Reagan: The Life

by H. W. Brands

  “Yes, I guess I was,” Reagan said.

  “That’s what I remember,” Regan reiterated. “I remember you being angry and saying something like, ‘Well, what’s done is done.’ ”

  “You know, I think he’s right,” Reagan said.

  Wallison drafted a memo to Reagan to help organize the president’s thoughts for the second interview. “On the issue of the TOW shipment in August,” Wallison wrote, “in discussing this matter with me and David Abshire, you said you were surprised to learn that the Israelis had shipped the arms. If that is your recollection, and if the question comes up at the Tower Board meeting, you might want to say that you were surprised.”

  Reagan was indeed asked about the discrepancy between his testimony and Regan’s. He told the commissioners he had changed his mind. He had talked the matter over with Regan and been convinced that Regan was right. He had not authorized the shipment in advance, and he had been surprised when he learned about it. As if to confirm his statement, the president stood up and looked toward Wallison. “Peter, where is that piece of paper you had that you gave me this morning?” Spotting the memo, he grabbed it and read, “If the question comes up at the Tower Board meeting, you might want to say that you were surprised.”

  “I was horrified, just horrified,” Wallison said later. “I didn’t expect him to go and get the paper. The purpose of it was just to recall to his mind before he goes into the meeting that on something that he had been all over the lot on for so long, he had seemed to have come to some conclusions.” Wallison shook his head. “God, it was just terrible.”

  The commissioners were astonished and confused. The commission’s chief of staff, Rhett Dawson, remembered the reaction of the commissioners—John Tower, former secretary of state Edmund Muskie, and former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft—after the meeting. “Ed and Tower and Brent slumped on the couch or in their chairs just thunderstruck,” Dawson said. The commissioners’ conclusion that Reagan’s memory, or at any rate his testimony, on the subject was worthless received corroboration when the president wrote the board a letter abdicating all reliability. “In trying to recall events that happened eighteen months ago I’m afraid I let myself be influenced by others’ recollections, not my own,” Reagan said. “I have no personal notes or records to help my recollection on this matter.” He declined to mention the diary entries that contained repeated mention of arms and hostages. “The only honest answer is to state that try as I might, I cannot recall anything whatsoever about whether I approved replenishment of Israeli stocks around August of 1985. My answer therefore and the simple truth is, ‘I don’t remember—period.’ ”

  THE TOWER REPORT, released on Thursday, February 26, confirmed what was by then common knowledge: that the administration had traded arms for hostages and had taken proceeds from the arms sales and sent them to the contras. The report faulted the president himself for not supervising the NSC staff sufficiently. “The president’s management style is to put the principal responsibility for policy review and implementation on the shoulders of his advisers,” the report stated. “Nevertheless, with such a complex, high-risk operation and so much at stake, the president should have ensured that the NSC system did not fail him. He did not force his policy to undergo the most critical review of which the NSC participants and the process were capable. At no time did he insist upon accountability and performance review.”

  The report laid most of the operational blame on Robert McFarlane, John Poindexter, and Oliver North, all of whom had left the administration. Donald Regan, the ranking staffer of those who remained in the White House, was treated roughly but briefly. “More than almost any chief of staff of recent memory, he asserted personal control over the White House staff and sought to extend this control to the national security adviser,” the report said. “He was personally active in national security affairs and attended almost all of the relevant meetings regarding the Iran initiative. He, as much as anyone, should have insisted that an orderly process be observed. In addition, he especially should have ensured that plans were made for handling any public disclosure of the initiative. He must bear primary responsibility for the chaos that descended upon the White House when such disclosure did occur.”

  REGAN SOUGHT A period of grace before he resigned, to let the world know that the president disagreed with the report’s findings. He didn’t expect Reagan to admit that by giving McFarlane and Poindexter a back door to the Oval Office, he had made it impossible for Regan to do his job. Yet neither did he expect the president to toss him overboard bearing all the blame.

  But that was exactly what Nancy Reagan wanted her husband to do. And he largely acceded. Reagan began considering successors to Regan; Paul Laxalt suggested Howard Baker, the former Senate majority leader. “It’s not a bad idea,” Reagan wrote in his diary on the Thursday of the Tower report’s release. “I’d probably take some bumps from our right wingers but I can handle that.” In this same entry, the president added, “V.P. just came up—another meeting with Don. This time totally different”—different from the angry meeting Bush had reported to Reagan a few days earlier. “He says he’ll hand in his resignation first thing Monday. My prayers have really been answered.”

  But Nancy didn’t want to wait until Monday. The next day, Friday, CNN reported that Howard Baker would succeed Regan as chief of staff. Nancy didn’t admit that the leak had come from her staff, but interest and evidence pointed to the East Wing.

  Regan decided he’d had enough. He dashed off a one-sentence letter of resignation and sent it to the president. Frank Carlucci, the successor to John Poindexter as national security adviser, urged him to see the president personally. Regan refused. “I’m too mad,” he told Carlucci. “There’s been a deliberate leak, and it’s been done to humiliate me.”

  Carlucci wouldn’t let Regan leave without speaking to the president. So he had Reagan call Regan. Reagan apologized that the Baker appointment had been leaked, but he said he hoped Regan would stay around long enough to help Baker get grounded in the new job.

  Regan refused. “I’m sorry, Mr. President, but I won’t be in any more. This is my last day. I’ve been your secretary of the Treasury for four years and your chief of staff for two. You don’t trust me enough even to tell me who my successor is and make a smooth transfer. I deserved better treatment than this. I’m through.”

  Reagan tried to mollify him, but to no avail. “He was understandably angry,” the president wrote that night. He signed a gracious letter accepting Regan’s resignation. Regan read the letter and tossed it aside. “In my time with President Reagan, I had seen many such letters, and so I knew that someone else had written it for him,” he recounted.

  Nancy Reagan had her own reaction. “That night, for the first time in weeks, I slept well,” she remembered.

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  ON MARCH 4 the president addressed the American people in response to the Tower report. He had never given a more important speech, and he knew it. The final two years of his presidency hinged on whether he could win back the popular confidence that had been essential to everything he had achieved as president. Never had the people been more skeptical of him, nor with better reason. The evidence of his incompetence or culpability continued to mount, making the case for his policy toward Iran and the contras ever harder to defend. Yet he had to say something.

  “For the past 3 months, I’ve been silent on the revelations about Iran,” he began. “You must have been thinking: ‘Well, why doesn’t he tell us what’s happening? Why doesn’t he just speak to us as he has in the past when we’ve faced troubles or tragedies?’ Others of you, I guess, were thinking: ‘What’s he doing hiding out in the White House?’ ” Yet silence had been necessary, he said, because he didn’t know all the facts of the matter, and he didn’t want to speak until he knew them. “I’ve paid a price for my silence in terms of your trust and confidence,” he acknowledged. “But I’ve had to wait, as you have, for the complete story.” Now that t
he Tower board had delivered its report, he could break his silence.

  “I’m often accused of being an optimist,” he continued. “And it’s true I had to hunt pretty hard to find any good news in the board’s report. As you know, it’s well-stocked with criticisms, which I’ll discuss in a moment.” But there was good news amid the bad. “I was very relieved to read this sentence: ‘The board is convinced that the President does indeed want the full story to be told.’ ” There had been no cover-up. And there would be no cover-up. “That will continue to be my pledge to you as the other investigations go forward.”

  Regarding the bad news, Reagan didn’t blink. “I’ve studied the board’s report,” he said. “Its findings are honest, convincing, and highly critical; and I accept them.” There would be no buck-passing in this administration. “I take full responsibility for my own actions and for those of my administration. As angry as I may be about activities undertaken without my knowledge, I am still accountable for those activities. As disappointed as I may be in some who served me, I’m still the one who must answer to the American people for this behavior. And as personally distasteful as I find secret bank accounts and diverted funds—well, as the Navy would say, this happened on my watch.”

  Reagan addressed the issue that had generated the greatest controversy. “A few months ago I told the American people I did not trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best intentions still tell me that’s true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is not. As the Tower board reported, what began as a strategic opening to Iran deteriorated, in its implementation, into trading arms for hostages. This runs counter to my own beliefs, to administration policy, and to the original strategy we had in mind. There are reasons why it happened, but no excuses. It was a mistake. I undertook the original Iran initiative in order to develop relations with those who might assume leadership in a post-Khomeini government. It’s clear from the board’s report, however, that I let my personal concern for the hostages spill over into the geopolitical strategy of reaching out to Iran. I asked so many questions about the hostages’ welfare that I didn’t ask enough about the specifics of the total Iran plan.”

  Reagan remained concerned about the hostages. “Let me say to the hostage families: ‘We have not given up. We never will. And I promise you we’ll use every legitimate means to free your loved ones from captivity.’ ” But there would be no more trading arms for hostages. In what amounted to a significant concession of presidential impotence, Reagan said, “Those Americans who freely remain in such dangerous areas must know that they’re responsible for their own safety.”

  The other part of the report involved the money diverted to the contras. “The Tower board wasn’t able to find out what happened to this money, so the facts here will be left to the continuing investigations of the court-appointed independent counsel and the two congressional investigating committees. I’m confident the truth will come out about this mat ter, as well.” And he would live with the truth. “As I told the Tower board, I didn’t know about any diversion of funds to the contras. But as president, I cannot escape responsibility.”

  Reagan introduced the new personnel who would forestall future transgressions. “Former senator Howard Baker, my new chief of staff, possesses a breadth of legislative and foreign affairs skills that’s impossible to match,” he said. “Frank Carlucci, my new national security adviser, is respected for his experience in government and trusted for his judgment and counsel.” Reagan’s nominee for CIA director, William Webster, awaited confirmation by the Senate. Reagan had previously nominated Robert Gates to replace William Casey, who had at length resigned, still gravely ill. But the nomination ran into trouble when many senators questioned the swap of one CIA insider for another, and Reagan and Gates agreed to withdraw it. Reagan expected no such difficulty with Webster. “Mr. Webster has served as director of the FBI and as a U.S. district court judge. He understands the meaning of ‘rule of law,’ ” he said.

  The president said he had ordered a review of covert operations, to ensure that they clearly supported American policy and values. “I expect a covert policy that, if Americans saw it on the front page of their newspaper, they’d say, ‘That makes sense.’ ” He had forbidden the NSC staff to undertake covert operations. “No ifs, ands, or buts,” the president said. He had created a new position of NSC legal adviser to ensure compliance with the law. And he pledged to keep Congress informed. “Proper procedures for consultation with the Congress will be followed, not only in letter but in spirit.”

  Reagan hoped the country could get past the problems that had compelled the Tower report. “What should happen when you make a mistake is this: You take your knocks, you learn your lessons, and then you move on. That’s the healthiest way to deal with a problem.” He didn’t deny the importance of the continuing investigations. “But the business of our country and our people must proceed.”

  REAGAN’S SPEECH SCARCELY dented the skepticism. A new poll revealed that 85 percent of respondents believed that the White House had engaged in an organized cover-up of the Iran-contra affair, and half said Reagan himself was part of the conspiracy. By one measure the speech did more harm than good. Its focus on foreign affairs, combined with the general distrust surrounding the presidency, drove the approval rating of Reagan’s handling of foreign policy to a new low of 33 percent.

  Yet Reagan refused to be discouraged, or even to acknowledge the damage he had suffered. His staff continued to cocoon him. “The speech was exceptionally well received, and phone calls (more than any other speech) ran 93 percent favorable,” he wrote in his diary. “Even the TV bone pickers who follow the speech with their commentaries said nice things about it.”

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  REAGAN’S RESISTANCE TO unpleasant reality took other forms as well. He had known Rock Hudson the way he knew many other Hollywood stars: by reputation chiefly but by occasional encounter as well. And it wasn’t unusual that he had acknowledged the actor’s passing in October 1985. “Nancy and I are saddened by the news of Rock Hudson’s death,” Reagan declared in a written statement released by the White House. “He will always be remembered for his dynamic impact on the film industry, and fans all over the world will certainly mourn his loss. He will be remembered for his humanity, his sympathetic spirit and well-deserved reputation for kindness. May God rest his soul.”

  None denied the graciousness of the president’s gesture, but many found the statement late and lacking. Rock Hudson had been visibly wasting for months. “He had been to a White House dinner and had been at my table,” Nancy recalled. “I remember sitting across from him and thinking, Gee, he’s thin. I asked if he had been dieting, and he said he had been hard at work on a new picture and had lost weight.” The tabloid press asserted various causes for his decline. Reagan heard the stories and responded privately. “Called Rock Hudson in a Paris hospital where press said he had inoperable cancer,” Reagan wrote in July 1985. “We never knew him too well but did know him and I thought under the circumstances I might be a reassurance. Now I learn from TV there is question as to his illness and rumors he is there for treatment of AIDS.”

  Hudson confirmed the rumors, revealing that he had been diagnosed with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome a year earlier. The syndrome remained relatively new to doctors and public health officials; not until 1981 had AIDS been clinically described. And because it appeared first in homosexual men, it carried a stigma among those very many Americans who considered homosexuality sinful, perverted, or merely distasteful.

  Reagan was more tolerant than many of his generation. His daughter Patti Davis (who dropped her father’s last name in favor of her mother’s) later said that he had spoken matter-of-factly about Rock Hudson’s homosexuality, which had been an open secret in Hollywood for years. And she said that Reagan and Nancy had once left her and Ron in the care of a lesbian couple while they vacationed in Hawaii. As former governor of California in the late 1970s, Reagan visibly opposed a ballot measure that would have
barred gay men and women from teaching in California public schools.

  Yet Reagan headed a party that included powerful groups appalled by homosexuality. In their view the “gay plague,” as they often called it, was the consequence of homosexuals’ defiance of nature and God. “They have declared war upon nature, and now nature is exacting an awful retribution,” wrote Patrick Buchanan, a conservative pundit (and future Reagan communications director). Televangelist Jerry Falwell declared, “AIDS is God’s judgment on a society that does not live by His rules.”

  Reagan had sometimes catered, if not pandered, to the social conservatives. During the Republican primary season in 1980 journalist Robert Scheer inquired whether Reagan thought gay people had the same civil rights as everyone else.

  “I think they do and should,” Reagan replied.

  Then why, Scheer asked, did some of the candidate’s reported comments suggest otherwise?

  “My criticism of the gay rights movement is that it isn’t asking for civil rights,” Reagan responded. “It is asking for a recognition and acceptance of an alternative lifestyle which I do not believe society can condone, nor can I.”

  “For religious reasons?” Scheer asked.

  “Well,” Reagan said, “you could find that in the Bible it says that in the eyes of the Lord, this is an abomination.”