by Aristotle
But, it may be said, one may employ this good as a first principle to start from in speaking about particular goods. Even this is not correct. For the first principles that one assumes ought to be appropriate. How absurd it would be if, when one [1183b1] wished to prove that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, one were to assume as a principle that the soul is immortal! For it is not appropriate, and the first principle ought to be appropriate and connected. As a matter of fact, one can prove that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles quite as [5] well without the immortality of the soul. In the same way in the case of goods, one can speculate about the rest without the Ideal Good. Hence such a good is not an appropriate principle.4
Neither was Socrates right in making the excellences sciences. For he used to think that nothing ought to be in vain, but from the excellences being sciences he [10] met with the result that the excellences were in vain. Why so? Because in the case of the sciences, as soon as one knows what the science is, it results that one is scientific (for any one who knows what medicine is is forthwith a physician, and so with the other sciences). But this result does not follow in the case of the excellences. For any [15] one who knows what justice is is not forthwith just, and similarly in the case of the rest. It follows then that the excellences are actually in vain and that they are not sciences.
2 · Now that we have settled these points, let us try to say in how many senses the term ‘good’ is used. For goods may be divided into the honourable, the [20] praiseworthy, and capacities. By the honourable I mean such a thing as the divine, the more excellent (for instance, soul, intellect), the more ancient, the first principle, and so on. For those things are honourable which attract honour, and all such things as these are attended with honour. Excellence then also is a thing that is honourable, at least when some one has become a good man in consequence of it; for [25] already such a one has come into the form of excellence. Other goods are praiseworthy, as excellences; for praise is bestowed in consequence of the actions which are prompted by them. Others are capacities—for instance, office, wealth, strength, beauty; for these are things which the good man can use well and the bad man ill. Hence such goods are called capacities. Goods indeed they are (for [30] everything is judged by the use made of it by the good man, not by that of the bad); and it is incidental to these same goods that fortune is the cause of their production. For from fortune comes wealth, and also office, and generally all the things which [35] rank as capacities. The fourth and last class of goods is that which is preservative and productive of good, as exercise of health, and other things of that sort.
But goods admit of another division, to wit, some goods are everywhere and absolutely desirable, and some are not. For instance, justice and the other excellences are everywhere and absolutely desirable, but strength, and wealth, and [1184a1] power, and the like, are not so everywhere nor absolutely.
Again, take another division. Some goods are ends and some are not; for instance, health is an end, but the means to health are not ends: and wherever things stand in this relation, the end is always better; for instance, health is better [5] than the means to health, and without exception, always and universally, that thing is better for the sake of which the rest are.
Again, among ends themselves the complete is always better than the incomplete. A complete good is one the presence of which leaves us in need of [10] nothing; an incomplete good is one which may be present while yet we need something further; for instance, we may have justice and yet need many things besides, but when we have happiness we need nothing more. This then is the best thing of which we are in search, which is the complete end. The complete end then is the good and end of goods.
[15] The next point is how we are to look for the best good. Is it itself to be reckoned in with other goods? Surely that is absurd. For the best is the complete end, and the complete end, roughly speaking, would seem to be nothing else than happiness, and happiness we regard as made up of many goods; so that if, in looking for the best, [20] you reckon in itself also, it will be better than itself, because it is itself the best thing. For instance, take the means to health, and health, and raise the question which is the best of all these. The answer is that health is the best. If then this is the best of all, it is also better than itself; so that an absurdity ensues. Perhaps then this is not [25] the way in which we ought to look for the best. Are the other goods then to be separated from it?5 Is not this also absurd? For happiness is composed of certain goods. But to raise the question whether a given thing is better than its own components is absurd. For happiness is not something else apart from these, but just these.
[30] But perhaps the right method of inquiry may be by comparison of the best somewhat as follows. I.e., by comparing happiness itself, which is made up of these goods, with others which are not contained in it, would this be the right way of inquiring into the best thing? But the best of which we are now in search is not of a simple nature. For instance, one might say that wisdom is the best of all goods when [35] they are compared one by one. But perhaps this is not the way in which we ought to seek for the best good. For it is the complete good we are in search of, and wisdom by itself is not complete. It is not, therefore, the best in this sense, nor in this way, of which we are in search.
[1184b1] 3 · After this, then, goods admit of another division. For some goods are in the soul—for instance, the virtues; some in the body—for instance, health, beauty; and some outside of us—wealth, office, honour, and such like. Of these those in the [5] soul are best. But the goods in the soul are divided into three—wisdom, excellence, and pleasure.
Now we come to happiness, which we all declare to be, and which seems in fact to be, the end of goods and the most complete thing, and this we maintain to be [10] identical with6 doing well and living well. But the end is not single but twofold. For the end of some things is the activity and use itself—for instance, of sight; and the using is more desirable than the having; for the using is the end. For no one would care to have sight, if he were destined never to see, but always to have his eyes shut. And the same with hearing and the like. When then a thing may be both used and had, the using is always better and more desirable than the having. For the use and [15] exercise are the end, whereas the having is with a view to the using.
Next, then, if one examines this point in the case of all the sciences, he will see that it is not one that makes a house and another that makes a good house, but simply the art of housebuilding; and what the housebuilder makes, that same thing [20] his excellence enables him to make well. Similarly in all other cases.
4 · After this, then, we see that it is by nothing else than soul that we live. Excellence is in the soul. We maintain that the soul and the excellence of the soul do the same thing. But excellence in each thing does that well of which it is the [25] excellence, and, among the other functions of the soul, it is by it we live. It is therefore owing to the excellence of the soul that we shall live well. But to live well and do well, we say, is nothing else than being happy. Being happy, then, and happiness, consist in living well, and living well is living in accordance with the excellences. This, then, is the end and happiness and the best thing. Happiness [30] therefore will consist in a kind of use and activity. For we found that where there was having and using, the use and exercise are the end. Now excellence is a habit of the soul. And there is such a thing as the exercise and use of it;7 so that the end will be its activity and use. Happiness therefore will consist in living in accordance with [35] the excellences. Since then the best good is happiness, and this is the end, and the complete end is an activity,8 it follows that it is by living in accordance with the excellences that we shall be happy and shall have the best good. [1185a1]
Since, then, happiness is a complete good and end, we must not fail to observe that it will be found in that which is complete. For it will not be found in a child (for a child is not happy), but in a man; for he is complete. Nor will it
be found in an incomplete, but in a complete, period. And a complete period of time will be as long [5] as a man lives. For it is rightly said among the many that one ought to judge of the happy man in the longest time of his life, on the assumption that what is complete ought to be in a complete period and a complete person. But that it is an activity can be seen also from the following consideration. For supposing some one to be asleep [10] all his life, we should hardly consent to call such a man happy. Life indeed he has, but life in accordance with the excellences he has not, and it was in this that we made the activity to consist.
The topic that is next about to be treated of is neither very intimately connected with our main subject nor yet quite alien from it. I mean, since there is, as [15] it seems, a part of the soul whereby we are nourished, which we call nutritive (for it is reasonable to suppose that this exists; at all events we see that stones are incapable of being nourished, so that it is evident that to be nourished is a property of living things; and, if so, the soul will be the cause of it; but none of these parts of the soul will be the cause of nourishment, to wit, the rational or spirited or [20] appetitive, but something else besides these, to which we can apply no more appropriate name than ‘nutritive’), one might say, ‘Very well, has this part of the soul also an excellence? For if it has, it is plain that we ought to act with this also. [25] For happiness is the exercise of complete excellence’. Now, whether there is or is not an excellence of this part is another question; but, if there is, it has no activity. For those things which have no impulse will not have any activity either; and there does not seem to be any impulse in this part, but it seems to be on a par with fire. For that [30] also will consume whatever you throw in, but if you do not throw anything in, it has no impulse to get it. So it is also with this part of the soul; for, if you throw in food, it nourishes, but, if you fail to throw in food, it has no impulse to nourish. Hence it has [35] no activity, being devoid of impulse. So that this part in no way co-operates towards happiness.
After this, then, we must say what excellence is, since it is the exercise of this which is happiness. Speaking generally, then, excellence is the best state. But perhaps it is not sufficient to speak thus generally, but it is necessary to define more clearly.
[1185b1] 5 · First, then, we ought to speak about the soul in which it resides, not to say what the soul is (for to speak about that is another matter), but to divide it in outline. Now the soul is, as we say, divided into two parts, the rational and the [5] irrational. In the rational part, then, there resides wisdom, readiness of wit, philosophy, aptitude to learn, memory, and so on; but in the irrational those which are called the excellences—temperance, justice, courage, and such other states of character as are held to be praiseworthy. For it is in respect of these that we are called praiseworthy; but no one is praised for the excellences of the rational part. [10] For no one is praised for being philosophical or for being wise, or generally on the ground of anything of that sort. Nor indeed is the irrational part praised, except in so far as it is capable of subserving or actually subserves the rational part.
Moral excellence9 is destroyed by defect and excess. Now, that defect and [15] excess destroy can be seen from perceptible instances, and we must use what we can see as evidence for what we cannot see. For one can see this at once in the case of gymnastic exercises. If they are overdone, the strength is destroyed, while if they are deficient, it is so also. And the same is the case with food and drink. For if too [20] much is taken health is destroyed, and also if too little, but by the right proportion strength and health are preserved. The same is the case with temperance and courage and the rest of the excellences. For if you make a man too fearless, so as not even to fear the gods, he is not brave but mad, but if you make him afraid of [25] everything, he is a coward. To be brave, then, a man must not either fear everything or nothing. The same things, then, both increase and destroy excellence. For undue and indiscriminate fears destroy, and so does the lack of fear about anything at all. And courage has to do with fears, so that moderate fears increase courage. [30] Courage, then, is both increased and destroyed by the same things. For men are liable to this effect owing to fears. And the same holds true of the other excellences.
6 · In addition, excellence may also be determined by pleasure and pain. For it is owing to pleasure that we commit base actions, and owing to pain that we [35] abstain from noble ones. And generally it is not possible to achieve excellence or vice without pain and pleasure. Excellence then has to do with pleasures and pains.
Moral excellence gets its name as follows, if etymology has any bearing upon truth, as perhaps it has. ‘Character (ἦθoς)’ derives from ‘custom (ἔθoς)’; for it is [1186a1] called moral (ὴθική) excellence because it is the result of accustoming. Whereby it is evident that no one of the excellences of the irrational part springs up in us by nature. For nothing that is by nature becomes other by custom. For instance, a stone, and heavy things in general, naturally go downwards. If any one, then, throws [5] them up repeatedly, and tries to accustom them to go up, all the same they never would go up, but always down. Similarly in all other such cases.
7 · After this, then, as we wish to say what excellence is, we must know what are the things that there are in the soul. They are these—feelings, capacities, states; [10] so that it is evident that excellence will be some one of these. Now feelings are anger, fear, hate, regret, emulation, pity, and the like, which are usually attended by pain or pleasure. Capacities are those things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of these feelings; for instance, those things in virtue of which we are capable [15] of feeling anger or pain or pity, and so on. States are those things in virtue of which we stand in a good or bad relation to these feelings; for instance, towards being angered: if we are angry overmuch, we stand in a bad relation towards anger, whereas if we are not angry at all where we ought to be, in that case also we stand in a bad relation towards anger.
The mean state, then, is neither to be pained overmuch nor to be absolutely [20] insensible. When, then, we stand thus, we are in a good disposition. And similarly as regards other like things. For good temper and gentleness are in a mean between anger and insensibility to anger. Similarly in the case of boastfulness and mock-humility. For to pretend to more than one has shows boastfulness, while to [25] pretend to less shows mock-humility. The mean state, then, between these is truthfulness.
8 · Similarly in all other cases. For this is what marks the state, to stand in a good or bad relation towards these feelings, and to stand in a good relation towards them is to incline neither towards the excess nor towards the defect. The state, then, [30] which implies a good relation is directed towards the mean of such things, in respect of which we are called praiseworthy, whereas that which implies a bad relation inclines towards excess or defect.
Since, then, excellence is a mean of these feelings, and the feelings are either pains or pleasures or impossible apart from pain or pleasure, it is evident from this [35] that excellence has to do with pains and pleasures.
But there are other feelings, as one might think, in the case of which the vice does not lie in any excess or defect; for instance, adultery and the adulterer. The [1186b1] adulterer is not the man who corrupts free women too much; but both this and anything else of the kind which is comprised under the pleasure of intemperance, whether10 it be something in the way of excess or of defect, is blamed.
9 · After this, then, it is perhaps necessary to have it stated what is opposed [5] to the mean, whether it is the excess or the defect. For to some means the defect is opposed and to some the excess; for instance, to courage it is not rashness, which is the excess, that is opposed, but cowardice, which is the defect; and to temperance, which is a mean between intemperance and insensibility to pleasures, it does not [10] seem that insensibility, which is the defect, is opposed, but intemperance, which is the excess. But both are opposed to the mean, excess and defect. For the mean is in defect of the excess and
in excess of the defect. Hence it is that prodigals call the [15] liberal illiberal, while the illiberal call the liberal prodigals, and the rash and headlong call the brave cowards, while cowards call the brave headlong and mad.
There would seem to be two reasons for our opposing the excess or the defect to the mean. Either people look at the matter from the point of view of the thing itself, [20] to see which is nearer to, or further from, the mean; for instance, in the case of liberality, whether prodigality or illiberality is further from it. For prodigality would seem more to be liberality than illiberality is. Illiberality, then, is further off. But things which are further distant from the mean would seem to be more opposed [25] to it. From the point of view, then, of the thing itself the defect presents itself as more opposed. But there is also another way, to wit, those things are more opposed to the mean to which we have a greater natural inclination. For instance, we have a greater natural inclination to be intemperate than sober in our conduct. The tendency, therefore, occurs rather towards the things to which nature inclines us; and the things to which we have a greater tendency are more opposed; and our [30] tendency is towards intemperance rather than towards sobriety; so that the excess of the mean will be the more opposed; for intemperance is the excess in the case of temperance.
What excellence is, then, has been examined (for it seems to be a mean of the feelings, so that it will be necessary for the man who is to obtain credit for his [35] character to observe the mean with regard to each of the feelings; for which reason it is a difficult matter to be good; for to seize the mean in anything is a difficult matter; for instance, any one can draw a circle, but to fix upon the mean point in it is [187a1] hard; and in the same way to be angry indeed is easy, and so is the opposite of this, but to be in the mean is hard; and generally in each of the feelings one can see that what surrounds the mean is easy, but the mean is hard, and this is the point for which we are praised; for which reason the good is rare).