The Politics of Aristotle

by Aristotle

  There is also a friendship in equality; for instance, that of comrades is on an equality in respect of number and capacity of good (for neither of them deserves to [5] have a greater share of goods either in number or capacity or size, but what is equal; for comrades are supposed to be a kind of equals). But that between father and son is on an inequality, and that between ruler and subject, between worse and better, [10] between wife and husband, and generally in all cases where there is one who occupies the position of worse or better in friendship. This friendship in inequality indeed, is proportional. For in giving of good no one would ever give an equal share to the better and the worse, but always a greater to the one who was superior. And [15] this is the proportionally equal. For the worse with a less good is in a kind of way equal to the better with a greater.

  12 · Among all the above-mentioned forms of friendship love is in a way strongest in that which is based on kindred, and more particularly in the relation of [20] father to son. Now why is it that the father loves the son more than the son the father? Is it, as some say rightly enough as regards the many, because the father has been a kind of benefactor to the son, and the son owes him a return for the benefit? Now this cause would seem to hold good in the friendship which is based on utility. [25] But as we see it to be in the sciences, so it is here also. What I mean is that in some the end and the activity are the same, and there is not any other end beyond the activity; for instance, to the flute-player the activity and end are the same (for to [30] play the flute is both his end and his activity); but not to the art of housebuilding (for it has a different end beyond the activity); now friendship is a sort of activity, and there is not any other end beyond the act of loving, but just this. Now the father is always in a way more active owing to the son being a kind of production of his [35] own. And this we see to be so in the other cases also. For all feel a sort of kindness towards what they have themselves produced. The father, then, feels a sort of kindness towards the son as being his own production, led on by memory and by hope. This is why the father loves the son more than the son the father.

  There are other things which are called and are thought to be forms of [1212a1] friendship, about which we must inquire whether they are friendship. For instance, goodwill is thought to be friendship. Now, speaking absolutely, goodwill would seem not to be friendship (for towards many persons and on many occasions we entertain a feeling of goodwill either from seeing or hearing some good about them. Does it follow then that we are friends? Surely not! For if some one felt goodwill [5] towards Darius, when he was alive among the Persians, as some one may have done, it did not follow that he had a friendship towards Darius); but goodwill would seem to be sometimes the beginning of friendship, and goodwill may become friendship if, where one has the power to do good, there be added the wish to do it for the sake of the person towards whom the goodwill is felt. But goodwill implies character and is [10] relative to it. For no one is said to have a goodwill towards wine or towards anything else without life that is good or pleasant, but if any one be of a good character, goodwill is felt towards him. And goodwill is not separate from friendship, but acts in the same sphere. This is why it is thought to be friendship.

  Unanimity borders close on friendship, if the kind of unanimity that you take is [15] that which is strictly so called. For if one entertains the same notions as Empedocles and has the same views about the elements as he, is he unanimous with Empedocles? Surely not! Since the same thing would have to hold in any like case. For to begin with, the sphere of unanimity is not matters of thought but matters of action, and herein it is not in so far as they think the same, but in so far as in addition to [20] thinking the same they choose to do the same about what they think. For if both think to rule, but each of them thinks that he is to be ruler, are they therefore unanimous? Surely not. But if I wish to be ruler myself, and he wishes me to be so, then it is that we are unanimous. Unanimity, then, is found in matters of action coupled with the wish for the same thing. It is therefore the establishment of the [25] same ruler in matters of action that is the sphere of unanimity in the strict sense.

  13 · Since there is, as we maintain, such a thing as friendship towards oneself, will the good man be a lover of self or not? Now the lover of self is he who does everything for his own sake in matters of advantage. The bad man is a lover of [30] self (for he does everything for his own sake), but not the good man. For the reason why he is a good man is because he does so and so for the sake of another; hence he is not a lover of self. But it is true that all feel an impulse towards things that are good, and think that they themselves ought to have these in the highest degree. This is [35] most apparent in the case of wealth and rule. Now the good man will resign these to another, not on the ground that it does not become him in the highest degree to have them, but if he sees that another will be able to make more use of these than he; but other men will not do this owing to ignorance (for they do not think they might make a bad use of such goods) or else owing to the ambition of ruling. But the good [1212b1] man will not be affected in either of these ways. Hence he is not a lover of self as regards such goods at least; but, if at all, in respect of the noble. For this is the only thing in which he will not resign his share, but in respect of things useful and [5] pleasant he will. In the choice, then, of things in accordance with the noble he will display his love of self, but in the choice which we describe as being prompted by the useful and the pleasant it is not he who will do so, but the bad man.

  14 · Will the good man love himself most of all or not? In a way he will love himself most and in a way not. For since we say that the good man will resign goods [10] in the way of utility to his friend, he will be loving his friend more than himself. Yes; but his resignation of such goods implies that he is compassing the noble for himself in resigning these to his friend. In a way, therefore, he is loving his friend more than [15] himself, and in a way he is loving himself most. In respect of the useful he is loving his friend, but in respect of the noble and good he is loving himself most; for he is compassing these for himself as being noblest. He is therefore a lover of good, not a lover of self. For, if he does love himself, it is only because he is good. But the bad man is a lover of self. For he has nothing in the way of nobility for which he should [20] love himself, but apart from these grounds he will love himself qua self. Hence it is he who will be called a lover of self in the strict sense.

  15 · It will come next to speak about self-sufficingness and the self-sufficing man. Will the self-sufficing man require friendship too? Or will he not, but will he [25] be sufficient to himself as regards that also? For even the poets have such sayings as these—

  What need of friends, when Heaven bestows the good?25

  Whence also the difficulty arises, whether he who has all the goods and is [30] self-sufficing will need a friend too? Or is it then that he will need him most? For to whom will he do good? Or with whom will he live? For surely he will not live alone. If, then, he will need these things, and these are not possible without friendship, the self-sufficing man will need friendship too. Now the analogy that is generally [35] derived from god in discussions is not right there, nor will it be useful here. For if god is self-sufficing and has need of none, it does not follow that we shall need no one. For we hear this kind of thing said about god. Seeing that god, so it is said, possesses all goods and is self-sufficing, what will he do? We can hardly suppose that he will sleep. It follows, we are told, that he will contemplate something; for [1213a1] this is the noblest and the most appropriate employment. What, then, will he contemplate? For if he is to contemplate anything else, it must be something better than himself that he will contemplate. But this is absurd, that there should be anything better than god. Therefore he will contemplate himself. But this also is [5] absurd. For if a human being surveys himself, we censure him as stupid. It will be absurd therefore, it is said, for god to contemplate himself. As to what god is to contemplate, then, we may let that pass. But the self-s
ufficingness about which we are conducting our inquiry is not that of god but of man, the question being whether [10] the self-sufficing man will require friendship or not. If, then, when one looked upon a friend one could see the nature and attributes of the friend, . . .26 such as to be a second self, at least if you make a very great friend, as the saying has it, ‘Here is another Heracles, a dear other self. Since then it is both a most difficult thing, as some of the sages have said, to attain a knowledge of oneself, and also a most [15] pleasant (for to know oneself is pleasant)—now we are not able to see what we are from ourselves (and that we cannot do so is plain from the way in which we blame others without being aware that we do the same things ourselves; and this is the effect of favour or passion, and there are many of us who are blinded by these things [20] so that we judge not aright); as then when we wish to see our own face, we do so by looking into the mirror, in the same way when we wish to know ourselves we can obtain that knowledge by looking at our friend. For the friend is, as we assert, a second self. If, then, it is pleasant to know oneself, and it is not possible to know this [25] without having some one else for a friend, the self-sufficing man will require friendship in order to know himself.

  Again, if it is a fine thing, as it is, to do good when one has the goods of fortune, to whom will he do good? And with whom will he live? For surely he will not spend his time alone; for to live with some one is pleasant and necessary. If, then, these [1213b1] things are fine and pleasant and necessary, and these things cannot be without friendship, the self-sufficing man will need friendship too.

  16 · Should one acquire many friends or few? They ought neither to be absolutely many nor yet few. For if they are many, it is difficult to apportion one’s [5] love to each. For in all other things also the weakness of our nature incapacitates us from reaching far. For we do not see far with our eyes, but if you set the object too far off, the sight fails owing to the weakness of nature; and the case is the same with hearing and with all other things alike. Failing, then, to show love through [10] incapacity one would, not unjustly, incur accusations, and would not be a friend, as one would be loving only in name; but this is not what friendship means. Again, if they are many, one can never be quit of grief. For if they are many, it is always likely that something unfortunate will occur to one at least of them, and when these [15] things take place grief is unavoidable. Nor yet, on the other hand, should one have few, only one or two, but a number commensurate with one’s circumstances and one’s own impulse to love.

  17 · After this we must inquire how one ought to treat a friend. This inquiry does not present itself in every friendship, but in that in which friends are most liable to bring complaints against one another. They do not do this so much in the [20] other cases; for instance, in the friendship between father and son there is no complaint such as the claim that we hear made in some forms of friendship, ‘As I to you, so you to me’, failing which there is in those cases grave complaint. But between unequal friends equality is not expected, and the relation between father and son is on a footing of inequality, as is also that between wife and husband, or [25] between servant and master, and generally between the worse and the better. They will therefore not have complaints of this sort. But it is between equal friends and in a friendship of that sort that a complaint of this kind arises. So we must inquire how we ought to treat a friend in the friendship between friends who are on a footing of [30] equality.

  **TEXT: F. Susemihl, Teubner, Leipzig, 1884

  1Reading τὰγαθóν.

  2Reading ὅ τι for ὅτι, twice.

  3Excised by Susemihl.

  4Text uncertain.

  5Reading αὐτό for αὐτoῦ.

  6Reading τῷ for τό.

  7Omitting τῶν ὰρετῶν.

  8Reading ἐνέργεια.

  9I.e. excellence of character.

  10Omitting ἤ.

  11There is a lacuna in the text.

  12There is a lacuna in the text.

  13Iliad XXII 100.

  14There is a lacuna in the text.

  15Reading ἢ μᾶλλoν γε δή.

  16Reading τoὐς τoιoὐτoυς λόγoυς.

  17Text uncertain.

  18Retaining ἐναντιoῦται τῷ μὴ εἶναι.

  19Text uncertain.

  20Transposing καὶ ἡδoναὶ σωματικαί to follow γεῦσις.

  21Reading ἐν ἀπάσαις for ἀγαθόν.

  22Transposing ἀεί to follow ἐπὶ τò πoλὐ ἤ.

  23Text uncertain.

  24See Odyssey XVII 218.

  25Euripides, Orestes 667.

  26There is a lacuna in the text.

  EUDEMIAN ETHICS**

  J. Solomon

  BOOK I

  [1214a1] 1 · The man who stated his judgement in the god’s precinct in Delos made an inscription on the propylaeum to the temple of Leto, in which he separated from one another the good, the beautiful, and the pleasant as not all properties of the same [5] thing; he wrote, ‘Most beautiful is what is most just, but best is health, and pleasantest the obtaining of what one desires’. But let us disagree with him; for happiness is at once the most beautiful and best of all things and also the pleasantest.

  [10] Now about each thing and kind there are many views that are disputed and need investigation; of these some concern knowledge only, some the acquisition of things and the performance of acts as well. About those which involve speculative philosophy only we must at a suitable opportunity say what is relevant to that study. [15] But first we must consider in what the good life consists and how it is to be acquired, whether all who receive the epithet ‘happy’ become so by nature (as we become tall, short, or of different complexions), or by teaching (happiness being a sort of science), or by some sort of discipline—for men acquire many qualities neither by [20] nature nor by teaching but by habituation, bad qualities if they are habituated to the bad, good if to the good. Or do men become happy in none of these ways, but either—like those possessed by nymphs or deities—through a sort of divine influence, being as it were inspired, or through chance? For many declare happiness [25] to be identical with good luck.

  That men, then, possess happiness through all or some or one of these causes is evident; for practically all events come under these principles—for all acts arising from intelligence may be included among acts that arise from knowledge. Now to [30] be happy, to live blissfully and beautifully, must consist mainly in three things, which seem most desirable; for some say practical wisdom is the greatest good, some excellence, and some pleasure. Some also dispute about the magnitude of the contribution made by each of these elements to happiness, some declaring the [1214b1] contribution of one to be greater, some that of another—these regarding wisdom as a greater good than excellence, those the opposite, while others regard pleasure as a greater good than either; and some consider the happy life to be compounded of all or of two of these, while others hold it to consist in one of them alone. [5]

  2 · First then about these things we must enjoin every one that has the power to live according to his own choice to set up for himself some object for the good life to aim at (whether honour or reputation or wealth or culture), with reference to which he will then do all his acts, since not to have one’s life organized in view of [10] some end is a mark of much folly. Then above all we must first define to ourselves without hurry or carelessness in which of our belongings the happy life is lodged, and what are the indispensable conditions of its attainment—for health is not the same as the indispensable conditions of health; and so it is with many other things, [15] so that the good life and its indispensable conditions are not identical. Of such things some are not peculiar to health or even to life, but common—to speak broadly—to all dispositions and actions, e.g. without breathing or being awake or having the power of movement we could enjoy neither good nor evil; but some are [20] peculiar to each kind of thing, and these it is specially import
ant to observe; e.g. the eating of meat and walking after meals are more peculiarly the indispensable conditions of a good physical state than the more general conditions mentioned above. For herein is the cause of the disputes about happy living, its nature and [25] causes; for some take to be elements in happiness what are merely its indispensable conditions.

  3 · To examine then all the views held about happiness is superfluous, for children, sick people, and the insane all have views, but no sane person would [30] dispute over them; for such persons need not argument but years in which they may change, or else medical or political correction—for medicine, no less than whipping, is a correction. Similarly we have not to consider the views of the multitude (for they talk without consideration about almost everything, and most about happiness); [1215a1] for it is absurd to apply argument to those who need not argument but experience. But since every study has its special problems, evidently there are such relating to the best life and best existence; it is well to examine these opinions, for a [5] disputant’s refutation of what is opposed to his arguments is a demonstration of the argument itself.

  Further, it is proper not to neglect these considerations, especially with a view to that at which all inquiry should be directed, viz. the causes that enable us to share in the good and noble life—if any one finds it invidious to call it the blessed [10] life—and with a view to the hope we may have of attaining each good. For if the good life consists in what is due to fortune or nature, it would be something that many cannot hope for, since its acquisition is not in their power, nor attainable by their care or activity; but if it depends on the individual and his personal acts being [15] of a certain character, then the supreme good would be both more general and more divine, more general because more would be able to possess it, more divine because happiness would then be the prize offered to those who make themselves and their acts of a certain character.