis — would not have been there to lift him Heavenwards at the last. And yet no one could say that Goethe disparages the enormity of Faust’s crime. That ineffable retort of Mephistopheles, when, on those “black horses,” they are whirled through the night to her dungeon, “She is not the first,” has the essence of all pity and wrath in its cruel sting. Mephistopheles himself is the most interesting of all Devils. And he is so because, although he knows perfectly well — queer Son of Chaos as he is — that he is bound to be defeated, he yet goes on upon his evil way, and continues to resist the great stream of Life which, according to his view, had better never have broken loose from primeval Nothingness.

  That is ultimately Goethe’s contribution to the disputes about what we call “God.” The name does not matter. “Feeling is all in all. The name is sound and smoke.” “God,” or “the Good,” is to Goethe simply the eternal stream of life, working slowly upwards, onwards, to unknown goals. All that opposes itself to this Life-stream is evil. Morality, a man-made local convention, is our present blundering method of assisting this great Force, and preventing its sterility, or dissipation. In his conception of the nature of this Life-stream Goethe is more Catholic and more subtle than Nietzsche.

  Self-realization? Certainly! That is an aspect of it which was not likely to be forgotten by the great Egoist whose sole object, as he confessed, was to “build up the Pyramid of his Existence” from the broadest possible base. But not only self-realization. The “dying to live” of the Christian, as well as “the rising above one’s body” of the Platonist, have their part there. Ascetism itself, with all its degrees of passionate or philosophical purity, is as much an evocation of the world-spirit — of the essential nature of the System of Things — as is the other.

  It is, of course, ultimately, quite a mad hope to desire to convert “the Spirit that Denies.” He, too, under the Lord, is an accomplice of the Life-stream. He helps it forward, even while he opposes himself to it, just as a bulwark of submerged rocks make the tide leap landward with more foaming fury!

  Goethe’s idea of the “Eternal Feminine” leading us “upward and on” is not at all the sentimental nonsense which Nietzsche fancied it. In a profound sense it is absolutely true. Nor need the more anti-feminist among us be troubled by such a Truth. We have just seen that the Devil himself is a means, and a very essential means, for leading us “upward and on.”

  Goethe is perfectly right. The “love of women,” though a destructive force, and a frightful force as far as certain kinds of “art” and “philosophy” are concerned, cannot be looked upon as anything but “a provocation to creation,” when the whole large scheme of existence is taken into account.

  I think myself that it is easy to make too much of Goethe’s Pantheism. The Being he worshipped was simply “Whatever Mystery” lies behind the ocean of Life. And if no “mystery” lies behind the ocean of lif
e, — very well! A Goethean disciple is able, then, to worship Life, with no mystery behind it! It is rather the custom among clever, tiresome people to disparage that second part of Faust, with its world-panoramic procession of all the gods and demi-gods and angels and demons that have ever visited this earth. I do not disparage it. I have never found it dull. Dull would he be, as “the fat weed that rots itself in case on Lethe’s wharf,” who found nothing curious and provocative about these Sirens and Centaurs and Lemures and Larvae and Cabiri and Phorkyads! I can myself endure very pleasantly even the society of those “Blessed Boys” which some have found so distressing. As for the Devil, in the end, making “indecent overtures” to the little Heavenly Butterflies, who pelt him with roses — even that does not confuse my mind or distract my senses. It is the “other side of the Moon” — the under-mask of the world-comedy, and the incidental “saving” of Dr. Faust is not more essential in the great mad game!

  Read Faust, both portions of it, dear reader, and see if you do not feel, with me, that, in the last resort, one leaves this rich, strange poem with a nobler courage to endure life, and a larger view of its amazing possibilities!

  I wonder if that curious novel of Goethe’s called the “Elective Affinities” is perused as widely as it deserves? That extraordinary company of people! And the patient, portentious interest Goethe compels us to take in the laying out of gardens and the beautifying of church-yards! “The Captain,” “the Architect” — not to speak of the two bewildering women — do they not suggest fantastic figures out of one’s memories of remotest childhood? I suppose to a world-child like Goethe, watching, with grave super-human interest, all our little pre-occupations, we have all of us something of the sweet pedantry of these people — we are all of us “Captains” and “Architects” with some odd twist in our quiet heads.

  The solemn immorality, amounting to outrageous indecency, of those scenes between the assorted lovers when they make “double” love, and behind the mask of their legitimate attachments follow their “elective affinities,” is a thing that may well stagger the puritan reader. The puritan reader will, indeed, like old Carlyle, be tempted more than once to fling these grave, unblushing chronicles, with their deep, oracular wisdom and their shameless details, into the dust-heap. But it were wiser to refrain. After all, one cannot conceal from one’s self that things are like that — and if the hyaena’s howl, from the filthy marshes of earth’s weird edge and the thick saliva on his oozing jaws, nauseates our preciosity, and besmirches our self-esteem, we must remember that this is the way the Lord of “the Prologue in Heaven” has willed that the scavengers of life’s cesspools go about their work!

  Probably it will not be the “indecency” of certain things in Goethe that will most offend our modern taste; it will be that curious, grave pre-occupation of his, so objective and stiff, with artistic details, and architectural details, and theatrical details!

  One must remember his noble saying, “Earnestness alone makes life Eternity” and that other “saying” about Art having, as its main purpose, the turning of the “Transitory” into the “Permanent”! If the Transitory is really to be turned into the Permanent, we must take ourselves and our work very seriously indeed!

  And such “seriousness,” such high, patient, unwearied seriousness, is, after all, Goethe’s bequest to our flippant and fanciful generation. He knows well enough our deepest doubt, our most harrowing scepticism. He has long ago “been through all that.” But he has “returned” — not exactly like Nietzsche, with a fierce, scornful, dramatic cry, to a contemptuous “superficiality” — he has returned to the actual possibilities that the world offers, “superficial” and otherwise, of turning the whole strange business into a solid, four-square “work of art.” We must reject “evil,” quietly and ironically; not because it is condemned by human morality, but because “we have our work to do”! We must live in “the good” and “the true,” not because it is our “duty” so to do, but because only along this particular line does the “energy without agitation” of the “abysmal mothers” communicate itself to our labour.

  And so we come back, like the grief-stricken children over Mignon’s grave, to Life and Life’s toil. There only, in the inflexible development of what taste, of what discernment, of what power, of what method, of what demonic genius, we may have been granted by the gods, lies “the cosmic secret.” That is all we have in our human hands, that malleable stuff out of which Fate made us — and only in the shrewd, unwearied use of that shall we prove our love to the Being “who cannot love us in return” and make our illusion of Free-Will part of his universal Purpose!

  GOETHE’S FAUST by George Santayana

  In approaching the third of our philosophical poets, there is a scruple that may cross the mind. Lucretius was undoubtedly a philosophical poet; his whole poem is devoted to expounding and defending a system of philosophy. In Dante the case is almost as plain. The Divine Comedy is a moral and personal fable; yet not only are many passages explicitly philosophical, but the whole is inspired and controlled by the most definite of religious systems and of moral codes. Dante, too, is unmistakably a philosophical poet. But was Goethe a philosopher? And is Faust a philosophical poem?

  If we say so, it must be by giving a certain latitude to our terms. Goethe was the wisest of mankind; too wise, perhaps, to be a philosopher in the technical sense, or to try to harness this wild world in a brain-spun terminology. It is true that he was all his life a follower of Spinoza, and that he may be termed, without hesitation, a naturalist in philosophy and a pantheist. His adherence to the general attitude of Spinoza, however, did not exclude a great plasticity and freedom in his own views, even on the most fundamental points. Thus Goethe did not admit the mechanical interpretation of nature advocated by Spinoza. He also assigned, at least to privileged souls, like his own, a more personal sort of immortality than Spinoza allowed. Moreover, he harboured a generous sympathy with the dramatic explanations of nature and history current in the Germany of his day. Yet such transcendental idealism, making the world the expression of a spiritual endeavour, was a total reversal of that conviction, so profound in Spinoza, that all moral energies are resident in particular creatures, themselves sparks in an absolutely infinite and purposeless world. In a word, Goethe was not a systematic philosopher. His feeling for the march of things and for the significance of great personages and great ideas was indeed philosophical, although more romantic than scientific. His thoughts upon life were fresh and miscellaneous. They voiced the genius and learning of his age. They did not express a firm personal attitude, radical and unified, and transmissible to other times and persons. For philosophers, after all, have this advantage over men of letters, that their minds, being more organic, can more easily propagate themselves. They scatter less influence, but more seeds.

  If from Goethe we turn to Faust — and it is as the author of Faust only that we shall consider him — the situation is not less ambiguous. In the play, as the young Goethe first wrote it, philosophy appeared in the first line, — Hab nun ach die Philosophey; but it appeared there, and throughout the piece, merely as a human experience, a passion or an illusion, a fund of images or an ambitious art. Later, it is true, under the spell of fashion and of Schiller, Goethe surrounded his original scenes with others, like the prologue in heaven, or the apotheosis of Faust, in which a philosophy of life was indicated; namely, that he who strives strays, yet in that straying finds his salvation. This idea left standing all that satirical and Mephistophelian wisdom with which the whole poem abounds, the later parts no less than the earlier. Frankly, it was a moral that adorned the tale, without having been the seed of it, and without even expressing fairly the spirit which it breathes. Faust remained an essentially romantic poem, written to give vent to a pregnant and vivid genius, to touch the heart, to bewilder the mind with a carnival of images, to amuse, to thrill, to humanize; and, if we must speak of philosophy, there were many express maxims in the poem, and many insights, half betraye
d, that exceeded in philosophic value the belated and official moral which the author affixed to it, and which he himself warned us not to take too seriously.

  Faust is, then, no philosophical poem, after an open or deliberate fashion; and yet it offers a solution to the moral problem of existence as truly as do the poems of Lucretius and Dante. Heard philosophies are sweet, but those unheard may be sweeter. They may be more unmixed and more profound for being adopted unconsciously, for being lived rather than taught. This is not merely to say what might be said of every work of art and of every natural object, that it could be made the starting-point for a chain of inferences that should reveal the whole universe, like the flower in the crannied wall. It is to say, rather, that the vital straining towards an ideal, definite but latent, when it dominates a whole life, may express that ideal more fully than could the best-chosen words.

  Now Faust is the foam on the top of two great waves of human aspiration, merging and heaping themselves up together, — the wave of romanticism rising from the depths of northern traditions and genius, and the wave of a new paganism coming from Greece over Italy. These are not philosophies to be read into Faust by the critic; they are passions seething in the drama. It is the drama of a philosophical adventure; a rebellion against convention; a flight to nature, to tenderness, to beauty; and then a return to convention again, with a feeling that nature, tenderness, and beauty, unless found there, will not be found at all. Goethe never depicts, as Dante does, the object his hero is pursuing; he is satisfied with depicting the pursuit. Like Lessing, in his famous apologue, he prefers the pursuit of the ideal to the ideal itself; perhaps, as in the case of Lessing, because the hope of realizing the ideal, and the interest in realizing it, were beginning to forsake him.