Washington's Engineer

by Norman Desmarais

  GENERAL GATES COMMANDS THE ARMY OF THE NORTH

  General Washington wrote to McDougall on April 22, informing him that Congress had appointed General Gates to command the Army of the North, with orders “to repair forthwith to Peekskill.” McDougall was therefore ordered to return immediately after Gates’s arrival to join the army at Valley Forge. In regard to the two colonel engineers, he wrote, “As Colo La Radiere and Colo Kosuisko will never agree, I think it will be best to order La Radiere to return especially as Kosuisko is better adapted to the Genius and the people.”12

  The Continental Army repossessed Philadelphia after the British evacuated, and General Washington sent General Duportail to Congress on June 30, 1778, with a letter recommending securing the Delaware River against enemy assaults.13 He also gave the general and principal engineer ample instructions, but seven weeks later, Congress still had not read the instructions. General Duportail was soon called away, and Colonel Jean Baptiste Joseph, Comte de Laumoy, was left in charge of the works. Congress paid very little attention to the matter. President Laurens wrote to the governor of South Carolina on August 11,

  Immediately after we had repossessed this city, General Washington, in the spirit of a wise and watchful Commander-in-Chief, sent General Duportail with a letter to Congress recommending the immediate securing the river against Assaults from the Enemy, and for that purpose gave the General, who is principal engineer, ample instructions. We have been here upwards of 7 weeks & I have repeatedly urged Congress to hear the instructions read, yet to this moment no step is taken.14

  The French fleet of ten ships of the line and three frigates under Admiral Comte Jean Baptiste Charles Henri Hector d’Estaing (1729–1794) was badly damaged in a hurricane on August 11, 1778, while they were attempting to engage the British fleet off the coast of Rhode Island. The British fleet went to New York to refit, while the French fleet departed Newport on August 21 for Boston for repairs. Duportail thought the British might attempt to block the port of Boston with a fleet and to embark troops at New York to go to Rhode Island, where they would debark and march directly toward Boston. He recommended ordering General John Sullivan to take all the necessary measures to hinder their debarkation; to reconnoiter positions to be occupied on the route to Boston; to have cut up, or hold himself ready to cut up, all parallel and detour roads leading there; and to fortify any place that could be favorable to fighting the British Army. He also recommended sending three thousand to five thousand men toward the Connecticut River to be ready to cross to reinforce General Sullivan. He also suggested that he (Duportail) go immediately “to General Sullivan’s army to assist in choosing and fortifying a good position on the route to Boston. When that should be done—That I should go myself to Boston to see what may be done for the defence of the town itself.”15

  Soon afterward, General Duportail was sent to oversee the works on the Hudson with the following orders:

  Head Quarters, White Plains,

  27 Augst. 1778

  Sir,

  You will proceed as speedily as possible to the Highlands and examine the several fortifications carrying on there for the defence of the North River. When you have done this, you will make me a full report of their state and progress, with your opinion of any alterations or additions which may appear to you necessary in improvement of the present plan. In doing this you will of course, consider the labor and expense which have been already incurred, the advanced season of the year & the resources of the country for carrying any plan which may be formed into execution.

  It is my wish you should also take measures without delay for executing the instructions given you the [thirtieth] of June last relative to a plan for the defense of the River Delaware and the City of Philadelphia.—In performing which you will also view the Subject in a maritime point of light; in order as far as natural circumstances will permit, to provide a secure Port capable of excluding the enemy’s vessels and receiving or protecting our own or those of our allies.—To this end you will make such arrangements as the good of the service and the state of your department will best warrant.16

  General Washington wrote to Colonel William Malcom on September 7, advising him that he was ordering Duportail to visit the posts in the Highlands to examine the state of the fortifications there. Duportail arrived two days later and examined all the works, then went to Windsor with Colonel Malcom on the eleventh to view the chevaux-de-frise.

  Chevaux-de-frise were used to block passageways and to serve as obstructions of troop movement on the battlefield. Photo courtesy of the author.

  DUPORTAIL’S SURVEY OF THE WEST POINT DEFENSES

  Duportail submitted the following report dated August 13, 1778 (it should be September 13, as his orders to undertake a survey of West Point defenses were issued on August 27, and he arrived on September 9):

  The Works which are in hand at West Point and some inconsiderable ones, which it is necessary to add to them, will, with the help of the chain, perfectly fulfill the object which is proposed,—that of hindering the enemy’s remounting the North River.

  Fort Putnam, which is as it were, the key of all the others may be rendered almost impregnable. There is indeed a height, which commands it, but besides that this height may be taken possession of with a redoubt, it would be very difficult for an enemy, even when master of it to bring heavy cannon there. Besides it would be too far to make a breach. This fort has nothing to fear but a bombardment or escalade with respect to a bombardment, the mean(s) to make it ineffectual is to have bomb-proofs sufficient for three fourths of the Garrison, magazines, hospital, etc.—I am told Col. Koshucsko proposes, at this time to begin one; but which will not suit more than 70 or 80 men. This is far from sufficient. There must be another, the place and size of which, I have pointed out to the Captain who conducts the works.—It will contain about two hundred men—with respect to the escalade, to prevent its success, the side of the fort which looks towards the river and is the most accessible, as well as that which looks towards Fort Arnold, must be raised a great deal more than it is, and besides the palisades and chevaux de frise, abaties must be made in front. The roof of the great bomb-proof, which I propose, may be made use of to collect the rain and conduct it into the Cistern. This will always be a small resource.

  Fort Willis [Fort Webb] does not appear to me well traced. It ought to be put entirely upon the declivity which looks towards the River, the force next Fort Putnam following the ridge of the eminence. In this manner it would have overlooked equally all the valley between Fort Putnam and itself and all its interior would have been under cover of Fort Putnam; the face next the river would have extended to the very border of the declivity; and the work in every respect would have been a great deal stronger. In its present position it is too large, its parapet makes too large a circuit. It will be best perhaps to rebuild this fort altogether; if this is not done, to remedy its inconveniencies, the face opposite Fort Putnam must be raised not so as to cover the interior, which I am told Col. Kosciousko proposes, because it must be prodigiously elevated to answer that purpose—but instead of this, I would prolong the eminence which is in the middle of the work, and improve it into a Traverse to extend the whole length of the work—I would then reject a third of the work on the South as altogether useless—the bomb-proof will be backed by the traverse above-mentioned.

  I should have preferred to the Redans which are in front of the Redout Willis, on the South side, and which require for their defense four or five hundred man—a small inclosed work to secure the possession of the eminence and protect the batteries in front—but for the present matters may be left as they are.

  Fort Arnold appears to me to be pretty well situated and traced—but if the intention of Col. Kosciusko is to leave the sides next the River at the present height—(as appears to be the case) I cannot approve it—they are exceedingly liable to an escalade—it is proper to elevate them and even to make a small covert way without having good palisades in front, to secure the body
of the place against all surprise.

  The Scantlin for the Bomb-proof appears to me too feeble—the top will be almost flat—What is made of earth ought to have been of Masonry or bricks—however I forbear enlarging upon this subject, because time will hardly admit of a Remedy—the Stuff being squared and ready to be put together—observing only that the work should be sunk more in order to furnish a greater thickness of earth for the roof.

  Reenactors assembled for inspection at Fort Putnam. Fort Putnam was part of a complex of forts and redoubts protecting West Point. Photo courtesy of the author.

  There is below Fort Putnam a battery nearly round, which is extremely well placed for battering the Vessels which should approach the Chain—but its situation likewise exposes it to the fire of the Ships—at least as it is much advanced, the fire of the tops would injure the Gunners, and the more, as by the form of the battery they are collected within a very small space—it appears to me advisable, to raise the parapet of this battery several feet—and to cover the embrasures from the top of one Merlon to another—so as not to interfere with the working of the Guns—although it is equally necessary to secure the Chain on the left-hand Shore of the River—it seems to have been little attended to—there is no inclosed work on this side to hinder the enemy from debarking a sufficient number of men to get possession of the ground and cut the Chain—there is only a battery which may answer some good ends, but cannot prevent the enemy from doing as above mentioned—With three small works we shall render the point perfectly secure—the first to be placed where the block house of fort independence [Constitution] stood—it is sufficient for it to contain about sixty men—its end is to afford an immediate defense to the Chain and its extremity—against a hardy enterprise, which a few men are engaged sometimes to undertake by dint of money or other recompense—The parapets ought to be of wood in order to take less room—and sufficiently elevated to cover the area.

  Links of the great chain that stretched across the Hudson to block British ships. The chain weighed 180 tons and was supported by log rafts. Trophy Point, US Military Academy at West Point. Photo courtesy of the author.

  The second Redout should be placed on a steep eminence which commands all the other rising ground in the island. the third on an eminence in the rear of the newly constructed battery—These two Redouts ought to be made for 150 men or 200 at most.

  There was a battery, the remains of which are still in existence, (below Fort Independence) it was perfectly well placed for battering the enemy’s Ships—it ought to be rebuilt, with a strong parapet of earth—and as this battery is low and exceedingly exposed to a plunging fire from the Tops of Ships—the Parapets must be high, and terminated by a Roof of thick plank for the protection of the Canoniers—this battery as well as that which is just finished, will be interlocked by the three Redouts—and be in perfection safety.—With these works we shall be completely masters of the Island.

  As to the Chain itself, I would not have it floating on the surface of the Water—which exposes it to be laid hold of by machines prepared for the purpose, on board the Vessels which may approach—but the greatest danger arising from this would be the breaking it by Cannon Shot—when a vast number comes to be fired on both sides in a contest between the enemy Ships and the batteries—I should think it more eligible therefore to suspend the Chain three feet below the surface of the Water—because as the greatest number of the Shot, bound when they strike the water—there would be so many ineffectual in respect to it—besides, the matter would be very easily executed—by placing the floats above instead of below the Chain—and having another Chain made fast at each end to the great one, and carried above the floats—by these means the great Chain may be supported at the depth which is just suitable—if a Shot should carry away the Chain, by which the great one is made fast to the floats—the whole mischief that would result, would be that place would douse a few feet more.

  There are so many accidents by which an iron Chain may be broken, that it would be prudent to have a stout cable in reserve, to supply its place, in part for a time.

  Every thing which I have explained being finished—1800 men will render us completely masters of the River; and put us out of reach of the enemy’s enterprises—at least, the resistence that may be made will allow ample time for the arrival of succours, however remote the Army may be.

  The following is the distribution of these Troops as nearly as can be judged—

  In Fort [Arnold]

  700

  Willis Redout 200

  Fort Putnam 400

  Small work above Fort Putnam 100

  For the works on the Island or Peninsula on the left-hand shore 400

  1800

  At the present moment, if we except the batteries against Ships—the works are not in a state of defence—but a little time would be sufficient for completing fort Putnam; which is the most important—the Redouts on the Island on the left hand shore—are likewise objects of the first attention.

  His Excellency had ordered me to give him an account of the expenses arising from all these works to the present time—it is not in my power to present anything on this subject, not having seen Col. Kosciusko, who alone is possessed of these facts—I am going to write to him for this purpose.

  I was likewise at New Windsor—The River appears to me very wide in this part for a defense of Chevaux de Frise besides the Chevaux de frise themselves appear to me to be very weak—I can with difficulty persuade myself that a Ship would be much embarrassed by them—and indeed until West Point is completed—I do not think we should occupy ourselves about New Windsor—I shall therefore forbear adding any thing farther relative to it.17

  Chevaux-de-frise supplemented the great chain. They consisted of large coffers made of pine logs lined with planking. Long, heavy poles with iron-tipped spikes projected out of the coffers at a 45° angle. The coffers were floated to strategic positions in the river, filled with rocks, and sunk. The spiked logs, hidden two or three feet below the water’s surface at low tide, punctured or damaged the hulls of ships striking them. This type of chevaux-de-frise was also used in the Delaware River to protect Philadelphia. Photo courtesy of the author.

  Washington replied on September 19, 1778,

  Fort Clinton West Point 19th September 1778

  Sir I have perused the memorial which you delivered relative to the defence of the North River at this place—and upon a view of them highly approve what you have offered upon the subject—Col. Kosciusko who was charged by Congress with the direction of the forts and batteries—has already made such a progress in the constructions of them as wd. render any alteration in the general plan a work of too much time—the favorable testimony which you have given of Col. Kosciousko’s abilities prevents uneasiness on this head—but whatever amendments subordinate to the general disposition that occur as proper to be made, you will be pleased to point out to Col. Kosciusko that they may be carried into execution.

  The works proposed on the peninsula not being subject to the above mentioned inconvenience, you will desire Col. Kosciousko to show you his plan for approbation before he proceeds to the construction—or have them traced in the first instance conformably to your own ideas.18

  After returning from the Highlands in September, General Duportail explained to the commander in chief that unless very strongly urged by Congress, he and his companions would return at the expiration of the present campaign, as their leave of absence would expire the first of February, and that if Duportail did not receive a “certain prospect of his being employed in a manner useful to the States and honorable to himself,”19 then he would return to France. Duportail was also anxious that Congress take action with respect to his and his companions’ pay and appointments. Washington wrote Congress,

  Headquarters, Fredericksburgh Novemr. 16, 1778

  Sir,

  By the time this reaches you General Du Portail will probably be at Philadelphia. One part of his business is to prosecute the directions
given him, sometime since, for forming a defence of the River Delaware, to be submitted to Congress, what may be their views and wishes with respect to his further continuance in America and that of the three other gentlemen attached to him. He informs me that the furlough, he obtained from the Court of France expires in February next, and that unless there is a certain prospect of his being employed hereafter, in a manner useful to the States and honorable to himself, he intends immediately to return.—He therefore wishes some explicit ideas to be realized on the subject. He is also anxious that something definite should be done, with respect to the pay and other appointments both of himself and of the other gentlemen with him; which have been hitherto undecided and have left them in an uncertain and disagreeable situation; added to this he is desirous to have some arrangement fixed for the rules and manner of service in his department.

  He delivered me some days since a memorial intended for Congress and which I have now the honor to inclose, containing his ideas on a general system of fortification for these States and which he requests me to accompany with my sentiments.

  But it includes questions of finance and considerations of policy the most extensive and important; of which Congress alone can form a competent judgment. I shall therefore only say, that considered merely in a military point of view, the plan appears to me worthy of very serious attention. It is but justice to General Du Portail to observe, that I have a high opinion of his merit and abilities; and esteem him not only well acquainted with the particular branch he professes, but a man of sound judgment and real knowledge in military science in general. I have also a very favorable opinion of the other Gentlemen.—I will take the liberty to add, that it appears to me, they will be extremely necessary and useful to our future operations, whether directed to offence or defence—whether to dispossess the enemy of posts in our frontier—to assist in carrying on the proposed expedition into Canada—or any other on a less extensive plan, which may be substituted in its stead, for the mere security of our frontier.