The Supreme Commander

by Stephen E. Ambrose

  The second major part of Marshall’s desired postwar program was the integration of the armed forces under a single Chief of Staff, with a single Secretary of Defense. The JCS, on Marshall’s urging, had set up in May 1944 a special board to study the reorganization of national defense and to make recommendations for a peacetime military establishment. Marshall talked to Eisenhower about the subject on one of his visits to Europe. Eisenhower accepted Marshall’s argument, and when the board came to ETO to interview senior officers, Eisenhower said he favored a single Department of Defense. The board made such a recommendation, but Admiral King would not accept it. King argued that centralized control was not necessary and that better results could be expected from friendly co-operation. Marshall replied that such co-operation “has been difficult and incomplete even in war, and will be infinitely more difficult in peace,” but he could not convince the admiral, and the problem had to be faced anew after the war.17

  Universal military training and a single Department of Defense were as much political issues as they were military. Eisenhower needed no reminder of his political responsibilities, and when congressmen came visiting in his theater he saw to it that they received VIP treatment. When seventeen members of the House Military Affairs Committee came to Paris in December, Eisenhower entertained them in the Trianon Palace. One of the congressmen presented Eisenhower with a bottle of good bourbon whiskey. A few days later Stars and Stripes reported that Eisenhower had sent the whiskey to a nearby field hospital. When Eisenhower read the story he berated Butcher (who had taken a position with SHAEF Public Relations Division), saying that every congressman in the party would know that the story was a lie. Butcher replied that the congressmen, being politicians, would not mind, and asked what had happened to the bourbon. “Why, dammit,” Eisenhower replied, “the Congressmen drank it before lunch.”18

  As Montgomery never tired of pointing out, Eisenhower had worldwide responsibilities. These included not only relations with Churchill, De Gaulle, and the heads of the occupied countries in Europe, but also the touchy problem of establishing and maintaining contact with the Soviets. Not until the end of 1943 had Stalin allowed the Western Allies to send a military mission to Moscow, and even then the only information the mission received was advance copies of the Red Army communiqués that were published in the press. In late October the SHAEF staff sent a message to the CCS, pointing out that liaison with the Red Army would soon be required to insure co-ordination of action by the air forces and full co-operation on other matters.19 The CCS replied that the Soviets should be approached cautiously. Eisenhower then suggested that a SHAEF liaison group be sent to Red Army headquarters, one that would “be very small with the idea of avoiding suspicion on the part of the Russians.” The prime need was to co-ordinate air action in order to avoid the bombing of each other’s forces. Once the air group was established in Moscow and information on front lines and proposed movements was flowing freely, other groups could be established.20 But the Russians held back, and nothing came of the attempted liaison.

  When the Bulge began, Eisenhower’s G-2 officers reported to him that a number of the German divisions involved in the Ardennes attack had come from the eastern front. On December 21 Eisenhower informed the CCS of this development and pointed out that “if this trend continues it will affect the decisions which I have to make regarding future strategy in the west.” It was essential, therefore, that SHAEF learn from the Russians what their intentions were. If the Red Army was about to launch a major offensive, “I would condition my plans accordingly.” Could the CCS help him get the information from the Russians?21

  The CCS turned to Churchill and Roosevelt, who between them were able to convince Stalin to receive representatives from SHAEF. The heads of government were able to make the arrangements, and Eisenhower decided to send Tedder, Bull, and a G-2 officer. The SHAEF party was delayed by weather and did not arrive in Moscow until January 14. Tedder saw Stalin the next evening; the Russian leader informed him that the Red Army offensive had already begun (January 12) and said he had wanted to wait for better weather but had advanced the date of the operation in order to help SHAEF’s embattled forces (the German offensive in the Ardennes had, in fact, been stopped two weeks earlier).22

  Tedder then explained to Stalin Eisenhower’s plans for the spring campaign. Stalin approved of them and promised to keep the enemy busy so that there would be no more transfers by the Germans from the eastern to the western front. The Russian leader commented that the Germans had more stubbornness than brains, as their stupid attack in the Ardennes demonstrated. In parting, he told Tedder that he considered it proper, sound, and selfish policy for all the Allies to help one another. It would be as foolish for him to stand aside while the Germans annihilated the British and Americans, he said, as it would be for them to allow Hitler to crush the Red Army.

  The members of the Allied Military Mission in Moscow thought the talks between Tedder and Stalin had done much to clear the air and improve relations in the Alliance, and they credited Tedder’s blunt, direct approach for this achievement. This approach reflected a slight shift in the expression of Allied attitudes toward the Russians. In January Eisenhower had sent an eloquent telegram of congratulations to the Russians on the opening of their offensive. Marshall saw a copy and told Eisenhower, “In future I suggest that you approach them [the Russians] in simple Main Street Abilene style. They are rather cynically disposed toward the diplomatic phrasing of our compliments and seem almost to appreciate downright rough talk of which I give a full measure.”23

  Although Eisenhower commanded one of the greatest fighting machines in the world, had at his disposal a bureaucracy larger than many governments, and controlled more raw power than most nations had, he was still only an agent, not a policy maker. However wide the range of his duties and responsibilities, he could not decide where or against whom the Anglo-American forces would fight, or the shape of postwar Europe, nor treatment of the country he was struggling to defeat. He did not question these limitations, but he did feel that he had a right—indeed, a duty—to try to influence the decisions. He believed that he knew as much about the situation in Europe as anyone within the State Department or the White House, and he thought he should be heard on the subject.

  There were practical factors that in any case forced him to raise the question of the postwar organization of Europe. In September 1944 De Gaulle informed Eisenhower that he wanted some French troops to participate in the war on German soil. Eisenhower agreed to see to it that at least one French corps crossed the border. As Eisenhower told the CCS, this brought up “the question of what area of Germany, if any, is to be occupied by the French after the defeat of Germany.” The position of the French First Army on the battle line meant that it would go into Germany in the neighborhood of the Swiss and Austrian frontiers, but De Gaulle might want to occupy a different area of Germany. Eisenhower reported that if the French President asked him about it “I intend to say that during the period of my command the occupation of Germany will be on a strictly military and Allied basis.” He would run the occupation in accordance with military requirements “and regardless of any political considerations.…”24

  On the face of it, Eisenhower’s statement represented a complete commitment on his part to the deeply held American tradition that soldiers do not mix in politics. But in fact he was making an attempt to influence policy. The European Advisory Commission (EAC), composed of representatives from the Big Three, had been working on an occupation policy for Germany since the beginning of 1944. It had decided—over Eisenhower’s protests—to divide Germany into three zones, with each of the Allies responsible for one area only. No decision on French participation had yet been made, nor had the heads of government ratified the EAC program.

  Eisenhower was aware of this and, although he had discarded his original idea of three-power co-operation in Germany (that is, no division into zones), he still felt that the West should stick together, keep SHAEF int
act, and run the British and American zones as if they were one. He realized that the trend of thought in Washington on the subject was against him, for it was feared that the Russians would see Anglo-American co-operation as an attempt to gang up on the U.S.S.R. Eisenhower told Marshall this had not been his intention; “my thoughts were restricted to the military problem; that is, the use of armed forces for carrying out the decisions of the Governments.” He wanted to continue the military system that had brought about the victory. The decision, however, went against Eisenhower, and he accepted it. On September 25 he told Marshall that he was satisfied that his views had been fully considered by his superiors “and since they have decided otherwise, this is the last time that my own ideas on the subject will be expressed.”25

  Within the context of national zones, however, problems remained. The War Department was working on deciding the size of the American occupation force, and in October Eisenhower told Marshall that although he felt the ground forces allotted were sufficient he wanted a larger air force. His reasons again, while partly military, were primarily political. Once the Americans went into their own zone, he said, “there would probably ensue a period in which frequent and prompt demonstrations of real strength might be a most economical way of enforcing our policies and regulations.” The mobility of a large number of bombers would be of great help in such situations. Eisenhower said he had talked to Spaatz about the problem, and “we felt that as long as Europe was in a state of almost violent unrest, any American contingent left here should be a powerful one and capable of instantaneous and effective action in any direction, possibly even outside our own area.”

  Finally, there were the Russians with which to contend. Eisenhower had no inkling of the size of the force Stalin intended to leave in eastern Germany, but he did know that America was far ahead of the Soviet Union in air strength. “Consqeuently, we felt that no matter how strong the Russian occupational force might be, the possession of a quite powerful bomber force would place the U.S. contingent on a substantial basis of equality and this might conceivably be a most desirable state of affairs.”26 The problem was left to be settled later, but for the most part the bombers were not retained on the Continent.

  Sometimes Eisenhower got involved in political issues because high officials wanted his opinion. In late October the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, wrote Eisenhower a long letter on American occupation policy. McCloy said the War Department was advising the President “that the government of Germany should be instituted on a military basis … [with] single, undivided responsibility in the military commander.” Eisenhower would be that commander, and McCloy wanted to protect him from a mass of civilian agencies and advisers. He proposed, therefore, to appoint a single civilian, with a title of High Commissioner, who would be directly under Eisenhower and who would handle all the civilian agencies. McCloy wanted to know what Eisenhower thought of the idea and how he reacted to having Judge Robert P. Patterson, the Under Secretary of War, take the position.

  Eisenhower was delighted. As had been the case in North Africa and Italy, he was finding it difficult to co-ordinate the action of the maze of agencies that had dealings with SHAEF one way or another. There were nearly a dozen of them, including the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department and a similar U.S.-British agency, the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, his own civil affairs advisers on the SHAEF staff, and committees and councils set up by the U. S. War, State, and Treasury departments. Eisenhower said he very much appreciated McCloy’s efforts “to protect us from a complex system of advisers which would only add to the difficulties of a straightforward problem of military government.” Patterson was quite acceptable, although “I always had you yourself in mind for this particular assignment.”27

  One reason McCloy had wanted to settle the administrative arrangements early was that he was disturbed at the tendency of various and diverse governmental officials to advance “plans” for the American sector, such as the “so called ‘Morgenthau Plan,’ ” which, supported by the Secretary of the Treasury, called for dismemberment of German industry. At Quebec in the fall of 1944 both Churchill and Roosevelt had given tentative approval to the idea of making Germany a pastoral state, evidently without giving much thought to the matter; both later changed their minds. Stimson, McCloy reported, had objected to certain aspects of the “Morgenthau Plan,” and the press had oversimplified the issue into “hard” and “soft” schools. Speculation was going on over the identity of the High Commissioner, with each school advancing a candidate.

  Eisenhower was very much involved in the discussion of how to treat a defeated Germany. Morgenthau had been in London in August 1944 and spent an afternoon with Eisenhower. Two years later he claimed that it was during this discussion that the idea of destroying German industry came to him, and he credited Eisenhower with first suggesting it. Eisenhower’s own memory of the conversation was different. Replying to Morgenthau’s postwar statement, he recalled that the views he had advanced were: the German people should be made to feel a sense of guilt for the terrible tragedy; Germany’s warmaking power should be eliminated; leading Nazis, Gestapo, and S.S. members, along with soldiers who had engaged in criminal acts, should be punished, and the German General Staff destroyed. “In eliminating German warmaking ability,” he added, “care should be taken to see that the Germans could make a living,” so that they did not become a charity burden on the American taxpayer. He thought the Ruhr should be worked by Germans under direct Allied supervision and control.28 Eisenhower may have been trying to fit his wartime views into an acceptable Cold War mold, but in April 1945 he did what he could to avoid useless or unnecessary damage to existing industrial facilities in the Ruhr, and virtually called to a halt air attacks against Germany’s major industrial region.29 This came, of course, rather late in the war.

  But at the beginning of 1945 his task was not to set occupation policy or pass judgment on the treatment of the German nation. Before these questions could be met, he first had to bring about a German defeat.

  Part IV

  THE LAST CAMPAIGN

  [January 1945–May 1945]

  THE great question after the Battle of the Bulge was how long it would take to end the war. The great controversy remaining was where the AEF should put the bulk of its strength in order to hasten the final victory. Brooke and Montgomery, supported by Churchill, continued to advocate what amounted to a single thrust in the north. They thought Eisenhower’s plan of closing to the Rhine all along his front before crossing the river north of the Ruhr would be disastrously slow, extending the European battle into the late summer or even the fall of 1945.

  Eisenhower continually rejected the British arguments. He did not want to take the risk of stopping Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups where they were while giving priority to Twenty-first Army Group, because he feared that the Germans might launch another major counterattack. The armies assigned to Bradley and Devers did not have good defensive positions and were therefore vulnerable; but once they had reached the Rhine they could hold the line with far less troops than were needed to maintain their current positions. Eisenhower could then put more men into the offensives across the Rhine. Although he consistently denied that he had any political motives, he remained unwilling to give all the glory to Montgomery. Most important by far was his belief that his plan would lead to the destruction of the bulk of the Wehrmacht west of the Rhine and thus bring about an earlier victory.

  CHAPTER 18

  The Rhineland Battles

  At the end of the first week of 1945 pessimism was widespread in the Allied high command. The Bulge was being eliminated, but because of the deep snows, overcast skies, and freezing weather the AEF was unable to cut off any major German units in the Ardennes. Ground soldiers were deeply disappointed. The Germans, Eisenhower noted in a review he sent to the army group commanders, were “fighting with great stubbornness,” even the newly raised divisions composed of boys and old men who were “only vaguely acquainted
with their tasks.” There were many instances of men who, “although wounded for two days, refuse to give up the fight.” There was a new fanaticism on the part of the enemy and Eisenhower had “no doubt that the Germans are making a supreme and all-out effort.…” He said that in his opinion the Ardennes and Alsace battles were “only episodes” and that the Allies must expect further action in other areas.1

  Airmen were glum. Their theories about the effectiveness of bombing, based on Douhet, had proven unsound. The Germans, far from having their morale shattered as Douhet had predicted, were more determined than ever. Some fliers insisted this was because strategic bombing had not been given a real opportunity to show what it could do, but others were beginning to have their doubts. On January 7 Arnold wrote Spaatz, “We have a superiority of at least 5 to 1 now against Germany and yet, in spite of all our hopes, anticipations, dreams and plans, we have as yet not been able to capitalize to the extent which we should. We may not be able to force capitulation of the Germans by air attacks, but on the other hand, with this tremendous striking power, it would seem to me that we should get much better and much more decisive results than we are getting now.” Arnold said he was not criticizing, “because frankly I don’t know the answer and what I am now doing is letting my thoughts run wild with the hope that out of this you may get a glimmer, a light, a new thought, or something which will help us to bring this war to a close sooner.”2

  Marshall, who had not had any pet theories shattered and was consequently not as upset as Arnold, nevertheless was sufficiently concerned to query Eisenhower as to his plans. On January 8 he told Eisenhower that although he had given strict orders that no one should add to Eisenhower’s burdens by asking him questions, “it may be … that we now face a situation requiring major decisions in order to prevent this war from dragging on for some time.” He wanted Eisenhower’s broad estimate of the resources the AEF would require and the steps that needed to be taken “to bring this war in Europe to a quick conclusion.”