Going Deep

by Lawrence Goldstone

  Two men from shore rushed aboard as soon as they could reach the boat, went below and pulled each crewman in turn from the interior. The men recovered and the incident might have passed as just one of the inevitable mishaps that come with testing any complex new invention, except that among the spectators for that run were a greater than usual number of reporters and two present or former United States Senators, William Stewart of Nevada and Matthew Butler of South Carolina, whose continued support would be crucial in persuading the navy to finally disburse the funds to build the boat.

  Afterward, “those on board refused to talk about the matter,” although as everyone present was aware, “had the incident happened when the boat was out in the bay, all the men would doubtless have been killed.”10

  Although Cable noted, “The talk went that this was the last of the submarine,” the incident did not result in a setback. The gas leak was dismissed as a minor malfunction easily repaired. Just why the two senators were not more alarmed at the near death of the entire crew was a mystery, unless one considers the coincidental rumors that Frost and Rice had agreed to hold blocks of Electric Boat stock in trust for certain key supporters both in the navy and in government. In fact, a former navy captain, William H. Jaques, once president of Holland Torpedo Boat, a post that had been entirely ceremonial, dissatisfied with the amount of stock he had received when Rice bought the company, had allegedly threatened to expose the stock-parking scheme, but Frost’s Washington attorneys had succeeded in having any congressional investigation squelched.

  Rice was apparently unconcerned because just one week later, he bought out the remaining interest in Electro-Dynamic and folded it into Electric Boat. The purchase included two factories, one in Newark, New Jersey, and the other in Philadelphia.

  In addition to senators, reporters, American naval officers, and thousands of members of the public who came to watch trial runs of the Holland in Little Peconic Bay, there was occasionally another category of spectator. In early October, “before the submarine boat left her moorings Herr Wellenkamp and Baron Captain A. von Rebeur Paschwitz, naval attaché to the German embassy at Washington, escorted by Mr. John P. Holland, inventor of the boat, visited the vessel and spent nearly two hours inspecting the interior of the strange craft.” Their interest went beyond dockside inspections. “Wellenkamp, constructor in the German navy, who is visiting the United States to inspect the larger shipbuilding plants and investigating the naval methods of this country, were on board the submarine boat. They were very favorably impressed with the mechanism of the vessel and pleased with her performances.”11 Wellenkamp was later quoted as saying, “In the hands of competent men, the boat would prove a formidable weapon.”

  On November 6, 1899, the Holland was finally ready for its official trial. The boat would run a straight course for one mile submerged, then quickly surface, fire a torpedo at a target, and then dive again. Under the water, it would reverse course and return to the starting point at full speed. Another torpedo would be loaded in the tube and fired, again at full speed, and a third torpedo would be fired while the vessel was on the surface. In addition, there would be a series of required maneuvers, including quick diving and surfacing, and rapid changes of course while submerged.

  Before the launch, members of the Naval Board of Inspection and Survey, including a rear admiral, a captain, a builder, and two engineers, “went into the Holland as she lay at the dock and minutely examined the mechanism and workings, and satisfied themselves that the required conditions as to the boat itself existed.”12 Since none of them knew anything about submarine navigation, how insightful an inspection they were capable of is problematic. The one man who had been present for earlier trials and knew the Holland’s workings intimately, a highly experienced naval engineer, Captain John Lowe, remained aboard the lighthouse tender that would serve as another of the observation posts during the test.

  After satisfying themselves that the Holland looked the part inside, the board members repaired to an accompanying tender, the Cactus, where they would observe the test and decide if the refurbished Holland demonstrated the fitness to attack and sink enemy surface vessels. John Holland remained the public face of the company, and it was Holland to whom the board members addressed their questions. They virtually ignored Frost; Charles Creecy, a Washington, DC, lawyer and old friend of E. B. Frost’s father, who acted as the company’s representative in the capital; and even Rice himself, all of whom were also aboard.

  As the test was to begin, “the Holland was sighted gliding along at an eight knot rate . . . looking not unlike the back of a small whale as she bore down on the starting point. Suddenly, two short, sharp toots of the Holland’s whistle announced the beginning of the trials. Within a boat length of the first two flags which mark the course, the Holland dove quickly beneath the surface and sped along at a depth of five feet.”13 The boat descended to nine feet—the depth could be measured by the flags mounted on twelve foot poles fore and aft—completed its run, surfaced, fired a torpedo, dove quickly and returned to its starting point. That sequence, as well as subsequent aspects of the trial, were completed smoothly and without incident. Although the board members refused to comment, the consensus among other observers was that the boat had handled brilliantly, meeting or exceeding every standard, even those the navy had made more stringent the previous year. Buttressing that view was a strong subsequent performance by Electric Boat stock, attributable according to stockbrokers to “the success of the recent tests of the Holland submarine.” Within two weeks, the stock would appreciate an additional 25 percent.

  The test run was big news away from Wall Street as well. Across America, people once again read of the “Terror of the Seas,” the “Engine of War,” and the “Great Destroyer”—the mysterious wraithlike vessel that could sink any battleship. The Holland was described as having almost supernatural powers, in terms similar to death rays in the 1950s or neutron bombs in the 1980s.

  On November 14, the board made its recommendations to the secretary of the navy in a report written by Captain Lowe. It was made public two days afterward. For once, the official reaction was a match for the breathless prose in the press. “The Holland is a successful and veritable submarine torpedo boat capable of making an attack upon an enemy unseen and undetectable and that therefore she is an engine of warfare of terrible potency which the government must necessarily adopt into its service.” Lowe, who had been in the navy for four decades and had suffered through the ebbs and flows of modernizing the fleet, added some personal remarks. “Concerning the worse than worthlessness of the present above water torpedo system, its methods, theories, and appliances, the need for a deliverance from its absurdities and from the fool’s paradise of its false security and instead the absolute need of a real torpedo system . . . a submarine service should at once be organized as a matter of necessity and security. The government should at once purchase the Holland and not let the secret of the invention get out of the United States.”14

  E. B. Frost then asked the navy to buy the boat for $165,000, a not unreasonable number since almost a quarter-million dollars had already been spent in developing it. He and Rice also decided that it was time to bring the Holland in from the provinces and allow government officials in Washington to see what they were buying. They had the boat sailed from New Suffolk to Bay Ridge in Brooklyn, and from there to Elizabethport, in preparation for bringing it to the capital.

  The timing for the move seemed perfect. In the wake of the board’s unqualified praise, rumors of a planned new submarine fleet abounded. On November 18, the Washington Evening Times, published an article whose headline read, “The Navy May Ask for Fifty Holland Boats,” and that “The New York Tests of the Craft Promise a Revolution in Fighting at Sea—Could Easily Destroy the Largest Battleship—Highly Praised by the Board of Inspection.” Newspapers discussed the purchase of the Holland submarine as if it had already been approved, or at least that approval was only a formality. The recent “very s
trong report” of Captain Lowe urging purchase “by the Government of the vessel and all patent rights connected therewith, has, it is thought, removed all doubt as to the practical character of the vessel as an engine of naval warfare.”15

  Certainty in the press, however, was not matched within the navy itself. The rear admiral in charge of construction claimed to “know nothing in an official way about the Holland boat.” Still the admiral, as well as any number of other officials interviewed by the newspaper all agreed that, if the report was accurate, the Holland submarine would be a vital component of any modern navy, and that its existence would change naval battle tactics forever.

  Movement within the navy and Congress remained desultory. If the American navy could not muster the will to commit to the (American) undersea miracle, the press reported, others were eager to. On November 23, an article was syndicated across America, with the headline, “Great Britain Wants the Holland.”

  Captain Charles T. Ottley R. N. naval attaché to her majesty’s embassy to the United States came from Washington today for the purpose of inspecting the Holland boat on behalf of his government. He was taken to the boat, which is moored in the Atlantic Yacht club basin in Brooklyn, by John P. Holland who explained the workings of the vessel to the captain. For more than two hours Captain Ottley looked over the boat. He seemed very much impressed with what he saw and when asked his opinion, said, “It is my intention to recommend to the board of admiralty of the British government that they immediately consider the merits of the Holland with a view to adopting vessels of her type into the British navy. She is, to my mind, the most formidable type of submarine boat and has demonstrated that she is the only successful one. The vessel could not only be used in keeping the harbor and the coasts free from invading fleets but with vessels of the Holland type there would need be no fear of submarine mine or other obstructions to navigation as she could destroy them readily. It is my opinion that there is no question that the submarine boat has come to stay and that such boats can be reckoned on in future naval warfare.”16

  The following day, another syndicated article appeared, “France Wants the Holland.” It began, “Lieutenant Gontran De Faramond De Lafajole, naval attaché of the French embassy, Washington, DC, and M. Louis Revier, naval engineer, representing the French government, have been in the city recently inspecting the Holland boat and it is announced that negotiations have been entered into between the representatives of the French government and the company controlling the submarine torpedo boat for the construction of several vessels of the Holland type and also for the exclusive use of the patents for the submarine boat for the French government.”17

  Although each report seemed authoritative enough, neither was followed by an actual sale nor by an announcement by Electric Boat that a sale was pending. The British and French representatives vanished from the newspapers as quickly as they had appeared. But the public was being fed a steady stream of positive publicity, which could not help but to increase the pressure on their elected representatives.

  On December 2, the Holland left its old berth in New Jersey, accompanied by the tender Josephine. The original plan was for the boat to make its way down the Atlantic coast, but no insurer would cover an ocean route, so an inland course through New Jersey on the Raritan Canal was chosen instead. Frank Cable, now permanently installed as captain, reported that everywhere he cruised, large crowds lined the banks to cheer.

  The Holland reached Washington on December 19, and was assigned a berth at the navy yard. Holland, who had traveled by rail with Frost, was there to meet his boat as it pulled into the dock with Frank Cable, in a new custom-made captain’s uniform, striding across the deck. Senator Stewart had already introduced a bill authorizing the navy to purchase the boat but it was still pending. Accordingly, Frost arranged for a series of test voyages, similar to those carried out in Peconic Bay, to convince any remaining skeptics of the boat’s worth.

  The trial runs in Washington went every bit as well as had those in Peconic Bay. Finally, on March 14, 1900, the Holland was exhibited on a test run between Fort Washington and Mount Vernon before an elite group of naval officers, political leaders, and other men of influence. The most important of the guests was Admiral George Dewey, then a national icon, “the hero of Manila Bay,” but also present were Rear Admiral Rodgers and Captain Emory of the advisory board, William Kimball, now a lieutenant commander, “who commanded the torpedo boat flotilla during the late war in Cuban waters,” the navy’s judge advocate general, two builders, five senators, an assistant attorney general, and the assistant secretary of the navy. Secretary John D. Long, who continued to resist issuing an official endorsement of the submarine project, was listed as “unable to attend.” E. B. Frost, Charles Creecy, and John Holland joined these men aboard the yacht Sylph to observe the trial, while Isaac Rice remained on the Josephine. Lieutenant Harry Caldwell, Admiral Dewey’s personal aide was assigned to sail with the Holland during the test run.

  The exhibition, which included the firing of torpedoes, a series of quick, porpoise-like dives, and long runs under the surface, went spectacularly well. Subsequent demonstrations for other naval officers and members of foreign legations were equally impressive and momentum generated by the Holland at long last became inexorable. The following month, the House Committee on Naval Affairs held hearings to decide whether or not, finally, to purchase the boat. Admiral Dewey was the first to testify. In his opening remarks, he said, “The boat did everything that the owners proposed to do. And I said then, and I have said it since, that if they had had two of those things in Manila, I never could have held it with the squadron I had. The moral effect—to my mind it is infinitely superior to mines or torpedoes or anything of the kind. With those craft moving under water it would wear people out. With two of these in Galveston, all the navies of the world could not blockade that place. I think it would be money well spent. I think it would tend to keep peace. That is what we want a navy for. We want peace.”18

  Rear Admiral James Edward “Fighting Jim” Jouett, who had helped Admiral David Farragut blockade Mobile during the Civil War, added, “If I commanded a squadron that was blockading a port and the enemy had half a dozen of these Holland submarine boats, I would be compelled to abandon the blockade and put to sea to avoid the destruction of my ships from an invisible source and from which I could not defend myself.”19 Rear Admiral Philip Hichborn, head of the navy’s Bureau of Construction and Repair was equally insistent that the navy add submarines to the fleet and that it train constructors to build them. William Kimball and Lewis Nixon also testified, as did Harry Caldwell and a series of other junior officers all engineers, all in favor of the navy acquiring the Holland.

  The final witness was John Holland, the only representative of the Holland Torpedo Boat Company to be called. After recounting the difficulties he had experienced in getting the navy to first show any interest in his invention, and then to live up to the rules of its own competitions, Holland was asked by legislators if he would be willing to turn over all his patents, both domestic and foreign, to the United States government, if he was paid appropriately. He was also asked if he was a United States citizen. Holland assured the congressman that he would be pleased to do so and keep the submarine as the exclusive property of the United States. The committee members seemed unaware that the patents were no longer Holland’s to sell.

  When the hearings ended, as a result of unstinting praise from senior line officers, especially Admiral Dewey, opposition to the Holland evaporated, and in April 1900, the navy purchased its first ever submarine for $150,000. Two months later, Congress approved another appropriation for the purchase of five additional boats.

  Thus, after years of delay, Isaac Rice within fifteen months had secured contracts for the Electric Boat Company for six new submarines of the “improved Holland type,” each to cost no more than $170,000.* The navy also agreed to cancel the Plunger contract if Electric Boat would return the $85,000 it had paid out in
construction fees, which the company happily agreed to do. To ease the pain, the navy ordered an additional boat. They also assigned a military crew to learn the submarine’s operation. Lieutenant Caldwell had requested he be allowed to captain the vessel, and both Dewey and the navy agreed.

  The Holland was sailed regularly in the ensuing months, Caldwell taking on more and more of the responsibilities of command, and at the end of September, off Newport, Rhode Island, it was deemed ready for an unprecedented test. For the first time in United States naval history, a submarine was to take an active role in a mock battle at sea.

  The war game was an extensive, complex exercise involving almost twenty ships in which a large attacking force, including three battleships, would attempt to circumvent a blockade manned by a much smaller force, and then sink the single battleship behind the blockade line. One of the three attacking battleships was the Kearsarge, which led the flotilla. Guarding the defending battleship Massachusetts was one cruiser, a single gunboat, a tug . . . and the Holland. On the second day of the exercise, the Holland, under the command of Lieutenant Caldwell, sailed quietly from its mooring and headed for the opposing fleet more than seven miles away. In a letter to Congress, Caldwell described his voyage.

  The Holland left the Torpedo Station at sundown and was placed in a partially submerged condition with the turret and about six inches of the hull above water, ready to dive at short notice. Cruised in this condition to S and E of Brenton’s Reef Lightship. Sighted two vessels of blockading fleet and fired torpedo signal at them, but was not answered, and they disappeared before I could ascertain their identity. About 9 P.M., about seven SS. from harbor entrance, sighted U.S.S. Kearsarge within range and fired torpedo signal. Followed her and getting within 100 yards without being discovered, showed light, hailed her and informed her commanding officer that she had been torpedoed. The Holland was not seen by any vessel of the blockading fleet or torpedo boat, although she was within range of three of the former and several of the latter. I consider that the attack was a success because the Holland could in all probability have torpedoed three blockading vessels without being discovered.20