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With Us or Against Us

Page 23

by Tony Judt


  battle against corruption and favoritism, the rule of law, and respect

  for human rights and ethnic minorities. Americanization went too

  far—the elite began losing control over the news agencies, which it

  had only recently been using in its own interests to Americanize the

  country and prevail over communist bureaucrats. In other words, the

  further popularization of the American theory and practice became, in

  its own way, a censor morum, and undermined the strength and

  omnipotence of the new Russian authorities. They couldn’t allow that

  to happen.

  The Russian elite began to feel first-hand the consequences of the

  fall in international influence and the loss of choices for their country.

  A sense of jealousy toward the American elite began to increase—not

  material jealousy (most Russian politicians have more wealth and

  assets than their American counterparts), but “geopolitical jealousy”

  of America’s military, political, and diplomatic choices, jealousy

  toward their ability to fulfill their agenda. At the beginning, the new

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  elite naively assumed that it would play the same role in the world

  as the Soviet elite once did, that is, idem et caeteris.74 The realization

  that this was not to be turned into anti-Americanism among the new

  ruling elite.

  By the end of the 1990s, Russia began transforming itself into a

  country with a pro-American or neutral population, and a political

  elite that viewed the United States with skepticism, suspicion, and

  hostility.75 Yet, a small but powerful pro-American group also formed

  in the elite—one that after 9/11 began to be associated with

  President Putin and his inner circle.76 Speaking in front of Russian

  diplomats in July 2002, Putin declared that the Russian–American

  relationship was based on “a new reading of the national interests of

  both countries, as well as a common understanding of the nature of

  global threats.” He called for the development of a “trusting partner-

  ship between Russia and the US.”77

  The terrorist acts of 9/11 became events of historic magnitude,

  altering many global processes. It is too early to speak of their influ-

  ence on the Russian citizens’ objective perceptions of the United States.

  Not enough time has passed for emotions to cease playing a defining

  role. The uniqueness of the Russian reaction is tied to the fact that

  the event that started a new epoch happened not in Russia, as it did

  10 years ago, but on the territory of a former foe, which had defeated

  Russia in the Cold War. Many Russians saw this as the true end of that

  war, because both countries now had common priorities.78 Thus,

  40 percent believe that the terrorist threat is a global one, and that the

  attack could have occurred in Europe or in Russia. Yet, 63 percent

  believed that this was payback for America’s foreign policy.79

  Immediate reactions to the terrorist attacks were extremely emotional.

  “Pity and compassion” were named by 50 percent of the respondents,

  “fear, anger, and shock” by another 36 percent, “indifference” by

  only 2 percent. Seventy-nine percent said they condemn the people

  who celebrated the attacks. If before the terrorist acts only 20 percent

  thought that the United States played a positive role in the world,

  while 58 percent thought it played a negative role, the numbers after

  the attack changed to 26 and 48 percent, respectively. The number of

  those who saw America as an unfriendly state decreased from 52 to

  43 percent, while the number of those who saw it as a friend increased

  from 32 to 43 percent.80

  The 1990s saw the development of the unchallenged and undeni-

  able power of the United States. But on September 11, “a nameless

  and omnipotent evil not only destroyed the power of the US, but

  called into question the possibility of the existence of a power that can

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  withstand such evil.”81 For Russians, who, in the words of an old

  remark by Winston Churchill, respect and fear nothing more than

  power, the blatant vulnerability of America was an important psycho-

  logical factor. There was a reassessment of the concepts of “us” versus

  “them.” Gradually, in both countries, an understanding emerged that

  our differences, for all their relevance, are immeasurably smaller than

  traditionally thought. It could be said that after 9/11, a real long-

  term basis for strategic union, one that isn’t politically adversarial, could

  be created. In many ways, it is still a tabula rasa. But Putin’s course of

  rapprochement with America began receiving widespread support.

  After George Bush’s visit to Moscow in May 2002, Putin’s rating rose

  another 7 points and reached 75 percent. Many judged the meeting

  itself in a positive light as well.82

  The popularity of Putin’s foreign policy is based on the fact that he

  doesn’t go for concessions, but demands “equal cooperation”—so

  think 50 percent of Russians. Twelve percent think he received unilateral

  concessions from America, and 13 percent think he makes concessions

  to America. By comparison, 42 percent think that Gorbachev made

  unilateral concessions to America, 46 percent think Yeltsin did so,83

  and neither put “a trusting partnership” with America as one of their

  goals. In public opinion, Putin’s pro-Americanism does not contradict

  his image as a protector of Russian interests.

  The number of people who condemn America for something reg-

  ularly exceeds 50 percent, while 70 percent of Russians are for “Russia

  and the US having a closer relationship.” Many think that the terrorist

  acts helped America understand Russia. This gives Moscow a chance

  for a substantial increase of its global influence—not at the cost of

  American influence, but in tandem with it. America can effectively

  respond to the threat it was given and carry the burden of global lead-

  ership only in a union with Russia, accepting Russia’s just and uncom-

  promising stance on battling global terrorism. So think 60 percent of

  Russians.84

  Russia is an example of a country where there is a perpetual dis-

  tinction between the deep-seated objective perception of America and

  the public sentiment at any given time. That is why it is so easy to

  make a mistake, to build a political trajectory, or make decisions on

  the basis of the latest opinion poll. By the time the decisions are

  enforced, the moods will change and the policy will be dissonant with

  the sentiment. Such miscalculations, on the parts of both Russian and

  American elites, are not uncommon. On the other hand, to construct

  an agenda based on fundamentals is also dangerous, since public opinion

  could the politician’s popularity shift dramatically, thus calling into

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  question. But in a Russian–American relationship, only such an

  approach will be strategically successful. Such was Putin’s decision, for


  example, to support America after 9/11.

  Alexander Pushkin once noted that he was annoyed by many

  Russian attitudes, but became even more annoyed when foreigners

  pointed them out. Even today, many Russians would concur with the

  words of their great poet. Isn’t “Love it or leave it!” a famous American

  expression? The evolution of Russian perceptions about America

  reflects a centuries-old Russian conflict between a tendency to inte-

  grate with the Western world and a desire to maintain its uniqueness.

  No one really knows if this conflict will reach a solution, but we can

  be sure that the United States will remain a yardstick by which Russians

  continue to measure themselves.

  Notes

  The author wishes to thank Leon Aron, director of Russian studies at the

  American Enterprise Institute, and Barbara Friedman from the University of

  Missouri for valuable comments made during the preparation of this chapter.

  1. Vasily Klyuchevsky, Cочинeния в дeвяти томaх, vol. 9 (Moscow: Mysl’,

  1990), p. 386.

  2. Suffice it to say that the Russian language has no word for “privacy”—

  evidence, in my opinion, of the existence of two widely divergent principles

  of society in Russia and the United States.

  3. As a February 2, 2002 survey by Russia’s Public Opinion Fund (hereafter

  POF) showed, the Olympics sharply changed Russian opinion of the

  United States. Only 17% of Russians called the United States a friendly

  nation, while 71% thought it hostile. As a result of the Olympics, the num-

  ber of Russians who viewed the United States positively, decreased sharply

  by 12%, which equaled the increase in the number of people who thought

  that the United States was Russia’s enemy. By comparison, before the

  Olympics, 29% of people saw America unfavorably, and 32% favorably. A

  few weeks after the Olympics, the surge of anti-Americanism began to

  decline once again. The United States was viewed favorably by 49%, and

  unfavorably by 41%. See http://top.rbc.ru/index2.shtml for 03.07.2002

  and 04.01.2002.

  4. See A. Oslon, “Peaкция нa 11 сeнтября в российском общeствeнном

  мнeнии,” in Aмeрикa: взгляд из Pоссии. Cо и послe 11 сeнтября (Moscow:

  POF, 2001), p. 31.

  5. See Dominant, no. 6, 19, 23, 37, 47; 2002, no. 6,19 (Moscow: POF,

  2001).

  6. See G. Diligensky, «Зaпaд» и российскоe общeство (Moscow: POF, 2001),

  July 12, http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/d012541.html.

  7. See Alexander Zinoviev, Зaпaд (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2000).

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  135

  8. Alexander Block formulated this forcefully in his poem “Scythians.”

  9. Sergey Soloviev, Чтeния и рaсскaзы по русской истории (Moscow:

  Pravda, 1990), p. 439.

  10. Nikolai Danilevsky, Pоссия и Eвропa (Moscow: Kniga, 1991), p. 498.

  11. Ibid., pp. 68–69.

  12. This conflict unfolds in War and Peace as well. For this reason, the tradi-

  tional English-language translation of the title may confuse the reader. In

  Russian, the word “mir” can mean both “world” and “peace.” A more

  correct translation would probably be “War and the World.”

  13. Lev Gumilev, Oт Pуси до Pоссии: очeрки зтничeской истории (Moscow:

  Svarog and K, 2002), p. 217.

  14. Memoirs of V. Pecherin, Зaмогильныe зaписки (Apologia pro vita mea)

  were published in the book Pусскоe общeство 30-х годов X1X вeкa. Люди

  и идeи: Meмуaры соврeмeнников (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), pp. 148–311.

  Pecherin propounded the idea of rejecting “the tyranny of materialist civ-

  ilization,” and thought that humankind’s salvation lay in religion, not sci-

  ence. Pitirim Sorokin thought that Russia and the United States are

  bound to have a binding peace, since they have similar systems of values

  and institutions. See Pitirim Sorokin, Pоссия и Cоeдинeнныe Штaты

  (New York: Chekhov Publishing, 1944).

  15. An interesting related fact is that in the initial drafts of his novel, The

  Idiot, Fyodor Dostoyevsky calls his protagonist Count Myshkin “a Count

  of Christ.” See F. Dostoyevsky, Cобрaниe сочинeний в 10 томaх, vol. 6

  (Moscow: State Literature Publishing House, 1957), p. 709.

  16. This idea is widespread in Russian culture. Recall that in Crime and

  Punishment, Dostoyevsky brings together Raskolnikov and Sonya

  Marmeladov, juxtaposing pragmatic reason with emotion. Sonya is also a

  criminal, but she criminalizes herself for the sake of others. It is better to

  be the victim, the object of aggression, rather than the aggressor, says

  Dostoyevsky.

  17. Soloviev, Чтeния и рaсскaзы по русской истории, op.cit. pp. 493–494.

  18. In trying to understand the origin of Russian anti-Americanism, I often

  see a double reflexive emerging: we don’t like them because we think that

  they don’t like us.

  19. Russia’s biggest modernizer, Peter the Great, once said to his circle of

  advisors, “We need Europe for a few more decades, and then we can turn

  our back on it.” See Klyuchevsky, Cочинeния в 9 томaх, vol. 8, Articles,

  p. 397. Since then, in moments of improvement in relations between

  Russia and the West, such talk is regularly heard among the Russian polit-

  ical establishment.

  20. Georges Nivat, “Paсхожee мнeниe, что у нaс нa Зaпaдe цaрит бeзвeрьe,

  ошибочно . . .” Kontinent, no. 112 (2002), pp. 247–248.

  21. One can’t argue about taste (lat.).

  22. Soloviev, Чтeния и рaсскaзы по русской истории, p. 447.

  23. Contemporary emigrant poet Igor Guberman wrote about this once:

  “The muted Russian soul / eschews associations / and takes on foreign

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  languages / with glossaries and detestations. / How queer the hue of

  Russian life / composed o’er so many centuries / its conscience talks to

  Russia / albeit in foreign languages.” I. Guberman, Гaрики нa кaждый

  дeнь (Moscow: EMIA, 1992), pp. 221–222.

  24. Dostoyevsky’s The Idiot is interesting in that respect. Dostoyevsky tries to

  prove that the necessary basis for public life is not the law or the state, but

  the moral authority of the church, and that Russians can develop success-

  fully only within a framework of the ideals of the Russian Orthodox

  Church. His protagonist Count Myshkin is, in the words of Saltykov-

  Schedrin, a man who had attained “a complete moral and spiritual

  balance.”

  25. Interestingly, the eminent sociologist Pitirim Sorokin thought, on the

  contrary, that the political and economic roots of the democratic system

  are identical in Russia and the United States, having grown out of a peas-

  ant system of values. See Pitirum Sorokin, Pоссия и Cоeдинeнныe Штaты

  (New York: Chekhov Publishing, 1944), pp. 38, 64, 75, 88–89.

  26. Klyuchevsky, Cочинe�
�ия в 9 томaх, vol. 8: Articles pp. 378, 383–384.

  27. Sergei Dovlatov, Прозa, vol. 2, p. 135

  28. Nikolai Berdyaev, Pусскaя идeя: Oсновныe проблeмы русской мысли X1X

  вeкa и нaчaлa XX вeкa (Paris: YMCA Press, 1971), p. 243.

  29. Nikolai Berdyaev writes that “rationalism is the fatal sin of the West . . .

  Russia is free of the sin of rationalism, which binds one to necessity.” See

  O Pоссии и русской ФилосоФской культурe, (Moscow: Nauka, 1990),

  pp. 81–82. Alexander Herzen sharply criticized the idea of a parliamen-

  tary democracy and thought the русский мужик will save the world.

  30. One recalls the history of a judicial error in Lev Tolstoy’s novel

  Bоскрeсeниe and the fate of its heroine Katyusha Maslova.

  31. Klyuchevsky, Cочинeния в дeвяти томaх, vol. 9 c. 424.

  32. ФOM. Aмeрикaнский обрaз жизни. 05.31.2001; http://www.fom.ru/

  survey/dominant/203/517/1746.html.

  33. http://www.fom.ru/survey/finfo/579/1316/4569.html.

  34. According to an POF survey from October 2001, 80% of Russians said

  that their perception of the United States had not changed after the

  attacks. www.fom.ru/survey/dominant/290/721/2358.html.

  35. Cоврeмeнноe российскоe общeство: пeрeходный пeриод (Moscow:

  Institute of Sociology RAN, 1998), p. 22.

  36. Mониторинг общeствeнного мнeния: экономичeскиe и социaльныe

  пeрeмeны. Journal of the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public

  Opinion (hereafter—ACSPO), 1997, no. 1, c. 12; no. 2, c. 21.

  37. As an example, I could cite a POF survey from the fall of 1999. To the

  question “Which were the hardest years of your life,” 65% said

  1996–1999, 33%—1991–1995, 5%—1986–1990, while only 6% chose

  the years of World War II, and 3% the first post-war decade. See

  http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/t906402.html. On the question of

  which years were the best, 27% said 1976–1980, another 27%—

  1981–1985, and 20%—1971–1975. See http://www.fom.ru/reports/

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