by Aristotle
20 · . . .12 Since, then, courage has to do with feelings of confidence and fear, [10] we must examine with what sort of fears and confidences it has to do. If, then, any one is afraid of losing his property, is he a coward? And if any one is confident about these matters, is he brave? Surely not! And in the same way if one is afraid of or confident about illness, one ought not to say that the man who fears is a coward or that the man who does not fear is brave. It is not, therefore, in such fears and confidences as these that courage consists. Nor yet in such as follow; for instance, if [15] one is not afraid of thunder or lightning or any other superhuman terror, he is not brave but a sort of madman. It is with human fears and confidences, then, that the brave man has to do; I mean to say that anyone who is confident under circumstances in which most people or all are afraid, is a brave man. [20]
These points having been settled, we must inquire, since there are many ways in which men are brave, which is the brave man. For you may have a man who is brave from experience, like soldiers. For they know, owing to experience, that in such a place or time or condition it is impossible to suffer any damage. But the man [25] who knows these things and for this reason stands his ground against the enemy is not brave; for if none of these things is the case, he does not stand his ground. Hence one ought not to call those brave whose courage is due to experience. Nor indeed was Socrates right in asserting that courage was knowledge. For knowledge becomes knowledge by getting experience from custom. But of those whose [30] endurance is due to experience we do not say, nor would men in general say, that they are brave. Courage, therefore, will not consist in knowledge.
But again, on the other hand, there are some who are brave from the opposite of experience. For those who have no experience of the probable results are free from fear owing to their inexperience. Neither, then, must we call these brave.
Again, there are others who appear brave owing to their passions; for instance, those who are in love or are inspired by the gods. We must not call these brave either. For if their passion is taken away, they are not brave any more, whereas the [1191a1] truly brave man must always be brave. Hence one would not call wild beasts like boars brave, owing to their defending themselves when they have been pained by a wound, nor ought the brave man to be brave through passion.
Again, there is another form of courage, which we may call civic; for instance, [5] if men endure dangers out of shame before their fellow citizens, and so appear to be brave. In illustration of this we may take the way in which Homer has represented Hector as saying—
Then were Polydamas first to pile reproaches upon me;13
for which reason he thinks that he ought to fight. We must not call this sort courage [10] either. For the same definition will apply to each of these. For he whose courage does not endure on the deprivation of something cannot properly be considered brave; if, then, I take away the shame owing to which he was brave, he will no longer be brave.
There is yet another way of appearing brave, namely, through hope and anticipation of good. We must not say that these are brave either, since it appears [15] absurd to call those brave who are of such a character and under such circumstances.
No one, then, of the above kinds must be put down as brave.
We have then to ask who is to be so put down, and who is the brave man. Broadly speaking, then, it is he who is brave owing to none of the things [20] above-mentioned, but owing to his thinking it to be right, and who acts bravely whether any one is present or not.
Not, indeed, that courage arises in one entirely without passion and impulse. But the impulse must proceed from reason and be directed to the right. He, then, who is carried by a rational impulse to face danger for the sake of right, being free [25] from fear about these things, is brave; and these are the things with which courage has to do.
When we say ‘free from fear’, it is not to be understood that the brave man feels no fear at all. For such a person is not brave, for whom nothing at all has any terrors. For in that way a stone and other things without life would be brave. But it is necessary that while he feels fear he should still face the danger; for if he faces it without feeling fear, he will not be brave.
[30] Further, according to the distinction that we made above, it is not concerned with all fears and dangers, but only with those which threaten existence. Moreover, not at any and every time, but when the fears and the dangers are near. For if one is void of fear with regard to a danger that is ten years off, it does not follow that he is [35] brave. For some are confident owing to its being far away, but, if they come near it, are ready to die with fear. Such, then, are courage and the brave man.
21 · Temperance is a mean between intemperance and insensibility to pleasures. For temperance and generally every excellence is the best state, and the [1191b1] best state lies in the attainment of the best thing, and the best thing is the mean between excess and defect; for people are blameworthy on both grounds, both on that of excess and on that of defect. So that, since the mean is best, temperance will be a mean state between intemperance and insensibility. These, then, are the vices [5] between which it will be a mean.
Temperance is concerned with pleasures and pains, but not with all, nor with those that have to do with all objects. For one is not intemperate if one takes pleasure in beholding a painting or a statue or something of that sort, and in the same way not so in the case of hearing or smell; but only in the pleasures which have to do with touch and taste.
[10] Nor yet with regard to these will a man be temperate who is in such a state as not to be affected at all by any pleasures of this sort (for such a person is devoid of feeling), but rather he who feels them and yet does not let himself be led away into enjoying them to excess and regarding everything else as of secondary consideration; [15] and, we must add, the man who acts for the sake of right and nothing else .…14 For whoever abstains from the excess of such pleasures either from fear or some other such motive is not temperate. For neither do we call the other animals temperate except man, because there is not reason in them whereby they test and choose the right. For every excellence is concerned with and aims at the right. So [20] temperance will be concerned with pleasures and pains, and these those that occur in touch and taste.
22 · Next to this we must speak about the definition and sphere of gentleness. Gentleness, then, is in a mean between irascibility and a want of anger. And generally the excellences seem to be a kind of means. One can show that they [25] are so in this way as well. For if the best is in the mean, and excellence is the best state excellence will be the mean. But it will be more plain as we inquire into them separately. For since he is irascible who gets angry with everybody and under all [30] circumstances and to too great an extent, and such a one is blameworthy (for one ought not to be angry with everybody nor at everything nor under all circumstances and always, nor yet again ought one to be in such a state as never to be angry with anybody; for this character also is blameworthy, as being insensible), since then both he who is in the excess is blameworthy and he who is in the defect, the man who [35] is in the mean between them will be gentle and praiseworthy. For neither he who is in defect in anger nor he who is in excess is praiseworthy, but he who stands in a mean with regard to these things. He is gentle; and gentleness will be a mean state with regard to these feelings.
23 · Liberality is a mean state between prodigality and illiberality. Feelings of this sort have to do with property. The prodigal is he who spends on wrong objects [1192a1] and more than he ought and at wrong times, while the illiberal man, in the opposite way to him, is he who does not spend on right objects and as much as he ought and when he ought. And both these characters are blameworthy. And one of them is [5] characterized by defect and the other by excess. The liberal man, therefore, since he is praiseworthy, will be in a mean between them. Who, then, is he? He who spends on right objects and right amounts and at right times.
24 · There are several forms of illiberality; for instance, we call so
me people niggards and cheese-parers, and lovers of base gain, and petty. Now all these fall [10] under the head of illiberality. For evil is multiform, but good uniform; for instance, health is single, but disease has many shapes. In the same way excellence is single, but vice has many shapes. For all these characters are blameworthy in relation to property.
Is it, then, the business of the liberal man also to get and procure property? [15] Surely not! That sort of thing is not the business of any excellence at all. It is not the business of courage to make weapons, but of something else, but it is the business of this when it has got them to make a right use of them; and so in the case of temperance and the other excellences. This, then, is not the business of liberality, but rather of the art of procuring property. [20]
25 · Greatness of soul is a mean between vanity and littleness of soul, and it has to do with honour and dishonour, not with honour from the many but with that from the good, or at any rate15 more with the latter. For the good will bestow honour [25] with knowledge and good judgement. He will wish then rather to be honoured by those who know as he does himself that he deserves honour. For he will not be concerned with every honour, but with the best, and with the good that is honourable and ranks as a principle. Those, then, who are despicable and bad, but [30] who deem themselves worthy of great things, and besides that think that they ought to be honoured, are vain. But those who deem themselves worthy of less than befits them are men of little soul. The man, therefore, who is in the mean between these is he who neither deems himself worthy of less honour than is befitting to him, nor of greater than he deserves, nor of all. And he is the man of great soul. So that it is [35] evident that greatness of soul is a mean between vanity and littleness of soul.
26 · Magnificence is a mean between ostentation and shabbiness. Now magnificence has to do with expenses which are proper to be incurred by a man of [1192b1] eminence. Whoever therefore spends on the wrong occasions is ostentatious; for instance, one who feasts his dinner-club as though he were giving a wedding-banquet is ostentatious (for the ostentatious man is the sort of person who shows off [5] his own means on the wrong occasion). But the shabby man is the opposite of this, who fails to make a great expenditure when he ought; or if, without going to that length, when, for instance, he is spending money on a wedding-feast or the mounting of a play, he does it in an unworthy and deficient way—such a person is shabby. Magnificence from its very name shows itself to be such as we are [10] describing. For since it spends the great amount on the fitting occasion, it is rightly called magnificence. Magnificence, then, since it is praiseworthy, is a mean between defect and excess with regard to proper expenses on the right occasions.
But there are, as people think, more kinds of magnificence than one; for [15] instance, people say, ‘his gait was magnificent’, and there are of course other uses of the term ‘magnificent’ in a metaphorical, not in a strict sense. For it is not in those things that magnificence lies, but in those which we have mentioned.
27 · Righteous indignation is a mean state between enviousness and malice. For both these states are blameworthy, but the man who shows righteous indignation [20] is praiseworthy. Now righteous indignation is a kind of pain with regard to good things which are found to attach to the undeserving. The man, then, who feels righteous indignation is he who is apt to feel pain at such things. And this same person again will feel pain, if he sees a man faring ill, who does not deserve it. Righteous indignation, then, and the person who feels it, are perhaps of this sort, [25] but the envious man is the opposite of this. For he will feel pain without distinction, whether one deserves the good fortune or not. In the same way the malicious man will be pleased at ill-fortune, whether deserved or undeserved. Not so with the man who feels righteous indignation, but he is in the mean between these.
28 · Dignity is in a mean between pride and complaisance, and has to do [30] with social intercourse. For the proud man is inclined not to meet or talk to anybody (but his name seems to be given to him from his character; for it means self-pleasing, from his gratifying himself); but the complaisant is ready to associate with every one under all circumstances and in all places. Neither of these characters [35] is praiseworthy; but the dignified man, being in the mean between them, is praiseworthy. For he does not lay himself out to please everybody, but only those who are worthy, nor yet nobody, for he does so to these same.
29 · Modesty is a mean between shamelessness and bashfulness, and it has [1193a1] to do with deeds and words. For the shameless man is he who says and does anything on any occasion or before any people; but the bashful man is the opposite of this, who is afraid to say or do anything before anybody (for such a man is incapacitated [5] for action, who is bashful about everything); but modesty and the modest man are a mean between these. For he will not say and do anything under any circumstances, like the shameless man, nor, like the bashful man, be afraid on every occasion and under all circumstances, but will say and do what he ought, where he ought, and [10] when he ought.
30 · Wit is a mean state between buffoonery and boorishness, and it is concerned with jests. For the buffoon is he who thinks fit to jest at every one and everything, and the boor is he who neither thinks fit to make jests nor to have them made at him, but gets angry. But the witty man is midway between these, who [15] neither jests at all persons and under all circumstances, nor on the other hand is a boor. But wit is of two sorts. For both he who is able to jest in good taste and he who can stand being jested at may be called a man of wit. Such, then, is wit.
31 · Friendliness is a mean state between flattery and unfriendliness, and it [20] has to do with acts and words. For the flatterer is he who adds more than is proper and true, while the unfriendly man is hostile and detracts from the truth. Neither of them, then, can rightly be praised, but the friendly man is between the two. For he will not add more than the facts, nor praise what is not proper, nor on the other hand [25] will he represent things as less than they are, nor oppose in all cases contrary to what he thinks. Such, then, is the friendly man.
32 · Truthfulness is a mean between self-depreciation and boastfulness. It has to do with words, but not with all words. For the boaster is he who pretends to have more than he has, or to know what he does not know; while the self-depreciator, [30] on the other hand, lays claim to less than he really has and does not declare what he knows, but tries to hide his knowledge. But the truthful man will do neither of these things. For he will not pretend either to more than he has or less, but will say that he has and knows what as a matter of fact he does have and does [35] know.
Whether, then, these are excellences or not is another question. But that they are means of the above-mentioned states is plain. For those who live according to them are praised.
33 · It remains to speak about justice—what it is, in what, and about what. [1193b1] First, then, if we could fix upon what justice is. Justice is twofold, of which one kind is legal justice. For people say that what the law commands is just. Now the law commands us to act bravely and temperately, and generally to perform the [5] actions which come under the head of the excellences. For which reason also, they say, justice appears to be a kind of complete excellence. For if the things which the law commands us to do are just, and the law ordains what is in accordance with all excellences, it follows that he who abides by legal justice will be completely good, so [10] that the just man and justice are a kind of complete excellence.
The just, then, in one sense is in these things and about these things. But it is not the just in this sense, nor the justice which deals with these things, of which we are in search. For in respect of just conduct of this sort it is possible to be just when one is alone (for the temperate and the brave and the self-controlled is each of them [15] so when alone). But what is just towards one’s neighbour is different from the legal justice that has been spoken of. For in things just towards one’s neighbour it is not possible to be just when alone. But it is the just in this sense of which we are in
search, and the justice which has to do with these things.
The just, then, in relation to one’s neighbour is, speaking generally, the equal. [20] For the unjust is the unequal. For when people assign more of the goods to themselves and less of the evils, this is unequal, and in that case they think that injustice is done and suffered. It is evident, therefore, that since injustice implies unequal things, justice and the just will consist in an equality of contracts. So that it [25] is evident that justice will be a mean between excess and defect, between too much and too little. For the unjust man by doing wrong has more, and his victim by being wronged has less; but the mean between these is just. And the mean is equal. So that [30] the equal between more and less will be just, and he will be just who wishes to have what is equal. But the equal implies two things at least. To be equal therefore in relation to one’s neighbour is just, and a man of this sort will be just.
Since, then, justice consists in just and equal dealing and in a mean, we must notice that the just is said to be just as between certain persons, and the equal is a [35] relation between certain persons, and the mean is a mean for certain persons; so that justice and the just will have relation to certain persons and be between certain persons.
Since, then, the just is equal, the proportionally equal will be just. Now proportion implies four terms at least; for as A is to B, C is to D. For instance, it is [1194a1] proportional that he who has much should contribute much, and that he who has little should contribute little; again, in the same way, that he who has worked much should receive much, and that he who has worked little should receive little. But as the man who has worked is to the man who has not worked, so is the much to the [5] little; and as the man who has worked is to the much, so is the man who has not worked to the little. Plato also seems to employ proportional justice in his Republic. For the farmer, he says, produces food, and the housebuilder a house, and the weaver a cloak, and the shoemaker a shoe. Now the farmer gives the housebuilder food, and the housebuilder gives the farmer a house; and in the same way all the rest [10] exchange their products for those of others. And this is the proportion. As the farmer is to the housebuilder, so is the housebuilder to the farmer. In the same way with the shoemaker, the weaver, and all the rest, the same proportion holds towards [15] one another. And this proportion holds the republic together. So that the just seems to be the proportional. For the just holds republics together, and the just is the same thing as the proportional.