The Politics of Aristotle

by Aristotle

  It would seem from what has been said that he can do this better if he makes himself capable of legislating. For public care is plainly effected by laws, and good care by good laws; whether written or unwritten would seem to make no difference, [1180b1] nor whether they are laws providing for the education of individuals or of groups—any more than it does in the case of music or gymnastics and other such pursuits. For as in cities laws and character have force, so in households do the injunctions and the habits of the father, and these have even more because of the tie [5] of blood and the benefits he confers; for the children start with a natural affection and disposition to obey. Further, individual education has an advantage over education in common, as individual medical treatment has; for while in general rest and abstinence from food are good for a man in a fever, for a particular man they may not be; and a boxer presumably does not prescribe the same style of fighting to [10] all his pupils. It would seem, then, that the detail is worked out with more precision if the care is particular to individuals; for each person is more likely to get what suits his case.

  But individuals85 can be best cared for by a doctor or gymnastic instructor or any one else who has the universal knowledge of what is good for every one or for [15] people of a certain kind (for the sciences both are said to be, and are, concerned with what is common); not but what some particular detail may perhaps be well looked after by an unscientific person, if he has studied accurately in the light of experience what happens in each case, just as some people seem to be their own best doctors, though they could give no help to any one else. None the less, it will perhaps be [20] agreed that if a man does wish to become master of an art or science he must go to the universal, and come to know it as well as possible; for, as we have said, it is with this that the sciences are concerned.

  And surely he who wants to make men, whether many or few, better by his [25] care must try to become capable of legislating, if it is through laws that we can become good. For to get anyone whatever—anyone who is put before us—into the right condition is not for the first chance comer; if anyone can do it, it is the man who knows, just as in medicine and all other matters which give scope for care and practical wisdom.

  Must we not, then, next examine whence or how one can learn how to [30] legislate? Is it, as in all other cases, from statesmen? Certainly it was thought to be a part of statesmanship. Or is a difference apparent between statesmanship and the other sciences and faculties? In the others the same people are found offering to teach the faculties and practising them, e.g. doctors or painters; but while the sophists profess to teach politics, it is practised not by any of them but by the [1181a1] politicians, who would seem to do so by dint of a certain faculty and experience rather than of thought; for they are not found either writing or speaking about such matters (though it were a nobler occupation perhaps than composing speeches for [5] the law-courts and the assembly), nor again are they found to have made statesmen of their own sons or any other of their friends. But it was to be expected that they should if they could; for there is nothing better than such a skill that they could have left to their cities, or could choose to have for themselves, or, therefore, for those [10] dearest to them. Still, experience seems to contribute not a little; else they could not have become politicians by familiarity with politics; and so it seems that those who aim at knowing about the art of politics need experience as well.

  But those of the sophists who profess the art seem to be very far from teaching it. For, to put the matter generally, they do not even know what kind of thing it is nor what kinds of things it is about; otherwise they would not have classed it as [15] identical with rhetoric or even inferior to it, nor have thought it easy to legislate by collecting the laws that are thought well of; they say it is possible to select the best laws, as though even the selection did not demand intelligence and as though right judgement were not the greatest thing, as in matters of music. For while people experienced in any department judge rightly the works produced in it, and [20] understand by what means or how they are achieved, and what harmonizes with what, the inexperienced must be content if they do not fail to see whether the work has been well or ill made—as in the case of painting. Now laws are as it were the [1181b1] works of the political art; how then can one learn from them to be a legislator, or judge which are best? Even medical men do not seem to be made by a study of text-books. Yet people try, at any rate, to state not only the treatments, but also how particular classes of people can be cured and should be treated—distinguishing the various states; but while this seems useful to experienced people, to the ignorant it is [5] valueless. Surely, then, while collections of laws, and of constitutions also, may be serviceable to those who can study them and judge what is good or bad and what enactments suit what circumstances, those who go through such collections without a practised faculty will not have right judgement (unless it be spontaneous), though [10] they may perhaps become more intelligent in such matters.

  Now our predecessors have left the subject of legislation to us unexamined; it is perhaps best, therefore, that we should ourselves study it, and in general study the question of the constitution, in order to complete to the best of our ability the philosophy of human nature. First, then, if anything has been said well in detail by [15] earlier thinkers, let us try to review it; then in the light of the constitutions we have collected let us study what sorts of influence preserve and destroy states, and what sorts preserve or destroy the particular kinds of constitution, and to what causes it is due that some are well and others ill administered. When these have been studied [20] we shall perhaps be more likely to see which constitution is best, and how each must be ordered, and what laws and customs it must use. Let us make a beginning of our discussion.

  TEXT: I. Bywater, OCT, Oxford, 1894

  1Works and Days 293–7.

  2Excised by Bywater.

  3Omitting τἀληθές.

  4Omitting ψυχικάς.

  5Omitting κατ’ ἀρετήν.

  6Λόγoν ἔχειν means (i) ‘possess reason’, (ii) ‘pay heed to’, ‘obey’, (iii) ‘be rational’ (in the mathematical sense).

  7‘Moral’, here and hereafter, is used in the archaic sense of ‘pertaining to character or mores’.

  8ἠθικἡ from ἔθoς.

  9Reading πράττειν δεῖν.

  10Reading ώς ἄν.

  11Reading ἐναντίως δὲ αὑτoῖς.

  12Reading μικρᾶς τιμῆς.

  13Odyssey XII 219.

  14Reading λέγoντας . . . αὑτoὐς.

  15Reading δoκεῖ ὅ καἱ oὑ ἔ νεκα.

  16Readings δέ.

  17‘π ρoαἰρεσις’ connected with ‘π ρὁ ἑτἑρων αἱρετόν’.

  18Reading καἰτoι εἰ.

  19Reading ὼς ὁ λὀγoς, ὑπoμενεῖ τε.

  20Reading ἀνδρείῳ δή · ἡδ’ ἀνδρεία.

  21Iliad XXII 100.

  22Iliad VIII 148.

  23See Iliad II 391; XV 348.

  24See Iliad V 470; XI 11; XVI 529; Odyssey XXIV 318.

  25Excised in Bywater.

  26Iliad III 24.

  27ὰκόλαστoς (‘self-indulgent’) is connected with κoλάζειν (‘chasten,’ ‘punish’).

  28Omitting δἰδωσιν.

  29Odyssey XVII 420.

  30Omitting ἡ μεγαλoπρἐπεια.

  31Omitting ὼς.

  32‘Ambitious’ translates φιλὀτιμoς, a compound of the form ‘fond-of-such-and-such,’ φιλoτoιoῦτoς.

  33Reading δεῖται.

  34Reading τoῦ ἤ λυπεῖν.

  35Omitting Bywater’s καἱ εἰρωνεἰας.

  36Reading ὡς γ’ ἀλαζών.

  37Reading καὶ ὰπoτελεῖ τι.

  38Reading ταὐτά.

  39Reading ἀλλ’ ὅ.

  40In the MSS, and in B
ywater, this sentence occurs after ‘. . . what is equal,’ line 29.

  41Excised in Bywater: see 1133a14–16.

  42Excised by Ramsauer.

  43Reading νóμoν for λóγoν (‘reason’).

  44Reading ἀγνoίας for αἰτίας.

  45Iliad VI 236.

  46Reading τῷ ἑπιεικἐστερoν.

  47Omitting oὐ δἰκαιoν.

  50Posterior Analytics I 1.

  51Reading ὰρχῆς.

  52Omitting διó.

  53Σωφρoσύνη connected with σῷζειν τὴν φρόνησιν.

  54Reading δεῖν for ἰδεῖν.

  55Συγγνώμη, ‘forgiveness’, is a form of γνώμη, ‘judgement’.

  56Bywater thinks that this sentence has been misplaced.

  57Reading χρήσιμoν for φρóνιμoν.

  58Reading oὖσιν for ἔ χoνσιν.

  59Reading τoὺς πανoύργoυς.

  60Iliad XXIV 258.

  61Reading περιγίνεται for παρoύσης γίνεται.

  62Omitting ἤ.

  63Iliad XIV 214.

  64Reading τι for τινι.

  65Reading καθ’ ὑπερβoλήν, καί.

  66μακάριoς from χαίρειν.

  67Omitting ἡδεῖ.

  68Retaining τις for τισιν.

  69Hesiod, Works and Days 763.

  70Placing a comma after ἀκόλαστoς.

  71Reading τινές.

  72Euripides, Orestes 234.

  73Excised by Cook Wilson.

  74Hesiod, Works and Days 370.

  75Euripides, Orestes 667.

  76Hesiod, Works and Days 715.

  77Reading ὼς oἷóν τε for oἷς oἴoνται συζῆν.

  78Theognis, 35.

  79See Philebus 60BE.

  80Reading κίνησις.

  81Reading τῆς ἠδoνῆς.

  82Frag. 9 Diels-Kranz.

  83Odyssey IX 114.

  84Placing καὶ δρᾶν αὐτò δὑνασθαι after συμβάλλεσθαι.

  85Reading καθ’ ἔνα.

  MAGNA MORALIA**

  St. G. Stock

  BOOK I

  1 · Since our purpose is to speak about matters to do with character, we must [1181a25] first inquire of what character is a branch. To speak concisely, then, it would seem to be a branch of nothing else than statecraft. For it is not possible to act at all in affairs of state unless one is of a certain kind, to wit, good. Now to be good is to [1181b25] possess the excellences. If therefore one is to act successfully in affairs of state, one must be of a good character. The treatment of character then is, as it seems, a branch and starting-point of statecraft. And as a whole it seems to me that the subject ought rightly to be called, not Ethics, but Politics.

  [1182a1] We must therefore, as it seems, speak first about excellence, both what it is and from what it comes. For it is perhaps of no use to know excellence without understanding how or from what it is to arise. We must not limit our inquiry to [5] knowing what it is, but extend it to how it is to be produced. For we wish not only to know but also ourselves to be such; and this will be impossible for us, unless we know from what and how it is to be produced. Of course, it is indispensable to know what excellence is (for it is not easy to know the source and manner of its production, if [10] one does not know what it is, any more than in the sciences); but we ought to be aware also of what others have said before us on this subject.

  Pythagoras first attempted to speak about excellence, but not successfully; for by referring the excellences to numbers he submitted the excellences to a treatment which was not proper to them. For justice is not a square number.

  [15] After him came Socrates, who spoke better and further about this subject, but even he was not successful. For he used to make the excellences sciences, and this is impossible. For the sciences all involve reason, and reason is to be found in the intellectual part of the soul. So that all the excellences, according to him, are to be [20] found in the rational part of the soul. The result is that in making the excellences sciences he is doing away with the irrational part of the soul, and is thereby doing away also both with passion and character; so that he has not been successful in this respect in his treatment of the excellences.

  After this Plato divided the soul into the rational and the irrational part—and in this he was right—assigning appropriate excellences to each. So far so good. But [25] after this he went astray. For he mixed up excellence with the treatment of the good, which cannot be right, not being appropriate. For in speaking about the truth of things he ought not to have discoursed upon excellence; for there is nothing common [30] to the two.

  The above-mentioned, then, have touched upon the subject so far and in the way above described. The next thing will be to see what we ought to say ourselves upon the subject.

  First of all, then, we must see that every science and capacity has an end, and that too a good one; for no science or capacity exists for the sake of evil. Since then [35] in every capacity the end is good, it is plain that the end of the best will be the best good. But statecraft is the best capacity, so that the end of this will be the good.1 It is [1182b1] about good, then, as it seems, that we must speak, and about good not without qualification, but relatively to ourselves. For we have not to do with the good of the Gods. To speak about that is a different matter, and the inquiry is foreign to our present purpose. It is therefore about the good of the state that we must speak. [5]

  But we must make a distinction here. About good in what sense of the term have we to speak? For the word is not univocal. For ‘good’ is used either of what is best in the case of each being, that is, what is desirable because of its own nature, or of that by partaking in which all other things are good, that is, the Idea of [10] Good.

  Are we, then, to speak of the Idea of Good? Or not of that, but of good as the element common to all goods? For this would seem to be different from the Idea. For the Idea is a thing apart and by itself, whereas the common element exists in all: it therefore is not identical with what is apart. For that which is apart and whose nature it is to be by itself cannot possibly exist in all. Are we then to speak about this [15] indwelling good? Surely not! And why? Because the common element is that which is got by definition or by induction. Now the aim of defining is to state the substance of each thing, either what good is2 or what evil is, or whatever else it may be. But the definition states that whatever thing is of such a kind as to be desirable for its own [20] sake is good in all cases. And the common element in all goods is much the same as the definition. And the definition says what is good, whereas no science or capacity whatsoever states of its own end that it is good, but it is the province of another capacity to speculate as to this (for neither the physician nor the mason says that [25] health or a house is good, but that one thing produces health, and how it produces it, and another thing a house). It is evident then that neither has statecraft to do with the common element of good. For it is itself only one science among the rest, and we have seen that it is not the business of any capacity or science to talk of this as end. It is not therefore the business of statecraft to speak of the common element of good [30] corresponding to the definition.

  But neither has it to speak of the common element as arrived at by induction. Why so? Because when we wish to prove some particular good, we either prove by defining that the same description applies to the good and to the thing which we wish to prove to be good, or else have recourse to induction; for instance, when we [1183a1] wish to prove that magnanimity is a good, we say that justice is a good and courage is a good, and so of the excellences generally, and that magnanimity is an excellence, so that magnanimity also is a good. Neither then will statecraft have to speak of the common good arrived at by induction, because the same impossible [5] consequences will ensue in this case as in that of the common good conformable to
the definition. For here also one will be saying that the end is good. It is clear therefore that what it has to speak about is the best good, and the best in the sense of the best for us.

  And generally one can see that it is not the part of any one science or capacity to consider the question of good in general. Why so? Because good occurs in all the [10] categories—in that of substance, quality, quantity, time, relation, and generally in all. But what is good at a given time is known in medicine by the doctor, in navigation by the pilot, and in each art by the expert in that art. For it is the doctor [15] who knows when one ought to amputate, and the pilot when one ought to sail. And in each art each expert will know the time of the good which concerns himself. For neither will the doctor know the time of the good in navigation nor the pilot that in medicine. It follows then from this point of view also that we have not to speak about the common good; for time is common to all the arts. Similarly the relative good and [20] the good which corresponds to other categories is common to all, and it does not belong to any capacity or science to speak of what is good in each at a given time, nor, we may add, is it the part of statecraft to speak about the common element of good. Our subject then is the good, in the sense of the best, and that the best for us.

  [25] Perhaps when one wishes to prove something, one ought not to employ illustrations that are not manifest, but to illustrate the obscure by the manifest, and the things of mind by the things of sense; for the latter are more manifest. When, therefore, one undertakes to speak about the good, one ought not to speak about the Idea. And yet they think it quite necessary, when they are speaking about the good, [30] to speak about the Idea. For they say that it is necessary to speak about what is most good, and the thing-itself in each kind has the quality of that kind in the highest degree, so that the Idea will be the most good, as they think. Possibly there is truth in such a contention; but all the same the science or capacity of statecraft, about which we are now speaking, does not inquire about this good, but about that which [35] is good for us. [For no science or capacity pronounces its end to be good, so that statecraft does not do so either.]3 Hence it does not concern itself to speak about the good in the sense of the Idea.