Underground Warfare 1914-1918

by Simon Jones

  The preparatory bombardment began on 19 September, but as the saps progressed the French artillery was not able to fire on the German front line, owing to the danger to the men digging the saps. Martin described how the Germans took refuge in their front line from the bombardment on their rear and an anonymous officer of 28th Regiment told how from their own lines they could see shovelfuls of earth being thrown out as the Germans repaired their trenches at leisure. On 24 September, the front line and saps were evacuated in order to bombard the German front line briefly. On 25 September the parallels and open saps from which the attackers were to leave were packed with troops waiting to attack and flooded by heavy rain. The same officer says that there were so many men in the new positions that it was impossible that the Germans were not aware of them. Corporal Paul Andrillon of the 119th Regiment was optimistic, however:

  …at about 1100 we occupy the saps, the spectacle is superb, on all the points of the plain our guns are raging, impossible to distinguish anything of the Boche’s, there is only smoke, everyone has confidence in the outcome of the attack.6

  Zero hour was 1235. Ten minutes before, the French discharged flame throwers from the front line about every 30m along the frontage of the attack. In places there were enormous flames and thick plumes of black smoke, but the fire was not spread everywhere. Paul Andrillon described the moment of attack:

  …advance. No sooner got out, the Boche machine gunners in the front line spray us with a rain of bullets. I managed 10 metres on my feet and then collapsed knocked down like a sack of potatoes.7

  The war diary of the 24th Regiment reported the fate of the first wave:

  All who left the saps and parallels were mown down… The wounded of the first, second and third waves fell into the heads of the saps and the parallels… The obstruction of the communication trenches is extreme; orders and information arrive only very slowly.8

  The leading elements were stopped dead with heavy losses. Units then became completely mixed up, the following waves crammed into the saps and parallels were unable to advance.9 Vincent Martin took refuge in a shell hole:

  The captain being wounded, it was impossible for us to try to get to our jumping off trench without getting killed, the enemy machine-guns and rifles are directed on anyone who raises his head. The other comrades lined up beside us, faces to the ground, are dead. The night comes, the able bodied combatants who had taken refuge in the shell holes crawled and dropped down into the sap heads which had been dug by each of us, but no sooner had I arrived but they were crammed full of dead and wounded. I spent the night on the corpse of a former comrade whom I turned over onto his stomach so that I could sit on his pack which he still wore on his back. What horror! At day break our stretcher-bearers clear the dead and wounded and us the survivors, imprisoned in these cursed saps, under fifty centimetres of ground, we took again our place as soldiers in the jumping off trench where we are now also regrouped. We can then witness the horrible spectacle of death that there is in front of us: three successive lines of corpses in horizon blue, face down, weapon in their hands, facing the enemy that killed them! One could not dwell on this failure…10

  The French attack, which had as its objective the summit of the Vimy Ridge, was repeated the following day, gaining the sunken road, and during the following two weeks pushed further up the slopes to the ridge. Vincent Martin condemned the attack:

  After a 72-hour bombardment, where all the available artillery is used to destroy all Germans found in front of us, it is still us, the infantry: men, NCOs and officers up to colonel, who will be put to death for the glory of our generals, incompetent mass murderers, and so very ignorant of the situation.11

  The Russian saps, and General Hache’s ‘new and very special process’, had not contributed to the attack as hoped. He had used siege methods to attempt to create a broad breach in the German defences, but had launched the attack before the breach was formed and failure resulted. On the same day as the launch of the Third Battle of Artois, 25 September, the British also used Russian saps at the Battle of Loos as a means of pushing the front line closer to the Germans so that the assaulting troops would have a shorter distance to attack. On the 15th Division front this was reduced to less than 200yds and on the 9th Division front, opposite the Hohenzollern Redoubt, it was 150yds. During the night before the attack the heads of the saps were opened out and linked to form a new trench from which the attack could be launched.12 These to some extent helped the troops, giving them a shorter distance to cross, although the attacks were only partially successful.

  In May 1915, Colonel Ernest Swinton RE at GHQ formulated a plan with Norton Griffiths to use deep tunnels to smuggle troops past the German defences:

  The idea was that we should arrange for the sudden intervention of a useful force behind the German front. This was to be done by means of galleries started well behind our own front, driven at depth in the clay far below that of the enemy mine system, and then inclined upwards to break ground at night behind his front in different woods, where the exits would be boarded over and concealed until the moment for action, which would be when we made an attack on the surface. Then, when the enemy was fully occupied on his front, British machine gunners and sappers would suddenly appear from out of the earth in his rear, ‘shoot up’ his heavy-gun detachments and cut his communications.13

  Such a scheme, implausible as it may sound, came close to execution on the Gallipoli peninsula, where there was significant experimentation in the use of tunnels to cross no man’s land. In the cramped positions around Anzac Cove, the development of a defensive mining system against shallow level mines was combined with underground sapping. At the Pimple, saps on either flank had been completed by the end of May and more were begun between them, with the intention of joining them with a transversal tunnel which would form a new front line when they were 90ft out. The first 14ft of the three new saps (later called B3, B5 and B6) were to be underground to pass beneath the built-up parapet of the Australian front line. The blowing of a Turkish mine at Quinn’s Post on 29 May, which alerted the Australians to the danger of countermining, caused them to modify the sapping operations and continue sapping by shallow tunnels. These had an average of 18in of head cover and, largely driven without timber supports, were Russian saps in all but name.

  By opening recesses from the transversal tunnels in which sentries could be stationed they became a means by which the Australians could push forward their positions and improve their observation over the Turks.14

  As the tunnels lengthened ventilation holes were drilled about every 45ft:

  This was generally accomplished by means of an old bayonet on the end of a rifle. Owing to the presence of so many dead Turks in the ground through which we were tunnelling, these holes were very necessary. They also served to keep the drives at one level. At night time, great care had to be taken that they were blocked with sacking or something to ensure that no light was visible from above. (Lance Corporal Cyril Lawrence, 2nd Field Company, Australian Engineers)15

  Drawing by Cyril Lawrence of B4, the second southernmost of the underground saps towards Lone Pine from the Pimple position. The leading company of the Australian 2nd Battalion attacked from these openings on 6 August 1915. From The Gallipoli Diary of Sergeant Lawrence.

  Drawing by Cyril Lawrence of the underground firing line planned in the C Group of tunnels opposite Johnston’s Jolly, 1 July 1915. From The Gallipoli Diary of Sergeant Lawrence.

  The method was safer than open sapping, although in due course the Turks became aware of the work through sound and by discovering the ventilation holes:

  About 11pm tonight a Turk shoved his hand down the air hole in the drive just opposite me. It scared the wits out of us all. We could hear them crawling around above us all night. The men in the firing line evidently shot one, as we could hear him groaning just above us. (Lance Corporal Cyril Lawrence, 2nd Field Company, Australian Engineers, 15 June 1915)16

  In early June General Walker,
temporarily commanding the 1st Australian Division, decided to make a new forward line underground along most of the right Central Sector of Anzac. Also in June, a semi-underground system to extend the front line was adopted for the right sector. At Tasmania Post on the southern part of the Anzac position, a number of short tunnels were driven forward at the request of Lieutenant Colonel Smith, commanding the 12th Battalion, in order to gain a view into the Valley of Despair, a steep gully in front of the position. These ended in ‘bombing-holes’, openings in which sentries were stationed and barbed wire put out. Two of the tunnels were continued towards the Turkish trench without encountering Turkish countermining. Smith suggested to Brigadier General MacLagan (commanding 3rd Australian Brigade) that the mines could be blown and the tunnels used as communication routes to aid an attack to take the Turkish trench on the edge of the valley. General Birdwood, commanding the Anzac Corps, took up the proposal, as the attack could serve as a feint to distract from the coming Suvla Bay landing. When the Turks extended their position opposite Tasmania Post north, the Australians lengthened two more of the bombing-hole tunnels towards their trench. MacLagan asked Birdwood for two days extra to complete the tunnels and an attack using these galleries was fixed for moonrise of 31 July 1915. In a carefully planned assault, four mines were to be fired from the tunnels and an assault made by the 11th Battalion, led by Captain Leane. The tunnels would then be opened up to allow reinforcement of the captured Turkish position.

  The mines were to be fired at zero but, at the signal, only the two outer mines detonated. Leane nevertheless led his men forward and, as they reached the Turkish trench, the southern of the two central mines blew, burying small numbers of both Turks and Australians, and parties of men reached the Turkish trench with debris still raining on them. The fourth mine never exploded, but the Turkish troops left their trench on being attacked. While the trenches were assaulted the four mine tunnels were opened into the craters for communication use, with parties of infantry digging from both directions in the tunnels and the craters. The air in the tunnels was found to be sufficiently pure, the explosive gases having vented through the crater, and within an hour three were clear enough to allow some supplies to be passed through into the craters. It was not possible to get men through the tunnels until the early morning and during the night they crossed the open: by the small hours three were open for communication. The congestion in the tunnels, however, was apparently the reason that water stored ready in Tasmania Post was not taken forward. The captured position, named Leane’s Trench, was held against Turkish counterattacks and the use of tunnels for communication, like the blowing of mines, had been a partial success.

  Birdwood issued orders for another small attack against a post in front of Ryrie’s Post, immediately south of Tasmania Post. The tunnels were regarded as sufficiently essential to the attack for it to be indefinitely postponed on 5 August on the objections of the OC 3rd Field Company, Major Clogstoun. Clogstoun reported that his tunnels were unlikely to reach the Turkish trenches by the date of the attack and that, unlike at Leane’s Trench, the Turks were already mining in front of Ryrie’s. If the position was captured it would be unlikely that full communication using tunnels would be established in less than eighteen hours and, as the area was swept by Turkish flanking fire, it was doubtful whether the attackers could hold out that long.

  A more ambitious use of tunnels for the attack was already in hand at Lone Pine using the underground front line formed from the B Group tunnels as a diversion from the breakout attack being made north from Anzac. Seven saps were linked by a transversal to form the underground front line and two, B5 and B6, were extended to form galleries for offensive mining. The assault on Lone Pine on 6 August was to be a more ambitious version of that on Leane’s Trench and troops were actually to assault from the tunnels. Three battalions were to attack and the leading company of each was to depart from the underground firing line just 40 to 60yds from the Turks. The tunnels were widened and the space required by each battalion was carefully worked out. In its methodical timing the Lone Pine operation resembled a French sapping and mining assault of early 1915. The infantry were to assault at 5.30pm but, probably because of the complexity of the operation, the preparations were phased. The engineers began opening the exits the night before and completed the task three and a half hours before zero. At this time three mines were blown in no man’s land in order to create some cover for the attackers.17 The preparatory bombardment was carried out during the afternoon and was augmented one hour before zero by fire from heavy naval guns offshore.

  Drawing by Cyril Lawrence of the B5 tunnel showing six of the 5ft x 2ft openings from the underground firing line from which the leading company of the 3rd Battalion attacked Lone Pine on 6 August. The two remaining companies of the 1st also crossed no man’s land by this tunnel later in the evening. The shaded portion shows the continuation of the tunnel dug the following day, which broke into Turkish mine tunnels and was connected to the old Turkish front line. From The Gallipoli Diary of Sergeant Lawrence.

  The Australian official historian described the scene at the centre of the attack front, with the Brigade Major of the 1st Brigade at the tunnel entrance and the CO of the 3rd Battalion at the exits:

  In the opening of the main tunnel – B5, leading forward from the old firing line to the new underground line – stood Major King, whistle in one hand, watch in the other. At the corresponding opening in the underground line was Major McConaghy of the 3rd, ready to repeat the signal for the attack – three blasts of the whistle. Watches had been twice compared and corrected, and while the officers gave a few last hints to their men they kept an eye on the minute-hand as though they were starting a boat-race. ‘Five twenty-seven – get ready to go over the parapet,’ said a young officer crouched in the corner of one fire-step, glancing at his wrist-watch. Almost immediately the order came: ‘Pull down the top bags in that recess.’ The men on the step dragged down the uppermost row of sandbags, thus rendering the exit easier. ‘Prepare to jump out,’ said the officer [Capt D.T. Moore], putting his whistle between his teeth… A whistle sounded and was repeated shrilly along the front. In a scatter of falling bags and earth the young officer and his men scrambled from the bay. Rifle-shots rang out from the enemy’s trenches, gradually growing into a heavy fusillade. One of the men leaving that particular bay fell back, shot through the mouth. From every section of the Pimple, and from the holes of the forward line, troops were similarly scrambling; the sunny square of the Daisy Patch and the scrub south of it were full of figures running forward. (Charles Bean, War Correspondent)18

  On reaching the Turkish trenches, in many places ‘instead of a trench, they were confronted by a continuous sandy mound forming the roof of a covered gallery.’19. The Turks had roofed their trenches with heavy timbers, which were impossible to remove and were largely unbroken by the bombardment. In places New Zealand and British howitzer fire had smashed the timbers and nearly half of the garrison had additionally retreated into mine galleries; the Australians then reached their lines too swiftly for them to emerge and man the fire steps. The shelters and tunnels thus became death-traps for many of the front-line troops.

  As the Turkish front line was fought over, the opening up of the tunnels to supply the attackers was only slowly achieved. Bean describes a slow stream of walking wounded from B5 tunnel. It was not practicable to bring reserve troops through the tunnel; the leading company had to be taken over the open. The two remaining companies were ‘trickled slowly through’ and then dashed the remaining distance to the old Turkish line. By sundown, through heavy fighting, the Lone Pine position was secured against counterattack. Problems were encountered by 2nd Field Company in all three tunnels which were supposed to provide access across no man’s land to supply the captured position. In B5 tunnel 36 sappers, whose task it was to open up the tunnel for communication, had moved forward of the underground line prior to the attack to make way for the infantry. By 5pm, however, 30 were a
ffected by gas from the mine blown from a branch gallery (B37). Struggling with the effects, they only managed to create a decent air hole at 8pm and could not open the end of the tunnel to the surface until 9pm. A sap dug from B5 tunnel to Lone Pine was not completed until 1am. Parties breaking through the other tunnels (B6 and B8) discovered the overhead cover to be 7ft 6in, much thicker than expected. B8 was opened by 4am but required deepening, while B6 was extended to meet a Turkish tunnel, which was accomplished by 8am.20

  Communication from the Pimple to Leane’s Trench after capture on 6 August 1915. From Bean, The Story of Anzac, Vol. 2.

  Early the following day Cyril Lawrence was sent to complete the B5 tunnel into the Turkish lines and passed the place where the 3rd Battalion had attacked.

  What a different appearance the whole place has assumed since I saw it last. It is just torn to pieces, sandbags blown to smithereens and parapets just levelled. Anyhow, on down through the tunnels until we reach our old underground firing line. The daylight is coming in through the opened-up recesses, through which the first line hopped out, and lying all along it are the forms of fellows killed even before they had got out into the open… (Lance Corporal Cyril Lawrence, 7 August 1915)21

  Shallow underground saps (again Russian saps in all but name), in places only 6in below the surface, had been quickly run out at the Nek in preparation for the attack of 7 August. Had the attack been a success they were to be converted into communication trenches.22 The underground warfare at Lone Pine, while appearing to follow the conventions of siege warfare in the early blowing of the mines, was significant and innovative. The difficulties faced at Lone Pine were to be encountered by the British on 1 July 1916 when communication tunnels were attempted on a larger scale.