Down to the Sea

by Bruce Henderson

  Neither Gates nor the court had any further questions for Carney.

  Not surprisingly, Nunn, the Harvard-trained lawyer representing Marks, did have questions—more than a dozen. One area of interest had to do with what orders were given by Halsey to the fueling groups—one of which Hull belonged to—“after the fueling was abandoned on December 17th due to bad weather.”

  “That would not be a matter for Commander Third Fleet to concern himself with,” Carney said testily. “The rendezvous was given to the force and group commanders and they would issue their own orders.”

  The battle-hardened Nunn did not back down as he faced the higher-ranking officer. “In other words, a rendezvous with the fueling units was given by Commander Third Fleet and he expected them to meet that rendezvous?”

  “Yes.”

  “Can you state the date and time when the Commander Third Fleet was first advised of the presence of dangerous weather?”

  “About half past two in the afternoon of the 17th,” said Carney, who added that “prior to that time” Halsey had “suspected the existence of such a disturbance.”

  Asked by Nunn when the fleet “first maneuvered for the sole purpose of avoiding bad weather,” Carney answered that it had been at “midday the 17th when fueling was found to be impractical and a new fueling rendezvous was set to the westward. That being based on the first estimate that the storm was moving to the northwest and would recurve to the northeast.”

  “Admiral, did local observations prove helpful in determining the path of the storm?” asked Nunn.

  “As I previously stated it was not until the forenoon of the 18th that we were able to determine the position, course and speed of the storm.”

  “Was that determination by local observation?”

  “Yes.”

  When no one had further questions for Carney, he was told that he was “privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry” that had not been brought out by “the previous questioning.” Like the vast majority of the more than fifty witnesses who were to testify over the next week, Carney, when asked, had nothing to volunteer.*

  Also testifying the first day of the court of inquiry was Commander George Kosco. The Third Fleet’s senior aerologist began by reviewing his qualifications and experience as a weather forecaster. As his background included a master’s degree from MIT (1940), extensive duty as an aerology officer aboard a number of aircraft carriers (Saratoga, Yorktown, Ranger), and three months of “special hurricane research” in the West Indies, Kosco seemed impressively qualified on aerological matters, although he had been in the Pacific and on Halsey’s staff for only two weeks prior to the typhoon.

  In the first question posed by the judge advocate, Kosco was asked to take the court through the weather conditions “determined by you” on December 17 and 18, as well as indicating which factors influenced him to make “any recommendations to Commander Third Fleet.”

  Kosco’s uninterrupted answer eventually covered five pages of single-spaced typed transcript—ranging from the technical to the vague to the incomprehensible. Knowing that his testimony would be key, he had prepared himself with notes and charts—providing copies of the latter to the court—but at times they seemed to confuse him more than they helped.

  The first thing that became apparent was how little weight Kosco placed on his own observations or those of other aerological officers assigned to aircraft carriers in the Third Fleet—which Nunn had characterized during his cross-examination of Carney as “local observations”—and how much he relied on reports from other stations and forecasts from weather centrals, which, Kosco would admit, “fell short” of being adequate.

  In addition, Kosco explained how heavily he based his own weather forecasts on historical data. “There is only one typhoon normally for December,” he explained. “According to the record for the last 50 years, 75 percent of these storms pass off to the northwest and about 25 percent pass off into the Philippines. The fact that this storm was somewhere around Ulithi and west of Guam, gave it a free range to move off to the northeast, and I so indicated it on my map.” Kosco was acknowledging not only that he had placed great faith in the historical record as well as in the work of others but also that these sources seemed to him at least as important, if not more so, than wind and sea conditions he could observe for himself.

  Still without any prompting from the court, Kosco attempted in his long narration to pinpoint exactly when he knew he was dealing with a typhoon. “About 8 or 9 o’clock [on December 18] it became rather apparent it was not an ordinary tropical storm, but was starting to get into typhoon conditions, and the best estimate was that it was a tropical storm that was developing into a typhoon.” Yet that morning—still hours before any ships were lost—no typhoon warning was sent out by Third Fleet to its more than one hundred vessels.

  As if he wasn’t paying attention to his own testimony, Kosco went on, “About 1300 on the 18th we sent out a typhoon warning. You will find that in the TBS log. Until that time we had thought we were dealing with a tropical storm. The first mention of typhoon, which is about the worst weather report that can be sent out, was dispatched about 1300, and this was the first mention from any source of a typhoon or the possibility of a typhoon. In other words, we didn’t think that we were dealing with a storm as severe as a typhoon until we were within 100 miles of it.”

  As if he heard a critical voice in his own head about the substandard quality of his weather forecasting until a storm was on top of the fleet, Kosco blurted out, “By this report, I don’t mean that we didn’t know about it before 1300, but by 1300 it became apparent that the outside world and weather centrals should know that this intense storm was in this location.”

  Then, as if to get himself off the hook, Kosco added: “I have not made an exhaustive study of this typhoon, because I would have to get a lot of records from places like Guam, Leyte and Ulithi. They are not available on board the flagship [New Jersey].”

  Not only had the fleet aerologist given direct testimony, but he had seemingly cross-examined himself as well, in the process tripping himself up as surely as any skilled opposing lawyer might have. Perhaps realizing it was time to shut his mouth, Kosco abruptly said, “That is all I have.”

  The judge advocate asked:

  Q: “Did you as the Aerological Officer on the staff of Commander Third Fleet receive information from all the other fleet units having aerological equipment or personnel aboard?”

  A: “No, I did not.”

  Q: “Did the operation plan require various units to furnish you with that information?”

  A: “Not unless the situation warranted breaking radio silence, and the storm was the tantamount thing at the time. The breaking of radio silence was then up to the task group commanders or the individual ships.”

  The court was understandably confused as to the precise time Kosco had realized the storm was a typhoon. One of the admirals asked: “You first diagnosed this as a typhoon at about 1300 on the 18th?”

  “No, about 8 o’clock on the morning of the 18th. But we were fighting the typhoon and before I sent a message to the other weather centrals, it was about 1300, although I had sent a message at 8:30 A.M., saying that it was increasing in intensity.”

  No one—none of the admirals, not Gates as judge advocate, not Nunn for Marks, not Preston Mercer—attempted to pin down Kosco about why he had waited some five hours before sending out a typhoon warning, an hour after the destroyers were already sunk and hundreds of men dead.

  Declining the opportunity to volunteer anything further, Kosco stepped down, no doubt thinking he was finished with his ordeal.

  The court’s first day ended with a succession of ship captains, squadron commanders, and flag officers in charge of various task units and groups on the witness stand. While the skippers testified to the damage the typhoon had caused their ships, the higher-ups were asked about reports and forecasts by their own a
erologists, most of whom were not on the witness list. While the quality of the weather forecasting by others generally seemed to be on a par with Kosco’s own confused meanderings, there were exceptions. The aerologist on the carrier Monterey (CVL-26), for example, provided a more timely forecast for the approaching typhoon. “We knew that a typhoon was somewhere around our area on the 17th,” said Monterey’s commanding officer, Captain Stuart H. Ingersoll. That was one full day before Kosco and the Third Fleet came to the same conclusion. Yet Monterey, “the only large ship near the position of the three destroyers when they capsized,” had not broadcast a typhoon warning. Ingersoll was not asked why, although he might have answered that doing so was not his responsibility.

  The last to testify that first day was Captain George H. DeBaun, commanding officer of the light carrier Cowpens (CVL-25), which had suffered damage similar to Monterey—tied-down aircraft breaking loose on the flight and hangar decks and careening into each other, exploding and causing fires—as well as personnel casualties.* If the fleet’s aerological officers—including his own aboard Cowpens—had been unsure about the storm’s severity and what it portended, DeBaun had not been.

  “The weather followed the book description of a typhoon,” said the straight-talking DeBaun, an Annapolis graduate (1921) and designated naval aviator. “We had swells, increasing winds, barometer dropping, all that. A very good example of what is written up in Knight’s ‘Seamanship.’ There was no trouble realizing there was a typhoon. This was all evident to me from 8 o’clock in the morning [of December 18].”

  More ship and group commanders testified the next day. Soon a topic of inquiry besides aerological reports and forecasts emerged: the issue of ballasting, first addressed by Captain Jasper T. Acuff, the commander of the oiler task group that included Hull and Monaghan, along with Spence, which had been so low on fuel that she was left behind the night of the 17th to remain close to the oilers. Acuff testified that he had gone on the TBS to recommend to any ship low on fuel that it “partially ballast” to 50 percent in order to get through the night. His idea was for such ships to fuel “in two parts”—filling to capacity with oil in the morning, then moving away, deballasting the seawater, and returning for more oil. Of course, fueling never took place the next morning. While Acuff pointed out that the ships assigned to his group—including Hull and Monaghan—“were not low on fuel,” the question remained unanswered for the court whether Spence, down to 10 percent capacity by December 18, had ballasted during the night, as suggested by Acuff.

  “Have you any idea as to why these destroyers sunk?” asked one of the admirals.

  “No, sir,” Acuff answered. “Unless they failed to ballast.”

  Punctuating the importance of this issue, Captain William T. Kenny, commander of a destroyer squadron, testified that his flagship, the Fletcher-class destroyer Hickox (DD-673), a sister ship of Spence, had received Acuff ’s message to ballast. Kenny testified that for the morning fuel report on December 17 Spence had reported 15 percent fuel and Hickox 14 percent. Rather than ballasting to 50 percent during the night, however, Hickox was “fully ballast[ed]” as of 9:30 A.M. on December 18. And still, Kenny said, Hickox rolled up to 70 degrees and nearly capsized on two occasions “when the issue was in doubt.” Asked if Hickox might have gone over if the ship had had less ballast, Kenny said, “It is quite possible.”

  The focus of the court returned to aerological questions with the testimony of Captain Michael H. Kernodle, commanding officer of the light carrier San Jacinto (CVL-30) and Annapolis classmate (1921) of Acuff ’s. After confirming that an aerologist was assigned to his ship, Kernodle was asked by Gates: “Was he able to predict the storm that you encountered?”

  “Yes.”

  “Did you receive any warnings from any outside sources as to the approach of the storm?”

  “Yes.”

  “Please tell the court approximately when and from whom you received that information.”

  “I received warnings continuously for 24 hours before I got into the storm, from my aerographer, from the action of the ship, and condition of the sea. I was fully aware of the storm, and that it was going to be severe. In addition to that, I also heard reports from other vessels who were in desperate trouble…. I had all the warnings any one could possibly have.”

  Whatever standing Kosco still had with the court had plummeted. The Third Fleet’s senior weatherman—indeed, Halsey himself—certainly had had available the same reports that Kernodle had seen, as well as local weather reports and—if one looked out any porthole on any ship—the “condition of the sea.” Why, then, was the approaching typhoon not as evident to them as it had been to one skipper of an aircraft carrier?

  Captain Preston Mercer, switching hats from interested party to witness, was now called to the stand by the judge advocate. Allowed to make an opening narrative statement, Mercer described at length the movements and storm experiences of his destroyer squadron—and especially his flagship, Dewey—on December 17 and 18. He described making several suggestions to Dewey’s captain, Charles R. Calhoun, about ballasting and speed during the worst of the storm, rather immodestly suggesting that his sage advice may have helped save the ship from sinking.

  He then said he would “like to say a little about the stability characteristics” of the Farragut-class destroyers that made up his destroyer squadron. “When in the Navy Yard recently, there was the usual effort by various people to add lockers and various items topside, which I resisted vigorously,” Mercer said. He described pursuing the “new type 20 mm mounts” and having them installed on his squadron destroyers, “which reduced topside weight by 3,250 pounds” per ship. In spite of such efforts, Mercer stated, “all commanding officers and most of the officers and men of the squadron who have been in the ships any length of time were very much aware of the lack of stability” of the Farraguts.

  As for his two lost destroyers, Mercer said that on the morning of December 18, “when Monaghan reported inability to come to the southerly [fleet] course,” he considered “offering her some advice” but decided not to “in view of the communications situation and my inability to visualize what was happening in the ship.” He did not suggest what nature of advice he might have given. As for Hull, “I never knew she was in difficulties.” Mercer testified that Dewey had received the message by light signal from Tabberer on the night of the eighteenth that she was “picking up some survivors,” although Mercer said it was unclear to him at that time which ship had gone down. In defending his decision to withdraw Dewey from the search for men in the water, Mercer said: “Dewey was on a course about 220, speed 3 knots, and although we would have attempted to rescue survivors had we seen any, I did not consider it advisable to make a search.”*

  Once again, the search for survivors seemed to be a lower priority.

  One of the first questions asked of Mercer was whether Spence had been under his tactical command. He confirmed that she had been until he turned over command of the task unit about 10:00 A.M. on December 18.

  “At any time during that period did you receive any indication that Spence might be in trouble?”

  “No, none other than she was unable to fuel,” said Mercer.

  “Have you anything to say regarding the seamanship of Spence during the time that she was under your tactical command?”

  “I noted nothing unusual, except that she dropped behind when my task unit headed south at about 8:20 A.M. on the morning of the 18th. With the communication difficulties being encountered at that time, I didn’t think it remarkable that a ship had failed to receive a change of course signal, and I believe that she reported she was making the fleet speed on the fleet course after she fell out of position.”

  Mercer was asked to “compare the experience and capabilities” of the commanding officers of Hull and Monaghan, Jim Marks and Bruce Garrett, respectively.

  “The commanding officer of Monaghan was in the squadron for such a very short time that I had practically
no opportunity to make a sound estimate. He handled his ship well in formation, kept her on station in the screen, but that was the limit of my opportunity to observe him. The commanding officer of Hull has been separated from my squadron a great deal [while Hull was assigned to other units]. Likewise, when she was with us for a very short time, his ship was handled well, and I have no criticism whatever of his ability. [Marks] has served in the North Atlantic and experienced very heavy weather, but perhaps he did not appreciate that Hull was not as stable as previous destroyers in which he was embarked. I believe the commanding officers of Monaghan and Hull have at least average ability and judgment compared with their contemporaries.”

  This line of questioning continued for several exchanges.

  Q: “How does the service experience of the commanding officers of your squadron compare with that of the commanding officers of other squadrons?”

  A: “The commanding officers of the ships of my squadron are the most junior in destroyers, being of the Naval Academy class of 1938. The commanding officer of Spence was in the class of 1937, and now there are a few commanding officers of the class of 1938 in other destroyers.”

  Q: “I gather from your answer that these destroyer commanders of the class of 1938 are the junior ones in the fleet. Is that correct?”

  A: “That’s right, sir. They are just beginning to send a few of them to other ships.”

  Q: “Would you venture an opinion, or could you state, which destroyer squadron of the fleet has [ships with] the least stability?”

  A: “There is no question in my mind but that it is Destroyer Squadron One.”

  Inexplicably, the judge advocate had just provided Mercer with cover in the event anyone in authority questioned how and why two of his squadron’s destroyers—the oldest destroyers in the fleet, being commanded by the youngest skippers—and a third, newer destroyer temporarily assigned to him had been lost on December 18 while so many other ships, some also low on fuel, managed to survive the typhoon.