The American Military

by Brad D. Lookingbill

  Lacking a formal program for professional training, the Navy offered midshipmen little more than a life of debauchery at sea. Crews suffered rough justice under the high-handed authority of commanders, who administered floggings, lashings, rationings, and hangings. On board full-fledged warships, salty officers demanded teamwork, deference, and routine. In port, the best recruits attended shore academies to learn the naval sciences needed to complement the practical skills acquired on sea duty. For instance, a naval lyceum, museum, and library operated at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. Opening in 1839, the Naval Asylum School at Philadelphia provided a shore-based training environment, where midshipmen studied for their lieutenant's examinations. Journals such as the Army and Navy Chronicle provided professional forums in which to disseminate new information, to express common concerns, and to discuss best practices. Even so, naval education relied mostly upon apprenticeships for learning on the job.

  In 1842, the inadequacies of the system became apparent on board the U.S.S. Somers, a naval brig housing an experimental school for apprentices. Sailing from New York on September 13, the sleek 103-foot craft was commanded by Captain Alexander Slidell MacKenzie. It carried 110 men and boys on a cruise to the coast of Africa, although its design comfortably accommodated no more than 75. Infractions on board resulted in floggings with the colt, a one-stranded, less damaging version of the cat-o'-nine-tails. Worst of all, 19-year-old Philip Spencer seemed impervious to military discipline. A hard-drinking college dropout, he received an appointment as a midshipman largely because his father, John Canfield Spencer, headed the War Department.

  On the return voyage, MacKenzie accused Spencer of plotting mutiny. Accordingly, the reckless youth planned to kill the officers, take the brig, and become a pirate. Instead, he was arrested and chained to the bulkhead on the quarterdeck. Two accomplices, Elisha Small, a senior petty officer, and Samuel Cromwell, a boatswain's mate, faced charges as well. Following a dangerous mishap with the rigging, MacKenzie charged four more subordinates as collaborators. On December 1, 1842, he executed Spencer, Small, and Cromwell by hanging them from the main yardarm. After the captain and his crew reached New York without further incident, a court of inquiry exonerated MacKenzie of wrongdoing. Regardless of doubts about the handling of the case, the Somers affair marked the first mutiny in U.S. naval history.

  The Somers affair led to the reassessment of shipboard training and disciplinary procedures by the Navy Department. Ostensibly, midshipmen needed a safe and structured environment for training before they entered the disorderly confines of a ship at sea. However, the proposals for a consolidated school on shore became entangled with the efficacy of applied learning versus theoretical study in the naval profession. Furthermore, the question of appropriations sparked debate in Congress about whether or not the U.S. intended to overhaul its “Old Navy.” To provide a suitable education for responsible leaders at sea and on shore, the Navy aspired to establish a special academy.

  The Navy lacked its own academy until 1845, when Secretary of the Navy George Bancroft founded a campus at an abandoned military post. While also serving as the Secretary of War, he transferred control of Fort Severn in Annapolis, Maryland, from the Army to the Navy. On his authority as the Secretary of the Navy, he designated it as the place where midshipmen awaited orders. Meanwhile, he ordered those returning from sea duty to report to Annapolis for proper schooling. To protect them from the dangers of idleness, he directed that they receive a regular course of study at their common residence. After tapping the faculty and staff at the school in Philadelphia, the new location opened that October with 50 students and seven professors. Returning from its recess, Congress accepted what Bancroft wrought and soon granted money to the Navy Department for renovating the buildings. Five years later, the facility at Annapolis officially became known as the U.S. Naval Academy.

  Profession of Arms

  In a time of peace with foreign nations, the expertise of the American military improved significantly. The War Department organized review boards, compiled tactical manuals, and established training programs. Evincing a heightened sense of merit, service members elevated their profession with the formal study of warfare.

  During the early nineteenth century, the federal government hailed service members as the repositories of civic virtue. In 1818, Congress bestowed a pension on veterans able to show proof of nine months of service during the American Revolution. The costs grew excessive, however, and Congress revised the statute to require proof of economic need as well as prior service. Congress passed a new pension law in 1832 that reduced the prior service requirement to six months while removing the provision regarding economic need. Four years later, the widows of veterans were allowed to receive the pension on behalf of their deceased husbands. Although many passed away without collecting any pension, the U.S. established an important precedent in acknowledging the status of veterans.

  As the U.S. grew, the Military Academy at West Point constituted the center of gravity for the armed forces. Although the graduating classes remained small, the academy educated an officer corps with a degree of success. The first commissioned officer selected specifically as the superintendent was Captain Alden Partridge, who held the position until 1817.

  Following a court-martial for disobedience and mutiny, Partridge chose to resign his commission from the regular Army. Accordingly, he denounced West Point for producing an officer class at odds with the egalitarian examples of the greatest commanders such as George Washington and Andrew Jackson. In 1819, Partridge founded the American Literary, Scientific, and Military Academy at Norwich, Vermont. His curriculum advanced the study of the liberal arts while underscoring the sciences for subsistence agriculture and civil engineering. Likewise, he advocated field exercises as an extension of the classroom environment. His “American System of Education” inspired the establishment of six more private military institutions. Driven by his lifelong opposition to the elitism of West Point, Partridge assisted in the founding of the Virginia Military Institute and the Citadel.

  From 1817 until 1833, Captain Sylvanus Thayer served as the superintendent of West Point. Two years before assuming the position, the War Department sent Thayer to Europe to study foreign military schools as well as canals, harbors, and fortifications. He returned with books, manuals, and ideas to revitalize West Point. Consequently, Thayer raised the admission standards and improved the curriculum. To impart tactical training, he appointed an Army officer as the commandant of cadets. Because of his continuing emphasis on civil engineering, West Point graduates contributed mightily to the construction of railroads in the U.S. At his behest, annual examinations of the cadets occurred before a civilian group known as the Board of Visitors. He also instituted the merit roll, which permitted him to rank each cadet within a class based upon four years of work. Upon infractions of the superintendent's rules, demerits lowered a cadet's standing. Before punishing offenders, he announced: “Gentlemen must learn it is only their province to listen and obey.” He never married, for West Point remained his only passion. For his achievements, Thayer was dubbed the “father of the Military Academy.”

  Figure 5.2 W. G. Wall, West Point, 1821. Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress

  Whereas the academy introduced officers to the military arts and sciences, other schools attempted to give them special preparation for service in the combat arms. The first in the U.S. was the Artillery School of Practice at Fortress Monroe, which came into existence during 1824. Two years later, the War Department also established the Infantry School of Practice at Jefferson Barracks. Despite shortages of funding, both contributed to the development of professional military education in America.

  After his inauguration in 1829, President Jackson expressed serious doubts about the funding of West Point. Appealing to the Democratic Party, he spoke against the regulatory “tyranny” imposed upon the cadets. His followers also despised the ostensible “monopoly” over the officer corps. A few endorsed a pr
ivate system of military education, which complemented the ideas of Partridge. Others complained about the large number of resignations tendered each year by West Point graduates, who pursued their fortunes as civilians after obtaining an education at the public expense. Even during the 1840s, members of Congress openly railed against the high costs of the academy but never passed a bill to abolish it.

  Given the political climate in the U.S., the academy became a refuge for Army officers devoting themselves to the study of warfare. Many studied the precepts of Antoine-Henri Jomini, who was a Swiss-born general in Napoleon's army. He wrote more than 27 books on strategic thought, but his most notable remained the Summary of the Principles of the Art of War (1838). Influenced by the European Enlightenment, he insisted that armed conflict revealed orderly principles consistent with the military ideals of Frederick the Great. Like the natural laws of the universe, the principles of strategy for him remained timeless and unchanging.

  At the core of the West Point syllabus, the Jominian doctrines accentuated a basic strategy in war. First and foremost, an army must bring the maximum force to bear against the decisive point in the theater of operations. At the same time, operating with interior lines of communication permitted concentrated force in relation to an enemy's inferior strength. In addition, maintaining the initiative against the enemy required the rapid and coordinated deployment of forces. In effect, the domination of the battlefield involved a contest for control of geography. Strategy, in other words, reflected the art of making war upon a map.

  Eventually, Army officers sought a more realistic approach to making war. A Prussian officer, Carl von Clausewitz, delivered a single great work, On War (1873). Subsequent to his sudden death from cholera in 1831, his wife assembled the book from his manuscripts. His strategic thought seemed attuned to the complex and uncertain manner in which battles unfolded, taking into account both the “friction” and “fog” of war. However, the writings of Clausewitz made no impact upon the West Point curriculum until after the American Civil War.

  West Point faculty preferred the writings of General Scott, who traveled to Europe while holding various commands in the U.S. At the direction of the War Department, he authored Abstract of Infantry Tactics (1830). He also composed a three-volume edition titled Infantry Tactics (1835). Because of his attention to every detail and fondness for spectacular uniforms, West Point cadets referred to him as “Old Fuss and Feathers.”

  A professor at West Point for almost 40 years, Captain Denis Hart Mahan insisted that the cadets study Napoleonic warfare. Before his appointment, he spent four years at the School of Application for Engineers and Artillery at Metz, where he studied civil engineering and European institutions. Though emphasizing tactical skill and stationary fortification, he also taught a popular course on strategy called “Engineering and the Science of War.” He authored several textbooks, which often resorted to historical examples to convey lessons. His most memorable yet daunting work was titled An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-Guard, Out-Post, and Detachment Service of Troops, and the Manner of Posting and Handling Them in the Presence of an Enemy. With a Historical Sketch of the Rise and Progress of Tactics, etc., etc. After publication in 1847, cadets knew it simply by the name Out-Post. Eschewing reckless attacks, Mahan stressed the importance of intelligence, maneuver, and defense in warfare.

  Lieutenant Henry Halleck, a Mahan student appointed as a professor of engineering, became the first American to author a full treatise on the strategic thought of warfare. Published in 1846, the Elements of Military Art and Science borrowed heavily from his lectures that resonated with the principles of Jominian doctrines. “Strategy,” Halleck argued, “is defined to be the art of directing masses on decisive points, or the hostile movements of armies beyond the range of each other's cannon.” He posited that only “disciplined troops” would excel in proper tactics, which underscored “the great superiority of regulars” in the combat arms – infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Impressed by America's geographic advantages, he betrayed a cautious tone in respect to offensive campaigning. Accordingly, the primary role of the military remained to defend American soil against foreign attack.

  For decades, individuals in the armed forces meditated on the military arts and sciences. A new generation of leaders understood the logistical, strategic, and tactical elements of war while accepting their professional roles as the managers of violence. Attuned to the importance of decisive points on the battlefield, the officer corps prepared to command men in combat.

  Conclusion

  Awash in a sea of political, social, and economic changes, the American military helped to stabilize the country after the War of 1812. The Army and the Navy prepared for future wars in spite of austerity measures that limited their assets. Even if the skeletal force structure relied upon voluntary enlistments to fill out the ranks, the officer corps on active duty developed a professional outlook. Their strategies, tactics, and logistics adhered to European standards for military conduct, albeit with a growing nation in mind. Although no major wars erupted, they extended the borders of the U.S. southward across Florida and westward to the Pacific. They removed Indian populations from ancestral homelands while building vital infrastructure for internal colonization. As the American people pushed relentlessly to occupy the continent, the armed forces began to invent a new kind of republic.

  In the antebellum period, geographic isolation tended to make the American people confident in their own power. Of course, nation-building did not occur by mere happenstance but rather as a result of unilateral policies that employed force to thwart international rivals. Instead of paying a high price for national defense, the War Department invested in a small cadre of regulars to provide leadership to a large number of militiamen. Soldiers used almost any means necessary to pacify the contested frontiers and to achieve the territorial ambitions of the U.S. The rapprochement with Great Britain and the dissolution of the Spanish Empire permitted the Navy Department to keep its sails light. With oceans surrounding most of North America, sailors patrolled the blue waters to ensure unimpeded access to offshore markets. The myth about free security notwithstanding, Americans spread their arms from sea to shining sea.

  From service academies to isolated posts, Americans in uniform marched with pride and passion. Service members developed a cohesive identity that bound them together as a distinct entity. Over the decades, they turned inward to build a community of interest based on shared notions of duty, honor, and country. Whatever their station, their common experiences helped to refine the organizational culture of U.S. forces. While tasked with missions that kept them at the forefront of national interests, they fought a handful of small wars at home and abroad. They also conducted operations other than war in thousands of new places, where they found themselves greeting strangers, negotiating treaties, surveying lands, clearing roads, escorting wagons, constructing bases, dredging harbors, or charting oceans. “The ax, pick, saw, and trowel,” complained a young Army officer named Zachary Taylor, “has become more the implement of the American soldier than the cannon, musket, and sword.”

  The American military became a powerful tool for nationalism, although it remained at ease in an age of romance. More often than not, the projection of power by the U.S. involved military actions quite different from Napoleonic warfare. While Europeans stood toe-to-toe with one another to conquer space, Americans reached across the continent with few foreign adversaries to block them. By the 1840s, a strategy of passive aggression prevailed in Washington D.C. – whether the administration was called Republican, Whig, or Democratic. Accordingly, the federal government buttressed a defense posture with forts, towers, seawalls, and batteries in hundreds of disparate sites. A cohort of exceptional warriors, who still embodied the ethos of an armed citizenry, served faithfully in locations far and wide. Civil society grew bolder and mightier while harnessing the bountiful resources of North America. If the purpose of the American military was to uphold the martial spirit, t
hen it served its purpose well.

  Essential Questions

  1 Which military actions led to U.S. acquisition of Spanish borderlands?

  2 What role did the Army play in Indian removal?

  3 In what ways did the Navy inspire nationalism during the antebellum period?

  Suggested Readings

  Ambrose, Stephen E. Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966.

  Browning, Robert S. Two If By Sea: The Development of American Coastal Defense Policy. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983.

  Cunliffe, Marcus. Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1775–1865. New York: Little, Brown, 1968.

  Doubler, Michael D. Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636–2000. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003.

  Goetzmann, William H. Army Exploration in the American West, 1803–1863. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959.

  Hadden, Sally E. Slave Patrols: Law and Violence in Virginia and the Carolinas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.

  Hagan, Kenneth J. This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power. New York: Free Press, 1991.

  Hall, John W. Uncommon Defense: Indian Allies in the Black Hawk War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.

  Heidler, David S., and Jeanne T. Heidler. Old Hickory's War: Andrew Jackson and the Quest for Empire. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003.

  Howe, Daniel Walker. What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815–1848. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

  Kaufmann, J. E., and H. W. Kaufmann. Fortress America: The Forts that Defended America, 1600 to the Present. New York: Da Capo Press, 2004.