One way in which Jewish attachment to Israel has traditionally had a political impact is in presidential elections. Although American Jews make up perhaps 4 percent of the national electorate, their electoral significance, especially in presidential elections, is magnified for three reasons. First, their voter turnout is much higher than the American average. Second, they are geographically concentrated in more populous states that counts for more in the Electoral College system. Third, the Jewish vote is important in what are often considered to be swing states.75 In ideological terms, Jews are the most liberal of all religious groups in America, more liberal than even the religiously unaffiliated. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, around 45 percent identified as liberal while about a fifth identified as conservative, roughly the opposite of the responses among the general public.76 In parallel, Jews are also more strongly supportive of the Democratic Party than any other religious group. More than half of American Jews identify with the Democrats, less than a fifth with the Republicans.77 That leaves a swing factor of up to 30 percent in the Jewish vote, and the Israel factor has been a key influence on this swing vote, notably in 1972, 1980, and 1992.78 What effect will the shifts identified above in the demographics of Israel attachment have on the “Israel swing factor”?
In 2008, surveys determined that for more than half of American Jews, Israel was important or very important in determining their voting intensions in the presidential election. However, Israel ranked only eighth out of fifteen issues in importance as a presidential election consideration for Jews as a whole, with only 15 percent choosing Israel as one of their top three issues. Given that Obama’s pro-Israel credentials were a campaign issue, it is significant than only 15 percent, as opposed to the maximum swing of 30 percent, thought that Israel was an issue. In that same 2008 survey, the over-65s were nearly twice as likely to consider Israel as a key issue as the under-35.79 The fact that the older Jews view Israel as a more important issue may indicate that the Israel swing factor is in decline, especially as younger Jewish voters identify with the Democrats more than their parents and grandparents.80
There appeared to be some evidence of this in 2008. In the wake of doubts expressed about Obama’s pro-Israel credentials, he tried to reassure American Jews by visiting Israel and declaring himself a friend of Israel. But he did less than previous candidates; notably, he did not promise to move the American embassy to Jerusalem. The Obama campaign was also willing to make critical comments about the Likud and AIPAC – stating that neither defined what it means to be pro-Israel81 – that were bound to offend some Israel supporters. Evidently, Obama calculated that he did not need to please all of those who rank the Israel factor highly, as many would vote Republican anyway. Indeed, it is likely that a large part of the 20 percent Jewish swing to Obama was to do with the economy and the selection of Sarah Palin as the Republican candidate for vice president, which American Jews did not like because of her conservatism on domestic issues, despite her strong support for Israel.82
On the other hand, a survey conducted for the National Jewish Democratic Council found that a candidate’s support for Israel can create a potential 42-point swing in the vote.83 Still, only brazen disregard for the pro-Israel sentiments of most American Jews could exact such a political price. For as both the director of the Republican Jewish Coalition, Matt Brooks, and the acting director of the National Jewish Democratic Council, Aaron Keyak, admitted in 2013,84 Israel is primarily a threshold issue for American Jews. In other words, so long as a candidate is viewed as sufficiently pro-Israel (even if the candidate is not viewed as the most pro-Israel), the bulk of the Jewish electorate will decide their vote based on other issues.
Nonetheless, the Israel factor does appear to have retained influence. Thus, the 2010 AJC survey indicated growing Jewish concern with President Obama’s handling of U.S.-Israeli relations, with an almost even split on the question. In parallel, for the first time, Jewish support for Obama fell by more than the national average. By mid-2012, Obama’s standing on U.S.-Israel relations had largely recovered. Nonetheless, the Israel factor did seem to impact on the Jewish vote, though not in a way that was important in determining the overall result. Thus, between the 2008 and 2012 elections, Obama’s share of the popular vote fell by 2 percent, while his share of the Jewish vote fell by 5–9 percent.85
There are also some indications that the Israel factor may actually increase in importance. First, Birthright participants are much more likely to consider Israel an important issue in a presidential election. Second, there are the Orthodox, who are growing demographically. In 2008, 80 percent of the Orthodox under thirty-five viewed Israel as a top issue affecting their vote.86 Since 2004 a majority of the Orthodox have voted for the Republican candidate in presidential elections. To some extent the swing to the Republicans is part of a broader trend in which conservative religious groups have come to increasingly identify with the Republicans. However, this is by no means the whole story. In congressional and local elections, where foreign policy is much less of an issue, the Orthodox often vote Democrat. Moreover, Orthodox disapproval of Obama’s handling of U.S.-Israeli relations in 2010–2011 was more than 25 percentage points higher than among Americans Jews in general. This suggests that the Orthodox swing away from the Democrats in presidential elections has a lot to do with the perception that the Republican candidate is better for Israel.87
Pro-Israel Advocacy
Aside from voting, American Jewish attachment to Israel also has a political impact by serving as a recruiting sergeant for pro-Israel advocacy and lobbying. The declining interest of the younger generation in mainstream Jewish organizations and mass demonstrations could indicate a weakening of the foundations of pro-Israel activism. AIPAC itself is not too concerned even if fewer Jews overall can be mobilized, since its membership is larger than ever and it believes that its large core of supporters is what counts politically.88 “Politics,” as one leading professional working in a pro-Israel advocacy organization, told me, “is about those who turn up.” In any case, there are indications that since the onset of the second intifada, the number of pro-Israel activists has actually risen, along with an expansion in the number of start-up pro-Israel advocacy organizations. On top of this, there is the impact over the last decade of increased travel to Israel. Thus, participants in a Birthright trip, subsequent to their return, were two to three times more likely than nonparticipants to be involved in Israel-related activities on campus.89
Pro-Israel activism is not simply a function of American Jewish attachment to Israel. It is also affected by Israeli actions and policies toward American Jewry. Israeli actions have at times discouraged non-Orthodox Jews from getting involved in Israel advocacy because of the State’s approach to non-Orthodox streams of Judaism. Thus, at the height of the “Who is a Jew” controversy in 1988, leading American Jewish organizations, including Hadassah, threatened to stop pro-Israel lobbying unless the Israeli government reversed its position on the issue. If Israeli governments give in to their Ultra-Orthodox coalition partners on issues related to “Who is a Jew,” this could have serious political consequences, reducing the willingness of non-Orthodox American Jews to be politically active on behalf of Israel. Since the Ultra-Orthodox are the fastest-growing sector of Israeli society, this issue could become more contentious in the future. Pro-Israel activism is also affected by American Jewish attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace process. This is examined in detail in the next chapter.
Conclusion
From the 1980s onward, the declining fear of anti-Semitism, the growing strength of the State of Israel, and challenges to the image of Israel as a bastion of liberal values have led American Jews to become far more willing to criticize Israeli actions publicly. However, none of these changes in of themselves decreased attachment to Israel. In contrast, the decline in the sense of Jewish peoplehood did decrease attachment to Israel. Still, this decline has not been uniform. Older, more Orthodox, and aff
iliated Jews tend to retain a stronger sense of Jewish peoplehood and a great sense of attachment to Israel. Intermarried Jews and younger non-Orthodox Jews have a weaker sense of Jewish peoplehood and attachment to Israel. However, this distancing trend among the non-Orthodox has been offset by the growth of Orthodoxy and by increased visits of the young American Jews to Israel through the Birthright Israel program. Overall, American Jews are not distancing themselves from Israel. Yet even as American Jewish attachment has been sustained, the nature of that attachment has changed. In turn, this has changed the way in which the community relates to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is the focus of the next chapter.
7 American Jews and the Peace Process: Divided We Stand?
AIPAC’s great success derives from its capacity to define what it means to be pro-Israel.
—Liz Shrayer, AIPAC political director, 1983–19941
AIPAC doesn’t speak for the entire Jewish community.
—Joseph Biden, vice presidential nominee, 20082
Introduction
For many years American Jewry stood united behind Israel in its struggle against the Arab states and the PLO. This unity found institutional expression in the pro-Israel lobby spearheaded by AIPAC. However, in the wake of the first intifada, vociferous debate over Israeli policy stirred within the community, and in 2008, amid much fanfare and controversy, a new dovish pro-Israel lobby was established: J Street. It challenged the dominant approach of AIPAC and the mainstream and claimed to represent a large slice of American Jewish opinion. This seemed to signal unprecedented Jewish divisions over the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the other hand, the collapse of the peace process in 2000 was blamed on the Arab side by the overwhelming majority of American Jews. Subsequently, AIPAC’s annual conference set new records for attendance and fund-raising.3 Renowned academics John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt claimed that the pro-Israel lobby was all-powerful.4
This apparent contradiction begs the following questions: Is American Jewry increasingly divided over the peace process? What changes have taken place in their approach to the conflict? And what are the political implications of these changes? This chapter answers these questions in two parts. The first part deals with American Jewish attitudes towards the conflict. The second part deals with the approach of the organized Jewish community.
American Jewish Opinion and Discourse over the Peace Process
In general, American Jews have supported peace negotiations between Israel and its neighbors. In the 1970s and 1980s they were generally more willing than Israelis, in principle, to support territorial compromise in the context of a peace treaty and security for Israel.5 Yet paradoxically most thought Israeli policies in practice were about right.6 Whatever their preferences, the bulk of American Jews did not take a strong stand on these issues. As Charles Liebman explained, “Because Israel is a symbol, its particular policies are not very important to American Jews.”7 Since the late 1980s this situation has gradually changed. Whereas in the 1980s approximately a third reported having no opinion in response to survey questions about the future of the West Bank and Gaza, since the early 1990s that figure has fallen to about 10 percent.8
Preferences on the Core Issues: Palestinian Statehood, Settlements, and Jerusalem
The American Jewish Committee (AJC) has been conducting an annual survey of American Jewish opinion for many years.9 They have consistently asked questions regarding three of the main substantive issues of the peace process: Palestinian statehood, settlements, and Jerusalem. The answers to these questions are summarized in Table 7.1. Between 1993 and 2010, a majority consistently opposed handing over part of Jerusalem to the Palestinians, but a significant minority was willing to do so, with the number rising from 30 percent in 1993 to 44 percent in 2001, in the wake of Israel’s willingness to divide the city during peace talks, before falling back again when the peace process collapsed.10 Nonetheless, a majority has generally supported the creation of a Palestinian state “in the current context,” though a large minority has been opposed;11 after Hamas took control of Gaza, support for a Palestinian state eroded.12 On settlements, a majority have consistently expressed a willingness to withdraw from some settlements, though at least a third has been consistently unwilling to dismantle any settlements. An extensive 2013 survey by Pew indicates the prevalence of negative attitudes toward the settlements, with a plurality believing that settlements hurt Israeli security.13
Table 7.1. American Jewish Opinion on the Peace Process, 1993–2010 (%)
1. In current situation, do you favor or oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state?
* * *
favoroppose
2007–2010 48 43
2000–2006 55 39
1998–1999 43 48
1993–1994 55 32
* * *
2. In the framework of a permanent peace with the Palestinians, should Israel be willing to compromise on the status of Jerusalem as a united city under Israeli jurisdiction?
* * *
YesNo
2007–2010 36 59
1999–2006 40 54
1993–1998 33 61
* * *
3. As part of a permanent settlement with the Palestinians, should Israel be willing to dismantle all, some, or none of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank?
* * *
AllSomeNone
2009–2010 8 54 35
2000–2005 12 53 33
1995–1999 5 52 40
* * *
Data from American Jewish Committee’s annual surveys of American Jewish Opinion15
When asked in polls conducted by dovish Jewish organizations if they would support the creation of a Palestinian state and withdrawal from settlements in the context of a permanent agreement that guaranteed Israel’s peace and security, support for a Palestinian state rose to 80–90 percent,14 and a plurality supported withdrawal from most settlements, though opposition to a divided Jerusalem remained, when it was addressed as a stand-alone issue.16 Still, when asked about a package similar to the Clinton Parameters for a permanent agreement including the division of Jerusalem, three-quarters endorsed it.17
How can the difference between this apparently dovish consensus and the divisions apparent in the AJC polls be explained? Since the 1980s there was always a large gap between what American Jews were prepared to agree to immediately and what they were prepared to agree to in the context of a peace agreement that guaranteed Israeli security. The consensus in favor of a Palestinian state and withdrawal from many settlements holds so long as American Jews really believe that genuine peace and security will ensue for Israel. So the key question is whether they think there is a partner for peace.
In this regard, during periods of conflict negative beliefs about Arab intentions increased and the willingness for compromise declined.19 This effect was most noticeable after the 1991 Gulf War, during the course of which the PLO sided with Iraq, whose SCUD missiles struck at Israel. Since the collapse of the peace process in 2000, American Jews have become more skeptical about the chances of reaching a permanent peace, with the proportion of those distrusting Arab intentions rising to about three-quarters throughout the first decade of the new millennium. (See Table 7.2.)
Table 7.2. “The Goal of the Arabs Is Not the Return of Occupied Territories But Rather the Destruction of Israel”
* * *
Agree (%)Disagree (%)
2001–2010 77 19
1994–1995 53 39
1993 42 50
* * *
Data from American Jewish Committee annual surveys of American Jewish Opinion18
Even when the centrist Israeli government led by Ehud Olmert was negotiating with the Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas in 2007, more than half thought that the negotiations would not lead to peace, compared to just a third who were more optimistic.20 Overall, there was a strong correlation between those who believed that the goal of the Arabs was the return of territories rather than the destruction of Israel, (about a fifth o
f those surveyed by the AJC) and those that were more willing to support Israeli compromises.21 This strongly suggests that a major factor inhibiting many American Jews from supporting compromises in practice that they support in theory is a lack of faith in Arab intentions.
Attitudes to Israeli Policy: Right and Left
In 1993, immediately following the signing of the Oslo Accords, 84 percent of American Jews supported Oslo, and only 9 percent opposed.22 There were two main reasons for the extremely high level of support. First of all, Americans Jews had previously favored negotiating with the PLO if it recognized Israel and abandoned terrorism; this the PLO formally did in the Oslo Accords. Second, the Accords were initiated by the Israeli government, headed by the military hero of the Six Day War and former ambassador to the U.S., Yitzhak Rabin, without external pressure; this, too, served to widen support. The importance of an action being taken freely by the Israeli government was evident again in 2005, when 62 percent supported the Disengagement from Gaza, which included the evacuation of all eight thousand settlers and all the settlements there; only 23 percent were opposed.23 In contrast, when the initiative for compromise on settlements came from the U.S. administration, the position of the Jewish public was more equivocal and divided. Thus, a March 2009 poll sponsored by J Street indicated that 60 percent opposed expanding West Bank settlements.24 However, in a September 2009 AJC poll, only 40 percent supported Obama’s call for a settlement freeze, with 51 percent opposed.25
The Arab_Israeli Conflict Page 23