The Supreme Commander

by Stephen E. Ambrose

  This was a clear gain, but it did not satisfy Eisenhower. “Ike is considerably less than exuberant these days,” Butcher noted.16 The reason for his dissatisfaction, Montgomery and Brooke agreed, was that he never understood the campaign. Montgomery’s attitude did not help. On June 27 Bradley took Cherbourg, the first big victory since June 6. Montgomery discounted it. He thought Bradley should have done more. He explained to Brooke that he had tried to get Bradley to drive south toward Coutances at the same time as he was moving on Cherbourg, “but Bradley didn’t want to take the risk.”* Montgomery felt there was no risk involved: “Quick and skilful regrouping was all that was wanted.” Taking a broader view, Montgomery explained, “I have to take the Americans along quietly and give them time to get ready; once they are really formed up, then they go like hell.”17 On Second Army’s front, meanwhile, the situation was relatively calm. The British were stalled.

  Eisenhower now put his hopes in Bradley. After taking Cherbourg, Bradley faced his troops south and prepared to force his way out of the Cotentin. “I am very anxious that when we hit the enemy … we will hit him with such power that we can keep going and cause him a major disaster,” Bradley told Eisenhower on June 29. “I want to keep going without any appreciable halt until we turn the corner at the base of the peninsula.”18 This indicated that Bradley accepted Montgomery’s view of the campaign—hold with the left, strike with the right—and for the time being, so did Eisenhower. On July 1 he told Bradley he agreed completely with his ideas, and added that he was coming over to Normandy, with “nothing but a bedroll, one aide and an orderly,” to see the offensive for himself. He wanted “nothing but a slit trench with a piece of canvas over it.”19

  Montgomery had instructed Bradley to wheel First Army in a wide turn, upon completion of which it would face east along a north-south line from Caumount, through Vire and Mortain, to Fougères, with its right flank near the entrance into Brittany. At that point, Montgomery wanted Patton’s Third Army made operational. The plan was that it would move south and west to seize Brittany, while First Army would advance east toward the Seine and Paris. Bradley planned to carry out the orders by attacking from right to left, with VIII Corps advancing first along the west coast of the Cotentin, through La Haye-du-Puits to Coutances; then the VII Corps would pick up the attack, moving along the Carentan—Périers axis; finally the XIX Corps would attack last, moving from Carentan toward St. Lô.

  The plan hinged on Bradley’s ability to break through the German defenses, and it imposed on the American troops a most difficult task. Montgomery evidently expected quick results, since all the German armor was on Second Army’s front, but there are few places in the world more easily defended than the hedgerow country of the Cotentin. The advance was from field to field, hedgerow to hedgerow.20 Progress was measured in yards. In a little less than a month First Army made a general advance of less than ten miles.

  Eisenhower watched the start of the offensive. He went to Normandy on July 1 and stayed for five days. He visited with the troops, inspected the battlefield, and talked with Bradley and the American corps and division commanders. At one point, driving a jeep himself with his British aide, James Gault, and an orderly, he got behind the German lines. No startling events occurred, and he did not know he had been in danger until he reached 90th Division headquarters and was told where he had been. The GIs were delighted to see Eisenhower driving the jeep and shouted and whistled as he drove past. On July 4 he went to visit a fighter airfield of the Ninth Air Force; while there, he learned that a mission was about to be flown. Eisenhower said he wanted to go along in order to see the hedgerow country from the air. Bradley, who was with him, demurred, but Eisenhower insisted. His last words, as he climbed into a Mustang, were “All right, Brad, I am not going to fly to Berlin.”21

  He returned to England on July 5 and related his impressions to Marshall. He had been with VIII Corps on July 3 when it opened the attack, and with VII Corps the next day when it joined in. “The going is extremely tough,” he said, for three reasons. First, the fighting quality of the German soldiers; second, the nature of the countryside; third, the rain, which reduced air operations. In the hedgerow country, however, the last factor was not as important as it would have been elsewhere, because with or without the rain “it is extraordinarily difficult to point out a target that is an appropriate one for either air or artillery.” The only really cheerful news Eisenhower had was that the port of Cherbourg had not been demolished thoroughly and he expected it to be operating soon.22

  Since there obviously would not be a quick breakout by Bradley on the right, Eisenhower turned his attention to Dempsey on the left. Nothing significant had happened there since the German counterattack late in June and, as Butcher put it, “Ike has been smoldering.” On July 6 he met with Tedder and Smith, both of whom felt Montgomery was too cautious, and they urged him to act. Tedder said Montgomery was unjustly blaming the air forces for his lack of progress, and the deputy supreme commander thought “the Army did not seem prepared to fight its own battles.” Eisenhower agreed to draft a letter to Montgomery telling him tactfully to get moving.23

  The note was weak. Eisenhower made a statement of desired objectives rather than giving a firm order. He pointed out that the air power had done what had been asked of it—to gain superiority and delay the arrival of enemy reinforcements at the front. The problem now was that limited port facilities meant that the Allied build-up had about reached its maximum level while the Germans were increasing their strength daily. It was essential, therefore, to gain depth in the bridgehead and to get additional airfields. “It appears to me,” Eisenhower said, “that we must use all possible energy in a determined effort to prevent a stalemate or of facing the necessity of fighting a major defensive battle with the slight depth we now have in the bridgehead.” The Supreme Commander said he was familiar with Montgomery’s plan of holding with his left and attacking with his right, but pointed out that “the advance on the right has been slow and laborious.” He said that the arrival of German reinforcements on the St. Lô front had allowed the enemy to place some armored divisions in reserve, and suggested that the enemy ought to be more actively occupied. Since “a major full-dress attack on the left flank” had not yet been attempted, Eisenhower offered to send forward to Montgomery any unit he wanted. He would include an American armored division if Second Army needed it. Eisenhower promised Montgomery that everything humanly possible would be done “to assist you in any plan that promises to give us the elbow room we need. The air and everything else will be available.” Eisenhower said he knew Montgomery was thinking every minute about these problems; “what I want you to know is that I will back you up to the limit in any effort you may decide upon to prevent a deadlock.…”24

  Eisenhower’s letter did not constitute an order and Montgomery did not interpret it as such. Still, the pressure on him was growing. “If we don’t let go and avoid mistakes,” he had told Brooke on July 6, “we ought to be in a very good position in another week or two.” But he realized that, viewed from the English side of the Channel, the battle was flagging, and there was a growing fear of static trench warfare. There was also a growing tendency to attribute the slowness of the advance to Montgomery’s caution and insistence on overpreparation, and, in the case of at least some Americans at SHAEF, to Britain’s reluctance to expose her dwindling manpower to casualties.25

  Eisenhower took some of these complaints to Churchill, telling the Prime Minister that Montgomery was bogged down and appealing to Churchill to “persuade Monty to get on his bicycle and start moving.” Churchill was inclined to listen to the complaints, for, as Brooke recalled after the war, “Winston had never been very fond of Monty.”26 This led to a furious set-to between Churchill and Brooke that lasted from 10 P.M. until 2 A.M. on July 5–6. Churchill “began to abuse Monty because operations were not going faster,” and Brooke “flared up and asked him if he could not trust his generals for five minutes instead of belittling
them.” Churchill said he had never done such a thing, and throughout the evening “kept shoving his chin out, looking at [Brooke] and fuming at the accusations that he ran down his generals.” Brooke blamed Eisenhower for the trouble, since Eisenhower had taken the original complaints to Churchill.27

  Although he did not know the details, Montgomery was aware of the growing criticisms of his handling of the battle. He determined, therefore, to attack, this time with a concentrated force instead of with one or two divisions. In his reply to Eisenhower’s letter Montgomery roundly declared that he was “quite happy about the situation,” then added that he was working on a “very definite plan.” He was beginning to see daylight and had decided “to set my eastern flank alight, and to put the wind up the enemy by seizing Caen and getting bridgeheads over the Orne.” He was beginning operations that day, promised that the Second Army attack would be a “big show,” and said he intended to “put everything into it.”28 The next day, July 9, he wired Eisenhower, saying that operations on Second Army front were “going entirely according to plan and will continue without a halt.”29

  Eisenhower was delighted. The campaign was now going the way he wanted it to, with attacks on both flanks. Somewhere, he was sure, the enemy would crack. On his way from SHAEF Main in Bushey Park to SHAEF Forward in Portsmouth, he stopped off at Chequers to confer with Churchill. He told the Prime Minister, “We are going to the offensive all along the line and would gain room and would kill Germans.”30 While at SHAEF Main, Eisenhower had made good on his promise to give Montgomery everything he could for the attack by ordering the air forces to go all out. They proceeded to drop 2300 tons of bombs to open a path for Second Army.

  But still the attack moved slowly. The biggest trouble was that there was a six-hour pause between the aerial bombardment and the ground attack, which gave the Germans a chance to recover. In addition the high-explosive bombs had created craters which slowed the advancing British troops. Not until July 10 did Second Army have that part of Caen which lay west of the Orne, and still the large suburban areas east of the river remained in German hands. Although Montgomery did not have his goal of a bridgehead over the Orne, he called off the operation.31

  German losses were heavy, but there had been nothing approaching a breakthrough. On July 10 Montgomery talked with Bradley, who confessed that he was discouraged over the slowness of First Army’s advance, and with Dempsey, who suggested that the British might do more than draw German troops onto their front. Dempsey said there was not much point to holding the Germans around Caen if Bradley could not break out of the hedgerows anyway. Montgomery agreed to another offensive, telling Dempsey to build up a corps of three armored divisions, then hold it in reserve for a “massive stroke” east of the Orne from Caen to Falaise. He would call it Operation GOODWOOD.32

  In his operational instructions to his subordinates Montgomery made it clear that he did not regard GOODWOOD as a decisive battle for a breakout. The object, he said, was to “improve our positions on the eastern flank” and “generally to destroy German equipment and personnel.” He did not mention a breakout but did say that “a victory on the eastern flank will help us to gain what we want on the western flank.”33 He was, in short, realistic and continued to operate on the same policy he had followed for a month or more. He was sure that if he could only keep SHAEF off his back he would in the end score a tremendous victory. He was right about the victory, but since he either could not or would not explain the master plan to SHAEF he caused much irritation and never got the credit he deserved for his eventual great success.

  The word Montgomery sent up the chain of command was quite different from what he had sent down. He raised hopes at SHAEF about GOODWOOD to a very high level. On July 12 he told Eisenhower, “My whole Eastern flank will burst into flames.… The operation … may have far-reaching results.” He wanted the full weight of the air force thrown into the battle, and asked that Eisenhower keep all visitors away from his headquarters so that he could concentrate on his work.34 He repeated the same sentiments in a telegram later that day, and on July 14 wired Tedder to say that “Plan if successful promises to be decisive.”35

  Montgomery made his presentation in general terms and was careful never to mention specifically a breakthrough. But following so closely upon his statements of July 8 about his disappointment over the slowness of the advance on the right and the need to “put the wind up the enemy,” Montgomery’s presentation of GOODWOOD indicated to Eisenhower that the basic plan was to strike out from the left and achieve a significant breakthrough.

  Acting on the assumption that GOODWOOD would be decisive, Eisenhower reported that all the senior airmen were enthusiastic because they felt it would be “a brilliant stroke which will knock loose our present shackles.” Tedder assured Montgomery, “All the Air Forces will be full out to support your far-reaching and decisive plan to the utmost of their ability.” The airmen were awed by the size of the bombardment Montgomery wanted (and got)—a drop of 7700 tons of bombs delivered by 1676 heavy bombers and 343 medium and light bombers, in what was “the heaviest and most concentrated air attack in support of ground troops ever attempted.”36

  Eisenhower, expecting great things from GOODWOOD, told Montgomery on July 14 he was “confident that it will reap a harvest from all the sowing you have been doing during the past weeks.” The whole front would act aggressively, Eisenhower said, pinning down the Germans so that the British on the left could “plunge into his [the German’s] vitals” in a “decisive” manner. Bradley, Eisenhower promised, would “keep his troops fighting like the very devil, twenty-four hours a day, to provide the opportunity your armored corps will need, and to make the victory complete.” Eisenhower grew eloquent in his summary: “I would not be at all surprised to see you gaining a victory that will make some of the ‘old classics’ look like a skirmish between patrols.”37 Eisenhower was delighted that without having had to take drastic action he would be getting the offensive he wanted.

  Montgomery had misled Eisenhower, but he now had an opportunity to rectify the misunderstanding. He received Eisenhower’s message five days before GOODWOOD began, and there could have been no doubt in his mind that his superior had an entirely erroneous impression. Montgomery could have accepted Eisenhower’s standing offer to come to Twenty-first Army Group headquarters, where he could have explained to the Supreme Commander what he did have in mind, but he did not, probably because he did not want interference with his battle. It is also possible that by this stage Montgomery was himself beginning to dream of a breakout through GOODWOOD, and of course he was ready to take advantage of it if his limited attack produced it.

  On July 14 Montgomery told Brooke, “I have decided that the time has come to have a real ‘show down’ on the Eastern flank, and to loose a corps of three armoured divisions into the open country about the Caen-Falaise road.” He then sent his military assistant to the British War Office to explain his intentions verbally. The military assistant declared, “All the activities on the eastern flank are designed to help the [American] forces in the west while ensuring that a firm bastion is kept in the east.” That certainly was clear enough, but the next statement muddled the picture again: “At the same time all is ready to take advantage of any situation which gives reason to think that the enemy is disintegrating.” To reinforce success was, obviously, sound military policy, and Montgomery would have been remiss had he not been ready to take advantage of a major victory. But he did not really expect one since GOODWOOD was not designed to gain one. He failed however to make this clear to Eisenhower.

  Other factors may have influenced Montgomery in his exaggeration of the scope of GOODWOOD and in his refusal to inform Eisenhower of its exact aims. Montgomery knew that Eisenhower had been disappointed over results so far. Gossips at SHAEF were speculating on “who would succeed Monty if sacked,” and this could have reached Montgomery’s ears.38 He knew that Tedder and others were urging Eisenhower to set up an advanced tactical headquarter
s in France and to take control of the land battle himself, or better yet relieve Montgomery.39 Eisenhower said that removal was out of the question, in view of the adulation Montgomery enjoyed with the troops, Brooke, and the British population (the Supreme Commander seems to have been the only senior officer at SHAEF who recognized this obvious political truth).40

  Montgomery was keenly aware that he had to buy time, not so much to protect his position, which was secure, as to keep Eisenhower in England so that he could run the land battle. Even Montgomery, however, did not realize the extent of the impatience at SHAEF. Supreme Headquarters was under constant pressure from the British and American press, which increasingly talked about stalemate and World War I. In France, Twenty-first Army Group did not feel and possibly was not fully aware of this pressure. SHAEF was the raw nerve end, Twenty-first Army Group the muscle. In any case, by exaggerating the scope of GOODWOOD, Montgomery was successful in buying time.

  Another factor in Montgomery’s exaggeration of the aims of GOODWOOD involved the airmen. Montgomery knew that they did not like to see their weapons diverted from the strategic bombing operations on which they banked so heavily and may have felt he could get them to make a full effort only by presenting GOODWOOD as a decisive operation.

  GOODWOOD began on July 18. In its initial stages, helped by the tremendous air bombardment, the attack went well. The British 8 Corps was on the verge of achieving a clean penetration. The Germans committed their reserves at noon, four tank and four infantry battalions, in a counterattack that stopped the British but did not gain any ground. Hitler gave permission to rush in a Panzer division from Fifteenth Army north of the Seine, but the tanks could hardly arrive in time to save the situation. Nevertheless Montgomery did not press his advantage. He had lost 270 tanks and 1500 men. On the second day, as he tried to extend limited local gains, he lost 131 tanks and suffered 1100 casualties. Finally a heavy thunderstorm on the afternoon of July 20 brought an end to the offensive.41