The American Military

by Brad D. Lookingbill

  Anti-American sentiments in the Middle East increased after photographs from Abu Ghraib Prison circulated during 2004. American troops managed the austere facility 20 miles west of Baghdad, though several guards lacked proper training. As many as 7,000 detainees crowded into a space designed to hold 4,000. Most received insufficient food, water, clothing, and medical care in military custody. Furthermore, a number endured humiliation and abuse. Under pressure to extract useful information, a cadre of soldiers from the 372nd Military Police Company even tortured some. The Army later court-martialed seven of the worst offenders. Consequently, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 required all personnel to comply with the Army field manual for human intelligence collector operations.

  Although the vast majority of U.S. soldiers exhibited courage, honor, and decency, few understood how to counter the Iraqi insurgency. The casualties continued to mount, even as Rumsfeld boasted about his ongoing initiative called “defense transformation.” Defense experts insisted upon the achievement of military objectives with less reliance on manpower. While shrinking the force structure over the years, they posited that advancing technology enabled service members to accomplish missions with greater velocity at lower costs. The Pentagon kept overall troop figures at minimal levels but extended deployments longer than anticipated under the “stop-loss” program. Enlistment rates dropped, as greater incentives were required to maintain the end strength. With defense expenditures skyrocketing, the Army counted on the National Guard and the Reserves to compensate for the shortages of reinforcements. A sign on a vehicle operated by activated Guardsmen groused: “One Weekend a Month – My Ass!!!” The outlook grew bleak, especially for U.S. forces at the forward operating bases.

  The U.S. provided most of the personnel and resources for the Iraq Survey Group, which completed an exhaustive search of WMD storage sites. According to their final report, Hussein's purported arsenal did not pose a militarily significant threat. Nevertheless, insurgents employed IEDs using 155-mm artillery shells that contained sarin. Two U.S. soldiers received treatment for minor exposure to the nerve agent. On another occasion, investigators found a shell containing mustard gas on a Baghdad street. In sum, a small quantity of repurposed warheads in Iraq amounted to frightening relics from the previous decade.

  While public support for U.S. policy in Iraq wavered, Bush urged American voters to “stay the course” during the presidential election of 2004. He elevated democracy as the ultimate goal for the Global War on Terror, which promised to enhance national security in the long run. His Democratic rival, Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, highlighted the president's mishandling of Iraq. That November, Bush narrowly won a second term.

  On January 30, 2005, the Bush administration found vindication in the historic results of the Iraqi elections. The interim government helped to coordinate nationwide voting, which determined membership in the Transitional National Assembly. Irrespective of terrorist threats, more than 8 million citizens entered the polling stations. Iraqi women and men proudly held up ink-stained fingers to indicate their commitment to the democratic process.

  The Surge

  Iraq plunged into a ghastly civil war. The Sunnis increased their assaults on the Shi'ites, who retaliated in kind. Likewise, al-Zarqawi launched more strikes against U.S. and Iraqi forces. During 2005, more than 34,000 attacks occurred throughout the country. The carnage worsened the following year, when death squads, urban guerrillas, and suicide bombers multiplied. The bodies of the slain washed up on the banks of the Tigris River. Given the signs of anarchy, Iraqis associated their plight with American incompetence.

  The American military began to experiment with counterinsurgency operations, which involved concerted actions that isolated insurgents from the civilian population. Marine officers touted the “three-block war,” that is, they engaged in direct combat on one city block, provided low-intensity security on the next, and directed humanitarian assistance on the third. Marine General James “Mad Dog” Mattis urged subordinates to befriend Iraqis while patrolling neighborhoods. The new commander of the Multinational Force, General George Casey, Jr., called for training academies to prepare Army personnel to interact with sectarian leaders. Known by the acronym COIN, counterinsurgency operations avoided measures that led to civilian casualties. Success depended upon innovative officers taking the initiative with persistent outreach and changing the momentum at the community level.

  Colonel H. R. McMaster commanded the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar, a haven for insurgents near the Syrian border. During 2005, he established 29 outposts around the city of 250,000 people. To maintain law and order, his squadrons not only “drained the swamp” but also mingled with the inhabitants. After months of interacting with sheiks, American troops began turning over security details to friendly Iraqis. The new Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, took note of McMaster, who described his approach as “clear, hold, and build.”

  Even though U.S. soldiers formed alliances with anxious citizens, al-Qaeda gained control over ex-urban belts around Baghdad. Making Ramadi the capital of a prospective Islamic caliphate, al-Zarqawi hired henchmen to kill anyone defying his extremism. They bombed the Golden Mosque shrine in Samarra to exacerbate sectarian conflict. Eventually, they laced more than a dozen bombs with chlorine in a series of deadly attacks. Thanks to information acquired from a Sunni prisoner, U.S. forces discovered the location of al-Zarqawi's desert compound. On June 7, 2006, an air strike hit the target and killed him. Despite losing their leader, the terrorist group carved out a base of operations inside Iraq.

  Meanwhile, the Bush administration searched for a “new way forward” in Iraq. In meetings with key advisors, retired Army General Jack Keane as well as defense analysts Eliot Cohen and Frederick W. Kagan advocated raising American troop levels to quell the violence. They called it the “surge option,” which would safeguard Baghdad and the surrounding areas with a show of strength. Moreover, they envisioned a tactical and strategic reorientation of U.S. forces toward COIN. American stamina would keep the insurgents from regaining their footing. The president agreed, resolving to not retreat from the “central front” in the Global War on Terror. Though reluctant at first, the Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, accepted the deployment of five more brigades. Rumsfeld soon resigned from the DOD and was replaced by Robert Gates, who championed “new ideas on how America can achieve our goals in Iraq.”

  The rising death toll in Iraq and the declining opinion polls in America disheartened Washington D.C. Congress requested the report of a bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which recommended the gradual removal of combat units. Congressional leaders preferred a “phased redeployment” of U.S. soldiers out of Iraq. Appealing to an invigorated anti-war movement, Senator Barack Obama of Illinois promised to “actively oppose the president's proposal.”

  Bush ordered the surge in 2007 and appointed a new commander for the Multi-National Force in Iraq, General David H. Petraeus. Previously, he won acclaim for leading the 101st Airborne Division in securing Mosul. Holding a doctorate from Princeton University, he largely rewrote the book on COIN, or at least the Army field manual, FM 3-24. “You cannot kill your way out of an insurgency,” he told reporters, but defeating insurgents ultimately meant that “you have to turn them.”

  Figure 16.3 U.S. Army General David Howell Petraeus, the Multi-National Force Iraq Commander, June 4, 2008. Photo 080604-F-LX971-358, Department of Defense, http://www.defenseimagery.mil/

  While the U.S. expended more blood and treasure, Petraeus increased the focus on stability and reconstruction. An additional 40,000 soldiers deployed to Iraq, which brought the total number up to 160,000. They started to operate effectively in unsafe zones away from military bases. For months, Colonel Sean MacFarland, a brigade commander with the 1st Armored Division, experimented with approaches to providing security in Ramadi. Bolstered by the “Anbar Awakening,” Sunni insurgents began accepting money to join the foot patrols. Henceforth, Americans provided the mass
of force needed to ensure that “build” followed the “clear” and the “hold” phases of COIN.

  Among the Americans in the surge, Specialist Zachary Grass of Ohio belonged to the 2nd Infantry Division. His combat team operated the Army's new eight-wheeled vehicle known as the Stryker. After arriving that May, he participated in Stryker patrols east of the Tigris River. On June 16, 2007, the 22-year-old died in an IED explosion close to the town of Rashidiya. Although U.S. casualties peaked that month, they declined the rest of the year.

  Conditions on the ground improved, which prompted Petraeus to recommend gradually drawing down U.S. forces while standing up Iraqi forces. General Ray Odierno, commander of the Multi-National Corps, directed a series of offensive operations that secured the major cities. Within a year, the number of insurgents around the country entered into a steep decline. The Mahdi Army laid down their weapons and recast themselves as a nonmilitary social movement. After denouncing terrorists, Sunni fighters drove al-Qaeda from the outskirts of Baghdad. Owing to U.S. logistical support, Iraqi units reestablished government control in Basra. The Bush administration negotiated the Status of Forces Agreement with Maliki, thereby establishing a process to withdraw all American troops from Iraq by December 31, 2011.

  By holding the line in Iraq, the American military achieved a dramatic turnaround in the Global War on Terror. Nevertheless, the years of bloodshed left over 4,300 Americans dead and 32,000 wounded. Roughly 20 percent of the returning veterans reported symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, or PTSD. More than 100,000 Iraqis perished and millions more became refugees. The clash of arms also drained at least $1 trillion from the U.S. treasury, which increased the national debt to unprecedented levels.

  Though stretched to the limit, the U.S. successfully gave Iraq space and time to create a new nation. Iraqi citizens ratified a permanent constitution and selected a Council of Representatives. The nascent government met most of its benchmarks, but stabilization remained fragile, reversible, and uneven. By the end of 2008, Petraeus had disengaged from the day-to-day operations in order to assume command of CENTCOM. As his successor in Baghdad, Odierno acknowledged that “our work here is far from done.”

  Turn the Page

  Obama won the presidential election of 2008 and became the commander-in-chief the next year. “Our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred,” he declared in his inaugural address. He retained Secretary Gates at the Pentagon while appointing Hillary Clinton as the Secretary of State. Retired Marine General James L. Jones assumed the key post of National Security Advisor. Though eschewing the Bush Doctrine, the Obama administration endorsed overseas contingency operations to protect the U.S. from terrorism.

  “Lone wolf” terrorism represented another dimension of the war against the U.S. On November 5, 2009, Major Malik Hasan, an American medical officer, launched a shooting spree at Fort Hood, Texas. While opening fire on troops deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, the devout Muslim shouted: “Allah Akbar!” He murdered 12 soldiers and one civilian in addition to injuring 29 others. Instead of martyrdom, he suffered paralysis once police officers at the scene shot him. Investigators learned that he communicated with a radical imam in Yemen, Anwar al-Awlaki, to prepare himself for what he called “an Islamic duty.” A Senate report labeled the Fort Hood shooting the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil since 9/11, although the DOD later classified it as “workplace violence.”

  The Obama administration shifted the language of U.S. policy without necessarily changing the substance. Mired in legal limbo, hundreds of detainees too dangerous to release waited at Guantánamo. For example, the 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed remained in military custody without trial. Furthermore, several thwarted attacks made it clear that terrorist networks still plotted airline and car bombings. Although the president promised to close the Guantánamo prison, Congress blocked his efforts.

  Obama posited that Afghanistan represented the “central front in our enduring struggle against terrorism and extremism,” which he considered a “war of necessity.” By the time he entered office, Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters intensified their attacks in the southern and eastern provinces. They resorted to IEDs and suicide missions that killed scores of noncombatants. For years, ISAF patrols floundered under the restrictive rules of engagement. With a light footprint on the ground, the U.S. relied upon air strikes to curb the insurgents entering from Pakistan. The Karzai government appeared inept and corrupt despite winning nationwide elections.

  At CENTCOM, Petraeus suggested a new strategy for Afghanistan in accord with the doctrine of COIN. He wanted to focus on the civilian population as the center of gravity in military operations. General Stanley McChrystal, a Petraeus confidant, took command of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In danger of becoming a failed state, the war-torn country needed massive infusions of military and civilian resources as soon as possible.

  Despite previously opposing the surge in Iraq, Obama agreed with his “war council” about Afghanistan. On December 1, 2009, the president spoke at West Point about his war plan to deny al-Qaeda a haven, to reverse the Taliban's momentum, and to strengthen Afghan security and governmental forces. The U.S. began deploying an additional 30,000 soldiers, which raised American levels to 90,000. Furthermore, NATO added another 7,000 effectives to ISAF. With a conditions-based timetable, American troops would begin to return home after 18 months if successful.

  As the operations ramped up, McChrystal and his aides disparaged the Obama administration in a published interview with Rolling Stone magazine. The officers made snide comments about civilian authorities. McChrystal resigned as a result, which prompted the commander-in-chief to place Petraeus directly in charge of the surge in Afghanistan.

  The long war in Iraq wound down during 2010, when the Obama administration announced a renaming of the mission – Operation New Dawn. While U.S. forces played a reduced role in population security, fewer than 50,000 soldiers remained under Odierno's command to support and to train Iraqis. “Today, when I fly over Baghdad, I see hope with bright lights and busy traffic,” the general reported. “Now,” added Obama, “it is time to turn the page.”

  As the Obama administration planned for the end of the war, the American military continued retooling for the twenty-first century. Defense analysts held that state-of-the-art technology generated a revolution in military affairs, which they signified with the letters RMA. Accordingly, transformational planning optimized weapons programs to deliver swift but sure victories with fewer casualties. With a full spectrum of capabilities, men and women in uniform seemed poised to dominate battlefields worldwide. Some foresaw a future in which America's supremacy over all levels of combat intensity would render standing armies and navies obsolete. Of course, similar claims were made when sea power or atomic warfare supposedly relegated combat infantrymen to the dustbin of history. Irrespective of RMA concepts, no clear solution to the complex problem of national defense presented itself.

  Washington D.C. ranked as the leading investor in unmanned platforms for national defense. By 2010, the Pentagon possessed more than 7,000 aerial drones and some 12,000 ground robots. Among the unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, the Predator and the Reaper captured useful intelligence via video surveillance. Moreover, they launched laser-guided bombs and missiles against ground targets. The Air Force piloted most of the drone attacks, although the CIA and JSOC also ran classified programs. An assortment of navybots operated at sea, including unmanned surface vessels, or USVs, and unmanned underwater vehicles, or UUVs. Even though drones provided an effective force multiplier, they remained vulnerable to signal jamming and to computer hacking. During the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, unmanned warfare offered a supplement rather than a replacement for troops.

  The American military engaged in cyber warfare, which encompassed a new kind of battlefield. Service members conducted operations to penetrate an opponent's computers or networks in order to cause damage. Working at terminals, t
hey blocked and hunted down electronic intruders. Furthermore, they infected the information systems that supported nascent WMD programs. An array of cyber weapons suppressed enemy air and sea defenses and disrupted their command-and-control centers. As the director of the National Security Agency, General Keith B. Alexander became the first head of U.S. Cyber Command, or USCYBERCOM.

  In terms of manpower, U. S. forces remained broadly inclusive of different races, classes, and genders. Southerners amounted to the most overrepresented demographic cohort – nearly 40 percent of the force structure. In late 2010, Congress passed a repeal of the public law regarding sexual orientation known as “Don't ask, Don't tell.” The change in policy went into effect the next year. While developing “gender neutral” standards for specific jobs, the Army, Navy, and Air Force began to integrate women into combat units. The Pentagon worried about recruitment and retention across the branches, but new enlistments remained steady during a deepening economic recession. With less than 1.4 million Americans in uniform, the all-volunteer force was smaller in size than at any time since its inception.

  Both physically and intellectually, the uniformed services remained one of the most demanding of all professions. Global missions required adaptive personnel, because success on the ground often depended upon interagency operability, language skills, cultural awareness, political expertise, and personal integrity. Advancements in battlefield medicine and body armor enabled more and more of the wounded to survive attacks. Whatever the importance of firepower, the American experience in diverse theaters of operations underscored the advantages of “small change” soldiering going forward.