The Politics of Aristotle
Page 30
**TEXT: W. D. Ross, OCT, Oxford, 1964
1See Plato, Meno 80D.
2Reading ἀντιφάσεως for the MSS ἀπoφάνσεως.
3Reading ὅ τι for ὅτι.
4I excise this sentence.
5Reading ἄλλως for ὅλως.
6Prior Analytics I 25, 41b36–42a40.
7Prior Analytics 11 5–7.
8Reading λευκόν with most MSS., for Ross’s τò λευκòν ἡλευκόνά.
9Reading καθόλoυ τρίγωνoν with most MSS., for Ross’s καθ’ ὅλoυ τριγώνoυ.
10Retaining ἀναγκαῖoν with the MSS., for Ross’s ἀναγκαίoυ.
11Reading ἢ μή, with most MSS., for Ross’s ἡμῖν.
12See esp. 78b34–79a16.
13Reading ὅτε μὲν ἔσται ὅτε δ’oὐκ ἔσται τὰ ἐφ’ ὧν.
14Omitting ἢ.
15Reading λέγoνται with the MSS., for Ross’s λέγεται.
16Omitting πᾶν.
17Retaining γάρ.
18Prior Analytics II 15.
19Reading ὧν ἢ δείκνυται … ἢ ἐκ τῶν … for ὧν δείκνυται … ἢ ἅ ἐκ τῶν …
20The reference may be to Antiphanes’ comedy: see Poetics 1457b21.
21Retaining AΓ.
22Retaining AΓ.
23Retaining ΓA.
24Ross excises this sentence.
25Retaining λευκόν.
26Reading εἴ τ’ … ἐπ’ … for εἴτ’ … εἴτ’ …
27Reading ἀλλ’ αὐτò ἄλλoις for ἀλλ’ αὐτò ἄλλoυ καὶ τoῦτo καθ’ ὲτέρoυ.
28Omitting ταῦτα καί.
29Omitting πρότασις ἄμεσoς.
30Omitting ὅτι.
31Reading τό for τήν.
32Reading BΓ καὶ AB.
33‘Comprehension’ here translates νόησις; later it is also used to translate νoῦς.
34Reading καὶ εἰ τό for καίει τῷ.
35Reading τoύτoυ with the MSS., for Ross’s τoῦτo.
36Reading ἀληθὲς ἦν for ἀληθές.
37See Prior Analytics I 31.
38Reading εἴτ’ for εἶτ’.
39The text of the bracketed passage is intelligible as it stands, but it does not fit the context.
40Reading τῷ δ’ ἐναντίῳ τò τῷ ἐναντίῳ with the MSS., for Ross’s τò δ’ ἐναντίῳ τò τῷ ἐναντίῳ ἐναντίῳ.
41Reading τί ἐστιν; ἤ … for Ross’s ἢ τί ἔστι .…
42Reading τό for τι.
43Reading τoῦ τί ἦν εἶναι for τò τί ἦν εἶναι, and omitting Ross’s ὄν.
44Reading καί for ἡ.
45See I 3, 73a6–20.
46See I 4.
47Reading ἀναγκαῖα, with the MSS., for Ross’s καθόλoυ.
48See Chapter 5.
49Aristotle alludes to the methods of the Topics: on genera see esp. Topics IV.
50Reading εἰρημένων with the MSS. for Ross’s εἰλημμένων.
51Reading ἄλλων for κάτω.
52Reading ὲνιoῖς δ’ ὲστιν αἰσθανoμὲνoις for ὲν oἷς δ’ ἔνεστιν αἰσθoμένoις.
53Reading ἀλκήν for ἀρχήν.
54Reading καί for ἡ.
TOPICS**
W. A. Pickard-Cambridge
BOOK I [100a20]
1 · Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from reputable opinions about any subject presented to us, and also shall ourselves, when putting forward an argument, avoid saying anything contrary to it. First, then, we must say what deduction is, and what its varieties are, in order to grasp dialectical deduction; for this is the object of our search in the treatise before us.
Now a deduction is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, [25] something other than these necessarily comes about through them. It is a demonstration, when the premisses from which the deduction starts are true and primitive, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premisses which are primitive and true; and it is a dialectical deduction, if it reasons from reputable opinions. Things are true and primitive which are convincing on the [30] strength not of anything else but of themselves; for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them; each of the first principles should command belief in and by itself. On the other hand, those [100b20] opinions are reputable which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the wise—i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable of them. Again, a deduction is contentious if it starts from opinions that seem to be reputable, but are not really such, or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be reputable. For not every opinion that seems to be [25] reputable actually is reputable. For none of the opinions which we call reputable show their character entirely on the surface, as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments; for the nature of the falsity in these is obvious immediately, and for the most part even to persons with little power of comprehension. So then, of the contentious deductions mentioned, the former really deserves to [101a1] be called deduction, but the other should be called contentious deduction, but not deduction, since it appears to deduce, but does not really do so.
Further, besides all the deductions we have mentioned there are the fallacies [5] that start from the premisses peculiar to the special sciences, as happens (for example) in the case of geometry and its sister sciences. For this form of reasoning appears to differ from the deductions mentioned above; the man who draws a false [10] figure reasons from things that are neither true and primitive, nor yet reputable. For he does not fall within the definition: he does not assume opinions that are received either by everyone or by the majority or by the wise—that is to say, by all, or by most, or by the most reputable of them—but he conducts his deduction upon assumptions which, though appropriate to the science in question, are not true; for [15] he effects his fallacy either by describing the semicircles wrongly or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they should not be drawn.
The foregoing must stand for an outline survey of the species of deduction. In general, in regard both to all that we have already discussed and to those which we [20] shall discuss later, we may remark that that amount of distinction between them may serve, because it is not our purpose to give a precise definition of any of them; we merely want to describe them in outline: we consider it quite enough from the point of view of the line of inquiry before us to be able to recognize each of them in some sort of way.
[25] 2 · Next in order after the foregoing, we must say for how many and for what purposes the treatise is useful. They are three—intellectual training, casual encounters, and the philosophical sciences. That it is useful as a training is obvious on the face of it. The possession of a plan of inquiry will enable us more easily to [30] argue about the subject proposed. For purposes of casual encounters, it is useful because when we have counted up the opinions held by most people, we shall meet them on the ground not of other people’s convictions but of their own, shifting the ground of any argument that they appear to us to state unsoundly. For the study of [35] the philosophical sciences it is useful, because the ability to puzzle on both sides of a subject will make us detect more easily the truth and error about the several points that arise. It has a further use in relation to the principles used in the several sciences. For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles proper to the particular science in hand, seeing that the principles are primitive in relation to [101b1] everything else: it is through reputable opinions about them that these have to be discussed, and this task belongs properly, or most appropriately, to dialectic; for dialectic i
s a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries.
[5] 3 · We shall be in perfect possession of the way to proceed when we are in a position like that which we occupy in regard to rhetoric and medicine and faculties of that kind; [this means the doing of that which we choose with the materials that are available.]1 for it is not every method that the rhetorician will employ to persuade, or the doctor to heal: still, if he omits none of the available means, we [10] shall say that his grasp of the science is adequate.
4 · First, then, we must see of what parts our inquiry consists. Now if we were to grasp with reference to how many, and what kind of, things arguments take place, and with what materials they start, and how we are to become well supplied with these, we should have sufficiently won our goal. Now the materials with which arguments start are equal in number, and are identical, with the subjects on which deductions take place. For arguments start with propositions, while the subjects on [15] which deductions take place are problems. Now every proposition and every problem indicates either a genus or a property or an accident—for the differentia too, being generic, should be ranked together with the genus. Since, however, of what is proper to anything part signifies its essence, while part does not, let us divide [20] the proper into both the aforesaid parts, and call that part which indicates the essence a definition, while of the remainder let us adopt the terminology which is generally current about these things, and speak of it as a property. What we have said, then, makes it clear that according to our present division, the elements turn out to be four, all told, namely either property or definition or genus or accident. Do [25] not let any one suppose us to mean that each of these enunciated by itself constitutes a proposition or problem, but only that it is from these that both problems and propositions are formed. The difference between a problem and a proposition is a difference in the turn of the phrase. For if it be put in this way, ‘Is two-footed terrestrial animal the definition of man?’ or ‘Is animal the genus of man?’ the result [30] is a proposition; but if thus, ‘Is two-footed terrestrial animal the definition of man or not?’ and ‘Is animal the genus of man or not?’ the result is a problem. Similarly too in other cases. Naturally, then, problems and propositions are equal in number; for out of every proposition you will make a problem if you change the turn of phrase.
5 · We must now say what are definition, property, genus, and accident. A definition is a phrase signifying a thing’s essence. It is rendered in the form either of a phrase in lieu of a name, or of a phrase in lieu of another phrase; for it is [102a1] sometimes possible to define the meaning of a phrase as well. People whose rendering consists of a term only, try it as they may, clearly do not render the definition of the thing in question, because a definition is always a phrase of a [5] certain kind. One may, however, call definitory such a remark as that the beautiful is the becoming, and likewise also of the question, ‘Are perception and knowledge the same or different?’—for argument about definitions is mostly concerned with questions of sameness and difference. In a word we may call definitory everything that falls under the same branch of inquiry as definitions; and that all the [10] above-mentioned examples are of this character is clear on the face of them. For if we are able to argue that two things are the same or are different, we shall be well supplied by the same turn of argument with lines of attack upon their definitions as well; for when we have shown that they are not the same we shall have demolished the definition. But the converse of this last statement does not hold; for to show that they are the same is not enough to establish a definition. To show, however, that [15] they are not the same is enough of itself to overthrow it.
A property is something which does not indicate the essence of a thing, but yet belongs to that thing alone, and is predicated convertibly of it. Thus it is a property [20] of man to be capable of learning grammar; for if he is a man, then he is capable of learning grammar, and if he is capable of learning grammar, he is a man. For no one calls anything a property which may possibly belong to something else, e.g. sleep in the case of man, even though at a certain time it may happen to belong to him alone. [25] That is to say, if any such thing were actually to be called a property, it will be called not a property absolutely, but a temporary or a relative property; for being on the right hand side is a temporary property, while two-footed is a relative property; e.g. it is a property of man relatively to a horse and a dog. That nothing which may belong to anything else is a convertible predicate is clear; for it does not necessarily [30] follow that if something is asleep it is a man.
A genus is what is predicated in what a thing is of a number of things exhibiting differences in kind. We should treat as predicates in what a thing is all such things as it would be appropriate to mention in reply to the question, ‘What is the object in question?’; as, for example, in the case of man, if asked that question, it [35] is appropriate to say ‘He is an animal’. The question, ‘Is one thing in the same genus as another or in a different one?’ is also a generic question; for a question of that kind as well falls under the same branch of inquiry as the genus; for having argued that animal is the genus of man, and likewise also of ox, we shall have argued that [102b1] they are in the same genus; whereas if we show that it is the genus of the one but not of the other, we shall have argued that these things are not in the same genus.
An accident is something which, though it is none of the foregoing—i.e. [5] neither a definition nor a property nor a genus—yet belongs to the thing; and something which may either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing, as (e.g.) being seated may belong or not belong to some self-same thing. Likewise also whiteness; for there is nothing to prevent the same thing being at one [10] time white and at another not white. Of the definitions of accident the second is the better; for in the case of the first, any one is bound, if he is to understand it, to know already what definition and genus and property are, whereas the second is sufficient of itself to tell us the essential nature of the thing in question. To accident are to be [15] attached also all comparisons of things together, when expressed in language that is derived in any kind of way from accident; such as, for example, the question, ‘Is the honourable or the expedient preferable?’ and ‘Is the life of virtue or the life of self-indulgence the pleasanter?’, and any other problem which may happen to be phrased in terms like these. For in all such cases the question is ‘of which of the two [20] is the predicate more properly an accident?’ It is clear on the face of it that there is nothing to prevent an accident from becoming a temporary or a relative property. Thus being seated is an accident, but will be a temporary property, whenever a man is the only person sitting, while if he is not the only one sitting, it is still a property relatively to those who are not sitting. So then, there is nothing to prevent an [25] accident from becoming both a relative and a temporary property; but a property absolutely it will never be.
6 · We must not fail to observe that everything applicable to property and genus and accident will be applicable to definition as well. For when we have shown that the content of the definition fails to belong to the subject alone, as we do in the case of a property, or that the genus rendered in the definition is not the true genus, [30] or that any of the things mentioned in the phrase used does not belong, as would be remarked in the case of an accident, we shall have demolished the definition; so that, in the sense previously described, all the points we have enumerated might in a way be called definitory. But we must not on this account expect to find a single line [35] of inquiry which will apply universally to them all; for this is not an easy thing to find, and, even were one found, it would be very obscure indeed, and of little service for the treatise before us. Rather, a special plan of inquiry must be laid down for each of the classes we have distinguished, and then, starting from what is appropriate in each case, it will be easier to make our way right through the task [103a1] before us. So then, as was said before, we must outline a division of our subject,
and other questions we must relegate each to the particular branch to which it most naturally belongs, speaking of them as definitory and generic questions. The questions I mean have practically been already assigned to their several branches. [5]
7 · First of all we must determine the number of ways we talk of sameness. Sameness would be generally regarded as falling, roughly speaking, into three divisions. We generally apply the term numerically or specifically or generically—numerically in cases where there is more than one name but only one thing, e.g. doublet and cloak; specifically, where there is more than one thing, but they present [10] no differences in respect of their species, as one man and another, or one horse and another; for things like this that fall under the same species are said to be specifically the same. Similarly, too, those things are called generically the same which fall under the same genus, such as a horse and a man. It might appear that the sense in which water from the same spring is called the same water is somehow [15] different and unlike the senses mentioned above; but really such a case as this ought to be ranked in the same class with the things that in one way or another are called the same in view of unity of species. For all such things seem to be of one family and to resemble one another. For the reason why all water is said to be specifically the same as all other water is because of a certain likeness it bears to it, and the only [20] difference in the case of water drawn from the same spring is this, that the likeness is more emphatic: that is why we do not distinguish it from the things that in one way or another are called the same in view of unity of species. It seems that things numerically one are called the same by everyone with the greatest degree of agreement. But this too is apt to be rendered in more than one sense; its most literal [25] and primary use is found whenever the sameness is rendered by a name or definition, as when a cloak is said to be the same as a doublet, or a two-footed terrestrial animal is said to be the same as a man; a second sense is when it is rendered by a property, as when what can acquire knowledge is called the same as a man, and what naturally travels upward the same as fire; while a third use is found when it is rendered in reference to some accident, as when the creature who is [30] sitting, or who is musical, is called the same as Socrates. For all these are meant to signify numerical unity. That what I have just said is true may be best seen where one form of appellation is substituted for another. For often when we give the order to call one of the people who are sitting down, indicating him by name, we change [35] our description, whenever the person to whom we give the order happens not to understand us; he will, we think, understand better from some accidental feature; so we bid him call to us the man who is sitting or who is conversing—clearly supposing ourselves to be indicating the same object by its name and by its accident.