The Arab_Israeli Conflict
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Indeed, nationalism is central to their strategic thinking. As they see it, direct intervention in the affairs of other countries always breeds resentment from the locals, a resentment that easily translates into violent resistance. As the isolationist Republican senator Robert Taft (1939–1953) argued, “However benevolent we might be, other people simply do not like to be dominated.”18 From their perspective, this dynamic was compounded following the end of the Cold War by the gulf in power between America and other states, which was viewed as leading other countries to be especially fearful of America. When the U.S. is militarily assertive, this is said to generate a strong counteraction. Hence, defensive Realists advocate that direct U.S. intervention abroad should be extremely limited.19 Consequently, they opposed humanitarian intervention in the Balkans in the 1990s.20
Also in the 1990s they rejected the idea that Islamism represented a major threat to the U.S.,21 and 9/11 did not fundamentally alter their outlook. Instead, they posited that while America had discreet conflicts of interests with a variety of different actors in the Middle East, the vast majority could be handled by political accommodation.22 What united these actors and turned them into enemies of the U.S. was not religion or ideology, but blowback from American intervention in the Middle East,23 including the stationing of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, the Iraq War,24 and support for Israel.25 As Ron Paul put it, “They don’t come here to attack us because we’re rich and we’re free, they come and attack us because we’re over there.”26
The antidote was therefore to reverse all these policies. Thus, the Baker-Hamilton Report advocated a speedy withdrawal from Iraq; Mearsheimer and Walt recommended removing American ground troops from the region and relying on a strategy of “offshore balancing,” while libertarians advocated a wholesale American military withdrawal from the region.27 In the case of Iran, they reasoned that Teheran’s pursuit of the nuclear option was driven by power considerations, national prestige, and the threat they felt from the U.S., not ideology. Consequently, they felt that a nuclear Iran would be rational and hence manageable. They advocated engagement to reassure Iran; Buchanan was prepared to reach a deal that left the Islamist regime in possession of nuclear weapons.28
Strange as it seems, there has been something of an unholy alliance between the paleocons and the progressive-postcolonial Left based on their shared opposition to an activist interventionist American foreign policy. This convergence has roots going back to the late 1930s, when the conservative-led America First Committee merged with the left-wing Keep America out of War Committee. Indeed, in 1940 Russell Kirk supported the socialist Norman Thomas for president because of his antiwar stand. Another contemporary strand of convergence has been shared hostility to Israel. Indeed, articles in the American Conservative drew heavily on virulent left-wing critics of Israel.29
Israel
The defensive Realist approach of the old conservative establishment rejects the idea that the United States should have a special relationship with Israel. As Brent Scowcroft put it, “I think we have a relationship that is natural with a small, courageous democracy in a hostile land. But I don’t think we have any special commitment there. And I think we have an equal commitment to Palestinians.”30 Yet in practice, there has not been an “equal commitment” but rather a strong tendency to lean towards the Arab side. This is because they view Israel as a strategic liability.31 This view rests on the linkage32 theory, according to which the Arab-Israeli conflict is regarded as the lynchpin of regional instability and anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Many of them advocate ending American aid to Israel.33
Back in the 1930s and ’40s, adherents of unfavorable neutrality opposed the creation of Israel, fearing it would drive the Arabs into the pro-Soviet camp.34 Later, they blamed Western support for Israel for the penetration of Soviet influence into the Middle East. To counter this, they sought to distance the U.S. from Israel while advocating the imposition of a settlement to the conflict on pro-Arab terms.35 The Palestinian issue was deemed the key because of its resonance in Arab nationalist mythology. This was viewed as constraining America’s Arab allies from adopting pro-American policies, while simultaneously allowing America’s opponents to rally support to their cause. Consequently, after Anwar Sadat’s dramatic visit to Jerusalem in 1977, they opposed a separate Israeli peace treaty with Egypt, fearing it would simply draw the rest of the Arab world closer to the USSR. For the same reason they opposed the development of strategic cooperation between Israel and the U.S. in the 1980s. This approach continued to drive their thinking in the post–Cold War era. Thus they rejected the idea that Israel and the U.S. were both in conflict with radical Islamist enemies.36 Instead, American intervention in the Middle East and its support for Israel were identified as the major cause of opposition to the U.S. in the region.37 As Scowcroft put it, “[It] creates a sense of grievance and hatred for us … [and] at some point those chickens will come home to roost.”38
To assuage this sense of grievance they advocated heavy pressure on Israel. Mearsheimer and Walt went so far as to recommend that the U.S. “[line] up international support to isolate Israel, much the way South Africa was singled out and shunned.”39 In any case, in nearly all their schemes the practical onus for concessions fell squarely on Israel and involved the creation of a Palestinian state, irrespective of its internal nature and its approach to reconciliation with Israel.40 Libertarians took a different tack, advocating American strategic disengagement from Israel and the peace process altogether.41
In terms of ascribing blame for the conflict, the old conservative establishment placed the burden overwhelmingly on Israel. Palestinian terrorism was viewed as an understandable response to nationalist grievances. It was defined as merely a tactical problem that would disappear once Palestinian grievances were resolved.42 On occasion, a moral equivalence was drawn between the Likud and Hamas.43 Robert Novak even called Hamas “freedom fighters.”44 There was also a tendency in the American Conservative magazine to whitewash Israel’s enemies. For example, the paramilitary Shiite organization Hezbollah was presented as “a nonsectarian organization that is able to cooperate with people of all faiths,”45 while the brutal dictator of Syria, Bashar Assad, was presented as an unassuming head of state, a “wonkish professor” eager for peace and interreligious accord.46
Arab Nationalism, Oil, Anti-Semitism
Many State Department area specialists who first developed this approach were committed to Arab nationalism as a result of being the children and grandchildren of Americans who set up universities in Beirut, Cairo, and elsewhere in the Middle East – for example, John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen.47 While their influence is no longer felt directly, it lingers to a small degree in the culture of the State Department.48 In addition, some Realists, like James Baker and President George H. W. Bush, have extensive business ties in the Arab world.49 In addition, there has been very strong criticism of the pro-Israel lobby and the neoconservatives.50 On occasion, the language used has echoed anti-Semitic tropes51 with references to “the fifth column”52 and “the transparent cabal”53 “controlling” the media and Capitol Hill54 to fight wars for Israeli interests.55
To sum up, there are differences between the various strands that make up the old conservative establishment. Yet what unites them regarding Israel and the Middle East is more important than what divides them. They all advocate a defensive Realist grand strategy and neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict. They all oppose a special relationship with Israel, and they all believe that the special relationship is a major cause of anti-Americanism in Middle East. Paleoconservatives and Realists explicitly place the onus for concessions on Israel and call for heavy U.S. pressure on Israel in this regard. While libertarians call for American disengagement from the peace process, the practical implications of this stance would be similar, because in the absence of American diplomatic support for Israel, there would be enormous international pressure to impose a settlement on Israel, on Arab terms.
Kissingerian Realism: “Favorable Neutrality” toward Israel
Unburdened by the isolationist strand within the old conservative establishment, Kissingerian realism has been comfortable with the U.S. playing a leading role in international politics, while simultaneously opposing the more offensive orientated strategy of the new conservative mainstream. Unlike Arabist Realism, it has not adopted an unwaveringly negative approach to Israel, though without completely embracing Israel, as has the new conservative mainstream.
Favorable neutrality began to emerge at the end of the 1950s, when elements within the Dwight Eisenhower administration, including Vice President Richard Nixon, began to change their strategic assessment of Israel. The Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was accepting Soviet weapons, continuing to ferment revolution against U.S. allies in the region, while ignoring American support for Egypt during the Suez Crisis. All of this after he had rejected a pro-Arab American plan to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. Against, this background, some Realists began to understand that the key regional dynamic was not the Arab-Israeli conflict after all, but the “Arab Cold War”56 for leadership of the region in which pro-Soviet Nasserite forces were ranged against pro-American conservative regimes. Shared Arab hostility to Israel was a secondary issue in this strategic environment. At the same time, the weakness and unreliability of America’s Arab allies contrasted with Israel’s military strength and clear pro-Western orientation such that the Eisenhower Administration, which had previously thought that American support for the creation of Israel was an error, reached the conclusion in 1958 that it made sense for the U.S. “to support Israel as the only strong pro-West power left in the [Middle] East.”57
In the wake of Vietnam, Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon shared the Realist conviction within the old conservative establishment that America was strategically overstretched and that it needed to retrench and move to a policy of détente with the Soviet Union. However, they differed from the Arabist Realists regarding the implications of this for Middle East policy. Arabist Realists took a regional approach; for them détente meant working with the Soviet Union to pressure Israel into a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on Arab terms. In contrast, Nixon and Kissinger took a global approach in which containment of the Soviet Union, especially in areas of vital interest like the Middle East, was the primary concern. Given the need for retrenchment, the Nixon doctrine placed greater emphasis on burden-sharing with allies in place of direct U.S. intervention. Israel and Iran were considered the American allies best placed to play this role in the Middle East. Israel’s victory in the Six Day War had demonstrated its strength, and its designation as a strategic asset was sealed in September 1970, after Israel saved the pro-American regime in Jordan from collapse at the hands of the PLO and Syria, then Soviet allies. In the aftermath, Kissinger increased American aid to Israel tenfold.
Still, viewing Israel as a strategic asset did not mean giving it unconditional support. During and after the Yom Kippur War, the U.S. put enormous pressure on Israel, first to accept a cease-fire and then to withdraw from Egyptian territory in the Sinai desert. Initially this was done to contain the threat of escalation to a global nuclear confrontation and later in order to entice Egypt to switch sides in the Cold War. Nonetheless, Kissinger continued to view a strong Israel as a strategic asset; hence he increased military aid to the Jewish state. In any case, Kissinger absolutely opposed the idea that a comprehensive peace settlement on Arab terms with the active involvement of the Soviets and their radical allies was in the American interest; the whole purpose of his strategy was to exclude the Soviets.58
In the post–Cold War era, Kissingerian realists continued to support active U.S. engagement in international politics. In the 1990s they soberly supported the Middle East peace process as something that strengthened a pro-American balance of power in the region. This strategy also sought to bring Syria and the Palestinians under the U.S. wing through the promotion of a peace process that was designed to lead to Israeli withdrawal, in return not only for peace but for an enhanced security relationship with the United States.59 As under Kissinger, the aim was not simply to benefit Israel, but to reinforce America’s strongest and most reliable ally and thereby reinforce a pro-American balance of power by preventing America’s and Israel’s radical enemies exploiting Israel’s weakened geostrategic position following withdrawals.
One of the main proponents of Kissingerian realism in the conservative discourse was William F. Buckley Jr. in National Review, the leading highbrow conservative magazine in America. Although Buckley sympathized with Israel, he argued that strategic considerations rather than pro-Israel sentiment should guide US foreign policy.60
The New Conservative Mainstream: “Israel Is US”
Foundations
This pro-Israel approach is articulated by an intellectual elite of neoconservatives and by populist nationalists who form the base of the Republican Party. Both these groups became politically mobilized in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and both shifted their political allegiance from the Democrats to the Republicans thereafter. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, this staunchly hawkish pro-Israel approach was absolutely dominant among conservatives and Republicans. They share an offensive grand strategy and a perception of Israel as a “strategic asset,” which is complemented by a strong commitment to Israel independent of strategic considerations.
Populist nationalism61 consists of the instincts, emotions, beliefs, and values of a large section of the American public who put a premium on an “old-fashioned” sense of honor, and who favor a foreign policy based on a strong military and unilateralism. Populist nationalism is historically rooted in the feeling of belonging to a folk community prevalent among the white family farmers in the American heartland. It remains strong among white evangelicals in the South, but it has expanded beyond its geographic and ethnic core to include many black and Hispanic Americans, who have become disproportionally represented in the American military. Populist nationalists have come to form the base of the Republican Party in the South. Populist nationalism has a strong resonance with Tea Party supporters,62 as well as among many white working-class swing voters in the North, known as Reagan Democrats. Within the media, it is expressed by people like Rush Limbaugh and Glenn Beck. Among the political elites, former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld and former vice president Richard Cheney qualify as the more secular representatives of this tradition, while religion has played more of a role for people like the former Republican vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin and the former Republican congressman and House majority leader Dick Armey.
Neoconservatism emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s in reaction to the counterculture, the antiwar movement, and affirmative action – all of which it opposed. At that time, neoconservatives were Democrats who viewed themselves as classical liberals. They had strongly supported the civil rights movement and been skeptical about the Vietnam War. But after the Democratic Party moved leftward under George McGovern and Jimmy Carter, they shifted their allegiances to the Republican Party. Many of the first generation of neoconservatives had been Trotskyites in their youth. Among these founders were Irving Kristol and the editor of Commentary, Norman Podhoretz. Many of the second generation of neoconservatives also had early ties to the left. However, their dominant influence was the hawkish New Deal Democratic senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, for whom many of them worked, including Elliot Abrams, Richard Pearle, Paul Wolfowitz, and Doug Feith; these figures went on to serve in senior posts under George W. Bush. More broadly, neoconservatism draws on the American tradition of conservative internationalism, which Henry Nau argues is embodied in the foreign policies of previous presidents such as Thomas Jefferson, James Polk, and Ronald Reagan.63 Neoconservatism is particularly strong in intellectual circles; as such, their ideas gained significant influence through conservative think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institut
e, and the Center for Security Policy.64
An Offensive Grand Strategy
For both neoconservatives and populist nationalists, the world is sharply divided between America (“the children of light”) and its friends and allies on the one hand, and the enemies of America (“the children of darkness”) on the other hand. The preferred strategy for dealing with these enemies is a hawkish, offensive one, in which the use of force, deterrence, and resolve are key; compromises by the West are viewed as appeasement, which will only be exploited by the enemy. After 9/11 they advocated an offensive interventionist grand strategy to combat the threat from radical Islamic terrorism. Below, a more detailed account of each group’s approach is presented.
Neoconservatism
For the neoconservatives, the divide between liberal democratic ideology and totalitarian ideologies is the most important strategic divide in world politics. It was this antitotalitarianism that caused them to break with the Trotskyite Left in the 1940s. They came to utterly reject the view, which had been influential in their Trotskyite circles, that that there was little difference between imperialist Britain and Nazi Germany. They were deeply disturbed by the failure of a decadent, uncertain, demoralized West to prevent the collapse of the Weimar Republic; deeply disturbed by the failure of appeasement to contain Hitler, and deeply disturbed by the consequences of those failures: the Holocaust. This was true not only for first generation Jewish neocons, but also for Scoop Jackson, who visited Buchenwald just after its liberation, as well as for second-generation neocons like Paul Wolfowitz who lost family in the Holocaust. For the neocons, the cardinal sin is appeasement symbolized by the Munich agreement of 1938; the key lesson is that democracies must stand strong against totalitarianism; which during the Cold War meant Soviet Communism.65 As they saw it, the Cold War was, in essence, a struggle between two ideologies, one good and the other evil. When the Realists promoted détente as a prudent adjustment to shifts in the balance of power; the neoconservatives vehemently retorted that such “appeasement” would fail because Soviet hostility was driven by an inherently aggressive ideology that could not be reasoned with. Instead, they argued for a more offensive strategy of military buildup.66