Underground Warfare 1914-1918

by Simon Jones

  The village of Mametz, assaulted by the right battalions of the 7th Division, although attended by heavy losses, was markedly more successful than the attacks to the north. Furthermore, the attacks of the 18th and 30th Divisions and the French to their right achieved all of their objectives on 1 July. A series of mines of between 200 and 2,000lbs were placed under strong points or at the end of Russian saps (see Chapter 9). The sector of the eastern part of the 7th Division and the 18th Division was that of 183 Company, commanded by Hickling since his posting from 172 Company at St Eloi in early 1915. He was asked to prepare a series of Russian saps for the attack, to be used to reinforce the captured positions and from the ends of which small mines were blown. In view of the work required, he would have to drop defensive mining, which guaranteed the underground safety of the British front-line trenches at Carnoy and Fricourt only up to 1 July. He halted all deep mining except what he called ‘camouflage work’ to give the impression of continuing activity. He seems not to have had deep drives ready beneath key points in the German lines. Instead he drove shallow tunnels across, the ends of which were filled with small charges except for two larger mines, at Bulgar Point (2,000lbs) and Casino Point (5,000lbs). At Casino Point it was necessary to incline the tunnel down as it neared the German lines, to gain the necessary depth to lay the charge. As the chalk grew harder the method of softening involved drilling holes with a carpenter’s auger, into which they poured vinegar. The heading was only just completed and charged in time for the attack.37

  The mine at Bulgar Point failed to explode, owing to a British mortar projectile cutting the leads shortly before zero.38 The Casino Point mine, designed to destroy flanking machine guns and dugouts, was fired a few seconds before 7.27am and produced a crater with lips 97ft in diameter and 30ft deep. Hickling reported that three dugouts and four sniper’s posts were buried and he suspected a machine-gun emplacement.39 The infantry of the 6th Royal Berkshires attacked from 200yds away and suffered casualties from the mine debris, but also seem to have derived benefit from it.

  Hickling took a calculated risk by abandoning deep mining prior to the 1 July attack. His men surveyed the German mining systems in the captured areas and discovered an inclined gallery running beneath the Kiel Trench crater field, which reached 200ft in depth. They estimated that to form a crater it would require a charge of 450,000lbs and the resulting crater would have had a diameter of 460ft.40

  Following the 1 July attack there were few mines blown during the Somme fighting. In the south, the front moved on from the mine systems. At High Wood, 178 Company drove a mine at just 25ft depth, 320ft long, which they charged with 3,000lbs. It was blown thirty seconds before zero on 3 September 1916. British infantry occupied the crater, but lost it to counterattacks. The gallery was reopened by 178 Company, charged again with the same quantity and blown on 9 September, and this time it was held.41 In the north of the Somme battlefield, the Beaumont Hamel mine gallery was reopened by 252 Company four days after 1 July in preparation for a repeat mining attack on Hawthorn Ridge. The tunnel had to be re-driven and they completed charging with 30,000lbs of ammonal on 30 October. The attack of the Battle of the Ancre was launched on 13 November. This time there was no delay between the launch of the infantry attack and the blowing of the mine. The infantry moved forward to get clear of their own wire six minutes before zero, which was at 5.45am. The mine itself was used to signal zero and coincided with the opening crash of the British barrage. Infantry of the 51st Highland Division overran the crater and 252 Company found 58 Germans alive in a dugout adjacent to the crater. They told them that six other dugouts holding a similar number of men were destroyed by the explosion.42 The Battle of the Somme closed later in November.

  The second blowing of the Hawthorn mine was the point at which the British learnt how to use mines correctly in the attack. Mines were not part of a step-by step process, but a valuable shock weapon, which was nevertheless local and short-lived. Assault had to follow immediately, while the lighter debris was still falling, and before enemy troops on the flanks could gain the crater lips for their own advantage. Casualties from falling debris were minimal and were preferable to losing the race to the lips. The lessons of the Hohenzollern and St Eloi mining attacks of March 1916 were not incorporated into the attack plans of the opening of the Battle of the Somme. For Harvey the key lesson was to blow at zero. Other lessons concerned the location of mines, which were not always well-placed, in great part due to the virtual impossibility of silent working in chalk. The reforms in mining command and control introduced at the beginning of 1916 had only some bearing on the Somme, where local commanders were able to overrule the advice of the Inspector of Mines’ staff. In particular Preedy, the Controller of Mines of the 4th Army, lacked the authority to overrule senior officers commanding or on the staffs, especially Hunter-Weston and Fuller, who were both also Sappers. The Somme was the arena in which the British learnt the tactical methods of using the potential advantage offered by offensive mining. Mines could not, however, solve the tactical problems of the Somme, where the objectives were too deep for the capacity of the artillery. British attack tactics concentrated increasingly on coordinating artillery with the infantry advance, and on turning German defensive tactics against themselves. Mining, however, was still to play a major role in British offensives in the first half of 1917.

  Chapter 7

  Vimy, Arras and Messines 1917

  1917 saw the culmination of British mining potential and the establishment of a partial supremacy by British miners on some fronts. In the set piece and limited British victories of April and June mining played a role, although at Vimy and Arras a very limited one. At the Battle of Arras and the assault on Vimy Ridge, launched on 9 April 1917, the British could have placed a large number of mines beneath or near the German lines, but chose not to do so. The Vimy Ridge and Arras positions were taken over by the British from the French in March 1916. Extremely heavy fighting had taken place between the French and Germans during 1915. Following the capture of Carency the French had pushed the Germans to the crest of the ridge but, as at Vauquois, the Germans still retained observation over the Allied rear areas.

  The British took over a mining situation similar to that in the active area of the Somme the previous summer, with the Germans dominant and in many places beneath their front lines. Five British Tunnelling Companies were deployed along the ridge and seventy mines were fired in the first two months of the British occupation, mostly by the Germans. The Germans also used trench mortar fire on the shaft heads and this was the cause of high casualties amongst the tunnellers at Vimy. A German overland attack in May 1916, which forced the British back 700yds, was aimed at neutralising British mining activity by capturing the shaft entrances above ground. From June 1916, however, the Germans withdrew many miners to work on the preparation for the new defence system known collectively as the Hindenburg Line, and also, subsequently, for work in the mining industry at home. German activity tailed off and in the second half of 1916 the British established strong defensive underground positions incorporating transversal galleries. From August the British tunnelling companies were able to develop schemes for laying mines to support an attack on the Ridge proposed for autumn 1916, although this was subsequently postponed. The Canadian Corps was posted to the northern part of the Ridge in October 1916 and preparations for an attack were revived in February 1917.

  The commander of 182 Company, Mulqueen, described an encounter with General Currie, commanding the 1st Canadian Division, which took over the Carency and Berthonval sectors. Mulqueen explained that his men had obtained supremacy, but still needed to engage in offensive mining in places.

  General Currie was very interested in the offensive mines which had been, and were being built. He asked many questions regarding their depth, the weight of explosive in them, or intended, the size of the craters which would result, etc., etc. Nothing further was said and I was asked to keep in close touch with his G.S.O. 1, Colonel Radcl
iffe.1

  Mulqueen was a frequent visitor to the Divisional headquarters, but only later did Currie fully explain to him his views on mines for the offensive. Commanders in the Canadian Corps were very likely to have been influenced by the Canadians’ experience at St Eloi in April 1916, where the mines that Mulqueen had pioneered had so altered and damaged the landscape as to render occupation of the craters by the infantry all but impossible. Mulqueen’s 182 Company, however, and the other tunnellers on Vimy Ridge, were looking forward to playing their part in the coming attack:

  Above ground there were persistent rumours of a British attack on the ‘Ridge’ and underground we drove eagerly forward with our offensive mines, all the while congratulating ourselves on our unquestioned superiority of position. We lived and dreamed mines and the effect which they would have on the Hun. All of this was reported to the G.S.O.1, and he accepted it with patient reserve. When and by whom the meeting was called I have forgotten. All I can remember is the shock which I received at it. The purpose of the meeting was to consider preliminary arrangements for the assault on the ‘Ridge’. The meeting was not a large one, but it is probable a representative of the Corps was on hand. I was with Colonel Williams [1st Army Controller of Mines], but I do not remember representatives of any of the other Tunnelling Companies and it may be it was purely a First Division affair. General Currie spoke and stated that he had come to the conclusion that the large mines which were charged would be more of a hindrance than a help and, that they were not to be fired. He was so definite and his reasons were so sound that even had I had the authority to do so, I had no grounds on which to advance counter arguments. He pointed out that should a line of craters be thrown up under the German lines, they would undoubtedly disrupt the German front line position, but they would also hinder the advancing troops and force them to move forward over extremely difficult terrain. The chasms would be at least fifty feet deep and the attackers would be forced to move around their rims and would be sitting targets for enemy machine guns stationed in his support trenches. He considered these alone were sufficient reasons to drop the offensive mining operations, but he advanced the further argument that the Tunnelling Companies would be much better employed building subways. At that time we had several mines charged with some 120,000 pounds of explosive. Our plans called for charging several more, but these were all dropped. The mines which were charged were left undisturbed and while we rounded out one or two headings which were then well advanced, we did not embark on any new offensive operations.2

  Officers from the Canadian Corps studied the problems of advancing across heavily mine cratered ground and visited La Boisselle and Fricourt on the old Somme battlefield for this purpose. They were impressed by the fact that the decision not to assault across the crater areas had left troops on either side heavily exposed to fire from these areas, but concluded that the craters only rarely caused an obstacle. Parties could infiltrate around the lips of the craters with machine guns (the lighter Lewis gun was by then far more plentiful than in July 1916):

  The general conclusion arrived at is that, with the exception of the big ones of recent formation, such as Montreal and Patricia, the Craters do not present an insurmountable obstacle. This opinion is confirmed by the experience of several raids which have been carried out. They must be negotiated by small parties who can take advantage of the causeways formed by the lips, skirting the actual bottoms, which are likely to be wet and holding [sic]. The advance of these parties will be covered by a barrage of Stokes Mortars and Rifle Grenades.

  Special means of ingress into the Craters will be prepared by a trench or Russian Sap, each individual crater being treated differently.3

  Despite this report, offensive mines were removed from the entire central portion of the Canadian Corps attack opposite Hill 145, which was the highest part of the ridge and amongst the hardest fought over. Further mines were vetoed following the blowing by the Germans on 23 March of nine craters, named the Longfellow group, along no man’s land. These craters effectively closed a gap between a large crater to the north, Broadmarsh, and others to the south, leaving just 100yds of no man’s land clear. It is probable that the Germans were aiming to restrict the passage of attackers to predictable points as well as blowing craters as tank obstacles. It was therefore decided that three mines laid by 172 Company should not be blown, although the largest was designed to prevent the Germans firing across the Broadmarsh crater. These mines were left in place after the assault and only removed in the 1990s. Of a large number of British mines under preparation on Vimy Ridge, probably eleven were charged in preparation for the attack, but on the day just three were blown, including those forming a northern defensive flank.4 The 1st Army Controller of Mines, Lieutenant Colonel G.C. Williams, strongly implied after the attack that the Broadmarsh crater was too powerful a position to have been left intact:

  The position of Broadmarsh Crater is very commanding, and situated as it is at the commencement of a re-entrant in the enemy lines, it completely enfiladed our position behind the main group of craters to the south. It is a question whether the abandonment of this mine was wise, for our troops suffered heavily in traversing the gap. An inspection of Broadmarsh Crater has shown that the enemy dug-outs at the bottom were practically untouched by the bombardment. There is every reason to believe that the enemy machine gunners accommodated in them were ready on the lip when the assault came over.5

  In the north of the attack on Vimy Ridge a mine was prepared by 176 Tunnelling Company against the strongpoint position known as the Pimple, which was not completed in time for the attack. This was notable for the use that it made of the geological formation of that part of the ridge, where sand and clay lay over the chalk. The gallery was pushed silently through the clay, but by 9 April was still 70ft short of its target. The Pimple was not captured until 12 April but, despite this delay, the mine would not have reached under the strongpoint.6

  Owing to the German withdrawal from their front line south-east of Arras, the only mine that was used on the Arras front on 9 April was to the north-east, at Blagny. This was apparently a 2,200lb charge and was blown at zero, 5.30am, and, according to Lieutenant J.C. Neill of the New Zealand Tunnelling Company, destroyed two dugouts, 50yds of trench and a concrete pillbox. However, it also stunned and apparently buried some members of the 13th Royal Scots and checked their assault temporarily.7

  The mine aimed at the Pimple, Vimy Ridge. From The Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, Geological Work (1922).

  Flanders and Messines 1916–1917

  It was an eternal struggle both with the enemy and with the water and mud. Working forward, listening, loading and tamping required perseverance, great physical effort, willingness to sacrifice and courage. The deeper one went, the greater the struggle on the wet, narrow steps, the worse the air, the greater also the danger, from direct hits from above, from enemy mines, from inrush of mud and water to be cut off and suffocated. Endlessly the miners vied with one another, officers and men in long lines in smashed galleries lying one behind the other to save trapped mates. It was the same picture while charging in a race against the enemy; everyone wanted to be forward and to help. (Lieutenant Colonel Otto Füsslein, Commander of Miners, German 4th Army)8

  Although the British were unable to exploit the mining attack at St Eloi on 27 March 1916, the detonation of the mines, as well as killing or burying some 300 men of the 18th Reserve Jäger Battalion, had profound repercussions in the German command, especially the Pioneer service. Within three weeks the Germans formed Pioneer Mining Companies, apparently modelled on the British Tunnelling Companies, and issued new instructions on mine warfare. An officer with experience of mining at La Bassée, Captain Bindernagel, was ordered to the Wytschaete front, south of Ypres, as an advisor to the commander of Pioneers of the XIII Reserve Corps. Investigations by a geologist, Dr Siegfried Passarge, of Hamburg University, concluded that the British had succeeded in getting through the wet sand at 5 or 10m dep
th.9

  Subsequently, the commander of Pioneers of the XIII Reserve Corps was replaced by an officer who himself was a civilian mining engineer and experienced in mine warfare.10 Lieutenant Colonel Otto Füsslein commanded the 25th Pioneer Regiment, one of the units created from fortress battalions, and was brought from the Les Éparges sector, regarded by the German pioneers as the ‘school of mines’.11 Füsslein instigated further geological research and he blamed ignorance of the underground conditions as having caused misinformed and wasted mining work.

  Füsslein and Bindernagel recruited five new mining companies, which included the new Pioneer Mining Companies, which were authorized on 7 April 1916.12 It is possible that the Germans gained a knowledge of the composition of the British tunnelling companies from the prisoners taken at the Bluff in February. According to Füsslein, officers who in civilian life were miners or engineers were gathered from the whole of the German army to form a corps of officers with a technical and mining education. Usually these were formed from existing infantry mining units: for example 352 Pioneer Mining Company was created in November 1916 from an Infantry Mining Company named after its commander, Lieutenant Kurt Schmölling.13 However, the Germans were unable simply to create tunnelling companies in the same way that the British had. It was thought necessary to transfer qualified pioneer officers to the units, as very few of the mining officers knew field engineering duties. This, however, was opposed by the General of Pioneers at German GHQ, owing to the need to officer a large number of newly formed trench mortar units, for which the pioneers were also responsible, on the grounds that it was part of the pre-war siege capability of the pioneer service. It is questionable whether the mining or the mortar companies needed trained field engineers, and the impression is that the German Pioneer service was unable to accept the same level of civilianisation as the British. It took much urging from Füsslein to obtain authority to form new units and he claimed that the companies comprised transferred infantry without experienced officers and so required training from scratch. In August 1916 the Germans transferred a large number of coal miners out of the army back to Germany for industrial production, and those remaining were regarded as of poor quality.