Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes Are Choking Freedom Worldwide

by Paul Marshall

  In this system, even if there is no codified offense, a judge can punish apostasy if there is a relevant fatwa. One source of such fatwas is Ayatollah Khomeini himself, an “authoritative Islamic source” whose writings are frequently used by Iranian judges to justify executions. Khomeini’s Tahrir-al-Vasileh is probably the main source used to address apostasy, and in it he says, “A national apostate will be caused to repent and in case of refusing to repent will be executed. And it is preferable to give a three-day reprieve and to execute him on the fourth day if he refused.”12 This use of noncodified law has two consequences. First, when engaged in dialogue with the international community, the government can always claim that there is no such crime as apostasy and that no one in Iran has been ever prosecuted for this crime.13 Second, judges have very large discretion in whether to describe something as apostasy and how it will be punished.

  In only a few cases has the regime executed anyone on an explicit charge of apostasy. In most instances, the regime uses a selective interpretation of possible surrogates of apostasy and blasphemy to prosecute those who might challenge its “divine” authority. Dissidents may be charged with inter alia, “friendship with the enemies of God,” “hostility towards friends of God,” “corruption on earth,” “fighting against God,” “obstructing the way of God and the way towards happiness for all the disinherited people in the world,” “spreading lies,” “insulting the Prophet,” “acting against the national security,” “distributing propaganda against the government of Islamic Republic of Iran,” “attracting individuals to the misguided sect of Baha’ism,” “insulting Islam,” “calling into question the Islamic foundations of the Republic,” or even “creating anxiety in the minds of the public and those of Iranian officials.” It often appears that, when there is nothing else handy with which to charge a person, the Islamic government brings charges of apostasy, which has the added convenience of carrying the death penalty.

  There are also indications that the legal situation may worsen. In February 2008, a draft of a new proposed Islamic penal code was presented for discussion in the Iranian parliament (Majlis) that, for the first time, would make the death penalty for apostasy and heresy a legal stipulation in the criminal code.14 Because the proposed law uses the word Hadd, it would make the death penalty for apostasy mandatory and bar any reduction or annulment of this sentence. This law would be a special danger to liberal thinkers, to those who leave Islam, and to Baha’is. Any adherent of a non-Muslim religion with one parent who was Muslim when he or she was conceived would also be declared apostate under the proposed law.

  Following is a translation, made by the Baha’i community, of relevant sections of the proposed law:15

  Section Five: Apostasy, Heresy, and Witchcraft

  Article 225–1: Any Muslim who clearly announces that he/she has left Islam and declares blasphemy is an apostate.

  Article 225–2: Serious and earnest intention is the condition for certainty in apostasy. Therefore, if the accused claims that his/her statement had been made with reluctance or ignorance, or in error, or while drunk, or through a slip of the tongue or without understanding the meaning of the words, or repeating words of others; or his/her real intentions had been something else, he/she is not considered an apostate….

  Article 225–3: There are two kinds of apostates: innate (Fetri) and parental (Melli).16

  Article 225–4: Innate Apostate is someone whose parent (at least one) was a Muslim at the time of conception, and who declares him/herself a Muslim after the age of maturity, and leaves Islam afterwards.

  Article 225–5: Parental Apostate is one whose parents (both) had been non-Muslims at the time of conception, and who has become a Muslim after the age of maturity, and later leaves Islam and returns to blasphemy.

  Article 225–6: If someone has at least one Muslim parent at the time of conception but after the age of maturity, without pretending to be a Muslim, chooses blasphemy is considered a Parental Apostate.

  Article 225–7: Punishment17 for an Innate Apostate is death.

  Article 225–8: Punishment for a Parental Apostate is death, but after the final sentencing for three days he/she would be guided to the right path and encouraged to recant his/her belief and if he/she refused, the death penalty would be carried out.

  Article 225–9: In the case of a Parental Apostate, whenever there appears to be a possibility of recanting, sufficient time would be provided.

  Article 225–10: Punishment for women, whether Innate or Parental, is life imprisonment and during the sentence, under the guidance of the court, hardship will be exercised on her, and she will be guided to the right path and encouraged to recant, and if she recants she will be freed immediately.

  Article 225–11: Whoever claims to be a Prophet is sentenced to death, and any Muslim who invents a heresy in the religion and creates a sect based on that which is contrary to the obligations and necessities of Islam, is considered an apostate. [This article seems to be particularly directed at Baha’is.]

  Article 225–12: Any Muslim who deals with witchcraft and promotes it as a profession or sect in the community is sentenced to death.

  Article 225–13: Assistance to the crimes in this chapter, in case there is no other punishment assigned to it by law, is punishable by up to 74 lashes in proportion with the crime and the criminal.

  Article 112’s extension of the punishment for “threatening Iranian national security” to those outside of Iran’s border is especially dangerous in a government whose former “Supreme Leader” passed a death sentence on Salman Rushdie, has dispatched agents overseas to murder its opponents, and whose members have called for the death of Scandinavian editors and cartoonists, among others.18 On September 9, 2008, the Iranian parliament passed the bill by 196 votes for, seven against, and two abstentions. It then went to committee for review.19 In February 2010, Amnesty International reported that the provisions on apostasy had been removed from the bill in committee but that they could be reintroduced.20

  Baha’is

  The Baha’i religion began in Iran in the nineteenth century and originated from another religious movement, the Babis. The Babi movement began in 1844 with the Bab, Seyyed Ali Muhammad, a merchant from Shiraz, and gained many followers. However, it soon encountered hostility, especially from the Shia clergy. Officials ordered the imprisonment, torture, and death of thousands of adherents. After being imprisoned for a time, the Bab was executed in 1850. In 1863, Baha’u’llah, Hossein Ali Nouri, one of the followers of the Bab, announced that he was “Him Whom God Shall Make Manifest.” He was immediately imprisoned and subsequently banished to Iraq, Turkey, and Israel, which were all part of the Ottoman Empire. He passed away in 1892 in exile in what is now Israel.21

  Many Muslims consider Baha’is apostates because they are held to believe that Baha’u’llah is a true prophet and that the Bab is the return of the Twelfth Shia Imam, contradicting the Muslim belief that there is no valid religious revelation after Muhammad. Baha’is also believe that each of the world’s major religions represents an evolution in God’s message to mankind, hence that Islam is not the last and most complete religion. The Iranian Islamic regime also claims that, because the Baha’i World Center is located in Israel, Baha’is are Zionist spies and a threat to national security. In May 1996, the Head of the Judiciary called Baha’is “an organized espionage ring.”22

  Since the Islamic Revolution, the regime has killed more than 200 Baha’is merely because of their religious beliefs. Another fifteen have disappeared and are presumed dead, and more than 10,000 have been removed from posts in universities and government. Baha’i properties, including cemeteries, houses of worships, schools, libraries, private houses, real estate, businesses, and even furniture, have been confiscated by the regime. Members of Baha’i Local Spiritual Assemblies and the National Spiritual Assembly have been summoned to the notorious revolutionary courts and executed after summary closed-door “trials.” Nine members of the National Spiritua
l Assembly were abducted and executed, and their families were refused access to their bodies.23

  Article 297 of the penal code, which previously stipulated that a lesser amount of “blood money” (diyeh) be paid to families for the deaths of non-Muslims than for Muslims, was amended in 2004 to allow equal payment in each case. However, this change does not apply to Baha’is; their blood is held to be Mobah, which means that they may be killed with impunity.

  Since Baha’is are banned from attending university, they opened their own underground university, the Baha’i Institute of Higher Education. Classes are conducted in private homes. In September 1998, the government began a nationwide attack against the university, and in at least fourteen different cities, thirty-six faculty members were arrested and had property destroyed or confiscated. In March 1999, four of the arrested professors, Sina Hakiman, Farzad Khajeh Sharifabadi, Habibullah Ferdosian Najafabadi, and Ziaullah Mirzapanah, were sentenced to between three and ten years under Article 498 of the penal code. The court verdict said they had established a “secret organization” engaged in “teaching against Islam, and teaching against the regime of the Islamic Republic.”24

  From 2006 on, the Iranian government has used new tactics to block Baha’is from university. In June 2006, 500 of the 900 Baha’i students who took the university entrance exam for the coming academic year received a passing score. Two hundred successfully enrolled, but most were expelled when university authorities became aware they were Baha’is. Officials also told almost 800 of the more than 1,000 Baha’is who completed the exam in June 2007 that their files were “incomplete,” thus preventing their enrollment.25 Many non-Baha’i students object to this discrimination. In December 2008, twenty-six students at Goldasht College in Kelardasht refused to take their first-term final examination to protest the dismissal of one of their classmates, Ameed Saadat.26

  Baha’is are also forbidden to teach their faith to their children. Security forces have attacked houses where classes are held, arrested the adults, and confiscated books and anything related to Baha’i identity. Religious teachers have been imprisoned or executed by the regime. Mona Mahmudnizhad, a sixteen-year-old, and nine other women were hanged in 1983 for teaching Baha’i religious classes to Baha’i children. The government has forbidden Baha’is to have any official assembly or administrative institutions, and so they are forced to conduct their prayers and monthly ceremonies by rotating among private houses. Security forces routinely raid houses in which they believe there is a gathering, arrest family members, imprison them without charge for weeks or months, then release them with threats that if caught again they will face more serious consequences.27

  Since Ahmadinejad’s Election

  The persecution of Baha’is has increased since Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005. On October 29, 2005, a letter allegedly written on instructions from Ayatollah Khamenei by the Chairman of the Armed Forces Command, Major General Seyyed Hossein Firuzabadi, instructed officials including the Ministry of Information and the Commanders of the Army, Police and Revolutionary Guards, to provide the command with information for “a comprehensive and complete report of all the activities of [Baha’is and Babists] for the purpose of identifying all the individuals of these misguided sects.”28 The regime has also intensified its propaganda. There has been growing condemnation of Baha’is on radio and television programs, and even weekly anti-Baha’i broadcasts specifically aimed at evoking hatred of the community. This has led to increased social harassment, including threats and physical attacks.

  On February 16 and 17, 2007, there were similar attacks by a masked intruder on the homes of two elderly Baha’is. Eighty-five-year-old Behnam Saltanat Akhzari was killed in the assault, while seventy-seven-year-old Baha’i Shah Beygom Dehghani died several weeks later.29 In the eight months leading up to January 2007, sixty-three Baha’is were arrested. October and November 2008 saw an additional wave of arrests.30 On January 26 and 27, 2009, eight Baha’is were arrested in Tehran and Mash-Had. Of the Tehran detainees, a judiciary spokesman said, “These people were not arrested for their faith. The six Baha’is are accused of insulting religious sanctities. …”31

  The government has also specifically targeted the Baha’i leadership and, in May 2008, arrested six members of the ad hoc national leadership group, Mrs. Fariba Kamalabadi, Mr. Jamaloddin Khanjani, Mr. Afif Naeimi, Mr. Saeid Rezaie, Mr. Behrouz Tavakkoli, and Mr. Vahid Tizfahm. Intelligence agents entered and searched their homes before taking the occupants away. The seventh member of the leadership group, Mrs. Mahvash Sabet, had been arrested in early March after receiving a summons from the Ministry of Intelligence in Mashhad on the pretext of questioning her about a burial in a Baha’i cemetery.32 When Nobel Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi agreed to defend the seven leaders, she was immediately and vociferously attacked in the government-controlled news media as well as denied access to her clients’ files.33 Iranian-Japanese-American journalist Roxana Saberi, held in Evin prison for a month on espionage charges before her release under international pressure, reported that Mrs. Kamalabadi and Mrs. Sabet were being held there in a shared, four-by-five-meter cell, where they had to sleep on the floor, after both having previously been in solitary confinement. Ms. Saberi stated, “We have already seen infringements of their rights from the very beginning, including being held incommunicado, being interrogated while blindfolded, and having no access to a lawyer for months and months.”34 Charges against the seven include espionage for Israel, “insulting religious sanctities,” “spreading corruption on earth,” and “propaganda against the state.”

  After postponements in 2009, a trial took place on June 12–14, 2010, and the seven Baha’i leaders were then sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. On September 15, 2010, after an appeals court revoked three of the charges against them, the sentences were reduced to ten years.35 However, in March 2011, the seven were informed by prison authorities without explanation that their term of incarceration had now reverted to the lower court’s original ruling of twenty years.36

  The U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, the European Union, and a concurrent House of Representatives and Senate resolution condemned the prisoners’ plight.37 In a rare open letter to Iran’s Prosecutor General, the Baha’i International Community has said that “what is at stake is the very cause of freedom of conscience for all the peoples of your nation.”38However, the Prosecutor General, Ghorbanali Dari-Najafabadi, has said, “The corrupt cult of the Baha’i organization in all its rankings is illegal and is not recognized officially—their dependence on Israel, their anti-Islam posture and opposition to the regime of the Islamic Republic is corrosive and the danger it poses to national security is evident and documented.”39 In February 2009, more than 200 Iranian intellectuals signed an open letter of apology for their country’s treatment of the Baha’i community.40 The Baha’i community has historical reason to be concerned about their leaders’ arrests and sentencing: Bani Dugal, principal UN representative of the Baha’i community, notes that “this latest sweep recalls the wholesale arrest or abduction of the members of two national Iranian Baha’i governing councils in the early 1980s—which led to the disappearance or execution of 17 individuals.”41

  Days before the trial was set to commence, Iranian authorities arrested another thirteen Baha’is, allegedly in connection with antiregime protests on the holy day of Ashura, and claimed to have discovered weapons and ammunition in their homes. They were taken to a detention center to sign a document prohibiting them from future demonstrating—though none had taken part in demonstrations. This group included relatives of some of the leaders previously arrested. As of January 2010, forty-eight Baha’is were imprisoned in Iran, with sixty arrested since March 2009.42 A second group of thirteen Baha’is, again including a relative of the arrested leaders, was placed under arrest on February 10 and 11, while ten of those arrested in January remained in detention.43 The regime is also trying to stigmatize protesters thro
ugh association with Baha’is; Kayhan, a regime-linked paper, declared in a January 5, 2010, headline, “The So-Called God-Loving Mousavi’s Men Turned Out to Be Baha’is and Terrorists.” There have also been photographs of pro-government demonstrators carrying signs asserting that opposition leader Mir Hussein Moussavi is a Baha’i.44 Examples of the many persecuted Baha’is include the following:

  Musa Talibi

  Four months after his arrest in Isfahan in June 1994, Musa Talibi was sentenced to a ten-year prison term on charges of “acting against the internal security of the Islamic Republic of Iran” and “attracting individuals to the misguided sect of Baha’ism.” He appealed. After retrial in February 1995, his sentence was changed to eighteen months beginning on the date of his arrest. However, prosecutors objected to this reduction, saying the court had not considered the fact that Talibi, a practicing Baha’i, had claimed, while detained in 1981–1982, to have converted to Islam and was therefore an apostate. Based on this allegation, he was subjected to a further trial, and, on August 18, 1996, the Islamic Revolutionary Court, Branch Number 31, sentenced him to death. On January 28, 1997, on appeal, the Iranian Supreme Court of Iran upheld the death sentence. A February 1997 report by the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), the Iranian news agency asserted that Talibi had been found guilty of espionage, but his death sentence was in fact based on an apostasy charge. As noted above, apostasy was not then listed as a crime under the Iranian Penal Code. On May 28, 2003, he was released, but without any documentation from the authorities as to his legal status.45