The American Military

by Brad D. Lookingbill

  Thanks to the new concept of air mobility, helicopters became the workhorses of MACV. For years, the versatility of rotary-wing aircraft made them ideal for multiple support missions. In fact, the Pentagon weighed arming air transports with weaponry for tactical assaults. Nicknamed “the Huey,” the UH-1 was outfitted with rocket launchers, grenade launchers, and machine guns. The Army assigned the 11th Air Assault Division to the 1st Cavalry, which was dispatched to Vietnam in 1965.

  The most significant early test of the “Air Cav” occurred on November 14, 1965, inside the Ia Drang Valley. North Vietnamese commanders attempted to cut South Vietnam in half by establishing a front line south of the DMZ and driving from Pleiku to the coast. However, Westmoreland countered by sending the 1st Cavalry into the Central Highlands to stop them. In three weeks of fighting, over 50,000 helicopter sorties were flown. Commander of the 1st Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Harold “Hal” Moore, earned recognition for his “leadership by example” at landing zone X-Ray. In the valley, the Americans established a defensive perimeter. Aerial and artillery fire support devastated the enemy. Nearly 1,800 North Vietnamese died in the sharp engagement, yet the Americans lost only 240. Proclaiming a tactical victory, Westmoreland trumpeted the role of air mobility in combat.

  The tactical victory at Ia Drang reflected a long-term effort by the Army to improve its aviation capabilities. The Army faced resistance from the Air Force, which considered airborne fire support its own unique function. Soon, the former ceded its larger transport aircraft to the latter but kept control of a helicopter fleet to support ground combat. The number of Army helicopters soared to 2,700 in 1966, and the figure tripled within five years.

  As the helicopters permitted “dust-off” evacuations of wounded soldiers, more than 11,000 female nurses worked with doctors at field hospitals, evacuation centers, and medical ships. Enduring long and grueling shifts, they encountered a steady flow of casualties and saved countless lives. Many witnessed grisly wounds that required them to perform emergency procedures commonly known as “meatball surgery.” Captain Carolyn H. Tanaka, a nurse at the 24th Evacuation Hospital in Long Binh, described an extreme case in a letter home: “His buttocks and genitals were about shot off, his right hand and a few fingers were blown off, and had fragments in his orbital rim and nasal bone and mouth, fracture of left tibia, fracture of right calcaneous and talus.”

  While occupying large amounts of territory in South Vietnam, MACV rapidly expanded its infrastructure. The medical facilities, base camps, landing strips, deep-water ports, and supply depots added more than 16 million square feet of construction. While electrical generators brought power to cities and hamlets, paved roads and communication centers transformed the built landscape. American troops resided in wooden barracks with hot showers, and many officers enjoyed air-conditioned quarters. The PXs included movie theaters, bowling alleys, and service clubs as well as amenities like beer, hot dogs, hamburgers, french fries, and ice cream. However, pungent odors from the burning of excrement in the rear echelons created a distinct smell that few soldiers ever forgot. Given the scale and the scope of operations, the “tooth to tail” ratio in Vietnam reached 1 to 10. The ratio indicated the number of Americans engaged in combat versus the number deployed for support.

  Because of the emphasis on firepower, Americans seldom enjoyed the advantages of surprise. Upon hearing the noise from vehicles, guerrillas melted away into the jungle or retreated across the border into Laos and Cambodia. Before disappearing, they devised ingenious mines and booby traps that took a deadly toll on the infantry patrols. Armed with M-16 rifles, American “grunts” attempted to draw fire while “humping the boonies” outside of firebases. Distinguishing friend from foe proved difficult. In fact, enemy combatants fired the first shot in 85 percent of all firefights. Upon making contact, platoons often fell back to firebases and waited for aircraft or artillery to bombard the contact point. An enemy countermeasure was “clinging to the belt,” that is, engaging at close range in order to prevent platoon leaders from calling for fire support. The Viet Cong sought to maintain the initiative in battle with hit-and-run tactics, while U.S. forces relied upon sheer weight and mass in a war of attrition.

  U.S. operations repeatedly targeted the Iron Triangle, a Viet Cong stronghold northwest of Saigon. Near the Cambodian border, the 60-square-mile area included rice paddies, rubber plantations, and secret tunnels. On September 14, 1966, Westmoreland began Operation Attleboro to “attrit” the enemy in the area. MACV counted more than 1,106 Vietnamese casualties and made one of the largest hauls of enemy supplies to date.

  Beginning on January 8, 1967, Westmoreland launched Operation Cedar Falls. Several air assaults sealed off the Iron Triangle, while nearly 35,000 American troops began a series of sweeps that laid waste to the area. The village of Ben Suc was surrounded, evacuated, and leveled. American “tunnel rats” infiltrated an elaborate underground complex and uncovered vast quantities of supplies and documents. They destroyed a network of sanctuaries, which previously provided refuge to insurgents. Although 720 Viet Cong were killed in action, many of the high-level cadre escaped once again.

  More than 45,000 American and ARVN troops returned to the Iron Triangle during Operation Junction City on February 22. Inside Tay Ninh Province, communist forces battled the “big units” for weeks while screening the retreat of their comrades into Cambodia. Massive firepower forced the Viet Cong to disengage. While defending firebase Gold, artillerymen lowered the tubes of their howitzers and fired beehive rounds containing hundreds of dart-like projectiles directly at assailants. Operation Junction City ended after nearly three months of fighting, which resulted in at least 2,700 casualties among the Viet Cong.

  Later that year, a series of border battles raged near the DMZ. At Con Thien, the 3rd Marine Division held a defensive position shelled by the North Vietnamese Army, or NVA. Anticipating a conventional fight, Westmoreland authorized Operation Neutralize to strike targets outside of Con Thien. It included 4,000 B-52 and fighter-bomber sorties along with naval bombardments, which forced the NVA to break off its attack. In late October, communist forces attacked Song Be and Loc Ninh. Nevertheless, the 1st Infantry Division held firm while inflicting heavy casualties upon the enemy.

  Without a doubt, the Battle of Dak To indicated American superiority in the battle­field. When the NVA struck a Special Forces camp in Kontum Province, Westmoreland responded by sending elements of the 4th Infantry Division and the 173rd Airborne Brigade. They encountered ridge lines fortified with tunnels and bunkers. On November 20, the fight centered on Hill 875, where 300 B-52 and 2,000 fighter-bomber sorties softened the defensive positions before American troops successfully climbed to the top. Afterward, the U.S. commander treated his soldiers to a Thanksgiving feast – hot turkey, mashed potatoes, candied yams, cranberry sauce, buttered rolls, and lots of beer. North Vietnamese losses in the battle numbered in the thousands, while American fatalities reached 289.

  Private Bill Stone, a Yale drop-out who joined the Army, went to Vietnam that year. With his literary ambitions dashed by a publisher's rejection of a manuscript, he contemplated suicide. Instead, he intended to die as an anonymous “grunt” in a foreign land. A member of the 25th Infantry Division, he was assigned to 2nd Platoon of Bravo Company in the 3rd Battalion. During his 15 months of service, he earned a Bronze Star and a Purple Heart with an Oak Leaf Cluster. Using the first name Oliver, he eventually wrote a screenplay that became the basis for the Hollywood film, Platoon (1986).

  From the outset, General Victor “Brute” Krulak, commander of the Fleet Marine Force in the Pacific, opined that the war in Vietnam required a different approach. Instead of campaigning in destructive ways that did “more harm than good,” he advocated small-unit actions on behalf of pacification. He envisioned military and political operations akin to a “spreading inkblot.” He suggested assigning a Marine rifle squad to work with a local militia company in a Combined Action Platoon. Whereas Secretary McNamara p
referred a war of attrition, the Marine warned that it would amount to “little more than blows in the air.”

  An Army study completed in 1966 called “A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam,” or PROVN, also discounted attrition. Commissioned by General Harold K. Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, it found that the U.S. lacked a unified program for eliminating the insurgency. Military personnel needed to refocus on the village, district, and provincial levels, where “the war and the object which lies beyond it must be won.” The “search and destroy” missions contributed little to population security in the hamlets, or so the Army staff concluded. Although talk of pacification bored him, Westmoreland established the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS, in 1967.

  Westmoreland planned to begin a phased withdrawal from South Vietnam in two years or less. While gratified by the election of General Thieu to the presidency of South Vietnam, he knew that the regime in Saigon remained a sideshow. In the waning days of 1967, he appeared before Congress to testify about American progress. With more than 485,000 troops in Vietnam, he boasted that approximately two-thirds of the hamlets appeared secure. He posited that the war was entering a new phase “when the end begins to come into view.”

  Tet

  As 1968 dawned, the North Vietnamese planned to force the U.S. to abandon the war. NVA troops created diversions in the border areas, drawing Army battalions out of the cities and into the countryside. At the same time, the Viet Cong infiltrated the urban areas for a major offensive designed to inspire uprisings throughout South Vietnam.

  Before the offensive began, communist forces conducted assaults against scattered U.S. outposts. American intelligence discovered that almost 40,000 NVA were massed near a Marine base in Khe Sanh. Predictably, Westmoreland authorized Operation Niagara to pulverize them with air strikes. Pleased with the results, he shifted half of all combat forces into forward positions near the DMZ.

  Hanoi called for a ceasefire during Tet – the first day of the Vietnamese New Year on January 31. Consequently, many ARVN troops went home for the holiday. In spite of the holy truce, MACV detected signs of enemy activity near Saigon. Even though Westmoreland pulled some battalions closer to the capital, he deemed it a possible diversion from another NVA thrust along the northern border. With Americans poised for a decisive victory near Khe Sahn, more than 84,000 Viet Cong prepared to launch an offensive on multiple fronts.

  Around midnight on January 30, the Viet Cong launched the Tet Offensive across South Vietnam. They assailed 36 of the 44 provincial capitals and hit five of the six major cities, including Hue and Saigon. In the darkness, a battle raged at the U.S. embassy in Saigon between guerrillas and the 101st Airborne Division. By 9:00 a.m., Americans had secured the compound.

  In Saigon, the offensive ended within days. After a massive bombardment left the Cholon section of Saigon in rubble, the 199th Light Infantry Brigade cleared the Viet Cong from the neighborhood. American and South Vietnamese units held the capital while securing the nearby bases of Long Binh and Bien Hoa. However, cameramen filmed incredible scenes of violence. One clip showed General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, head of the National Police, approaching a captured guerrilla on the street. He put a revolver to the prisoner's head and executed him.

  The fiercest fighting occurred in Hue, the ancient capital of Vietnam, which fell to communist forces. Upon seizing the city, they murdered at least 3,000 civilians and buried the “enemies of the people” in mass graves. Within hours, a U.S. artillery barrage began to destroy the buildings occupied during Tet. Elements of the 1st Cavalry and 101st Airborne joined with Marine and ARVN units to battle their foes street to street and house to house. Following intense combat, Americans retook Hue by February 24.

  Throughout February, MACV directed a major counteroffensive and retook every position lost during Tet. Within the first three weeks, approximately 40,000 NVA and Viet Cong were killed in action. By comparison, the American dead numbered 1,100. Furthermore, communist forces lost many of their seasoned cadres. The mauling in the countryside left the insurgency depleted. To the dismay of Hanoi, no local uprising in and around Saigon occurred. Thus, the Tet Offensive constituted a tactical failure for North Vietnam.

  Thanks to the media coverage of Tet, the American people saw a different picture. The imagery of guerrillas storming the embassy in Saigon or raising the flag over Hue powerfully shaped perceptions of the war. With no more silver linings in the dark clouds, the claims of victory by Westmoreland lacked credibility. A wag parodied the news with the headline: “We Have the Enemy on the Run, Says General Custer.” During the CBS evening news broadcast of February 27, anchorman Walter Cronkite concluded that “Vietnam is to end in a stalemate.” Public opinion in the U.S. dramatically turned against the war.

  On the morning of March 16, U.S. forces operating in the Quang Ngai Province committed war crimes. Assigned to the 20th Infantry, Lieutenant William Calley led Charlie Company's 1st Platoon of the 1st Battalion into the hamlet of My Lai. Frustrated by their inability to distinguish civilians from combatants, they massacred nearly 500 people. Some of the soldiers participated in an orgy of sexual violence that included rape and sodomy. Three years later, Calley was tried and convicted by a military tribunal for premeditated murder.

  Tet marked a turning point for the American military, because it raised unsettling questions about the war. In a telegram from Saigon to Washington D.C., Westmoreland requested reinforcements to sustain the momentum of the counteroffensive. He asked for another 206,000 soldiers to conduct Operation Complete Victory. At a time when American troop levels exceeded a half-million, the magnitude of the new request stirred debate in the Pentagon. The new Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, saw no prospect for military victory and urged disengagement. Confronted by a political backlash, the Joint Chiefs appeared “tongue-tied.” Privately, the Johnson administration began to talk about “Vietnamization” and “peace with honor.” Likening the war to a cancer that consumed Great Society programs, the commander-in-chief eventually denied Westmoreland's request. On March 31, he announced on television that he would not run for re-election while attempting to reduce “the present level of hostilities.” Within two months, representatives from the U.S. and Vietnam began to meet in Paris.

  Just as Ho Chi Minh predicted, the protracted struggle weakened the U.S. With America's power declining around the world, North Korea captured the U.S.S. Pueblo and imprisoned the crew for nearly a year. Johnson halted the air strikes in Vietnam north of the 19th parallel and reluctantly abandoned Khe Sanh. For the remainder of the year, MACV attempted to restore security around Saigon and the coastal areas. The NVA, NLF, and Viet Cong avoided direct combat but instead maneuvered to improve their strategic positions. After a lengthy debate regarding the shape of the table, the Paris peace talks officially began that fall.

  After Tet, Johnson appointed Westmoreland as the Army Chief of Staff and turned command of MACV over to General Abrams, his deputy. Consequently, MACV began scaling down “big unit” operations. CIA officers created the Phoenix Program, which focused on eliminating a shadow government through an accelerated pacification campaign. Without officially changing the grand strategy, the American military tried to become “more flexible tactically” across South Vietnam.

  A Better War

  Former Vice President Nixon won the presidential election with campaign assurances of a “secret plan” to end the war. Upon taking office in 1969, the commander-in-chief intend­ed to facilitate a withdrawal from Vietnam. American troop levels peaked at 543,000 that April, but the number declined thereafter. The National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, needed the armed forces to provide “some bargaining leverage” for the peace talks in Paris. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird expected “Vietnamization” to create a strong, self-reliant South Vietnamese military – an objective espoused by the U.S. for over a decade.

  The Nixon administration placed the various and sundry opera
tions in South Vietnam under the supervision of Abrams, the new MACV commander. “He deserves a better war,” wrote one journalist at the time. A tank commander during World War II, he possessed a “tough guy” aura that inspired the rank and file. In private, he retreated to the solitude of fine wine, history books, and classical music. “The kind of war that we have here can be compared to an orchestra,” he once said, because “it is sometimes appropriate to emphasize the drums or the trumpets or the bassoon – or even the flute.”

  Virtually everything changed in MACV when Abrams took command. He recognized that upgrading Saigon's military capabilities and dismantling Hanoi's covert infrastructure required more than arms. He orchestrated “one war,” which blended military actions with civil defense according to strategic plans. With “Vietnamizing” the war in mind, he never forgot the rigors of hard fighting and enemy attrition. However, he focused on the communist system of forward movement by attacking their “nose” – weapon caches and food supplies pushed out in advance of their offensives. He discouraged the overuse of firepower in combat, which sometimes resulted in collateral deaths among civilians. In and around Saigon, he insisted on assessments other than “body counts” as measures of merit. Instead of “search and destroy” missions, the American and ARVN units swept the countryside on behalf of interdiction. The military objective shifted to increasing population security in South Vietnam while gradually disengaging U.S. forces from the war effort.

  Until their counterparts in ARVN became more proficient, the only alternative to American boots on the ground was air power. Nixon decided to lift the conventional restraints on aerial bombings, which underscored what he called a “madman strategy.” He aimed to convince Hanoi of the risks involved in opposing a leader with his hand on the nuclear button. Beginning with Operation Menu, B-52s bombed cross-border bases in Cambodia. Later, secret raids hit targets in northern Laos. Nixon mused that it might be necessary to bomb communist strongholds into the Stone Age.