The Supreme Commander

by Stephen E. Ambrose

  One of the key questions was disarming German troops in Italy. Eisenhower thought the Allies should not require this, partly because the Italians would consider it “completely dishonorable” to make such an about-face, mainly because the Italians “would not be getting the only thing in which they are interested, which is peace.” To insist on disarming the Germans “might prevent us from obtaining great advantages.”

  The list of requirements Eisenhower drew up was fairly stern, but two things stood out: the Italians could have peace, and the Italian government would remain in power. It was a long way from an unconditional surrender.

  The terms, Eisenhower declared, “are submitted in the hope that they may serve as a basis for an immediate directive to me by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.” Most important, he wanted authority to broadcast the terms to the Italian people, since they promised a peace under honorable conditions and after the people heard them “no Italian government could remain in power if it refused to request an armistice.”16

  Eisenhower’s request for approval of surrender terms took a long and circuitous route before being met. On July 28 Churchill approved Eisenhower’s provisions except that terms should more expressly provide for the release of Allied prisoners. The Prime Minister also thought that the Italians should be required to force the German garrison in Italy to surrender and implied that he hoped for a future alliance with Italy against Germany. He spoke of turning the “fury of the Italian population” against the Hun.17 In reply, Eisenhower said it was his conviction “that there is no fury left in the population unless it is aroused by desperation. The people are tired and sick of the war and want nothing but peace.”18 On July 29 Marshall warned Eisenhower that his authority was limited to concluding local surrenders.19 Eisenhower replied that he was “perfectly aware of the fact that there are many implications and corollaries that far transcend military considerations as well as my own authority,” and asked Marshall to inform the President that he had only military contingencies in mind. He added that Churchill had sent him a similar reminder.20 By July 31 Eisenhower had received four more long cables from London and Washington, each asking for some modification of the terms.

  On July 29 Macmillan summed it all up: “I spent from 9 to 12 going backwards and forwards between my own office and A.F.H.Q. and conversation with General Eisenhower and Bedell Smith.… Poor Eisenhower is getting pretty harassed. Telegrams (private, personal and most immediate) pour in upon him from the following sources:

  (i) Combined Chiefs of Staff, his official masters.

  (ii) General Marshall, Chief of U. S. Army, his immediate superior.

  (iii) The President.

  (iv) The Secretary of State.

  (v) Our Prime Minister (direct).

  (vi) Our Prime Minister (through me).

  (vii) The Foreign Secretary (through me).

  All these instructions are naturally contradictory and conflicting. So Bedell and I have a sort of parlour game in sorting them out and then sending back replies saying what we think ought to happen. As this rarely, if ever, coincides with any of the courses proposed by (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), or (vii), lots of fun ensues. But it gets a bit wearing, especially with this heat.”21

  The Germans also had divided counsels. Rommel wanted to pull back to northern Italy; Hitler wanted to seize the Badoglio government and put Mussolini back in power; Von Kesselring argued that the Germans should maintain correct relations with Badoglio while reinforcing southern Italy, which he felt could be held. But though the Germans disagreed among themselves, they were capable of acting. While the Allied governments and soldiers debated, the Germans started four more divisions on the road to Italy—they even went to the extreme of withdrawing two SS Panzer divisions from the eastern front.22

  The Allies, meanwhile, continued to bicker. Churchill cabled Eisenhower to inform him that he had told Roosevelt that no armistice terms should be broached until a responsible Italian government approached the Allies with a request for an armistice. That ended all hope of broadcasting a peace feeler from AFHQ, and meant as far as the Italians were concerned that unconditional surrender was all they could hope for. If a request for terms were made to Eisenhower, “you would naturally refer it to both Governments.” The Prime Minister said he liked Eisenhower’s draft, but “we feel that more precision is needed and that the document must be drawn up between Governments and must include civil as well as military terms.” Churchill thought the terms should be “cut and dried” rather than “attractive and popular.”23

  Eisenhower told Churchill that he did not think it necessary to repeat “that I am ready to carry out in detail any instructions that the two governments may choose to give me.” He did suggest that Roosevelt and Churchill “should give me a general directive on this subject couched in as accurate terms as they can now foresee as applicable,” so that he would be ready if Badoglio did ask for an armistice. Any delay, he reminded Churchill, would only work to the advantage of the Germans. “All I urge,” Eisenhower concluded, “is that the Governments decide quickly on what to do in a certain contingency and give me a suitable directive by which my actions may be guided.”24

  Clear directives, however, seemed to be beyond the two governments’ capacities, as an incident in the first week of August emphasized. “When things are going rather badly,” Eisenhower told Marshall on August 4, “the troubles of an Allied Commander-in-Chief are wholly at the front.” At such times the CCS provided him with everything he asked for, while the commanders at the front plagued him with demands for more of everything. When the battle was going well, however, the people in front were quite happy, “but some of the individuals who are responsible for running the war begin to take an enormous interest in its detailed direction.”25

  The incident that Eisenhower had in mind, and that upset him so much, had its origins with the British Political Warfare Executive at AFHQ. On July 24 the Allied bombers had reached a state of near exhaustion and Tedder and Spaatz had decided to give the crews a short rest. The propaganda staff decided to make the hiatus appear voluntary and proposed to announce to the Italians that the Allies were giving them a breathing space to allow them to unite “for peace and freedom.” The Joint Propaganda Planning Board and Macmillan agreed, and the announcement went out over Eisenhower’s name. Eisenhower was in Malta at the time, but as he later told Marshall, “I accept full responsibility for the actions of a staff in which I have confidence.”26

  Churchill, always sensitive to the intrusion of soldiers into political affairs, felt the announcement went much too far. He protested to the President, reminding Roosevelt that while it was necessary for low-level propaganda “to be pumped out by the machines,” when the Supreme Commander spoke it involved the governments. “Speaking broadly,” the Prime Minister told the President, “it is quite right that politicians should do the talking and generals the fighting.” He hoped Roosevelt would agree that no pronouncements should be made by AFHQ over Eisenhower’s name until they had been agreed to by the British.27

  It was the first time Churchill had protested to the President about an action of Eisenhower’s. Previously, when unhappy, he made his complaints directly to AFHQ. Eisenhower learned about the protest on August 4, a bad day for him. Montgomery’s attempt to get around Mount Etna had failed, Patton was making no real progress, the interminable discussion over armistice terms was at its height, the CCS had just turned down a request for more bombers, and the heat in Algiers was ungodly. “I spent rather a difficult couple of hours with the C.-in-C. and Chief of Staff,” Macmillan noted that afternoon. “Ike is beginning to get rather rattled by the constant pressure of telegraphic advice on every conceivable point.”28

  After discussing the situation with Smith and Macmillan, Eisenhower dictated a long cable to Marshall. As he talked his irritation grew. He could not see why the broadcast was considered harmful in conception, Eisenhower began; in fact he felt it was “a very good statement and one that appears appropriate in
the circumstances.” He pointed out that the entire statement dealt with the employment of forces in his theater and did not even hint at any broad Allied foreign policy.

  “The Combined Chiefs of Staff have provided me with personnel who are presumably expert in the business of using propaganda,” Eisenhower declared. He said that these staff officers had tried to keep up the closest possible contact with the appropriate agencies in Washington and London so that they would always know the policies of the two governments, “so far as these policies have been promulgated.” No statement had ever gone out from AFHQ without Macmillan’s approval, and Churchill had assured Eisenhower that Macmillan represented his, Churchill’s, personal views on political matters. Problems arose daily in a theater of war on which the commander had to act swiftly, Eisenhower felt; indeed, the governments expected him to act and not procrastinate.

  “I do not see how war can be conducted successfully if every act of the Allied Commander in Chief must be referred back to the home government for advance approval,” Eisenhower said. In an oblique reference to the discussion over armistice terms, he added that AFHQ could act much more effectively if the governments would agree upon a policy and then let the commander in chief know what it was. If he then failed to carry out the directive successfully, the CCS should relieve him of his command, “but the authority and responsibility of his office should not repeat not be diminished.” Eisenhower concluded by recommending that Churchill’s specific proposal—to have all AFHQ statements cleared with both governments—be emphatically rejected. Marshall agreed with Eisenhower, and the Prime Minister dropped the proposal.29

  The most troublesome aspect of the endless exchange of messages, both on the propaganda and on armistice terms, was that after a week of debate the Allies were no closer to agreeing upon terms to offer the Italians than they had been at the beginning. Nothing, meanwhile, had gone out to the Badoglio government to indicate that it could expect anything more than unconditional surrender. Roosevelt and Churchill, in fact, had both publicly said that the only terms were unconditional surrender. No Italian representatives, therefore, showed up at AFHQ, and Eisenhower’s hands remained tied.

  Plans for the invasion of Italy, meanwhile, went forward. Eisenhower had anticipated German reinforcement of Italy in reaction to the change of government, and it made him even more anxious to get the invasion started. The day Mussolini fell he met with his deputies to try to settle the vexing question of where and when to invade. Just before the meeting Eisenhower’s planners told him that after intensive study they had decided that, because of the shortage of landing craft and the commitment of these craft to supply duty on Sicily, it would be impossible to launch an attack before September 10. Eisenhower was disappointed, but facts were facts. For three hours he and his deputies went over the list of available equipment; in the end the planners, “as usual, backed by stern reality, won the day.” Eisenhower did get the date advanced to September 7, but he was “obviously disappointed at the inability to move ahead.”30

  The commanders were unable to settle upon a landing site; they wanted to wait a few days to determine “the military significance of recent political changes in Italy.” Eisenhower and his deputies did narrow the range of choice down to two alternatives: BUTTRESS, a British invasion of the toe at Gioia, and AVALANCHE, an invasion of Salerno, twenty-five miles south of Naples, with one British and one American corps, both under Clark’s Fifth Army. They also ordered plans prepared to rush two divisions into Naples, one by sea and one by air drop, in the event of a complete Italian collapse.31

  The independent strategic air war, meanwhile, continued. Immediately upon the conclusion of the attack on Rome, the air forces began training for Operation TIDALWAVE. The target was the Ploesti oil refineries in Rumania. Oil had always had a high priority in the planning of the Combined Bomber Offensive but Ploesti, the most inviting of all oil targets, lay beyond the reach of planes based in the United Kingdom. Bombers from North Africa, however, could hit Ploesti. It was heavily defended but since it provided one third of Germany’s total supply of oil was obviously worth attacking. Eisenhower was an enthusiastic proponent of the operation.32

  Marshall had his doubts. On July 19 he had urged Eisenhower to co-operate with the British-based Eighth Air Force in a raid on the German fighter airplane factories in Austria, even if it was done at the expense of TIDALWAVE. He also urged Eisenhower to return to Lieutenant General Ira Eaker, commander of the Eighth Air Force, three B-24 groups that the Ninth Air Force in the Mediterranean had borrowed.33 Eisenhower called in Tedder and Spaatz to discuss the situation. They agreed with him that TIDALWAVE was important, but that it should follow the raid against the fighter factories, mainly because it was the more dangerous of the two missions and would have higher losses.

  When he reported this conclusion to Marshall, Eisenhower went on to discuss the broader policy of withdrawing bombers from the Mediterranean for use in England. In so doing he began a debate that was to be one of the most exasperating of the entire war. Eisenhower said he could understand Eaker’s desire to get his bombers back, but pointed out that the operations scheduled for the Ninth Air Force would have a direct effect upon the whole European situation. “In other words,” Eisenhower said, “both these operations are in support of the raids now being carried out from the U.K. and it merely happens that we have the more practicable bases from which to execute them.” He wanted the borrowed groups to stay with Ninth Air Force until TIDALWAVE was completed, and warned that one raid against Ploesti would not be enough—there would have to be a follow-up. Finally, he assured Marshall that he was not simply trying to retain forces in his theater at the expense of OVERLORD. Neither the fighter factories nor Ploesti, he reminded the Chief, “is a specific or particular objective for this theater.”34

  Marshall would not agree. He did allow the Ploesti raid to go ahead, but he told Eisenhower to launch it first, then make the attack against the fighter factories, and then return the three borrowed groups to England. TIDALWAVE went on August 1. In one of the most controversial actions of the war the Ninth Air Force lost 54 planes while destroying forty per cent of Ploesti’s total refining capacity. By activating idle units at Ploesti, however, the Germans quickly made up for their losses. Because there was no follow-up raid, TIDALWAVE was a failure.35

  So, it seemed, was Eisenhower’s attempt to keep Eighth Air Force’s bombers, but he would not give up the two hundred or so planes involved without a fight, and even went so far as to expand his demand. Marshall had not accepted his strategic argument, so on July 28 Eisenhower shifted to a tactical one. Tedder had pointed out that the Germans were rushing fighters and bombers into Italy along with the ground divisions, which made AVALANCHE a risky undertaking, since Salerno was at the extreme limit of fighter aircraft range. Eisenhower told the CCS that the tenor of the messages pouring in on AFHQ from London and Washington indicated that everyone expected great results from Mussolini’s fall. AFHQ would like to meet the expectations, but it could take “bold and rapid advantage” of the situation only if it had the strength necessary to assure reasonable success in AVALANCHE. Specifically, Eisenhower said he and Tedder believed that, if they could keep the borrowed bombers for three or four more weeks and use them in Italy, “we could practically paralyze the German air effort in all southern Italy and almost immobilize his ground units.”

  Then, expanding his claim, Eisenhower said that if the CCS would send three or four more bomber groups from Eighth Air Force to North Africa the chances for achieving a decisive success in AVALANCHE “would be tremendously enhanced.” While on the surface such a shift would mean taking away from the central effort against Germany, Eisenhower felt that it was strategically sound. One of the purposes of the Mediterranean campaign was to secure bases for continuation of the bombing offensive against Germany, a purpose which would be furthered by using Eighth Air Force bombers on tactical missions in Italy. Eisenhower said that if the CCS agreed to the shift General Eaker sh
ould “lead his formations here in person in order that there may be no misapprehension as to the temporary and specific nature of the reinforcement.”36

  Lieutenant General Jacob Devers, the commanding general of ETO, saw a copy of Eisenhower’s request and protested bitterly. He argued that a diversion of bombers from ETO to AFHQ would be a mistake for a number of reasons: the Eighth Air Force was already too small to carry out its mission; August and the first half of September were critical for the Combined Bomber Offensive; the RAF was counting on a maximum effort from Eighth Air Force; and maintenance crews and bases were already established in the United Kingdom. Summing up, Devers said he had to consider “the overall war effort. I must be guided by the greatest damage to the German enemy and I must never lose sight of the imminence of OVERLORD.” The German high command would be delighted if the shift were made, Devers declared, and added that he felt the Eighth Air Force should “never be diverted” from its “primary task.”37

  Eisenhower received a copy of Devers’ protest; he contented himself with sending a short cable to Marshall saying that he found Devers’ arguments unconvincing. Around the office, however, he made no attempt to hide his feelings. “Ike is furious with Devers,” an aide recorded, “and feels that the much flaunted mobility of our Air Force has been exposed as talk rather than action.”38

  On July 31 Marshall entered the fray. He sent a message to both Devers and Eisenhower, saying that he had decided that Devers was right and the heavy bombers had to stay in England. He did ask Devers if he could spare four groups of medium bombers, and asked Eisenhower if mediums would meet his needs.39 Eisenhower replied that, while mediums would not really answer the requirements of the theater, still he could certainly use them. But Devers said he could not spare even those planes, and on August 4 Marshall told Eisenhower that after full consideration he had decided against the transfer.40