In general, Labor has been more popular than Likud.26 Approximately 60 percent of American Jews preferred Labor in the 1996 elections, and a larger majority preferred Barak over Netanyahu in the 1999 elections.27 Still, about 60 percent consistently had a favorable view of Netanyahu as prime minister and thought he was handling the peace process well. In contrast, in 1997 only 24 percent had a favorable view of Arafat. In March 1999, 43 percent thought Netanyahu was not doing enough to implement the Wye Agreements, but 88 percent thought that the Palestinian Authority was not doing enough.28 In other words, even if the majority of American Jews would not have voted for Netanyahu and harbored criticisms of his policies, he retained their support. Indeed, when Netanyahu returned to power in 2009, 60 percent of American Jews felt warmth for him, only 1 percent less than received by the leader of the center-left opposition, Tzippi Livni.29
Again, part of the reason for this situation lies in American Jews’ understanding of who is to blame for the collapse of the peace process in 2000. The unprecedented concessions offered by Barak on the one hand and Arafat’s rejection of those compromises and role in fanning violence during the second intifada on the other hand led American Jews to unequivocally blame the Palestinians for the collapse of the peace process. Thus, in the 2002 AJC survey, 80 percent thought that the Palestinians were responsible for the violence.30 A similar proportion approved of Operation Cast Lead against Hamas in Gaza while holding Hamas responsible for the violence. Against this backdrop, in 2010, 91 percent thought that Israel was doing more to bring peace than the Palestinians.31 Still, when the focus of attention shifted to negotiations between the center-right Netanyahu government and the relatively moderate Abbas, attitudes shifted somewhat. Thus in 2013, a plurality of American Jews did not think that the Netanyahu government was making a sincere effort to make peace. However, even then, over three times as many thought that the Israeli government was sincere as compared to the Palestinian leadership.32
Criticism and Pressure
AJC polls demonstrate that in principle, a majority of between half and two-thirds consistently believe that American Jews should support the policy of the elected government of Israel regardless of an individual’s view. On the other hand, a similar majority has consistently supported the right to criticize Israeli policy.33 Evidently the American Jewish public respects the right to freedom of speech and dissent while continuing to identify with the approach of the mainstream pro-Israel lobby. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that from 1992 to 2008, 66 to 83 percent of American Jews thought that the U.S. should support Israel over the Palestinians.34
Then there is the vexed issue of U.S. pressure on Israel to promote the peace process. Traditionally, American Jews opposed such pressure.35 However, a 1998 AJC poll showed them almost evenly divided on the issue, while an Israel Policy Forum survey demonstrated that three-quarters were in favor of pressure on both sides.36 Polls conducted by J Street (2008–2010) also showed that more than 70 percent were willing to support pressure on both sides to help achieve peace. Taken together, these polls demonstrate that American Jews remained more or less evenly divided on the theoretical question of whether the U.S. should publicly criticize or pressure Israel – assuming it was Israel that was blocking a peace agreement from being reached.37
However, these results overstate the willingness to pressure Israel in practice because, as noted above, American Jews overwhelmingly believed that the Arab side has been the main block on peace. Thus, by margins of 60 to 28 percent and 48 to 14 percent, a large majority thought that in practice the U.S. should generally support the Israeli government position.38 In any case, there is only majority support for pressure when it is applied on both sides by a president who is viewed as sympathetic to Israel, and only if there is perceived to be a real chance for advancing peace.
American Jewish Attitudes: Dissecting Demographic Distinctions
The Orthodox are consistently far more hawkish than any other demographic. Indeed, Orthodoxy is by far the most significant variable determining opinion to the peace process.39 About two-thirds of the Orthodox were unwilling to compromise on Jerusalem, settlements, or a Palestinian state, compared to about a quarter of Conservative, Reform, and “Just Jews.”40 Over half of the Orthodox opposed the 2005 Disengagement from Gaza, while two-thirds of the non-Orthodox supported it.41 These differences among the Jewish public were reflected in the positions of the respective movements’ rabbis.42
Political ideology also plays a major role in explaining divisions of opinion. Analysis of the AJC surveys from 2000 to 2005 demonstrates that liberals were twice as likely as conservatives to support a Palestinian state and compromise on Jerusalem and settlements.43 Similarly, in a 2010 survey, 62 percent of conservatives opposed dismantling any settlements, compared to a third of moderates and 13 percent of the liberals.44 To a significant degree, religious Orthodoxy and political conservatism reinforce each other, since the Orthodox are much more likely to be politically conservative than the non-Orthodox. The same overlap exists regarding party identification. Thus, while a plurality of Jewish Republicans thought that settlements helps Israeli security, a majority of Jewish Democrats thought that settlements hurt Israeli security (see Table 7.3).45
Table 7.3. Settlements and Israeli Security, 2013 (%)
* * *
HelpsHurtsMakes No Difference
All Jews 17 44 29
Orthodox 34 16 39
Conservative 23 36 30
Reform 23 50 26
No denomination 13 48 31
* * *
Data from Pew Research Center46
This opinion divide was also reflected in focus groups conducted in 2008.47 In these discussions three discourses were apparent: center, Left, and Right. Notwithstanding increasing polarization at the margins, the overwhelmingly dominant discourse was that of the center. The centrists were deeply affected by the collapse of the peace process in 2000. As they viewed it, the Palestinians were offered everything but walked away from the deal. For centrists the main problem was the lack of a partner on the Palestinian/Arab side. They did not view this as inevitable, but as a function of political choices made by the Palestinian leadership and the promotion of vitriolic anti-Israel themes in Palestinian educational institutions and more widely in their discourse, including the depiction of Jews in anti-Semitic terms and the production of school maps that do not show Israel. With the collapse of the Oslo process, discussion of historical and religious rights had been marginalized; the issue of Israeli security and whether any peace agreement would be secure and lasting became the primary focus of concern. There remained a willingness to make major territorial concessions in principle, but the main issue was whether the Palestinian side was really prepared to accept and honor a peace deal; on this the mainstream was skeptical. Consequently, while they would have liked to see the U.S. engaged in mediating the conflict, that view was balanced by a simultaneous desire for the U.S. to be supportive of Israel against her enemies. These mainstream themes were clearly dominant in the Reform, Conservative, and unaffiliated groups.
Meanwhile, the left-wing discourse was prevalent among members of Reconstructionist synagogues, college students, and members of Jewish peace organizations. They placed a much greater degree of blame on Israel both for the conflict in general and for the collapse of the peace process in 2000. They emphasized that Israel must immediately withdraw from the West Bank in order to protect its Jewish majority and democratic character. Several speakers contended that, as a consequence of the occupation, Israel does not presently qualify as a democracy.48 For some, like Peter Beinart, this critique is part of a broader call for American Jews to not automatically support any Israeli government, but rather to take sides inside Israel by supporting liberals against the Right. Beinart views this call as in the tradition of Brandeis’s American Zionism, which emphasized that support for Zionism was as much to do with progressive liberal values, as with a sense of Jewish peoplehood. Beinart and others al
so tend to think that the mainstream discourse exaggerates the level of security threat Israel faces.49 These types of views were likely to be the dominant voice in the left-wing Jewish periodical Tikkun, run by Michael Lerner. Another major source informing this outlook is the liberal Israeli newspaper Haaretz, which has had an online English language edition since the late 1990s. While anti-/post-Zionism is marginal among identifying Jews, it has been much discussed within the community, due to Jewish intellectuals promoting this stance in mainstream publications. One notable example is Tony Judt’s article “Israel: The Alternative,” which appeared in the New York Review of Books. It called the very idea of a Jewish state anachronistic, while calling for the dissolution of the Zionist enterprise.50
Finally, there is the right-wing discourse, to which the Orthodox are primarily drawn. The hallmark of this discourse was its utter rejection of the possibility of reaching a secure peace settlement with the Palestinians under any terms. As one participant put it, “I see very little difference between the Palestinians’ attitude toward Jews and Israel, and Hitler’s attitude.”51 Such a hawkish outlook is predominant. The Jewish Press strongly opposed the Oslo process in the 1990s; one article compared the Rabin government to a “Judenrat” handing over Jews to be killed by Arafat.52 Many Orthodox Jews’ opposition was informed by their belief that was wrong to cede territory for national and religious reasons. Many have spent a gap year in Israel studying in religious seminaries run by the followers of Rabbi Abraham Kook, who form the ideological backbone of the settler movement in Israel.53 Still, since 2000, the arguments presented by the Orthodox in focus groups were grounded less on these claims and more on the perception that the idea of peace was a dangerous illusion.54
Resolving the Unity/Disunity Paradox
In one sense then, American Jews are deeply divided about the conflict. They have divergent perspectives regarding the degree of compromise Israel should make in principle and the degree to which the U.S. should pressure Israel to achieve peace. These differences are informed primarily by political ideology and religious Orthodoxy, and they are reflected in vigorous debate about these issues in the media, and increasingly within Jewish organizational life, as we will see in the next section. However, in a deeper sense there is still a large mainstream consensus regarding the conflict. Ideologically, American Jews remain very strongly committed to the Zionist idea of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. On this, there is no difference between the denominations. More than 90 percent of Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Jews back the idea that the Palestinians should recognize Israel as a Jewish state in a final peace agreement.55 While on the strategic level, the Palestinians are viewed as overwhelmingly responsible for the lack of peace. Crucially, were American Jews to believe that a partner for peace existed that would ensure that Israel obtained true peace and security, then there would be consensual support for the establishment of a Palestinian state and the removal of a great many settlements. These underlying elements of consensus significantly constrain the intensity of ideological divisions.
The Organized Jewish Community and the Peace Process, 1973–2000: From Consensus to Pluralism
In the interwar period, American Jewry’s lobbying efforts for Zionism were hampered by internal divisions. However, by the 1950s a more coordinated, centralized structure emerged as support for Israel became part of a cross-communal consensus. There are now several large mainstream American Jewish organizations that lobby for Israel: notably, the AJC, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the Jewish Council of Public Affairs (JCPA), the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, and AIPAC. JCPA and the Conference of Presidents are umbrella organizations that operate on the basis of consensus. AIPAC is the most important pro-Israel organization; unlike the others, its agenda is solely focused on Israel. It has one hundred thousand dues-paying members and holds an annual policy conference that has often draws half the members of Congress.
Until the late 1980s the dominant approach within the organized Jewish community was one of consensual solidarity. Widespread support for Israel was channeled via large, centralized, communal institutions that focused on securing foreign aid and preventing pressure on Israel. The approach entailed the acceptance of Israeli political leadership through an internal communal consensus that presented a unified public line in support of Israeli policies in public. Internal disagreements and criticisms of Israeli policy were aired only in private. As ADL head Abe Foxman put it, “Israeli democracy should decide; American Jews should support.”56 The norm of consensual solidarity was evident when the right-wing Likud first came to power in Israel in 1977. At that time, a delegation of the top American Jewish leaders visited Israel. All the delegates opposed the construction of settlements promoted by Likud, but no one spoke out.57 However, by the 1990s a shift was taking place in American Jewry’s approach to Israel in the context of the peace process away from a centrally mediated, unified, consensual, deferential approach toward a more direct, polarized, pluralistic, assertive approach. American Jewish solidarity with Israel remains strong, but by the 1990s it was shifting from consensual solidarity to a more pluralistic form of solidarity.
The norms of consensual solidarity were first challenged in 1973 with the formation of Breira (Hebrew for “choice”). Though avowedly Zionist, it bucked the Israeli consensus at the time by publicly supporting the creation of a Palestinian state. It also challenged the taboo on criticizing Israeli policy publicly. Breira quickly disappeared, but other organizations such as New Jewish Agenda and Americans for Peace Now were formed that adopted similar positions, though all of this occurred at the periphery of the organized community.58
The first major incident affecting the mainstream occurred during the 1982 Lebanon War, when established American Jewish leaders expressed public criticism of Israeli policy. A more sustained assault on consensual solidarity followed the outbreak of the first intifada in December 1987. The leaders of tens of Jewish organizations placed a newspaper advertisement informing Likud prime minister Yitzhak Shamir that while they continued to support Israel, they opposed his policies. Forceful attempts were made to pass antisettlement resolutions in the JCPA.59 Seymour Reich, the outgoing chairman of the Presidents Conference, publicly condemned settlements.60
Things became especially heated in the wake of the George H. W. Bush administration’s demand that Israel freeze settlement activity in return for a U.S. government guarantee on $10 billion of loans designed to facilitate the absorption of a million Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union. AIPAC and the other mainstream organizations, including those personally opposed to settlements, dutifully lobbied against the linkage. But after having failed, Shoshanna Cardin of the Presidents Conference publicly criticized the Israeli finance minister for stating that settlements were more important than loan guarantees, and even Abe Foxman criticized the Likud government for its lack of realism and its insensitivity to embarrassing American Jews.61
With the rise of the Labor party to power in 1992 and the onset of the Oslo process in 1993, the American Jewish debate over the peace process became far more vociferous. This involved not only criticism of Israeli policy from the Left and the Right, but it also involved lobbying the American government to adopt policies opposed by the Israeli government. Between 1993 and 1996, right-wing American Jewish organizations such as the ZOA, Americans for a Safe Israel, American Friends of Likud, and the Jewish Institute for National Security (JINSA) lobbied in the US against Israeli government policies. For example, in 1994 the ZOA successfully lobbied Congress to institute the Specter-Shelby Amendment regarding U.S. aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Both the Israeli government and AIPAC opposed the amendment.62
Subsequently, between 1996 and 1999 American Jewish liberal groups such as the newly formed Israel Policy Forum (IPF) and Americans for Peace Now (APN) gained influence with the Clinton administration, and they lobbied for U.S. pressure on the Netanyahu government to push forward the peace proces
s. In the wake of the decision to construct the settlement of Har Homa in Jerusalem, even a mainstream representative umbrella organization, the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council (NJCRAC) passed a resolution urging the Israeli government to show “maximum restraint” on settlements by calling for a freeze and an end to housing subsidies in the settlements. Other mainstream Reform and Conservative leaders, as well as former leading figures within AIPAC and the Presidents Conference, also backed the administration’s call for a settlement freeze.63
Explaining the Shift from Consensual to Pluralistic Solidarity
As is evident above, in the 1990s the conventional, centrally mediated, unified, consensual, and deferential approach eroded, as a more direct, diverse, and assertive approach became more prevalent. Organized American Jewry continued to show solidarity with Israel, but there was a shift from the norms of consensual solidarity to a more pluralistic form of solidarity. Four factors lay behind this change.
First, there was the influence of political and strategic changes in the Middle East. When the Arab world had been implacably opposed to Israel’s existence, debate about what Israel should be willing to surrender for peace was largely mute, since there did not appear to be any realistic chance of peace in any case. However, as the peace process took off, it began to generate a debate about how serious these moves were and what price was worth paying. This debate started in Israel in earnest before it reached American Jewry, but eventually American Jews also became involved, having been influenced by the different positions adopted by Left and Right in Israel. As the Israeli debate polarized during the 1980s, it became easier for American Jews to disagree with Israeli government policy while remaining identified with significant groups in Israel itself. The willingness to break with the consensus was strongly reinforced in the 1990s when Israel reversed long-standing policies regarding the PLO and withdrawal from the Golan. For years Arafat had been compared to Hitler and the Golan declared to be of vital strategic importance. It was not so easy for many American Jews to turn on a dime and support diametrically opposite policies.
The Arab_Israeli Conflict Page 24