Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes Are Choking Freedom Worldwide

by Paul Marshall

In August 2007, approximately 100 Afghans demonstrated in the southeastern region of Khost after American soldiers presented local children with soccer balls decorated with the flags of various countries. One of the flags was that of Saudi Arabia, which carries the Islamic declaration of faith, the shehada. Afghan parliamentarian Mirwais Yasini explained the problem: “[T]o have a verse of the Koran on something you kick with your foot would be an insult in any Muslim country around the world.” A U.S. spokesperson expressed regret for the unintentional offense caused by the gifts.2 The following month, the Afghan parliament announced, “The people’s representatives want them (U.S.-led forces) to formally apologize out of respect for public opinion and sentiment…we, representing the people of Afghanistan, want our friendly forces to respect the culture and tradition of people in their activities.”3

  Country Overview

  After the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 and the toppling of the communist government in 1992, the Taliban (“students”) militia seized control of much of the country and installed a highly repressive version of Islam. In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched a military campaign aimed at toppling the Taliban and eliminating the Al-Qaeda terrorist network’s safe haven there. Afghanistan ultimately adopted a new constitution and a new government, which has since been led by Hamid Karzai. The population of the country is about thirty million; of that, approximately 80 percent is Sunni, 19 percent is Shia, including a small Ismaili community, and 1 percent is “other,” including Sikhs, Hindus, Christians, and, in 2008, one remaining Jew. There is a correlation between religious and ethnic identities: the Sunni population comprises mainly Pashtuns, Turkmen, Uzbeks, and Tajiks, while the Shia Muslims are mainly Hazaras, with some Qizilbash from the mountainous central highlands. Though many Sikhs and Hindus fled the country during the Taliban’s rule, approximately 1,500 Sikh and 100 Hindu families remain, along with a Christian community consisting of 500 to 8,000 people. A handful of Sikh and Hindu temples are left in the country, along with one official Christian church and one Jewish synagogue.

  The Taliban’s Continuing Depredations

  The Taliban has persecuted, and, where it can, continues to persecute, anyone who does not adhere to its reactionary brand of Islam, and the vast majority of its victims have been Muslims. When in power, they also specifically targeted anybody thought to be connected to criticism or conversion of Muslims. On January 8, 2001, reputed leader Mullah Mohammed Omar made a radio announcement warning that his government would execute both apostates from Islam and any non-Muslim who attempted to convert Muslims. Omar also decreed that any owners of bookshops offering texts that criticized Islam, or that even discussed other religions, would receive a five-year jail sentence.4

  In August of that year, Taliban officials arrested eight foreign Christians working for the Shelter Now International (SNI) aid organization, claiming that they had been “trying to convert Afghan Muslims to Christianity.” Two women from the group had been arrested on August 3 while presenting a Christian film to an Afghan family, and the six others were arrested on August 5. Taliban agents cited Dari-language Christian materials as evidence of the employees’ involvement in “proselytism.”5 Sixteen of the organization’s Afghan employees were also arrested, although their friends and coworkers maintained that they were all firmly Muslim. Unlike the foreigners, the incarcerated Afghans were not allowed visitors, and Taliban representatives said they might face death or life imprisonment. The Taliban even detained sixty-four children who had been in contact with the aid workers, holding them until any possible “Christian influences” on them could be eradicated.6 In keeping with their assertions that there was a “larger conspiracy” behind SNI’s alleged proselytism, the Taliban closed the offices of two more Christian relief agencies, SERVE and the International Assistance Mission (IAM) and expelled their foreign workers at the end of August. After the expulsion, officials exhibited Bibles and Christian videos they claimed to have seized from the foreigners to prove their point. Thirty-five Afghan employees of IAM were later arrested when Taliban officials ordered them to pick up their salaries at the planning ministry.7 Following the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, President Bush listed the release of the foreign workers among the demands made on the Taliban. On September 27, the Taliban said it would resume their trial. When the Taliban evacuated Kabul on November 13, they confined their prisoners in a steel container and drove them south: they were freed on November 15 when Northern Alliance troops liberated the prison in which they were held.8

  Even after its collapse as a government, the Taliban continued its practices wherever it could. On July 1, July 15, July 23, July 28, and August 7, 2004, Taliban supporters murdered five Afghan converts to Christianity by stabbing or beating them to death. In the first case, a Taliban representative, Abdul Latif Hakimi, phoned Reuters and announced that “Taliban dragged out Assad Ullah and slit his throat with a knife because he was propagating Christianity.” Hakimi warned foreign aid workers, whom he accused of proselytizing, that “they face the same destiny as Assad Ullah if they continue to seduce people.” Local sources said Ullah was killed in broad daylight at a local market and his body dragged around the marketplace as an example to those who might have been swayed by his teachings.9

  Between May and July 2005, at least six Afghan Muslim clerics who criticized the Taliban were murdered. The first, Maulvi Abdullah Fayyaz, had declared that Taliban leader Omar could no longer claim the title “leader of the faithful,” which he had assumed in 1995. Twelve other clerics were killed in 2006, and eleven were killed in 2007, either for supporting the government or for declaring that terrorism is against Islam.10

  On July 19, 2007, Taliban forces kidnapped twenty-three South Korean Christians from Saemmul Presbyterian Church who were visiting Afghanistan as short-term volunteers. They killed two and freed two others after the South Korean government agreed to negotiate directly with them. On August 28, the South Korean government agreed to pull its 200 military support personnel out of Afghanistan by the end of 2007 and to block missionary activities by South Korean evangelical groups as a condition of the remaining hostages’ release. The government said that they had merely confirmed the existing timetable to withdraw troops and that an agreement to withdraw South Korean volunteers and missionaries had already been made.11

  The New Constitution

  The vicious persecution by the Taliban regime of anyone whose practice differed from its version of Islam is well known, and persecution has lessened since they were deposed. However, with respect to blasphemy and apostasy provisions, particularly in the media, Afghanistan remains highly repressive. The Afghan constitution, adopted under American auspices in January 2004, borrows heavily from what it describes as Islamic principles.12 Article 1 identifies the state as an “Islamic Republic,” and Article 2 declares Islam the state religion. More worrisome, Article 3 sets forth the vague mandate that “no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam.” Article 35 declares that Afghans can only form political parties if “the program and charter of the party are not contrary to the principles of the sacred religion of Islam.” Article 54 declares that the state should ensure “the elimination of traditions contrary to the principles of the sacred religion of Islam.” Article 130 states that where statutory law does not directly cover a case, courts are to make decisions according to the Hanafi school of jurisprudence. Article 131 permits the use of Shia jurisprudence if only Shias are party to the dispute. The president is constitutionally required to be a Muslim and, with all Ministers, to swear to obey and support “the provisions of the sacred religion of Islam.” Supreme Court justices must take similar oaths.

  The constitution does not state what the principles of Islam are. But, whatever they are, they are the law, and “ignorance about the provisions of laws” (Article 56) will be no defense against them. Article 149 protects all such articles and declares, “The provisions o
f adherence to the fundamentals of the sacred religion of Islam and the regime of the Islamic Republic cannot be amended.” Hence, undefined principles that cannot be amended are Afghanistan’s ultimate legal authority.

  Chief Justice Shinwari

  The 2004 constitution’s initial major interpreter was Afghanistan’s first post-Taliban Supreme Court Chief Justice, Fazil Hadi Shinwari, who added his own unique perspectives to the justice system. At the time of his appointment, he was leader of the Council of Islamic Scholars.13 In January 2002, he announced that he would enforce strict sharia penalties, including amputations for theft, lashing or stoning for adultery, and possible executions for non-Muslim proselytizers. He explained, “We can punish them for propagating other religions—such as threaten them, expel them and, as a last resort, execute them, but only with evidence.”14

  In February 2002, National Public Radio reported, that Afghanistan’s chief justice found a sword in his office when he moved in and thereafter kept it above his desk to enforce what he considers Islam’s three essential rules: first, that a man should politely be invited to accept Islam; second, that if he does not convert, he should obey Islam. “And if he does not do that, then the third option is to use that sword and to behead him.”15

  In 2006, the Afghan parliament rejected President Karzai’s renomination of Shinwari to head the Supreme Court, and Abdul Salam Azimi, who boasted sounder legal credentials and has kept a somewhat lower profile than his predecessor, replaced Shinwari.16 However, this does not appear to have made much difference in legal interpretations of blasphemy and apostasy provisions. Local municipal and provincial judges often ignore statute laws and base their judgments on their personal understanding of sharia, tribal codes of honor, or local customs. Shuras—Islamic legal consultations that handle, by some estimates, 80 percent of cases—do not recognize any constitutional rights, and women and minorities frequently suffer rights violations at their hands.17 In fact, many areas are not under the effective control of the Kabul-based government and are subject to the dictates of the Taliban or other violent groups.

  Restrictions on Blasphemy and Apostasy

  Statutes are interpreted through, and may be supplemented or replaced by, the judge’s view of what Islam demands. This has led to calls to execute those thought guilty of apostasy or blasphemy if the individual is a male over age eighteen or a female over age sixteen and of sound mind. The sentence may be dropped if those accused recant their actions within three days.

  In March 2003, police confiscated hundreds of images of Muhammad from Kabul shops, and there are reports that images of the Caliph Ali, as well as of Jesus and Mary, were also taken. The Supreme Court promptly prohibited the sale of posters depicting the prophet or other religious figures.18 Chief Justice Shinwari claimed, without evidence, that the images “were printed in Iran by Jews because they have old enmity with Islam and want to insult the prophet.”19

  The Ulema Council, a council of senior Muslim scholars whose pronouncements carry enormous weight in Afghanistan, sought to close the major private television station, Tolo TV, which opened in October 2004, on the grounds that it is “immoral and anti-religious.” One Tolo employee, charged by Shinwari with “corrupting society,” was murdered in May 2005. A presenter for the station’s music shows fled Afghanistan after receiving death threats. In March 2008, the lower chamber of Parliament passed a resolution to stop the broadcasting of “un-Islamic” activities, such as dancing, on television. In April 2008, the Ministry of Information and Culture ordered private broadcasters to cease carrying Indian soap operas, which conservatives had declared “contrary to the principles of Islam.”20

  In May 2008, a cleric and some members of Parliament complained that the magazine Sobh-e-Omid had published a blasphemous article concerning an October–November 2007 Iranian-sponsored book exhibition held in Herat, which included books criticizing the caliphs, the prophet’s companions, and Bibi Ayesha, one of Muhammad’s wives. The cleric, Mawlawi Faruq Hosayni, charged Iran with disseminating blasphemous materials in order to create religious discord and faulted the Ministry of Information and Culture for failing to stem the import of offending Iranian books. Mobarez Rashedi, Deputy Minister of Information and Culture, promised to look into the case if given copies of the blasphemous texts.21

  Baha’is

  As in many other Islamist jurisdictions, Baha’is in Afghanistan are singled out for oppression. On May 20, 2007, the General Directorate of Fatwas and Accounts, a body under the Supreme Court that advises on religious questions not dealt with by the law, declared that all converts from Islam to Baha’ism are apostates and that all Baha’is are infidels. The ruling may render invalid the marriages of Baha’is who are married to Muslims. The status of second-generation Baha’is, who may be accused of blasphemy although they were born into Baha’i families rather than converting from Islam, is uncertain.22

  On April 9, 2007, one Baha’i, born into that faith, was arrested after his Muslim wife revealed his religious beliefs to authorities. The wife also applied for divorce, claiming she could not legally be married to a non-Muslim. Following international inquiries into the case, authorities released him on May 11, 2007. At that point, he had been in jail for thirty-one days without being charged, although, under the penal code, authorities can jail suspects for no longer than fifteen days without charges unless the courts grant an extension, which had not been given in this case. He fled Afghanistan with several family members.23

  Converts

  In a case widely reported in the international media, Abdul Rahman was arrested for apostasy in February 2006 after police learned that he had converted to Christianity sixteen years earlier. At that time, he had been living in Peshawar, Pakistan, and was employed by a Christian relief agency working with Afghan refugees. His wife obtained a divorce shortly after his conversion, and his parents in Afghanistan took custody of the couple’s two infant daughters. Rahman had traveled through Europe seeking asylum for nine years before being deported back to Afghanistan in 2002.

  In the months before his arrest, he had been seeking to regain custody of his children, and when he went to the local police for questioning, he was carrying a Bible and freely admitted to being a Christian.24 The prosecutor, Abdul Wasi, said that he would drop the case if Rahman agreed to convert back, “but he said he was a Christian and would always remain one.” After Rahman’s refusal, Wasi told the court, “He is known as a microbe in society, and he should be cut off and removed from the rest of Muslim society and should be killed.”25 One prison employee told reporters, “We will cut him into little pieces.… There’s no need to see him.” Other inmates in the Kabul jail also threatened him, so he was transferred to the high-security Policharki prison.26 In Friday sermons, clerics demanded his execution.27

  At his hearing, when Rahman was asked to confess that he had apostatized from Islam, he responded, “No, I am not an apostate. I believe in God.” On March 26, in an interview with the Italian daily La Repubblica, Rahman stated, “I am serene. I have full awareness of what I have chosen. If I must die, I will die.” After intense international pressure, Afghan officials, citing “problems with the prosecutors’ evidence,” said they needed time to decide if Rahman was mentally fit to stand trial. They acknowledged that a psychiatric evaluation would be difficult since, if Rahman were taken to an Afghan hospital, “he would be killed immediately.”28

  In reaction to the case’s dismissal, 700 protestors, including many clerics, gathered in Mazar-e-Sharif and chanted slogans including “Death to Christians,” “Death to America,” and “Abdul Rahman must be executed!” Without a formal vote, the lower chamber of Parliament demanded that Rahman not be allowed to leave the country.29 He was released on March 27 and two days later fled to Italy, whose government had offered him asylum. Meanwhile, there were repeated calls in Afghanistan for him to be brought back and killed.30 Abdul Rauf, despite his previous opposition to the brutal tactics of the Taliban, declared that he would kill R
ahman if he could: “If other people want to join Islam, we encourage and appreciate them. But ours is the complete and final religion. If you leave it, that is like throwing God away.” On October 12, 2006, Italian photojournalist Gabriele Torsello was kidnapped and offered in exchange for Rahman, though later released without concessions to his captors.31

  The Rahman case drew wide attention, but similar cases attracted little notice, sometimes because they occurred in remote areas and were dealt with locally. Also, at times, those targeted asked that their cases not be publicized for their own protection. Compass Direct News, one of the best sources on such matters, reports that while the Rahman case proceeded, police raided other Afghan Christians. Two were arrested, and one convert was attacked by six men who beat him unconscious. Others received threats.32 In March 2006, three other Afghan converts, as well as some of their family members, were “harassed.” In another case, a Christian convert was jailed on charges of homicide, and while he was in jail, another inmate, who came to know of his religious beliefs, killed him. In 2006, another convert was killed by his father-in-law, although no arrests were made.33

  Spiegel Online interviewed another Afghan convert, who used the pseudonym Hashim Kabar, who reported that at the time of his conversion, “[T]here were a lot of churches,” and Afghans could practice Christianity above ground. However, this ceased when the Taliban took power. Kabar survived only by pretending to be a Muslim when questioned by the police or visited by Muslims associates. In 2010, even in areas controlled by the Karzai government, converts must now hold services in private and on days other than Sunday to throw off suspicion, must shift locations, and often do not possess Bibles for fear that their homes will be searched. On May 30, 2010, the Afghan National Assembly (which includes the parliament, Wolesi Jirga, and senate, Meshrano Jirga) stated that the government should search, find, arrest, and execute all Afghans who have converted from Islam to Christianity, and dozens of Afghan Christians have fled their homes and even the country.34