The Supreme Commander

by Stephen E. Ambrose

  The Allies wanted French co-operation, but only Mast had any idea of when the invasion was coming. No one had discussed the operation with the Spanish, so their reaction was also a mystery. The unpredictable included the weather—the surf at Casablanca might force one third of Eisenhower’s total force to lay off shore for a day or even more, and he had no strategic reserve. The Allies were taking chances in TORCH, in short, that later in the war they would not dream of taking.

  Despite the risk, as October came to an end and D-Day approached Eisenhower exuded confidence. Patton’s force had already set out from Norfolk and so far there had been no mishaps. The Eighth Air Force was pounding away at the German submarine bases in the Bay of Biscay. Mast had “committed himself so far that there is no chance of his double-crossing us.” Montgomery had launched on October 23 his attack at El Alamein, and initial reports indicated that he was enjoying success. The troops for the Oran and Algiers landings were loaded and ready to go. Churchill and the BCOS were giving Eisenhower their full backing.

  Eisenhower had problems, but he was sure he would overcome them all. Taking his last long view of strategic developments before departing for his forward command post at Gibraltar, he suggested to Marshall that in so far as port capacity in North Africa was limited, they ought to begin thinking about what they were going to do with the mass army being built in the U.S. Some of the troops could be used profitably in the Southwest Pacific, but most of them should come to Europe. As Eisenhower saw it, “the spring of ’43 may see the ROUNDUP idea revived with the purpose of launching a decisive blow in the spring of ’44, with the summer of ’43 used for building up the necessary forces in Great Britain, firmly establishing ourselves in favorable position in the Southwest Pacific and exploiting TORCH to the point that the whole region” was secure.

  With Mast safely in the Allied camp, Eisenhower thought “everything for TORCH is well in hand.” He feared “nothing except bad weather and possibly large losses to submarines.” These dangers were real enough but, given a little luck, he told Marshall, “you may rest assured that the entry will go as planned and that we will have good news for you by the morning of November 9th.”

  The nagging problem was Giraud’s demand for command. Mast had made it clear to Clark that since the battle was on French territory, since Giraud was senior to Eisenhower and a distinguished commander in his own right, and since it was through his influence that the landings would be unopposed, Giraud should have the supreme command. Eisenhower was willing to go to great lengths to satisfy Giraud—for example, Mast had said Darlan could not be trusted and that Giraud would have nothing to do with him, so Eisenhower dropped the idea of working with Darlan—but not so far as to give him supreme command. The question of over-all command “is going to be a delicate one,” Eisenhower recognized, and he knew he would “have to ride a rather slippery rail on this matter.” But here, as with all his other problems, Eisenhower was sure he could handle it. He told Marshall not to worry.33

  CHAPTER 8

  The Invasion of North Africa

  Eisenhower planned to go to Gibraltar on Monday, November 2, take command of the Rock, the best communications center in the area, and direct the invasion from there. By Saturday, October 31, everything that could be done in London had been done, so the commander in chief went to Chequers for a final weekend. Sunday evening he and Butcher watched a movie. It was a private showing. Eisenhower was supposed to be in Washington, this having been announced to the press as cover for his imminent absence from London. The cover plan may have helped lull the Germans into thinking no invasion was coming, but it made Eisenhower a trifle nervous, for not even Mrs. Eisenhower knew it was a cover plan and she was expecting him in Washington. He tried to fly to Gibraltar on Tuesday, but the weather prevented it. The weather was still bad the next morning and Eisenhower’s pilot, Major Paul Tibbets (who later piloted the plane that dropped the first atomic bomb on Japan), did not want to fly. Eisenhower ordered him to take off, after taking the precaution of putting Clark on another B-17.

  After a bumpy passage and landing, Eisenhower went right to his headquarters, which were in the subterranean passages under the Rock. Feeble electric light bulbs only partially pierced the darkness of the tunnels. Water dripped from the walls. Offices were caves where the cold damp air stagnated and stank. It was, Eisenhower declared years later, “the most dismal setting we occupied during the war.”1

  For three days Eisenhower fretted. He tried to work on plans for operations after the capture of North Africa, but he could not concentrate. The talk in the Gibraltar tunnels centered around Giraud.2 He had finally agreed to leave France on the date selected by the Allies and was now on a submarine. He thought he was headed for Algiers to take command there; actually the submarine was bringing him to Gibraltar, for Eisenhower wanted to make sure he would co-operate before turning him loose in North Africa. Eisenhower’s staff meanwhile prepared a message for Giraud’s approval, announcing that he had made an alliance with the Allies to liberate French Africa and urging the Army not to resist. The idea was to send it by radio to Giraud on the submarine, have him approve, then print it and drop it from planes over Morocco and Algeria.

  Admiral Cunningham suggested that, since Giraud was safely in Allied hands, they might as well proceed to issue all the statements, pamphlets, and so on, they pleased, all in Giraud’s name. Eisenhower said that was too “double-crossy.”3

  That evening Eisenhower, Clark, and Butcher sat around in Eisenhower’s room and had a bull session. It would not be long, Clark said, before they were either lions or lice. Eisenhower mused that he would rather be leading an invasion directly into France. Clark cursed at all the politics involved in TORCH. Eisenhower declared that he would be happier commanding a division but added that he was thankful he had an opportunity to make some mark in history, an opportunity few men ever had. Clark, who was scheduled to fly to Algiers and set up an advanced headquarters there, said that if things went badly he intended to fly right on into central Africa and parachute out, keeping the gobs of gold he would be carrying with him for contingency use. He promised to let Eisenhower know where he was but said that if the commander in chief wanted to join him he had to bring his own gold along.4

  Such nonsense helped to pass the time, as did dictating letters. The day before the invasion Eisenhower sent a long letter to Marshall. There was little else he could do, since the troops were all at sea and he could not visit with them. He was caught in that period in a commander’s life in which all he could do was wait. The plans were finished, the operation in motion. Until it succeeded or failed, events were out of his hands. Eisenhower would go through that waiting period a number of times during the war, but he never got used to it.

  Dictating a message to Marshall was, in a way, like talking to the Chief, and Eisenhower drew some reassurance from it. He recounted all his worries, which centered on the German submarines, mentioned Murphy’s “case of jitters” and wondered if Murphy was developing “a bit of hysteria.” Eisenhower had just received a message from Murphy saying that unless the Kingpin (code name for Giraud) was in Algiers by the night of November 6–7 “the success of the operation could not be assured.” Murphy had also asked for diversionary attacks against Norway, western France, and southern France.

  In contrast to Murphy, the AFHQ staff had stayed calm. Eisenhower was especially impressed with his British subordinates. Growing expansive, he described to Marshall the congestion on Gibraltar, then gave a detailed account of his trip from London to Gibraltar.

  As he talked, Eisenhower’s mind jumped from subject to subject. He mused about the Spanish, weather conditions at Casablanca, and promotions for the American Army officers involved. He explained that bad weather had forced him to cancel a proposed paratrooper drop on Tunisia. While Eisenhower was talking a flash report came in that one of the combat loaders for Algiers had been torpedoed about three hundred miles east of Gibraltar. Eisenhower passed the information on, along with t
he hope that the ship could make it safely to shore. (It did.)

  When he ran out of minor details, Eisenhower began to talk about the meaning of TORCH. “We are standing, of course, on the brink and must take the jump—whether the bottom contains a nice feather bed or a pile of brickbats!” He was satisfied that he had done his best to assure a successful landing. Looking back over the “high pressure weeks since July 24th,” Eisenhower could not think of a major decision that he would change. He told Marshall that every member of the AFHQ staff, British and American, had “slaved like a dog,” and added that he felt strongly that “we have established a pattern for Combined Staff operation that might well serve as a rough model” for future expeditions.

  Analyzing the reasons for the successful teamwork, Eisenhower said the most important was unity of command. Next was the attitude of the British government, which had made “absolutely certain” that none of the British officers had any “mental reservations about their degree of responsibility to the Supreme Commander.” The way in which the CCS had allowed AFHQ to work out its own problems helped, too, as had the quality of the officers assigned to AFHQ by both countries.

  Eisenhower was proud of what he had achieved at AFHQ. Waiting now for the troops to hit the beaches, he told Marshall that it was always possible some unforeseen development might cause TORCH to fail. If so, he was afraid that “much of the work that has been done will be discredited by unthinking people, and the methods that have been followed [at AFHQ] will be cited as erroneous.” Eisenhower hoped that would never happen, because he was convinced that an integrated staff operating under unity of command was the only way to make the alliance work. If TORCH failed it would be because of political factors beyond AFHQ’s control; the lessons AFHQ had to teach would remain valid.5 As Eisenhower finished his dictation an aide ran in with news that Giraud had arrived on the Rock. A seaplane had picked him up off the submarine and brought him to Gibraltar. Giraud demanded to see Eisenhower—he would talk to no one else. While the secretary, with the dictated notes, left the cave that served as an office, Eisenhower sat down and waited for Giraud. Colonel Julius Holmes joined him to interpret.

  The tall Frenchman burst into Eisenhower’s cave and slapped down on the desk a memorandum for “The American General Staff.” In it Giraud demanded that he be taken to Algiers, be given a good radio transmitter and an airplane, some qualified American staff officers, and facilities for an advance command post. Eisenhower brushed aside the demands and said all he wanted Giraud to do was to issue a statement that could be broadcast that night to Morocco and Algeria. Giraud flatly refused. He said he could not participate in the operation unless he was made Allied Supreme Commander. He wanted to change the direction of the convoys and invade the south of France. Eisenhower told Holmes to tell Giraud that both demands were impossible. Giraud replied categorically that by November 10 all forces ashore must come under his command, and thereafter all forces landing in North Africa would have to come under him immediately upon debarking. He added that Eisenhower could retain control of base and administrative arrangements near the ports. He himself, however, “would make all decisions respecting the tactical and strategical employment of the troops.”

  Again and again Eisenhower said that Giraud could take command in Algeria after the Allies had moved on to Tunisia but it was simply impossible to change commanders in the middle of the operation. Each time Giraud paced the room and said he must have the command. Eisenhower promised him eventual command as soon as possible, but Giraud was “completely deaf” to the promises. He shook his head and repeated his demands. At one point he said he would not, as Supreme Commander, be responsible to the CCS. Eisenhower could deal with them on supply matters while Giraud directed the war. That was preposterous, Eisenhower replied. Very well, Giraud responded, he would stand aside, the French Army would fight, and the Allies would not even get ashore.

  Eisenhower conceded every point he could to get Giraud to come over. He offered Giraud “the governorship, virtually the kingship, of North Africa,” with money to build an army and an air force, but Giraud kept saying non. He had to have the supreme command.

  After about an hour of argument Eisenhower left the cave and told Clark to take over. Clark argued for an hour and gave up. Eisenhower went back. Giraud repeated that he had to be the Supreme Commander.

  Eisenhower found the conversation tiring and confusing. It was irritating to have to wait for Holmes to translate. Eisenhower thought Murphy had explained all the command arrangements to Mast, and that through Mast they had been explained to Giraud. The Frenchman’s idea of diverting the convoys to southern France was madness—obviously Giraud knew nothing of amphibious warfare, of the enormous complexity of Operation TORCH, or he would never have even made such a suggestion—and caused Eisenhower to question Giraud’s military ability. Eisenhower wanted to go to the communications room and listen for news from the assault convoys, but instead he had to stay in his cave and argue with a supposed ally. Giraud had no governmental backing, no infantry, no airplanes, no navy, no political following, nothing. Yet he was demanding the supreme command of the major Anglo-American operation in the war to date. The setting, in a dark, dripping cave with an air raid going on overhead, lent an Alice in Wonderland quality to the meeting.

  The Allied commander in chief could neither accept Giraud’s demands nor understand the man who was making them. From Giraud’s point of view, on the other hand, it was simple and logical. His country was being invaded by foreigners, who wanted him to lend his name to their aggression while withholding from him all real power. He was being asked to fight against his own government and army in a subordinate role under a plan elaborated by foreigners, with command in the hands of younger and less experienced commanders than he. To this proposition Giraud could only say non.

  While Eisenhower and Giraud talked, in the tunnels of the Rock there was “hubbub and bustle … like election eve.” Butcher burst into Eisenhower’s office with a message and came out to report that “Ike was red-faced from talk.” Clark guessed that Giraud was going to sit on the fence for forty-eight hours to see how the assaults went, then make up his mind. At 8 P.M. the meeting broke up. It had started at 4 P.M. and nothing had been accomplished.6 Eisenhower called in his secretary and added a postscript to his letter to Marshall. “I’ve had a 4 hour struggle with Kingpin,” he said. Giraud “says ‘Either I’m Allied C-in-C or I won’t play!; He threatens to withdraw his blessing and wash his hands of the affair.” Then, as a final note, Eisenhower added, “I’m weary!”7

  Even dinner was a problem. The governor of Gibraltar had asked Giraud and Eisenhower to be his guests, but if both went there would be a seating problem. Eisenhower decided to eat with Clark at the Royal Navy mess so that Giraud could sit in the position of honor at the governor’s right. At ten-thirty Eisenhower and Giraud went back into the caves. They argued for another two hours and again failed to reach any agreement.8

  By the end of the evening Holmes was too tired to interpret any longer, so Clark took over. His French was not good, but everyone got along without any difficulty because, as Eisenhower put it, “each of us merely repeated, over and over again, the arguments he had first presented.” Eisenhower finally said they might as well get some sleep. As they shook hands, Giraud’s good-night statement was, “Giraud will be a spectator in this affair.”9

  By the time the meeting broke up, the assault forces were on their way in. Butcher jubilantly reported that Eisenhower’s luck was holding—the surf on the Morocco coast was down to three to five feet. Patton’s men could go ashore and he would not have to bombard Casablanca. As Eisenhower dictated a long cable to CCS on the results of his meeting with Giraud, news came in from Oran. The landings there were unopposed. A message from Admiral Hewitt, naval commander in Patton’s force, said the operation was proceeding on schedule. There was no news from Algiers. Satisfied and exhausted, at 4:30 A.M. Eisenhower unfolded a cot in his office and went to sleep.10

&nb
sp; He was up at seven, reading messages and dictating cables. The situation was unclear, partly because the messages he was receiving were frequently garbled, but as far as he could tell everything was going ahead about as he anticipated. The French were beginning to resist, but Eisenhower could not tell how actively. “I’d give a month’s pay for an accurate report this minute from each sector,” he told Smith, who was in London, at 9:30 A.M. He did know that his troops were fairly solidly ashore at Oran and Algiers.11

  Giraud came in and the AFHQ staff gave the Frenchman exaggerated reports of the success of the landings. Somewhat subdued, he went into Eisenhower’s office at 10 A.M. for a conference. He must have sensed the hostility around him, perhaps even realized the potential danger he was in if he refused to co-operate. Butcher reported that “all felt something had to be done with him … even a little airplane accident.…” The governor of Gibraltar had told Eisenhower that “he had a good body disposal squad if needed.”12

  Eisenhower opened the meeting. “It is impossible for me to serve two masters,” he said. Giraud admitted that was true and declared he had no intention of asking for command of the air and sea forces. But the bulk of the ground forces, in any fight with the Germans, would be French, and they would only obey him. Eisenhower demurred, discussion followed, and no progress was made. Eisenhower finally agreed to “consult” with Giraud on the big decisions, making him in effect a co-commander for ground action. Giraud said that made him much happier.