The Politics of Aristotle

by Aristotle

  [25] 5 · Inasmuch as no rules are laid down for those who argue for the sake of training and of examination—for the aim of those engaged in teaching or learning is quite different from that of those engaged in a competition; as is the latter from that of those who discuss things together in the spirit of inquiry; for a learner should always state what he thinks (for no one tries to teach what is false); whereas in a [30] competition the business of the questioner is to appear by all means to produce an effect upon the other, while that of the answerer is to appear unaffected by him; on the other hand, in dialectical meetings held in the spirit not of a competition but of an examination and inquiry, there are as yet no articulated rules about what the [35] answerer should aim at, and what kind of things he should and should not grant for the correct or incorrect defence of his position—inasmuch, then, as we have no tradition bequeathed to us by others, let us try to say something upon the matter for ourselves.

  The thesis laid down by the answerer before facing the questioner’s argument is bound of necessity to be either reputable or implausible or neither; and reputable [159b1] or implausible either without qualification or else with a restriction, e.g. to some given person, to the speaker, or to some one else. But the way in which it is reputable or implausible, whatever it be, makes no difference; for the right way to answer, i.e. to admit or to refuse to admit what has been asked, will be the same in either case. If, then, the thesis is implausible, the conclusion is bound to be reputable, whereas if [5] the former is reputable the latter will be implausible; for the conclusion which the questioner tries to draw is always the opposite of the thesis. If, on the other hand, what is laid down is neither implausible nor reputable, the conclusion will be of the same type as well. Now since a man who deduces correctly demonstrates his conclusion from premisses that are more reputable and more familiar, it is clear [10] that where the view laid down by him is implausible without qualification, the answerer ought not to grant either what does not seem to be the case without qualification, or what seems to be the case, but to a less degree than the conclusion. For if the thesis is implausible the conclusion will be reputable, so that the premisses secured by the questioner should all be reputable, and more reputable than this [15] proposed conclusion, if the less familiar is to be inferred through the more familiar. Consequently, if any of the questions put to him is not of this character, the answerer should not grant it. If, on the other hand, the thesis is reputable without qualification, clearly the conclusion will be implausible without qualification. Accordingly, the answerer should admit all views that seem to be the case and, of those that do not, all that are less implausible than the conclusion. For then he will be thought to have argued sufficiently well. Likewise, too, if the thesis is neither [20] implausible nor reputable; for then, too, anything that appears to be true should be granted, and, of the views that do not seem true, any that are more reputable than the conclusion; for in that case the result will be that the arguments will be more reputable. If, then, the view laid down by the answerer is reputable or implausible [25] without qualification, then the views that are accepted without qualification must be taken as the standard of comparison; whereas if the view laid down is not reputable or implausible without qualification, but only to the answerer, then he must judge with reference to himself what seems or does not seem, and must grant or refuse to grant the point asked accordingly. If, again, the answerer is defending some one else’s opinion, then clearly it will be the latter’s judgement to which he must have regard in granting or denying the various points. This is why those who introduce others’ opinions—e.g. that good and evil are the same thing, as Heraclitus [30] says—refuse to admit that contraries do not belong at the same time to the same thing; not because they do not themselves believe this, but because on Heraclitus’ principles one has to say so. The same thing is done also by those who take on the defence of one another’s theses; their aim being to speak as would the man who stated the thesis. [35]

  6 · It is clear, then, what the aims of the answerer should be, whether the position he lays down is reputable either without qualification or to some definite person. Now every question asked is bound to be either reputable or implausible or neither, and is also bound to be either relevant to the argument or irrelevant; if then it seems to be true and is irrelevant, the answerer should grant it and remark that it [160a1] seems to be true; if it does not seem to be true and is irrelevant, he should grant it but add a comment that it does not seem to be true, in order to avoid the appearance of being a simpleton. If it is relevant and seems to be true, he should admit that it seems to be true but say that it lies too close to the original proposition, and that if it [5] is granted the problem proposed collapses. If the axiom is relevant but too implausible, the answerer, while admitting that if it is granted the conclusion sought follows, should yet protest that the proposition is too silly. If it is neither implausible nor reputable, then, if it is irrelevant to the argument, it may be granted without restriction; if, however, it is relevant, the answerer should add the comment [10] that, if it is granted, the original problem collapses. For then the answerer will not be held to be personally accountable for what happens to him, if he grants the several points with his eyes open, and the questioner will be able to draw his inference, seeing that all the premisses that are more reputable than the conclusion are granted him. Those who try to deduce from premisses more implausible than the conclusion clearly do not deduce correctly; hence, when men ask these things, they [15] ought not to be granted.

  7 · The questioner should be met in a like manner also in the case of terms used obscurely and in several ways. For the answerer, if he does not understand, is [20] always permitted to say ‘I do not understand’, and he is not compelled to reply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to a question which may mean different things. Clearly, then, in the first place, if what is said is not clear, he ought not to hesitate to say that he does not understand it; for often people encounter some difficulty from assenting to questions that are not clearly put. If he understands the question and yet it covers [25] many senses, then supposing what it says to be universally true or false, he should give it an unqualified assent or denial; if, on the other hand, it is partly true and partly false, he should add a comment that it bears different senses, and that in one it is true, in the other false; for if he leaves this distinction till later, it becomes uncertain whether originally he perceived the ambiguity. If he does not foresee the ambiguity, but assents to the question having in view the one sense of the words, [30] then, if the questioner takes it in the other sense, he should say, ‘That was not what I had in view when I admitted it; I meant the other sense’—for if a name or account covers more than one thing, disputes easily arise. If, however, the question is both clear and simple, he should answer either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.

  [35] 8 · Every deductive proposition either is one of the constituent elements in the deduction, or else goes to establish one of these (and you can always tell when it is secured in order to establish something else by the fact of a number of similar questions being put; for people for the most part secure the universal by means either of induction or of likeness); accordingly the particular propositions should all [160b1] be admitted, if they are true and reputable; but against the universal one should try to bring some objection; for to bring the argument to a standstill without an objection, either real or apparent, shows ill-temper. If, then, a man refuses to grant the universal when supported by many instances, although he has no objection, he [5] obviously shows ill-temper. If, moreover, he cannot even attempt a counter-proof that it is not true, far more likely is he to be thought ill-tempered. (Although even that is not enough; for we often hear arguments that are contrary to common opinions, whose solution is yet difficult, e.g. the argument of Zeno that it is impossible to move or to traverse the stadium; but still, this is no reason for omitting [10] to assert the opposites of these views.) If, then, a man refuses to admit the proposition without having either an obj
ection or some counter-argument to bring against it, clearly he is ill-tempered, for ill-temper in argument consists in answering in ways other than the above, so as to wreck the reasoning.

  9 · Before maintaining either a thesis or a definition the answerer should try [15] his hand at attacking it by himself; for clearly his business is to oppose those positions from which questioners demolish what he has laid down.

  He should beware of maintaining an implausible hypothesis: and this it may be in two ways; for it may be one which results in absurd statements (e.g. suppose anyone were to say that everything is in motion or that nothing is); and also there [20] are those which a bad character would choose, and which are opposed to men’s wishes (e.g. that pleasure is the good, and that to do injustice is better than to suffer it). For people then hate him, supposing him to maintain them not for the sake of argument but because he really thinks them.

  10 · When arguments reason to a false conclusion the right solution is to demolish the point on which the falsity depends; for the demolition of any random point is no solution, even if the point demolished is false. For the argument may [25] contain many falsehoods, e.g. suppose someone assumes that he who sits, writes and that Socrates is sitting; for from these it follows that Socrates is writing. Now we may demolish the proposition that Socrates is sitting, and still be no nearer a solution of the argument. ‘Yet the axiom is false’. But it is not on that that the falsity of the argument depends; for supposing that anyone should happen to be [30] sitting and not writing, it would be impossible in such a case to apply the same solution. Accordingly, it is not this that needs to be demolished, but rather that he who sits, writes; for not everyone who sits writes. He, then, who has demolished the point on which the falsity depends, has given the solution of the argument [35] completely. Anyone who knows that it is on such and such a point that the argument depends, knows the solution of it, just as in the case of a figure falsely drawn. For it is not enough to object, even if the point demolished is a falsehood, but the reason of the falsity should also be demonstrated; for then it will be clear whether the man makes his objection with his eyes open or not.

  There are four possible ways of preventing a man from working his argument [161a1] to a conclusion. It can be done either by demolishing the point on which the falsity that comes about depends, or by stating an objection directed against the questioner—for often when a solution has not as a matter of fact been brought, yet the questioner is rendered thereby unable to pursue the argument any farther. Thirdly, one may object to the questions asked; for it may happen that what the questioner [5] wants does not follow from the questions he has asked because he has asked them badly, whereas if something additional is granted the conclusion comes about. If, then, the questioner is unable to pursue his argument farther, the objection will be directed against the questioner; if he can do so, then it will be against his questions. The fourth and worst kind of objection is that which is directed to the time allowed for discussion; for some people bring objections of a kind which would take longer to [10] answer than the length of the discussion in hand.

  There are then, as we said, four ways of making objections; but of them the first alone is a solution: the others are just hindrances and stumbling-blocks to prevent the conclusions. [15]

  11 · Criticism of an argument when taken in itself and when presented in the form of questions, is not the same. For often the failure to carry through the argument correctly in discussion is due to the person questioned, because he will not grant the steps of which a correct argument might have been made against his thesis; for it is not in the power of the one side only to effect properly a result that [20] depends on both alike. Accordingly it sometimes becomes necessary to attack the speaker and not his thesis, when the answerer lies in wait for the points that are contrary to the questioner and becomes abusive as well: when people lose their tempers in this way, their argument becomes contentious, not dialectical. Moreover, [25] since arguments of this kind are held not for the sake of instruction but for purposes of practice and examination, clearly one has to deduce not only true conclusions, but also false ones, and not always through true premisses, but sometimes through false as well. For often, when a true proposition is put forward, the dialectician is compelled to demolish it; and then false propositions have to be put forward. Sometimes also when a false proposition is put forward, it has to be demolished by [30] means of false propositions; for it is possible for a man to believe what is not the case more firmly than the truth. Accordingly, if the argument is made to depend on something that he holds, he will be persuaded rather than helped. He, however, who would rightly convert anyone to a different opinion should do so in a dialectical and [35] not in a contentious manner, just as a geometrician should reason geometrically, whether his conclusion is false or true (what kind of deductions are dialectical has already been said).41 The principle that a man who hinders the common business is a bad partner, clearly applies to an argument as well; for in arguments as well there is a common aim in view—except with mere contestants, for these cannot both [161b1] reach the same goal; for more than one cannot win. It makes no difference whether he effects this as answerer or as questioner; for both he who asks contentious questions is a bad dialectician, and also he who in answering fails to grant the obvious answer or to accept whatever question the questioner wishes to put. What [5] has been said, then, makes it clear that criticism is not to be passed in a like manner upon the argument in itself and upon the questioner; for it may very well be that the argument is bad, but that the questioner has argued with the answerer in the best possible way—for when men lose their tempers, it may perhaps be impossible to [10] make one’s deductions just as one would wish: we have to do as we can.

  Inasmuch as it is indeterminate when people are claiming the admission of contrary things, and when they are claiming what originally they set out to prove—for often when they are talking by themselves they say contrary things, and admit afterwards what they have previously denied; for which reason they often [15] assent, when questioned, to contrary things and to what originally had to be proved—the argument is sure to become vitiated. The responsibility, however, for this rests with the answerer, because he refuses to grant some things and grants others of that sort. It is, then, clear that criticism is not to be passed in a like manner upon questioners and upon their arguments.

  In itself an argument is liable to five kinds of criticism. The first is when [20] neither the proposed conclusion nor indeed any conclusion at all is drawn from the questions asked, and when most, if not all, of the premisses on which the conclusion rests are false or implausible, when, moreover, neither withdrawals nor additions nor both together can bring the conclusion about. The second is if the deduction, [25] though constructed from the premisses, and in the manner, described above, is irrelevant to the thesis. The third is if certain additions would bring a deduction about but yet these additions would be weaker than those that were put as questions, and less reputable than the conclusion. Again, supposing certain withdrawals could effect the same; for sometimes people secure more premisses than are necessary, so that it is not through them that the deduction comes about. [30] Moreover, suppose the premisses are more implausible and less convincing than the conclusion, or if, though true, they require more labour to demonstrate than the problem.

  One must not demand that for every problem the deductions should be equally reputable and convincing; for it is a direct result of the nature of things that some [35] subjects of inquiry shall be easier and some harder, so that if a man concludes from opinions that are as reputable as the case admits, he has argued correctly. Clearly, then, the argument is not open to the same criticism when taken in relation to the proposed conclusion and when taken by itself. For there is nothing to prevent the argument being open to reproach in itself, and yet commendable in relation to the problem, or again, vice versa, being commendable in itself, and yet open to reproach [162a1] in relation to the problem, whenever th
ere are many propositions both reputable and true whereby it could easily be proved. It is possible also that an argument, even though brought to a conclusion, may sometimes be worse than one which is not so concluded, whenever the premisses of the former are silly, while the problem is not [5] so; whereas the latter requires some additional premisses which are reputable and true, and moreover does not rest as an argument on these additions. With those which bring about a true conclusion by means of false premisses, it is not fair to find fault; for a false conclusion must of necessity always be deduced from false premisses, but a true conclusion may sometimes be deduced from false premisses; [10] as is clear from the Analytics.42

  Whenever by the argument stated something is demonstrated, but that something is other than what is wanted and has no bearing whatever on the conclusion, then there is no deduction as to the latter; and if there appears to be, it will be a sophism, not a demonstration. A philosopheme is a demonstrative [15] deduction; an epichireme is a dialectical deduction; a sophism is a contentious deduction; an aporeme is a deduction that reasons dialectically to a contradiction.

  If something were to be proved from premisses both of which seem true, but not to the same degree, it may very well be that what is proved seems more true than [20] either. If, on the other hand, the one seems true and the other neither, or if the one seems true the other does not, then, if they are equally balanced the conclusion will be also; if, on the other hand, the one preponderates, the conclusion too will follow suit.