A Concise History of Sunnis and Shi'is
Page 35
VII
There have always been tensions between Sunnis and Shi‘is, but there has never been sectarian strife between them to compare with the wars of religion and persecutions of the Reformation in Christian Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Sectarian strife did play a role at times in rivalries like that between the Ottomans and Safavids. But by the beginning of the nineteenth century, that had faded away. Ever since, Turkey and Iran have had peaceful relations. Any problems that exist between them today certainly do not have their roots in the fact that Turkey is predominantly Sunni, while Iran is predominantly Twelver Shi‘i.
The toxic sectarianism that has broken out since 2003 has been the unlovely flowering of seeds that were planted much earlier. Some of the most important, such as the hostility of Wahhabism to Shi‘ism, date from before the spread of Western political and cultural domination of the Muslim world. But if we look at the ways in which Sunni-Shi‘i sectarian politics have appeared in the Middle East, they cannot be examined without considering them against the backdrop of the reaction to the West and the spread of nationalism from the nineteenth century onwards. Before the appearance of nationalism and its rival, pan-Islamism, people in the Middle East and other Muslim countries – like pre-modern peoples everywhere – were much less self-aware with regard to their various feelings of identity. That does not mean that their senses of identity were any less powerful. Indeed, belonging to a faith community was one of the strongest manifestations of that, and there has always been a feeling of clannishness among members of religions and sects. An English-speaking audience ought to be able to understand this by considering how religion in Ireland took on a quasi-tribal aspect at some point in the past, and how this led to intense sectarian strife in Northern Ireland over many decades. In a similar way, the danger of ‘othering’ the members of another religion or sect was always present among the quasi-tribes of the Muslim world.
This brings us to the flawed state formation in the Middle East. In some countries, important factors worked against the people developing a cohesive sense of national identity. The glaring example that is frequently pointed out is the imposition of state boundaries that ignored significant facts of human geography. The British and French Mandates over Greater Syria and Iraq are an obvious case in point. Another that is perhaps stressed less often is the culture of patronage, which has been almost a leitmotif in the later chapters of this book. Patronage has deep roots in Arab society, and can pose a serious obstacle to the development of genuinely democratic politics. As noted above, Iraq and Syria are prime examples of this. In each case, patronage was an important factor both in frustrating democracy and in leading the two countries down the road to civil conflict, in which sectarianism would play a prominent role. The intense pressure that was put on the Iraqi state from 1980 onwards and on the Syrian state since 2011 has not helped either. As states begin to fail, people are forced back on their family, on their tribe (if they have one), and on whatever other trusted support networks they can find. Their religious community is usually one of these. When a religious community hears hate speech directed against it and perceives itself as under attack from members of a rival sect or religion, it is not surprising if this leads to sectarianism. Sectarianism between Sunnis and Shi‘is has proved to be most destructive when it has been grafted on to existing grievances. Indeed, in the absence of such grievances, serious sectarian discord has been rare.
Then there has been the manipulation of religion by powerful states as a way of promoting their hegemony, and by states that have created or exacerbated sectarianism among their citizens for short-term political ends. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been guilty of exploiting religion as a tool of foreign policy. As we have seen, from 1979 onwards, conservative Saudi Arabia and revolutionary Iran have been in ideological conflict for the leadership of all Muslims across the globe. This struggle has been exacerbated by Saudi Arabia’s wish to assume the mantle of leadership of the Sunni world, and Iran’s corresponding role as the self-appointed leader of Shi‘is everywhere. These relations were not helped by the consequences of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. When a second major country with a coast on the Gulf came under Shi‘i rule, this could only make the Saudis and other Sunni rulers in the Gulf nervous.
It is not only powers seeking hegemony, like Saudi Arabia and Iran, that can exploit sectarian divides. When a state that has a sectarian divide but no firm democratic tradition is weak, its own government can manipulate the divide. Yet sect-based movements in a divided society ultimately lead their followers into a cul-de-sac. Co-operation across the sectarian divide has always been possible. There is nothing inevitable about conflict between Sunnis and Shi‘is.
The Family of the Prophet
The Twelve Imams
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my publisher, Lynn Gaspard of Saqi Books, who suggested I write this book in the summer of 2015. It has proved a long and fascinating journey of study and writing. I owe her my deepest thanks for setting me on that path. I also thank my editor, Brian David, for his insights, comments and many deletions, which have made the book much more focused and readable than would otherwise have been the case. I am also grateful to Lynn’s colleagues at Saqi, Sarah Cleave in the early days and more recently Elizabeth Briggs, for their assistance on numerous matters. Many other people have helped me in various ways, either by reading parts or all of the draft, discussing my project as it evolved, or making helpful comments and suggestions. Madawi Al-Rasheed, (Col.) Alastair Campbell, Rose Hadshar, Moojan Momen and Russell McGuirk all gave me their thoughts on earlier drafts, and Rose sent me what can only be described as a root-and-branch edit. To all of them I am very grateful. I would also like to thank Juan Cole, Edmund Herzig, Hugh Kennedy, Daisy Livingston, Derek Plumbly and ‘Hooky’ Walker for their suggestions and ideas on particular matters, as well as helpful tips as to how I should go about my research. I hope I have been honest and true to myself in the final text. The fault for whatever errors it contains lies with me alone.
But my greatest debt is to Diana. She has given me emotional support and encouragement throughout what has often been a gruelling process, as well as the benefit of her own knowledge and insights.
Notes
Preface
1. V. Nasr, The Shia Revival, p. 47.
2. ‘The terms Sunni and Shi’a exist today in reciprocal relationship and any attempt to understand one is simultaneously a journey into the other.’ See Pierce, Twelve Infallible Men, p. 149. See also the final section of Chapter Three below.
3. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/opinion/thomas-friedman-tell-me-how-this-ends-well.html?_r=0
4. See Hashemi and Postel, p. 2 and note 3 for further details.
Chapter One
1. This was how it was meant to be. Nevertheless, although Islam would succeed in ending conflicts between Muslim tribes during the remainder of the Prophet’s life and the years immediately after his death, Islam did not succeed in eradicating these pre-Islamic customs. Blood feuds and activities such as cattle rustling among Arabian tribes have persisted into modern times.
2. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Mecca, p. 10, citing Ibn Sa‘d.
3. Ibid., p. 27.
4. Madelung, p. 57, referring to Qur’an 8: 72–74 and 9: 100, 117.
5. Montgomery Watt, op. cit., p. 288.
6. Article ‘Umar’ in The Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam, ed. H.A.R. Gibb and J.H. Kramers, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1974
7. Abbott, p. 8.
8. Madelung, p. 33.
9. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Mecca, p. 288.
10. Lings, p. 244.
11. Madelung, p. 67.
12. Madelung, pp. 18–27. Madelung shows that the accuracy of the attributions of their accounts to Aisha and Abdullah bin Abbas is, so far as these things ever can be established, extremely plausible. My summary of these events is based on Madelung’s work.
13. Madelung, pp. 62–63.
14. Ibid., p. 24.<
br />
15. Ibid., p. 23.
16. Ibid., pp. 45–46.
17. Ibid., pp. 40 ff.
18. Ibid., p. 58.
19. Ibid., p. 61.
Chapter 2
1. Madelung, p. 79.
2. Ibid., p. 80.
3. Ibid., pp. 81–82.
4. Ibid., p. 96.
5. Ibid., p. 113
6. Ibid., p. 108.
7. Ibid., pp. 121–23.
8. Ibid., p. 127.
9. Ibid., p. 127.
10. Ibid., pp. 112–13.
11. Ibid., p. 211.
12. Ibid., p. 145.
13. Ibid., p. 150.
14. Ibid., pp. 150–52.
15. Ibid., p. 149.
16. Ibid., p. 155.
17. Ibid., p. 161.
18. Ibid., p. 169.
19. Ibid., p. 179.
20. Ibid., p. 174.
21. Ibid., p. 175.
22. Ibid., p. 201. See also p.205.
23. Ibid., p. 205.
24. Ibid., p. 231.
25. Ibid., p. 203.
26. Ibid., p. 216.
27. Ibid., p. 231.
28. Ibid., p. 235.
29. Ibid., p. 238.
30. Ibid., p. 238.
31. Ibid., p. 244.
32. Ibid., p. 245.
33. Ibid., p. 246.
34. Ibid., p. 247.
35. Ibid., p. 252.
36. Ibid., pp. 255–56.
37. Ibid., p. 276.
38. Ibid., p. 279.
39. Ibid., p. 304.
40. Ibid., p. 308.
41. Ibid., pp. 311–12.
42. Ibid., p. 319.
43. Ibid., p. 323.
Chapter Three
1. V. Vaglieri, article on Hussein in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed.
2. Jacob Lassner, ‘Responses to unwanted authority in early Islam’, in Bengio and Litvak, p.33.
3. El-Hibri, p. 271.
4. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, p. 134.
5. Daftary, ‘Varieties of Islam’, in New Cambridge History of Islam, vol. 4, p. 112.
6. Pierce, p. 13.
7. Ibid., p. 13.
8. Ibid., p. 45.
Chapter Four
1. This paragraph is distilled from the first chapter of Norman Calder’s PhD thesis, pp. 1–23.
2. Madelung, pp. 80–81.
3. Crone and Hinds, pp. 5–6, 13–15.
4. Rodwell’s translation. There are other candidates for ‘the rope of God’apart from the caliph. One is the Qur’an itself.
5. The Arabian poet al-Farazdaq (641–732), quoted in Crone and Hinds, p.33.
6. Crone and Hinds, p. 41.
7. For the emergence of the Sharia and Islamic Law, see Hallaq, pp. 142–83.
8. Hallaq, pp. 157–58.
9. Crone andHinds, pp. 86–87.
10. Crone andHinds, pp. 88–90.
11. The expression is that of Wael Hallaq: Hallaq, p. 162.
12. Hallaq, pp. 164–65
13. Ibid., p. 166.
14. Crone and Hinds, p. 93.
15. El-Hibri, in The New Cambridge History of Islam, vol. 1, pp. 291–92.
16. Melchert, p. 10.
17. Calder, p. 25–26.
18. Ibid, p. 301.
19. Calder, see pp. 29–48 passim.
20. Madelung, p. 216.
21. Ibid., p. 298.
22. Definition in Hans Wehr’s Dictionary, 1966 English Edition.
23. Quoted in Halm, p. 37.
24. Quoted by Hurvitz in ‘Early Hanbalism and the Shi‘a’, in Bengio and Litvak, p. 46.
25. Hurvitz, p. 47.
26. Pierce, p. 31.
27. Halm, p. 48.
28. Ibid., pp. 49–51.
29. Ibid., p. 53.
30. See Halm, pp. 53–54, which is also my source for this quote.
31. Halm, p. 55.
32. Calder, pp. 70–71.
33. Ibid., p. 78.
34. Ibid., pp. 110–13.
Chapter Five
1. Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War, pp. 31–37; Momen, pp. 90–91.
2. Kennedy, p. 316.
3. Ibid., p. 334.
4. Halm, p. 180.
5. The material in this section is based on Halm, pp. 202–05.
6. Momen, Shi‘i Islam: A Beginner’s Guide, pp. 4–5.
7. Halm, p. 155.
8. See, for instance, Ghazali’s discussion of the fourth and highest level of tawhid in the first chapter of Book XXXV of the Ihya’ ‘ulum al-din, translated by this writer as ‘The Book of Divine Unity and Trust in God’, The American University in Cairo, unpublished MA Thesis 1976, pp. 1–48, especially at e.g. 11, 13.
9. See Halm, p. 157 and Daftary, ‘Varieties of Islam’ in New Cambridge History of Islam, vol. IV, pp. 136–37.
10. Daftary, p. 138.
11. Ibid., p. 138.
12. Schimmel, p. 27.
13. Ibid., pp. 41–42.
14. Ibid., p. 231.
15. Ibid., p. 238.
Chapter Six
1. R. McCarthy, Deliverance from Error, An Annotated Translation of al-Munqidh min al Dalal and Other Relevant Works of Al-Ghazali, 1980, p. 235.
2. Halm, pp. 62–63, Momen, pp. 208–11. Fuad Khuri states there are six, not seven ‘cycles’. See Khuri, ‘The Alawis of Syria’, in Syria: Society, Culture and Polity, pp. 49–61.
3. Halm, p. 61.
4. Calder, p. 233.
5. Halm, p. 65.
6. Calder, p. 240.
7. The comparison is made and explored by David Morgan in Medieval Persia, 1040–1797.
8. Halm, p. 69.
9. Junayd is presented as the head of the Safavi order in the version of history promulgated by the Safavids. However, it seems that the real head of the order at that time was his uncle Ja‘far, who forced him into exile. See Morgan, op. cit., p. 107.
10. Halm, p. 77 referring to Melikoff, ‘Le probleme Qizilbas’, Turcica 6, 1975, pp. 51 ff.
11. Halm, p. 78 quoting Khunji, Tarikh-i ‘alam-ara-yi Amini, translated by Minorsky, No. 204.
12. Quoted in Morgan, p.117.
13. Morgan, p. 117.
14. Halm, p. 81.
15. Ibid., p. 93.
16. Tucker, p. 19.
17. Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War, p. 18.
18. Tucker, p. 24.
19. Litvak, Encounters between Sunni and Shi‘i ‘Ulama’ in Ottoman, Iraq, in Bengio and Litvak, pp. 71–72.
20. Quoted in Tucker, p. 82.
21. Quoted in Tucker, pp. 82–83.
22. Tucker, p. 98.
23. Morgan, p. 155.
Chapter Seven
1. Streusand, p. 68.
2. Ibid., p. 68.
3. Scherberger, ‘The Confrontation between Sunni and Shi‘i Empires’, in Bengio and Litvak, p. 53.
4. Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War, pp. 17–18.
5. Cole, op. cit., p. 19.
6. Scherberger, pp. 58–59.
7. Ibid., p. 60.
8. Ibid., p. 65.
9. Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War, pp.18.
10. Cole, op. cit., p. 19.
11. Ibid., p.21.
12. Scherberger, p. 55.
13. Streusand, p. 201.
14. Dale, p. 77.
15. Streusand, p. 209.
16. Ibid., p. 243.
17. Ibid., p. 279.
18. Schimmel, p. 367.
19. Cole, p. 8.
20. Momen, Shi‘i Islam, pp. 79–80; Halm, p. 134.
21. Finkel, p. 366.
22. He did, however, apply a version of Hanbali fiqh himself. See Crawford, p. 54.
23. Crawford, pp. 51–53.
24. Ibid., p. 105.
25. M. Crawford, p. 20.
26. Crawford, p. 21.
27. Ibid., p. 22. It is sometimes claimed he also went to Iran, but Crawford dismisses this possibility.
28. Ibid., p. 25.
29. Ibid., p. 27.
30. Ibid., p. 3
1.
31. Ibid., pp. 37–38.
32. Ibid., p. 63.
33. Ibid., p. 59.
34. Ibid., p. 87.
35. Guido Steinberg, ‘The Wahhabiyya and Shi‘ism’, in Bengio and Litvak, pp. 166–67.
36. Crawford, p. 97.
37. Ibid., p. 42.
38. Halm, p. 98.
Chapter Eight
1. B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, 1983/2006, pp. 5–7.
2. Finkel, p. 492.
3. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939, p. 106.
4. J. Cole, Napoleon’s Egypt, p. 151.
5. Hourani, op. cit., p. 106.
6. Quoted in Finkel, p. 493.
7. The expression is Caroline Finkel’s. See Finkel, p. 495.
8. Halm, p. 99.
9. The information contained in these paragraphs is taken from Halm, pp. 98–104.
10. Halm, p. 108.
11. Ansari, Iran: A Very Short Introduction, p. 94.
12. Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War, p. 30.
13. Cole, op. cit., p. 27.
14. Litvak, ‘Encounters between Sunni and Shi‘i “Ulama”’ in Bengio and Litvak, p. 81.
15. Derengil, ‘Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: the Reign of Abdulhamid II’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 23, 1991, pp. 347–48.
16. Litvak, ‘Encounters between Sunni and Shi‘i “Ulama”,’ in Bengio and Litvak, p. 82.
17. Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, p. 44.
18. See Nakash, p. 55, where there is reference to the publication of a speech by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in which he called for the overthrow of Nasir al-Din Shah for endangering Islam.
19. The thought and career of this once seemingly contradictory figure have been unravelled by Albert Hourani in Arab Thought in the Liberal Age 1789–1939, pp. 103–29; and Nikki Keddie in her book An Islamic Response to Imperialism.
20. For this, see Tripp, Islam and the Moral Economy, pp. 129 ff. Unfortunately Muhammad Abduh’s reasoning on this issue has not survived.
21. Sedgwick, pp. 11–12, p. 68.
22. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, p. 143; Sedgwick, p. 64.