The Supreme Commander

by Stephen E. Ambrose

  Eisenhower was caught in the middle of this plethora of political conflicts, which were far more complex than the summary above indicates. Roosevelt instructed him to act in North Africa as the military governor of a conquered province, but if he did that even Giraud would balk, and Eisenhower would be forced to use invaluable manpower to maintain order in North Africa. Nonetheless, the President wanted to keep De Gaulle out of power and made Eisenhower responsible for achieving this end. This ran counter to British wishes, and if Eisenhower was ever tempted to forget that he had more than one master Macmillan was there to remind him. Both Churchill and Roosevelt wanted Eisenhower to bring De Gaulle and Giraud together, a nearly impossible task because they wanted it accomplished on different terms. De Gaulle, in turn, wanted Eisenhower’s help in freeing France of the Vichy administrators, while Giraud and Roosevelt wanted Eisenhower to see to it that the administrators stayed and the army was re-equipped. The De Gaulle faction put pressure on AFHQ to get the British and American governments to recognize the committee in Algiers as the provisional government of France, while the Giraud group wanted something altogether different. Eisenhower’s personal wish was to escape from politics altogether, and his official desire was to get the issue settled so that he could get on with the war. But the stakes were high, the problem complicated, and there was no easy or quick solution. There was simply no way for Eisenhower to escape a deep and lasting involvement in the politics of war-torn France, especially as he became more and more accomplished as a diplomat and the leading actors came to look to him for solutions.

  On May 30 De Gaulle arrived in Algiers. Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden were already there. The Prime Minister had come, along with Brooke and Marshall, to discuss post-HUSKY strategy with Eisenhower, but Churchill also wanted to be a witness to the French union. He no longer flattered himself with the belief that he had undue influence with De Gaulle, who he knew was going to go his own way whatever the Prime Minister thought, but Churchill did feel that along with Eden he could play some sort of role. De Gaulle had declared that if Giraud wished to continue as commander in chief of the French armed forces he should not serve as a member of the prospective committee. Churchill was a strong advocate of civilian control of the military, but in this case he did not agree with De Gaulle. He talked about the problem with Eisenhower, calling De Gaulle an “ego-maniac” and a “Prime S.O.B.” These were welcome words to American ears, and Eisenhower ventured to say that Giraud was a capable leader of the French Army who had done what he was told. Eisenhower declared that he intended to continue to back Giraud as commander in chief of the French armed forces and would expect the governments to do the same.9

  Behind the scenes, meanwhile, De Gaulle’s supporters were building their strength for the showdown. Some two thousand Fighting French enlisted men and officers, who had fought through the desert with the Eighth Army, had gone AWOL (the British had ordered them to stay in Tripoli) and come into Algiers, where they were proselytizing among Giraud’s French troops and officers, with great success. Giraud’s police tried to herd up the Free French, but they simply scattered to the homes of friends outside Algiers.

  With, in effect, two French armies in Algiers, one responsive to Giraud and the other to De Gaulle, and with the eventual government of France at stake, the atmosphere was tense. A Fighting French officer boasted that De Gaulle had enough troops to take control of the city in a coup. With Darlan’s death fresh in everyone’s mind, the possibility of assassination could not be ignored. Eisenhower quietly checked on the number of American and British troops available for combat in the city and found there were almost none. There were, however, two British battleships and an aircraft carrier in the harbor and, of course, the air forces. Eisenhower felt that De Gaulle could probably take Algiers with an organized putsch but would be unable to hold it long. He did promise his aides one day he would start wearing a pistol, but he forgot it the next.10

  The French, it turned out, were doing a better job of keeping calm than the British and Americans. On June 3 De Gaulle and two of his Free French representatives met with Giraud and two of his followers. Monnet was the seventh member of the committee. The proposal before them was to constitute themselves into what was in effect a provisional government of France. Giraud at first balked at the proposal. He wanted to keep all the power Eisenhower and the Americans had given him for himself, but Monnet advised him to yield and he ultimately agreed. Thus the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) was born. After discussion, the FCNL proclaimed itself the central French power. At Monnet’s urging, the committee was careful to state definitely that it would “relinquish its power” when France was liberated. De Gaulle and Giraud were co-presidents of the Committee, and Giraud remained as head of the armed forces.11

  Eisenhower was delighted. Although neither the British nor the American government recognized the FCNL as a provisional government, they did agree to deal with it as an administrative agency for French interests. This meant, Eisenhower hoped, that all relations with the French would now be on an impersonal basis. When Churchill or Roosevelt wanted something, Macmillan or Murphy could discuss it with the FCNL. The old days, in which Eisenhower personally had to talk everything over with Giraud, hopefully were gone.12

  The members of the FCNL, however, soon began bickering with each other. De Gaulle wanted to dismiss the old Vichy administrators, starting with Boisson at Dakar. Giraud would not agree. De Gaulle wanted control of the armed forces taken out of Giraud’s hands and placed in those of the FCNL, and he was furious with Giraud for the supine way in which he accepted the “constant and unjustified interference by the Allies in French affairs.” De Gaulle was also upset because the Americans had prevented some of his followers in London from coming to Algiers.

  Everything came to a head at a meeting on the morning of June 10. De Gaulle stated his position, failed to carry a majority, and thereupon indulged in a calculated outburst. “Shrouded in sorrow,” he declared he could “no longer associate with the Committee” and resigned.13

  Whatever illusions Eisenhower had had about being free of French political troubles now disappeared. The day after De Gaulle’s outburst Roosevelt sent Eisenhower three cables. In the first he said he was not displeased, for he felt “this De Gaulle situation was bound to come to a head sooner or later” and better now than a month hence. In the second cable Roosevelt repeated a message he had sent the same day to Churchill, insisting that Giraud must have complete control of French troops in North Africa. He said he would send “several regiments to Dakar and also naval vessels if there were any sign that De Gaulle proposes to take things over in French West Africa.”

  In the third message Roosevelt referred to De Gaulle’s intention of dumping Boisson. Churchill had given Boisson an oral promise, and Roosevelt a written one, that he would not be punished for co-operating with Vichy. Thus Roosevelt ordered Eisenhower to pass an important message to both Giraud and De Gaulle, a message that was to come from the general, not the President. Eisenhower was to say that he was pleased by the expression of French unity shown in the formation of the FCNL and then to express his concern over reports of the possibility of the removal of Boisson from his West Africa post as a violation of this very spirit of unity and co-operation. He was then to ask for reassurances that the reports were unfounded. Roosevelt told Eisenhower to “go as far as you like in carrying out” these orders.14

  Eisenhower spent the morning in conference with Murphy and Macmillan. He ruefully commented that Marshall and others had advised him “to get out of the political machinations, and yet the President had plunged him back into them.”15 Because Eisenhower did not speak French he asked Murphy to deliver the message to Giraud. Murphy did so, and Giraud replied, “Tres bien.”

  De Gaulle was pleased with the hornet’s nest he had stirred up and when Murphy saw him was in a “most amiable state of mind.” He talked for an hour. He told Murphy the United States should make more of an effort to understand
him and his movement. He had realized from the first, he said, that Great Britain could not win the war alone and that therefore France’s future would hinge on the efforts of the Americans. He realized that the British were “traders capable of quick shifts of policy to meet their own interests and that they wished to use France for the purpose,” so he felt no compunction about using the British “as a convenience.” He expected from the United States “better comprehension” of the new France which he was building. Again and again he referred to the American attitude on Boisson, saying “it presented him with the gravest kind of problem on a matter of principle concerning French Sovereignty. If he yielded … he was lost.”16

  Monnet, meanwhile, oiled the wheels and got the FCNL rolling again. De Gaulle returned to the committee, which expanded from seven to fourteen members, with a permanent subcommittee composed of De Gaulle, Giraud, Juin, and two others to control military affairs. Giraud had gone along because Monnet advised him to do so, but by June 16 it was clear that De Gaulle dominated the larger committee. Giraud charged that Monnet had betrayed him and threatened his own resignation. Murphy insisted that he remain in office. Eisenhower was out of town on a three-day inspection trip to Clark’s Fifth Army, and in reporting these developments to Roosevelt, Murphy was most pessimistic. The diplomat saw no way to prevent a Gaullist takeover.17

  The President’s response was immediate and sharp. On June 17 he cabled Eisenhower to insist that “we will not tolerate control of the French Army by any agency which is not subject to the Allied Supreme Commander’s direction … nor are we interested in the formation of any government or committee that in any way presumes to indicate that it will govern in France.” In even stronger language, he added, “It must be absolutely clear that in North and West Africa we have a military occupation and, therefore, no independent civil decision can be made without your full approval.”18*

  In another cable of the same day Roosevelt told Eisenhower, “for your very secret information … we may possibly break with De Gaulle in the next few days.” The President also cabled Churchill to point out that “it is an intolerable situation.… We must divorce ourselves from De Gaulle because … he has been interested far more in political machinations than he has in the prosecution of the war.…”19

  Late on June 17 Eisenhower returned to Algiers. The next morning he tried to get Washington to calm down a little. He told the President that the “local French difficulties … have been magnified.” Much of the “acrimonious discussion” between De Gaulle and Giraud was more indicative of typical French politics than anything else. He had arranged to meet with De Gaulle and Giraud the next morning “to lay down in definite terms my minimum requirements” on the control of the French armed forces, and he expected to be successful. The question of Boisson was not on the agenda of the FCNL and Eisenhower advised Roosevelt not to make an issue of French West Africa, since to do so would give De Gaulle “the opportunity of breaking on an issue which he might falsely publicize as interfering in French civil administration.…” Eisenhower respectfully suggested to Roosevelt that nothing be done in Washington about breaking with De Gaulle until after the meeting. “I assure you, Mr. President,” he concluded, “that I am fully alive to the potentialities of the situation.…” In a cable to Marshall, Eisenhower pointed out that “De Gaulle has other and bigger fish to fry” and asked that the Chief, at an opportune moment, present his case to the President.20

  More clearly than Roosevelt, in short, Eisenhower recognized De Gaulle’s strength. De Gaulle was enormously popular among French civilians in Algiers and had at least as much influence in the army as Giraud. To break with him and try to throw him to the wolves would, at the very least, touch off serious civil disorder in Algiers. HUSKY was only three weeks away and Eisenhower had no troops in the area to keep order.

  Eisenhower also realized—as Roosevelt did not—that De Gaulle could not be intimidated or bribed. He was far stronger now than he had been in January at Casablanca, when the Allies had in effect offered him a secure position, a sort of recognition, and funds to carry on his work. If he had yielded to please them and joined Giraud, he could have become an important part of a Giraud government, probably the Minister of Defense. He would have had to follow Eisenhower’s orders and agree that France, when liberated, would be run by an Allied military government until the British and Americans chose to hold an election on their terms. But he would have received in return security, honor, prestige, and the friendship of the United States. By standing off at Casablanca he risked losing all. He had rejected the offer then, holding out for bigger prizes. There was no question but that he would do the same now.

  But though Eisenhower saw these facts, he did have his orders from the President to carry out. The key to the Eisenhower-Giraud-De Gaulle meeting of June 19 would be Eisenhower’s ability to hold his temper. De Gaulle was sure to make policy statements which would amount to insults. Eisenhower would have to try to soothe his feelings and keep smiling himself.

  De Gaulle purposely arrived last and spoke first. He strode into the room in full uniform, his tall frame ramrod stiff, his Roman nose suspiciously sniffing the air. “I am here in my capacity as President of the French government,” he announced. “For it is customary that during operations the chiefs of state and of the government should come in person to the headquarters of the officer in command of the armies they have entrusted to him.”

  De Gaulle looked around. No one could think of a response to his preposterous opening gambit, so he plunged on. “If you wish to address a request to me concerning your province,” he said to Eisenhower, “be assured that I am disposed beforehand to give you satisfaction, on condition, of course, that it is compatible with the interests in my charge.”

  Eisenhower then politely asked De Gaulle to leave Giraud in charge of France’s armed forces. De Gaulle replied that “the organization of the French command is the province of the French government, not yours.” Eisenhower repeated his request, whereupon De Gaulle asked, “You who are a soldier, do you think that a leader’s authority can subsist if it rests on the favor of a foreign power?” Eisenhower spoke of his responsibilities and his need to have his line of communications through North Africa secure and in the hands of a man he could trust.

  De Gaulle thought Eisenhower was acutely embarrassed to have to demand assurances from a head of government about his army leaders and did so only because of the pressure from Roosevelt. He admitted that Eisenhower was playing a strong hand insofar as the American general was directing the rearming of the French Army with American equipment. But he recalled World War I, when the Americans had fired only French cannon, driven only French trucks, flown only French airplanes. “Did we,” he asked, “in return … demand of the United States that they appoint this or that leader or institute this or that political system?” He then demanded that Eisenhower reduce his statements and demands to writing, and Eisenhower agreed to do so.

  At this point Giraud, for the first time, spoke up. He began to discuss French problems and emphasized how utterly dependent upon the Americans the French were. De Gaulle mumbled that he had heard all this before and stalked out of the room.21

  Eisenhower chatted with Giraud for a few more minutes, then went to confer with Cunningham and Alexander. They agreed that the best thing to do was nothing. Any unrest or disturbances in Algiers at the present time would only have the most deplorable effect on HUSKY, and the chances were good that in time the French would find their own way out of the tangle. “I hope you will say to the President,” Eisenhower concluded in his report of the meeting to Marshall, “that I beg of him to avoid any action that could increase our local difficulties until after HUSKY is at least a week old.”22

  The President responded by insisting on the retention of Giraud and, returning to his old obsession, declaring, “I want it distinctly understood that under no circumstances will we approve the removal of Boisson from Dakar.” He added that he expected Eisenhower to accomplish the
goals of his government in this area.23

  On June 22 Eisenhower sent a long analysis of the situation to Marshall. He emphasized that “when the HUSKY forces begin loading within a very few days, there will be practically no repeat no troops west of Tunisia that could be employed for insuring tranquility.” He again begged Marshall to see to it that Roosevelt did not force matters to a crisis. Monnet had told him that any attempt to depose De Gaulle would be disastrous, and Eisenhower added that he felt De Gaulle could be controlled. Giraud, Eisenhower said, had strength in the FCNL because of his record of co-operation and more important because Roosevelt had personally given him support. “His great weakness is the uneasy feeling throughout the region, including the Army and the civil population, that he is reactionary, old fashioned, and cannot be persuaded to modernize the forces already organized. It must be admitted that he moves with ponderous slowness. He had no repeat no political acumen whatsoever.”24

  The next day the situation brightened. The FCNL met and reached a compromise agreement. Giraud would be commander in chief of all French forces in North Africa, while De Gaulle would command all French forces elsewhere. Both were part of but responsible to a war committee that was in turn responsible to the FCNL. At AFHQ everyone was delighted, mainly because the officers there greatly misjudged De Gaulle’s political abilities. Eisenhower said he and his advisers had gone over the terms of the compromise “very carefully” and were “convinced that it assures the conditions prescribed” by the President. Eisenhower promised to watch the situation to make sure nothing was changed “by subterfuge, or otherwise except in the direction desired by us.”25 Smith wired Marshall to say that he had just talked with Giraud’s chief of staff, who was delighted with the decree and considered it “a definite victory.” Smith commented, “From every point of view we are certain that the new arrangement is all that we could ask for and I am still surprised that it was put across without a flare-up.”26 The Americans, in short, thought that De Gaulle had been had.