Washington's Engineer

by Norman Desmarais

  Head Quarters [Newburg] 21st Augt. 1782

  Sir,

  I have received your favor of the twelfth instant. Were it reduced to a certainty that your exchange would not be effected for a considerable time to come, I should have no objection to recommending your request for liberty to visit France, to Congress—But as the offer which I have just made to Sir Guy Carleton of appointing another meeting of Commissioners may possibly be productive of an exchange of a number of officers, I think your application had better stand suspended till we see the issue of the proposed meeting. I return your Certificates for the present, without adding my name to them, not because I have any doubt of your abilities and merit, but because I would wish to do more than barely signify that due credit ought to be given to the honorable testimonials already in your possession, which is all I could do having never had the pleasure of commanding you personally—I hope before you return to France to be able to speak from my own knowledge.21

  ENDLESS NEGOTIATIONS

  Negotiations seemed to drag endlessly. Cambray renewed his discreet appeals in October to have his present distressing situation mended. Congress responded with assurances that they entertained a “high sense of his merit and military talents and of his zeal and activity in the cause of the United States.”22 He was granted a leave of absence for twelve months but received no money. Alexander Hamilton chaired the committee to consider the financial settlement. The committee reported on December 4, 1782, that it renewed their sense of the peculiarly distressing situation of foreigners, “remote from any resources they may have in their own (country) and destitute of any competent provision here.”23 Nevertheless, the embarrassment of the present financial situation made it impossible for them to advise any measure of relief. They were obliged, therefore, to turn the matter over to the superintendent of finance, whose discretion would enable him to decide what was proper to be done.

  Cambray undoubtedly owed his exchange to the efforts of Rocham-beau and the French minister, but the date or nature of the transactions remain unknown. His letter asking for a brevet commission as colonel was read in Congress in April 1783. His request was granted on May 2, along with a raise in rank for Major Villefranche and Captain L’Enfant.

  Cambray returned to France soon after this date, as is evident by a letter from him to Franklin, asking that letters he was sending be forwarded to friends in America and that mail for him be readdressed to “No. 1 rue St. Pierre, qr. Montmartre.” He wrote again in August, asking Franklin’s aid in securing an interview with the Comte de Vergennes as part of a plan of advancement in the French army, which had the support of the Marquis de Ségur, the minister of war, and other prominent men. In this letter he speaks of the testimonials from Washington, Lincoln, and Congress, which he brought with him from America, as well as those from the states of North and South Carolina, and of the medal given him from the latter state in reward for very exceptional services rendered at the siege of Charleston.

  The Rochambeau Papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress include a testimonial from General Duportail regarding several members of the Corps of Engineers and requesting places for them in the French service. Regarding Colonel Cambray, Duportail says,

  M. du Cambray entered the French Artillery in 1770. Passing to the service of America in 1778 he had the happiness to obtain without effort the rank of Lt. Colonel in the corps of engineers. Since that time he has justified the favor so prematurely accorded him by Congress, through the distinguished manner in which he served in the South where he merited the most flattering testimonials from the Generals who commanded him. He asks to be made Major in the Royal Grenadiers or in a provincial regiment.24

  Colonel Cambray’s efforts and those of his friends do not seem to have secured the desired results. A letter from his sister to Franklin, supposed date 1784, speaks of her brother being in a destitute condition and asks for an advance on the debt still owed him from the United States. Franklin must have written home, as a letter from the comptroller’s office in New York reached him in 1785. It stated the sum due Cambray with interest prior to 1784.

  After the passage of Alexander Hamilton’s Assumption Bill, Congress caused a list of claims with amount and interest still due French volunteers in the American service to be advertised in Europe in 1794. The sum due Colonel Cambray was stated as $6,977.72 (the interest on these debts stopped by 1792). The list continued to be advertised in Europe for the next nine years and was definitely closed in 1803. Cambray’s name, with the unclaimed sum due him, was still there, along with those of Lieutenant Colonel Villefranche and Colonel Gouvion and an unclaimed sum of $637.76 (interest on principal of $2,657.33, paid to the heirs in 1796) belonging to the estate of Colonel Radière. Colonel Gouvion died in 1792 but apparently had no heirs.25

  8

  THE CAMPAIGN OF 1781 Yorktown

  Congress appointed Colonel John Laurens its minister extraordinary to the Court of France in December 1780. He stopped at headquarters on the Hudson, where Washington and the army were spending the winter, and spent three days there, conferring with the commander in chief about the assistance he should request from their ally. Washington’s instructions to Laurens were almost identical to those expressed in the memoir of his commandant of engineers to the French minister, even though the two had had no opportunity of meeting, much less discussing the situation since the latter’s release from prison. Washington’s instructions said in part,

  January 15, 1781.

  . . . inexperience in affairs, necessarily incident to a nation in its commencement, the want of sufficient stock of wealth, the depreciation of the currency, the general difference that has taken place among the people, the calamitous distress to which the army has been exposed by the mode which, for want of money, has been resorted to for supplying it . . . have brought the country to a crisis which renders immediate and efficacious succors from abroad indispensable to its safety. . . .

  . . . the patience of the army, from an almost uninterrupted series of complicated distress, is now nearly exhausted, and their discontents matured to an extremity . . . which demonstrates, the absolute necessity of speedy relief.

  . . . There is danger that a commercial and free people, little accustomed to heavy burdens, pressed by impositions of a new and odious kind, may not make a proper allowance for the necessity of the conjuncture, and may imagine they have only exchanged one tyranny for another. . . .

  In consideration of which [we need] an immediate, ample & efficacious succor in money, large enough to be a foundation for a substantial arrangement of finance, revive fallen credit and give vigor to future operations . . . a constant naval superiority, additional . . . troops. . . . it were however better to diminish the aid in men . . . than diminish the pecuniary succor. . . .

  . . . no nation will have it more in its power to repay what it borrows than this. . . . its independence being established [it will be able] to redeem in a short term of years the comparatively inconsiderable debts it may have occasion to contract.

  [Finally] . . . the people are discontented, but it is with the feeble and oppressive mode of conducting the war, not with the war itself. . . . a large majority are still firmly attached to the independence of these states, abhor reunion with Great Britain and are affectionate to the Alliance.1

  Washington also wrote various other documents showing the hopelessness of the situation without greatly increased aid from France during this trying period. He wrote in a letter to Benjamin Franklin, introducing Colonel Laurens, “[T]he period of our opposition will very shortly arrive if our allies cannot afford us that effectual aid—money and naval superiority.”2 After visiting Rochambeau at Newport, in March 1781, Washington made a more emphatic statement in another letter to Laurens: “Day does not follow night more certainly than it brings with it some additional proof of the impracticability of carrying on the war without the aids you were directed to solicit.”3

  Franklin, together with the Comte de Vergennes,
had been working toward the same end in Paris: substantial aid in money, supplies, and naval superiority on the American coast. Less than two weeks after Colonel Laurens’s arrival, the Comte de Grasse set out from the port of Brest with his fleet. Vergennes assured Franklin that the king would send a free gift of six million livres.4

  Meanwhile, Duportail was on the road to New York, where he was to rejoin the commander in chief, on January 11, 1781. He left Nathanael Greene’s camp in South Carolina on or about January 13. A few days before February 5, he was in Maryland, on his way to Philadelphia to inform Congress that “our Friends in Carolina . . . are suffering much, & anxious for an Exchange.”5

  On February 8, Duportail was in Philadelphia, where he wrote to Washington, thanking him for his exchange, expressing his impatience to return to headquarters under his command, but asking at the same time to have leave to stay until he could renew his depleted possessions, as he lost everything during his captivity. He closed by begging to be permitted to send his regards to Mrs. Washington and to his friends at camp.

  General Washington replied on February 13,

  I received with much pleasure your letter of the 8th from Philadelphia, & sincerely congratulate you on your liberation from captivity, and safe arrival at that place.

  I shall set out the day after tomorrow for New Port.—Had you not so lately come of a long tiresome journey, I should have been glad of your company thither—but this being impracticable, and there being no immediate occasion for your presence at this Post, you have my free consent to remain in Philadelphia till the business you had in contemplation is accomplished, after which I shall be impatient to welcome you to Head Qrs.

  Col. Gouvion (if he has not already done it) is about setting out for New Port—Majr. Villefranche went thither a month ago.6

  General Washington wrote Duportail again on February 21,

  My trip to Rhode Island has been delayed. . . . important considerations make me wish to have you with me this trip. . . . If not inconvenient you will leave Philadelphia immediately. Let me know by express if you can come and what day I may expect you at Head quarters. . . . You will forward your reply with all possible despatch as I shall await your answer and be governed in my departure by it.7

  Matters were rapidly beginning to take shape. Before receiving General Duportail’s reply, the commander in chief wrote him again on March 1, “Some unexpected events have determined me suddenly to set out for Rhode Island. I depart tomorrow—and dispatch you this to request you will join me there as soon as possible, Your information and advice will be very important to our plans.”8

  Washington’s two letters arrived at the same time. Duportail complied with the orders and wrote the following hasty note on March 5,

  i receive this afternoon your two letters, one of the 21 of february the second of the first of march. i have not time enough to enquire how it happened so, but i am exceedingly sorry of that accident. i will do all my endeavors for repairing it as much as it is possible. i will set off tomorrow morning and i will go as fast as my horse will be able to do; i will go by new windsor and fiskill although i believe it is not the shortest road. but i have not time enough to enquire and i must now agree with Colonel pickering about the road i will take on account of the horses.

  i am exceedingly afraid not to joint your excellency—at a time—but i take the liberty to beg (if you leave rhodisland before I arrive there, and you have other orders to give me) to send them by the different roads I may take. this is principally necessary if you do not come by the same road you went.

  i dont thinck i shall arrive at newport before the 14th.9

  Duportail traveled quickly, passing through New Windsor and reaching Newport, as expected, on March 14, only to find that he had passed Washington on the way. Washington had left the day before but took a different route. Duportail remained with the Comte de Rochambeau for three weeks, discussing the American situation with him from every point of view and going over the plans and suggestions that had been brought out during the visit of the American commander in chief. Rochambeau wrote General Washington from Newport on March 31.

  DUPORTAIL’S MEMORIAL

  Duportail’s lengthy memorial, written undoubtedly while at Newport and undated but classed as belonging to the end of March 1781, is titled “General Observations upon the different operations which can be undertaken according to the different cases at the arrival of the Comte de Grasse at the Hook.” He begins by confronting the problem of taking New York, supposing that Admiral de Ternay could force Sandy Hook. He then considers alternatives if they could not attack New York. He notes, “The enemy either will have evacuated or they will have left a Garrison at Portmouth.” After discussing all the possibilities and having exposed the situation at Charleston, he determines that the possession of the port of Portsmouth was the most important action to undertake in the South because possession of the harbor there would make it easy to capture the few Crown positions left in Virginia:

  If it is determined that Count De Grasse cannot force the Hook [Sandy Hook], but if he is master of those Seas, I suppose ’till November when he must go to the West Indies, it is asked in what case we may attack New York.

  I think that if the British at New York have not received any Reinforcement from Virginia and if Count De Grasse brings 4000 men with him we may undertake to attack New York, to speak more generally, to attack New York in the case mentioned here, I would have no less than thrice the number of Men which we suppose that the Enemy have, because the time for the siege is determined and if we don’t succeed, we lose all our advantages we could get in other quarters. . . .

  Let us suppose now, that the circumstances do not permit to attempt any thing against New York, then we must consider these two cases.

  Either the Enemy shall have evacuated Virginia entirely or they shall have left a Garrison in Portsmouth.

  If the Enemy have evacuated Virginia entirely, I suppose they have made this distribution of their Troops, they have sent 3000 Men to New York and 12,000 to Charlestown. I suppose besides, that Lord Rawdon has now 3500 and that in case of an Attack, the British may collect 1500 Militia that will make 8000 Men in all. Is it advisable to undertake something against Charlestown so Garrisoned?

  I answer that we have here a circumstance like that at New York. I mean that the harbour may be forced, and that by the local circumstances, after you have forced it, you may Stay in it as long as you please. Although not in possession of the Town, so that with a moderate number of Troops you can reduce it by Famine, if not by force.

  I cannot say what difficulty we could meet now in the attempt for forcing the bar; but I observe we must observe it cannot be defended by land Batteries, it must be defended only by Armed Ships, Frigates, floating Batteries; Gallies, etc. When I was Prisoner near Charlestown, I heard the British had only sometimes one two or three small frigates at most, with one or two Gallies for that purpose; if it is the case now, I think that it should be very easy to force the bar with four or five large Frigates, or better, one or two 44 Gun Ships. Admiral Arbuthnot, in one of his Letters to Lord Germaine, says there are 19 feet of Water upon the bar at high tide. I think this is enough for a 40 Gun Ship. After you have forced the bar and entrance of the Harbour, you may introduce two or three fifty Gun Ships in it and then I believe you could brave all the attempts of the Enemy to get in again, so the whole fleet of Ships of the line may go where they are more necessary.

  When we are perfectly Master of the Harbour of Charlestown, we then may choose either to attack it, or to block it up according to our means and strength.

  To block it up, I think 7000 Men are enough on the Land side between James and Ashley Rivers, because we may fortify them if necessary. The quantity of Troops we must have on James’s Island, and on the other sides of Cooper and Ashley, either for the greater security of our Fleet or from hindering the Enemy from getting Provisions, it depends upon this how far up the Ships have been able to penetrate into the Harbour a
nd the Rivers (because the Enemy can make obstructions in some places, but in the most advantageous case, I think 4000 Men part of which may be Militia shall fill our object.

  So I think that with 1100 [11,000?] Men we can block Charlestown up entirely.

  To attack it I would have at least 4000 More.

  A difficulty occurs, is it possible to supply with Provisions, so large a number of Men in that Quarter.

  I believe it is, if the Expedition takes place, it will be before the Rice is cut, so that we can get plenty either in Carolina or Georgia, where we may send a body of Troops for that purpose.

  Besides, I observed already that after we are in possession of the Harbour, the Fleet may go away. I suppose it will go to Chesapeak; so far they shall cover perfectly well the Transportation of our Supplies. If Count De Grasse is obliged, in the beginning of November to return to the West Indies, I do not doubt he will leave a fleet Superior or at least equal to that of the Enemy, so that our Convoys shall be safe; besides, we know that from Chesapeak to Charlestown, there is between the Main and some Islands an interior Navigation which may render the transportation very easy. It is only necessary to have for that purpose some small Armed Vessels to protect them against Privateers. So I think that on account of the importance of the Capture of Charlestown this year, as soon as it is determined that we cannot undertake any thing against New York, we must embark all the French Troops and as many of the Americans as can be spared with plenty Provisions, etc., and go, under the protection of the whole fleet, directly to Charlestown. . . .

  . . . Mr. Duportail with whom I have had conferences upon all these objects, is quite of my opinion, he goes away on the 1st of April, and proposes being at New Windsor on the 5th; he will give your Excellency a more ample relation of the discussion of the different objects which were the subjects of the conferences with your Excellency here.10