by Aristotle
Since, then, excellence has been spoken of . . .11 we must next inquire whether [5] it is possible of attainment or is not, but, as Socrates said, to be good or bad does not rest with us to come about. For if, he says, one were to ask any one whatever whether he would wish to be just or unjust, no one would choose injustice. Similarly in the case of courage and cowardice, and so on always with the rest of the [10] excellences. And it is evident that any who are bad will not be bad voluntarily; so that it is evident that neither will they be voluntarily good.
Such a statement is not true. For why does the lawgiver forbid the doing of wrong acts, and bid the doing of right and good ones? And why does he appoint a [15] penalty for wrong acts, if one does them, and for right acts, if one fails to do them? Yet it would be absurd to legislate about those things which are not in our power to do. But, as it seems, it is in our power to be good or bad.
Again, we have evidence in the praise and blame that are accorded. For there is praise for excellence and blame for vice. But praise and blame are not bestowed [20] upon things involuntary. So it is evident that it is equally in our power to do good and bad acts.
They used also to employ some such comparison as this in their desire to show that it is not voluntary. For why, they say, when we are ill or ugly, does no one blame [25] us for things of this sort? But this is not true. For we do blame people for things of this sort, when we think that they themselves are the causes of being ill or of their having their body in a bad state, on the assumption that there is voluntary action even there. It seems, then, that there is voluntariness in being excellent and vicious.
10 · One can see this still more clearly from the following considerations. [30] Every natural kind is given to begetting a being like itself, i.e. plants and animals; for both are apt to beget. And they are given to beget from their first principles—for instance, the tree from the seed; for this is a kind of principle. And what follows the principles stands thus: as are the principles, so is what comes from the principles. [35]
This can be seen more clearly in matters of geometry. For there also, when certain principles are assumed, as are the principles, so are what follow the principles; for instance, if the triangle has its angles equal to two right angles, and the quadrilateral to four, then according as the triangle changes, so does the [1187b1] quadrilateral share in its changes (for it is convertible), and if the quadrilateral has not its angles equal to four right angles, neither will the triangle have its angles equal to two right angles.
11 · So, then, and in the like way with this, is it in the case of man. For since man is apt to produce things, he tends to produce the actions which he does from [5] certain principles. How else could it be? For we do not say that any of the things without life acts, nor any other of the things with life, except men. It is evident, then, that man is the begetter of his acts.
[10] Since, then, we see that the acts change, and we never do the same things, and the acts have been brought into being from certain principles, it is evident that, since the acts change, the principles from which the acts proceed also change, as we said in our comparison was the case with geometrical properties.
[15] Now the principle of an act, whether good or bad, is choice and wish, and all that accords with reason. It is evident, then, that these also change. But we change in our actions voluntarily. So that the principle also, choice, changes voluntarily. So [20] that it is plain that it will be in our power to be either good or bad.
Perhaps, then, some one may say, ‘Since it is in my power to be just and good, if I wish I shall be the best of all men’. This, of course, is not possible. Why so? Because in the case of the body it is not so either. For if one wishes to bestow attention upon his body, it does not follow that he will have the best body that any [25] one has. For it is necessary not merely for attention to be bestowed, but also for the body to be beautiful and good by nature. He will then have his body better, but best of all men, No. And so we must suppose it to be also in the case of soul. For he who [30] chooses to be best will not be so, unless nature also be presupposed; better, however, he will be.
12 · Since, then, it appears that to be good is in our power, it is necessary next to say what the voluntary is. For this is what chiefly determines excellence, to wit, the voluntary. Roughly speaking, that is voluntary which we do when not under [35] compulsion. But perhaps we ought to speak more clearly about it.
What prompts us to action is desire; and desire has three forms—appetite, passion, wish.
First of all, then, we must inquire into the act which is in accordance with appetite. Is that voluntary or involuntary? That it is involuntary would not seem to [1188a1] be the case. Why so? And on what ground? Because wherever we do not act voluntarily, we act under compulsion, and all acts done under compulsion are attended with pain, whereas acts due to appetite are attended with pleasure, so that on this way of looking at the matter acts due to appetite will not be involuntary, but voluntary.
[5] But, again, there is another argument opposed to this, which makes its appeal to incontinence. No one, it is maintained, does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. But yet the incontinent, knowing that what he does is bad, nevertheless does it, and does it in accordance with appetite; he is not therefore acting voluntarily; therefore [10] he is under compulsion. There again the same answer will meet this argument. For if the act is in accordance with appetite, it is not of compulsion; for appetite is attended with pleasure, and acts due to pleasure are not of compulsion.
There is another way in which this may be made plain—I mean, that the incontinent acts voluntarily. For those who commit injustice do so voluntarily, and [15] the incontinent are unjust and act unjustly. So that the incontinent man will voluntarily commit his acts of incontinence.
13 · But, again, there is another argument opposed to this, which maintains that it is not voluntary. For the self-restrained man voluntarily performs his acts of self-restraint. For he is praised, and people are praised for voluntary acts. But if that which is in accordance with appetite is voluntary, that which runs counter to [20] appetite is involuntary. But the man of self-restraint acts contrary to his appetite. So that the man of self-restraint will not be self-restrained voluntarily. But this conclusion does not commend itself. Therefore the act which is in accordance with appetite is not voluntary.
Again, the same thing holds of acts prompted by passion. For the same arguments apply as to appetite, so that they will cause the difficulty. For it is [25] possible to be incontinent or continent of anger.
Among the desires in our division we have still to inquire about wish, whether it is voluntary. Now the incontinent wish for the time being the things to which their impulse is directed. Therefore the incontinent perform their bad acts with their own wish. But no one voluntarily does evil, knowing it to be evil. But the incontinent [30] man, knowing evil to be evil, does it with his own wish. Therefore he is not a voluntary agent, and wish therefore is not a voluntary thing. But this argument annuls incontinence and the incontinent man. For if he is not a voluntary agent, he is not blameworthy. But the incontinent is blameworthy. Therefore he is a voluntary agent. Therefore wish is voluntary. [35]
Since, then, certain arguments seem opposed, we must speak more clearly about the voluntary.
14 · Before doing so, however, we must speak about force and about necessity. Force may occur even in the case of things without life. For things [1188b1] without life have each their proper place assigned to them—to fire the upper region and to earth the lower. It is, however, possible to force a stone to go up and fire to go down. It is also possible to apply force to an animal; for instance, when a horse is [5] galloping straight ahead, one may take hold of him and divert his course. Now whenever the cause of men’s doing something contrary to their nature or contrary to their wish is outside of them, we will say that they are forced to do what they do. But when the cause is in themselves, we will not in that case say that they are forced. Otherwise the incontinent
man will have his answer ready, in denying that he is bad. [10] For he will say that he is forced by his appetite to perform the bad acts.
15 · Let this, then, be our definition of what is due to force—those things of which the cause by which men are forced to do them is external (but where the cause is internal and in themselves there is no force).
But now we must speak about necessity and the necessary. The term [15] ‘necessary’ must not be used in all circumstances nor in every case—for instance, of what we do for the sake of pleasure. For if one were to say ‘I was necessitated by pleasure to debauch my friend’s wife’, he would be a strange person. For ‘necessary’ does not apply to everything, but only to externals; for instance, whenever a man receives some damage by way of alternative to some other greater, when compelled [20] by circumstances. For instance, ‘I found it necessary to hurry my steps to the country; otherwise I should have found my stock destroyed’. Such, then, are the cases in which we have the necessary.
[25] 16 · But since the voluntary lies in no impulse, there will remain what proceeds from thought. For the involuntary is what is done from necessity or from force, and, thirdly, what is not accompanied by thought. This is plain from facts. For whenever a man has struck or killed a man, or has done something of that sort [30] without having thought about it beforehand, we say that he has acted involuntarily, implying that the voluntariness lies in the having thought about it. For instance, they say that once a woman gave a love-potion to somebody; then the man died from the effects of the love-potion, and the woman was put on trial before the Areopagus; on her appearance she was acquitted, just for the reason that she did not do it with [35] design. For she gave it in love, but missed her mark; hence it was not held to be voluntary, because in giving the love-potion she did not give it with the thought of killing. In that case, therefore, the voluntary falls under the head of what is accompanied with thought.
[1189a1] 17 · It now remains for us to inquire into choice. Is choice desire or is it not? Now desire is found in the lower animals, but not choice; for choice is attended with reason, and none of the lower animals has reason. Therefore it will not be desire.
[5] Is it then wish? Or is it not this either? For wish is concerned even with the impossible; for instance, we wish that we may live for ever, but we do not choose it. Again, choice is not concerned with the end but with what contributes to the end; for instance, no one chooses to be in health, but we choose what leads to health, e.g. [10] walking, running; but we wish for the ends. For we wish to be in health. So that it is evident in this way also that wish and choice are not the same thing.
But choice seems to be what its name suggests; I mean, we choose one thing instead of another; for instance, the better instead of the worse. Whenever, then, we [15] take the better in exchange for the worse as a matter of choice, there the term ‘to choose’ would seem to be appropriate.
Since, then, choice is none of these things, can it be thought that constitutes choice? Or is this not so either? For we entertain many thoughts and opinions in our [20] minds. Do we then choose whatever we think? Or is this not so? For often we think about things in India, but it does not follow that we choose them. Choice therefore is not thought either.
Since, then, choice is not any of these singly, and these are the things that there are in the soul, choice must result from the combination of some of them.
[25] Since, then, choice, as was said before, is concerned with the goods that contribute to the end and not with the end, and with the things that are possible to us, and with such as afford ground for controversy as to whether this or that is desirable, it is evident that one must have thought and deliberated about them beforehand; then when a thing appears best to us after having thought it over, there [30] ensues an impulse to act, and it is when we act in this way that we are held to act on choice.
Since, then, choice is a deliberate desire attended with thought, the voluntary is not necessarily done by choice. For there are many acts which we do voluntarily before thinking and deliberating about them; for instance, we sit down and stand up, and do many other things of the same sort voluntarily but without having [35] thought about them, whereas every act done by choice was found to be attended with thought. The voluntary, therefore, is not necessarily done by choice, but the act [1189b1] done by choice is voluntary; for if we choose to do anything after deliberation, we act voluntarily. And a few legislators, even, appear to distinguish the voluntary act from the act done by choice as being something different, in making the penalties that they appoint for voluntary acts less than for those that are done by choice. [5]
Choice, then, lies in matters of action, and in those in which it is in our power to do or not to do, and to act in this way or not in this way, and where we can know the reason why.
But the reason why is not always of the same kind. For in geometry, when one says that the quadrilateral has its angles equal to four right angles, and one asks the [10] reason why, one says, ‘Because the triangle has its angles equal to two right angles’. Now in such cases they reached the reason why from a definite principle; but in matters of action, with which choice has to do, it is not so (for there is no definite principle laid down), but if one asks, ‘Why did you do this?’ the answer is, ‘Because [15] it was the only thing possible’, or ‘Because it was better so’. It is from the consequences themselves, according as they appear to be better, that one chooses, and these are the reason why.
Hence in such matters the deliberation is as to the how, but not so in the sciences. For no one deliberates how he ought to write the name Archicles, because [20] it is a settled matter how one ought to write the name Archicles. The error, then, does not arise in the thought, but in the act of writing. For where the error is not in the thought, neither do people deliberate about those things. But wherever there is an indefiniteness about the how, there error comes in.
Now there is the element of indefiniteness in matters of action, and in those [25] matters in which the errors are two-fold. We err, then, in matters of action and in what pertains to the excellences in the same way. For in aiming at excellence we err in the natural directions. For there is error both in defect and in excess, and we are carried in both these directions through pleasure and pain. For it is owing to [30] pleasure that we do base deeds, and owing to pain that we abstain from noble ones.
18 · Again, thought is not like the senses; for instance, with sight one could not do anything else than see, nor with hearing anything else than hear. So also we do not deliberate whether we ought to hear with hearing or see. But thought is not like this, but it is able to do one thing and others also. That is why deliberation [1190a1] comes in there.
The error, then, in the choice of goods is not about the ends (for as to these all are at one in their judgement, for instance, that health is a good), but only about those which lead to the ends; for instance, whether a particular food is good for [5] health or not. The chief cause of our going wrong in these matters is pleasure and pain; for we avoid the one and choose the other.
Since, then, it has been settled in what error takes place and how, it remains to ask what it is that excellence aims at. Does it aim at the end or at what contributes [10] to the end? for instance, at what is right or at what contributes to it?
How, then, is it with science? Does it belong to the science of housebuilding to design the end rightly, or to see what contributes to it? For if the design is right—I mean, to make a beautiful house—it is no other than the housebuilder who will [15] discover and provide what contributes to it. And similarly in the case of all the other sciences.
So, then, it would seem to be also in the case of excellence, that its aim is rather the end, which it must design rightly, than what contributes to the end. And no one else will provide the materials for this or discover what is needed to contribute to it. And it is reasonable to suppose that excellence should have this in view. For both [20] design and execution always belong to that with which the or
igination of the best lies. Now there is nothing better than excellence; for it is for its sake that all other things are, and the origination looks to this, and the contributory factors are rather for the sake of it; now the end seems to be a kind of principle, and everything is for [25] the sake of it. But this will be as it ought to be. So that it is plain also in the case of excellence, since it is the best mode of causation, that it aims at the end rather than at what contributes to the end.
19 · Now the end of excellence is the right. This, then, is what excellence aims at rather than the things from which it will be produced. But it has to do also [30] with these. But to make these its whole concern is manifestly absurd. For perhaps in painting one might be a good imitator and yet not be praised, if one does not make it his aim to imitate the best subjects. This, therefore, is quite the business of excellence, to design the right.
Why, then, someone may say, did we say before that the activity was better [35] than the corresponding state, whereas now we are assigning to excellence as nobler not the material for activity, but something in which there is no activity? Yes, but [1190b1] now also we assert this just the same, that the activity is better than the state. For his fellow men in viewing the good man judge him from his acts, owing to its not being possible to make clear the choice which each has, since if it were possible to [5] know how the judgement of each man stands towards the right, he would have been thought good even without acting.
But since we reckoned up certain means of the feelings, we must say with what sort of feelings they are concerned.