Arsonist: The Most Dangerous Man in America

by Nathan Allen

  Yet even with victory, Jemmy was relentless. Writing under the pseudonym “Freeborn Armstrong” in the January 27 edition of the Gazette, Otis relayed his synopsis of events for all of Boston to read:

  The Resolve was the same Day sent up the Hon. Board for their Concurrence, when the Hon. Thomas Hutchinson, Esq; Lieutenant Governor and Chief Justice of the Superior Court, who on this Occasion also sits as President of the Council, a Place he has usurped, after engrossing all the Places of Honor and Profit in the Province, moved to give it the go-by, saying it was Impertinent, and beneath the Notice of the hon. Board or to that Effect.

  Lambasting Hutchinson both for his vast collection of offices and his demand for deference, Otis paints a picture of an aloof aristocrat. Hutchinson was livid and insisted that Gazette printers Edes and Gill formally identify the author, though everyone knew it was Jemmy. The Council refused to issue Hutchinson’s demand to Edes and Gill, arguing that if the author were imprisoned, the mob would quickly free him. Further, Hutchinson had hoped that once the identity of the author were known, the House would reprimand him, but the Council did not wish to pick a fight with the powerful and rebellious House, thus confirming that they knew the author was a powerful member of the House. Writing to Thomas Pownall on March 8, Hutchinson said he found the Council’s unwillingness to defend him “dishonorable” and thereafter refused to attend Council meetings for the remainder of the session.

  By March, the Popular Party’s near complete control fueled rumors that the Prime Minister would capitulate, and the Black Act would be repealed; Hutchinson refused to be present in Superior Court, and the court declared that it would hear all cases attorneys initiated, with or without stamps. The Popular Party was now unquestionably the lone force in Massachusetts politics, exhibiting a solid philosophical foundation in Otis’s pamphlets, and enjoying a reputation for slaying giants among the population. Bernard summarized the opening months of 1766 in a March 10 letter to John Pownall thus: “The Great Leviathan (Otis I mean) has frequently & lately given his Testimony of the Equity & Mildness of my administration; at the same time he was doing all he could to embarrass it.” And throughout these months, Jemmy continued to push his arguments about colonial rights vs. Parliamentary supremacy. In responding to an Evening Post article that claimed the radicals desired independence, Otis wrote in the January 27, 1766 edition of the Gazette:

  Where is the policy … of putting wicked dangerous tho’ts into young people’s heads? Are not such tho’ts but too apt to obtrude themselves? For shame, let this string be no more saw’d, lest it be cut asunder in good earnest!

  Otis continues to establish two related arguments: first, that the Boston radicals were the more reasonable and responsible party; second, that should efforts toward independence ever erupt, the catalyst will be a push from Whitehall and the Court Party, not a pull from the radicals.

  The Stamp Act was repealed on March 18, 1766, though the colonists would not learn of the repeal until after the May elections. The repeal occurred fewer than five months after it was intended to go into effect, though it never truly went into effect. The bureaucracy and enforcement organizations required to implement and enforce such a tax simply did not exist. The Stamp Act, which was in essence a sales tax, was intended to be too pervasive to enact in the face of mass resistance. But as Parliament repealed the Stamp Act, they replaced it with The Declaratory Act, which plainly stated that Parliament “had, hath, and of right ought to have, full power and authority to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the colonies and people of America ... in all cases whatsoever.” In theory, the colonists should have been pleased that the Stamp Act was repealed, and some were, but the Declaratory Act of 1766 was an echo of the Dependency of Ireland on Great Britain Act of 1719, which made Ireland wholly subservient to England. Had the issue been about taxes, then the colonists all would have rejoiced. Instead, Sam Adams, Jemmy Otis and others were as opposed to the Declaratory Act as much as they’d been to the Stamp Act because both were predicated on the concept that Parliament could create taxes without the people’s consent. Otis’s arguments had not been primarily about taxes but about consent and Parliamentary absolutism – “An Act against the Constitution is void” – and replacing the Stamp Act with the Declaratory Act did not resolve the problem. Parliament, of course, was quite aware of Otis’s arguments, and the Declaratory Act was its response.

  Three days before the Stamp Act was repealed, Governor Bernard issued a desperate proclamation to “all Justices of the Peace, all Sheriffs and Deputies, and all Civil Officers in their several Districts and Departments” to “use their utmost Endeavors” to enforce the Acts of Trade. Further, Bernard promised fifty pounds to any person “who shall inform against or discover any one or more concerned in these riotous and unlawful Proceedings.” Additionally, Bernard promised that any informer “shall receive his Majesty’s Pardon” if the informer is also an accomplice. The proclamation, which revealed an anxious governor making a final attempt to reestablish government control over the province, was printed in the Boston Gazette of Thursday, March 18, 1766 – two days after the Stamp Act was repealed. The same issue was filled with advertisements for imported goods for sale, mostly undoubtedly smuggled, including an advertisement for “Choice Dumb FISH, a Few Bushels of HEMP-SEED, – Also Newcastle Case and Quart BOTTLES: – To be Sold by – Samuel A. Otis, At Store No 5. Just below the Swing-Bridge.” It is safe to assume that more were interested in Samuel Allyne’s “Choice Dumb FISH” than Bernard’s bounty.

  The General Court’s session had been set to adjourn on Wednesday, April 9, but on the Saturday before, Bernard issued a proclamation immediately dissolving the Court. In Monday’s Gazette, Otis argued that such a move was an act of arbitrary government and called for a meeting of the House on Wednesday. Only about a dozen members showed, and Bernard ignored their request to postpone dissolution until more members arrived. The members in attendance then left, but Bernard notes in a letter to the Board of Trade on April 10, it was a “daring and dangerous” provocation by Otis. He had attempted nothing short of severing the Crown’s control of a colonial legislature. Bernard postulated that had Otis succeeded in producing a quorum, the colony’s charter would almost surely have been revoked. Further, Otis’s actions “subjected the persons of all the members joining therein to the highest penalties of the Law,” by which he meant one of Blackstone’s “hundred and sixty have been declared by Act of Parliament to be felonious without benefit of clergy; or, in other words, to be worthy of instant death.” In short: treason.

  The May 1766 elections would serve as a referendum on the expected repeal of the Stamp Act: was the issue about taxes or rights and consent? If the issue were about taxes, then Bernard would be proved right, and the Court Party would regain many of the seats it had lost; while the colonists did not yet know that the Act was repealed, they expected it to be. The Popular Party launched the first province wide political campaign in Massachusetts history. The 32 Court Party members of the House seeking reelection were tagged as Black Act supporters and targeted for defeat; Otis’s efforts focused on using the media to cultivate a sense of American nationalism and a consciousness of resistance against imperialism. Predictably, the Court Party concentrated its attacks on Otis, with the Evening Post launching weekly assaults in April and early May on the man they labeled a “double-faced Jacobite-Whig.” In late April, Bernard reported that Otis had declared that if Parliament doesn’t repeal the Stamp Act, “We will repeal it ourselves.”

  Only 11 of the 32 Court Party incumbents were reelected as the Popular Party swept the elections. Hutchinson was shocked by the people’s response and the campaign’s efficacy; he claimed the success of the “plebian party” was the result of Otis’s ability to bring the rural voters and the Boston voters together in unified opposition to Parliamentary rule. The Popular Party’s first act in power was to elect Jemmy Otis Speaker of the House. The Popular Party then purged the Governor
’s Council of Court Party stalwarts: Lt. Governor Hutchinson, Secretary Andrew Oliver, his brother Superior Court Justice Peter Oliver, and Attorney General Trowbridge. Only Province Treasurer Harrison Gray retained his seat, most likely because he was now related to the Otises through two marriages.

  Governor Bernard continued his long record of imprudence and poor diplomacy; he vetoed the selection of James Otis as Speaker, an action only one previous governor had ever dared do. Bernard then vetoed the men selected to replace the Court Party Council members who had been purged. Bernard then vetoed the reelection of Colonel Otis to the Council. In letters dated May 30 and 31, Bernard gloated that he had “humbled” Otis and that his vetoes engendered “universal satisfaction” to Boston’s “principal people.” The vetoed men “sunk down in part of their own insignificance & others in the effect of their own Machinations.” Despite Bernard’s proclamations of victory, it was clear that the Popular Party had cultivated the will to stand their ground. Bernard informed the House that Colonel Otis would have his Council seat if Bernard’s four “friends” – Hutchinson and company – could regain their seats. Jemmy Otis responded for the House that the time for compromise had passed. Bernard labeled the Popular Party’s maneuvers “an attack upon government,” and Otis responded that the only attack on government would be not to implement the people’s wishes. Bernard refused to approve the Popular Party members to the Council, and the Popular Party refused to elect new members to the Council. In result, the credibility and power of the Council withered. The Popular Party decisively won the House and, with Bernard’s assistance, relegated the Council to irrelevancy. Since Otis was unable to secure Bernard’s approval as House Speaker, he was replaced by his Boston bench friend Thomas Cushing. In some ways, Cushing was no less radical than Otis, but he wasn’t a beacon for revolution as Otis was, and Bernard knew that the House was now full of radicals, and he couldn’t reject them all for the Speaker position. And in sanctioning the election of Thomas Cushing, Bernard approved the man who would lead the House as Speaker right up to the Revolution.

  By 1766, the fire had been lit and could not be extinguished. The ruling oligarchy went through the motions of exercising authority, but they knew they were one rebel speech away from another night of terror by Sam Adams’s gang. They knew they were one mistake or misunderstanding away from riots, destroyed houses, and widespread looting. Otis, by infiltrating the Court Party, had managed to permanently loosen its control of Massachusetts Province. The oligarchy could be challenged and intimidated, and that lesson would soon be applied to the greater oligarchy that ruled from London.

  The Colonel was of the previous generation, so he hoped for compromise, to regain his seat on the Council, and to restore normalcy and stability. The Colonel openly rejected some of the Popular Party’s most radical positions. He objected when his son rendered Locke obsolete by arguing that a man’s greatest asset was his liberty not his property, and therefore a government’s primary purpose was to protect liberty. Thus, a government could not make slaves of anyone. And consequently, a man in possession of his liberty had a stake in government and must be permitted to vote, regardless of whether he owned property. The Colonel, reflecting feudal attitudes of the centuries before Jemmy Otis, firmly believed that voters should have property qualifications and reaffirmed that belief publicly in Barnstable town meetings.

  Reverend Mayhew wrote a letter to Jemmy on June 8, 1766 that illustrates his interest and involvement in Popular Party politics. In the letter, Mayhew advises that “Cultivating a good understanding and hearty friendship between these colonies, appears to me so necessary a part of prudence and good policy, that no favorable opportunity for that purpose should be omitted. I think such an one now presents.” Mayhew was to attend an Ecclesiastical Council the following day and suggested to Otis that the colonies create a “communion of colonies” just as there was a “communion of churches.” The council that Mayhew was to attend settled disputes in and among churches and acted as an objective source of advice in all church affairs. “It is not safe for the colonies to sleep,” he advises, “for it is probable they will always have some wakeful enemies in Great Britain.” In order to organize a “communion of colonies” without arousing the government’s suspicion or anger, Mayhew suggested that issuing invitations to the other colonies to join the communion be “conceived … in terms of friendship and regard, of loyalty to the king, filial affection towards the parent country ….” Mayhew made clear that he felt compelled to commit “these hints” to paper because he was going out of town and didn’t expect to return for over a week.

  Mayhew’s letter demonstrates that he saw Otis regularly and did not often write letters, particularly ones that contained “hints,” and hence Mayhew’s need to explain why he was writing. Mayhew appears very involved in politics and is clearly “hinting” at coordination not just between the radical preachers and the Popular Party, but among rebels in every colony. Mayhew also stated in the letter that he’d already “had a sight of the answer to the governor’s last … speech.” Mayhew was an insider, an advisor, and as a popular and influential minister, a potent compatriot of the rebels’s cause. Jasper Mauduit, that old friend of Mayhew, was almost certainly appointed province lobbyist to ingratiate the Popular Party with the Black Regiment. It wasn’t long before the alignment between the political and clerical rebels was openly acknowledged; in an allegorical dialogue printed in the Gazette of July 25, 1768, one of the characters comments, “But Otis says, he could not carry his points without the aid of the black regiment.”And while the rebels’s every move in church and government may not have been coordinated, there can be little doubt that Bernard’s 1761 accusation that Otis “was at the head of the Confederacy” was accurate. After the Ecclesiastical Council, Mayhew returned home riding through rain on horseback. He grew ill and developed a fever and died on July 9, 1766, a month after he’d sent that letter to Otis.

  Bernard essentially held his breath until the May 1767 elections; he would ensure the government would do as little work as possible until he could return his “friends of government” to office. Bernard reported that one of his associates in the House had declared that he “knew the time when the House would have readily assisted the Governor in executing the Laws of Trade.” Otis replied that “the times were altered; they now knew what their rights were, then they did not.” The times were altered too much for some. Bernard understood the Colonel and his generation; he understood the spoils of office and flattery. Bernard did not understand Jemmy Otis and Sam Adams. And so the governor responded to the Popular Party’s power the only way he knew how: to panic. According to Judge John Cushing, a friend of Hutchinson, the governor was “promising almost Everybody” rewards and commissions in return for their support. The paranoid governor also alerted Lord Shelburne that Jemmy Otis was orchestrating a campaign to impugn Bernard’s standing in Whitehall. Bernard was correct.

  The Stamp Act was not the only statute being ignored in 1766; with the Popular Party in control of the House and the streets, they decided to disregard whatever revenue statutes they felt were unfair. Daniel Malcolm, a member of the Sons of Liberty, was officially referred to as “captain” but only because “smuggler” and “antagonist” weren’t official designations. Malcolm not only smuggled alcohol into Massachusetts, but he did so brazenly. In the late summer of 1766, he smuggled in 60 casks of French brandy protected by a mob of club wielding thugs, undoubtedly lent to him by the Sons of Liberty. The shipload was transferred from boat to basement without declaring a single drop. The customs establishment, if it was to remain an establishment at all, had to confront such a blatant disregard for the law. So in September 1766, customs officers were sent to Captain Malcolm’s house to search his cellar and, not surprisingly, Captain Malcolm refused to admit them and declared that he’d shoot anyone who entered his house without his permission. A crowd assembled and the mobs were informed that the bells of North Church would ring if Malcolm required the
ir assistance in expelling customs officials from his house. The officers then went to court to obtain a writ of assistance – that general warrant that would permit them to search wherever they liked. And not surprisingly, Captain Malcolm hired famed writs defense attorney Jemmy Otis. Customs officials sought Bernard’s assistance, and he passed the problem off to the Council, which, fearing the power of the mobs, promptly declared that their assistance did not “appear at present to be needful.” But the Council and governor did proceed to take depositions, at which point the Boston town meeting elected Otis to chair a committee to demand the names of Malcolm’s accusers and copies of the depositions. Several New York merchants began writing to Jemmy and the Boston radicals requesting their assistance in defying New York trade regulations.