The Politics of Aristotle

by Aristotle

  Again, a spurious deduction may, as in eristical discussions, be based on the confusion of the absolute with that which is not absolute. As, in dialectic, for instance, it may be argued that what-is-not is on the ground that what-is-not is [5] what-is-not; or that the unknown can be known, on the ground that it can be known to be unknown: so also in rhetoric a spurious enthymeme may be based on the confusion of some particular probability with absolute probability. Now no particular probability is universally probable: as Agathon says,

  One might perchance say this was probable— [10]

  That things improbable oft will hap to men.47

  For what is improbable does happen, and therefore it is probable that improbable things will happen. Granted this, one might argue that what is improbable is probable. But this is not true absolutely. As, in eristic, the imposture comes from not adding any clause specifying relationship or reference or manner; so here it arises [15] because the probability in question is not general but specific. It is of this commonplace that Corax’s Art of Rhetoric is composed. If the accused is not open to the charge—for instance if a weakling is tried for violent assault—the defence is that he was not likely to do such a thing. But if he is open to the charge—i.e. if he is a strong man—the defence is still that he was not likely to do such a thing, since he [20] could be sure that people would think he was likely to do it. And so with any other charge: the accused must be either open or not open to it: both seem probable, but one is probable and the other not so absolutely but only in the way we have described. This sort of argument illustrates what is meant by making the worse argument seem the better. Hence people were right in objecting to the training [25] Protagoras undertook to give them. It was a fraud; the probability it handled was not genuine but spurious, and has a place in no art except Rhetoric and Eristic.

  25 · Enthymemes, genuine and apparent, have now been described; the next [30] subject is their refutation.

  An argument may be refuted either by a counter-deduction or by bringing an objection. It is clear that counter-deductions can be built up from the same commonplaces; for the materials of deductions are reputable opinions, and such opinions often contradict each other. Objections, as appears in the Topics.48 may be [35] raised in four ways—either by directly attacking your opponent’s own statement, or by putting forward another statement like it, or by putting forward a statement contrary to it, or by quoting previous decisions.

  By ‘attacking your opponent’s own statement’ I mean, for instance, this: if his enthymeme should assert that love is always good, the objection can be brought in two ways, either by making the general statement that all want is an evil, or by making the particular one that there would be no talk of Caunian love if there were not evil loves as well as good ones.

  An objection from a contrary statement is raised when, for instance, the [5] opponent’s enthymeme having concluded that a good man does good to all his friends, you object, ‘But a bad man does not do evil to all his friends’.

  An example of an objection from a like statement is, the enthymeme having shown that ill-used men always hate their ill-users, to reply, ‘But well-used men do not always love those who used them well’.

  The decisions mentioned are those proceeding from well-known men; for instance, if the enthymeme employed has concluded that some allowance ought to [10] be made for drunken offenders, since they did not know what they were doing, the objection will be, ‘Pittacus, then, deserves no approval, or he would not have prescribed specially severe penalties for offences due to drunkenness’.

  Enthymemes are based upon one or other of four things: probabilities, examples, evidences, signs. Enthymemes based upon probabilities are those which [15] argue from what is, or is supposed to be, usually true. Enthymemes based upon example are those which proceed from one or more similar cases, arrive at a general proposition, and then argue deductively to a particular inference. Enthymemes based upon evidences are those which argue from the inevitable and invariable. [20] Enthymemes based upon signs are those which argue from some universal or particular proposition, true or false.

  Now as a probability is that which happens usually but not always, enthymemes founded upon probabilities can, it is clear, always be refuted by raising some objection. The refutation is not genuine but spurious; for it consists in showing not that your opponent’s premiss is not probable, but only in showing that it is not [25] inevitably true. Hence it is always in defence rather than in accusation that it is possible to gain an advantage by using this fallacy. For the accuser uses probabilities to prove his case: and to refute a conclusion as improbable is not the same thing as to refute it as not inevitable. Any argument based upon what usually happens is always open to objection: otherwise it would not happen usually and be a [30] probability but hold always and be necessary. But the judges think, if the refutation takes this form, either that the accuser’s case is not probable or that they must not decide it; which, as we said, is a false piece of reasoning. For they ought to decide by considering not merely what must be true but also what is likely to be true: this is, indeed, the meaning of ‘giving a verdict in accordance with one’s honest opinion’. Therefore it is not enough for the defendant to refute the accusation by proving that [35] the charge is not bound to be true: he must do so by showing that it is not likely to be true. For this purpose his objection must state what is more usually true than the statement attacked. It may do so in either of two ways: either in respect of time or in [1403a1] respect of the facts. It will be most convincing if it does so in both respects; for if the thing in question happens oftener thus, the probability is greater.

  Signs, and enthymemes based upon them, can be refuted even if the facts are correct, as was said at the outset. For we have shown in the Analytics49 that every [5] sign is non-deductive.

  Enthymemes depending on examples may be refuted in the same way as probabilities. If we have a single negative instance, the argument is refuted, in so far as it is proved not inevitable, even though the positive examples are more similar and more frequent. Otherwise, we must contend that the present case is dissimilar, or that its conditions are dissimilar, or that it is different in some way or other. [10]

  It will be impossible to refute evidences and enthymemes resting on them, by showing in any way that they are non-deductive: this, too, we see from the Analytics.50 All we can do is to show that the fact alleged does not exist. If there is no doubt that it does, and that it is an evidence, refutation now becomes impossible; [15] for this is equivalent to a demonstration which is clear in every respect.

  26 · Amplification and depreciation are not an element of enthymeme. By an element I mean the same thing as a commonplace; for an element is a commonplace embracing a large number of particular kinds of enthymeme. Amplification and depreciation are used to show that a thing is great or small; just [20] as there are other kinds used to show that a thing is good or bad, just or unjust, and anything else of the sort. All these things are the subject-matter of deductions and enthymemes; none of these is a commonplace for an enthymeme; no more, therefore, are amplification and depreciation.

  Nor are refutative enthymemes a species. For it is clear that refutation consists [25] either in offering proof or in raising an objection, and that we prove the opposite of our adversary’s statements. Thus, if he shows that a thing has happened, we show that it has not; if he shows that it has not happened, we show that it has. This, then, could not be the distinction, since the same means are employed by both parties, [30] enthymemes being adduced to show that the fact is or is not so-and-so. An objection, on the other hand, is not an enthymeme at all, but as was said in the Topics.51 it consists in stating some opinion from which it will be clear that our opponent has not reasoned correctly or has made a false assumption.

  Three points must be studied in making a speech; and we have now completed the account of examples, maxims, enthymemes, and in general the thought-element—the way to invent and refute arguments. We have
next to discuss [1403b1] language and arrangement.

  BOOK III

  1 · In making a speech one must study three points: first, the means of [5] producing persuasion; second, the language; third, the proper arrangement of the various parts of the speech. We have already specified the sources of persuasion. We [10] have shown that these are three in number; what they are; and why there are only these three; for persuasion is in every case effected either by working on the emotions of the judges themselves, by giving them the right impression of the speakers’ character, or by proving the truth of the statements made.

  Enthymemes also have been described, and the sources from which they should be derived; there being both special lines of argument for enthymemes and commonplaces.

  [15] Our next subject will be language. For it is not enough to know what we ought to say; we must also say it as we ought; much help is thus afforded towards producing the right impression of a speech. The first question to receive attention was naturally the one that comes first naturally—how persuasion can be produced [20] from the facts themselves. The second is how to set these facts out in language. A third would be the proper method of delivery; this is a thing that affects the success of a speech greatly; but hitherto the subject has been neglected. Indeed, it was long before it found a way into the arts of tragic drama and epic recitation: at first poets acted their tragedies themselves. It is plain that delivery has just as much to do with [25] oratory as with poetry. (In connexion with poetry, it has been studied by Glaucon of Teos among others.) It is, essentially, a matter of the right management of the voice to express the various emotions—of speaking loudly, softly, or between the two; of [30] high, low, or intermediate pitch; of the various rhythms that suit various subjects. These are the three things—volume of sound, modulation of pitch, and rhythm— that a speaker bears in mind. It is those who do bear them in mind who usually win prizes in the dramatic contests; and just as in drama the actors now count for more than the poets, so it is in the contests of public life, owing to the defects of our [35] political institutions. No systematic treatise upon the rules of delivery has yet been composed; indeed, even the study of language made no progress till late in the day. [1404a1] Besides, delivery is—very properly—not regarded as an elevated subject of inquiry. Still, the whole business of rhetoric being concerned with appearances, we must pay attention to the subject of delivery, unworthy though it is, because we cannot do without it. The right thing in speaking really is that we should be satisfied not to [5] annoy our hearers, without trying to delight them: we ought in fairness to fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts; nothing, therefore, should matter except the proof of those facts. Still, as has been already said, other things affect the result considerably, owing to the defects of our hearers. The arts of language cannot help [10] having a small but real importance, whatever it is we have to expound to others: the way in which a thing is said does affect its intelligibility. Not, however, so much importance as people think. All such arts are fanciful and meant to charm the hearer. Nobody uses fine language when teaching geometry.

  When the principles of delivery have been worked out, they will produce the same effect as on the stage. But only very slight attempts to deal with them have been made and by a few people, as by Thrasymachus in his ‘Appeals to Pity’. [15] Dramatic ability is a natural gift, and can hardly be systematically taught. The principles of language can be so taught, and therefore we have men of ability in this direction too, who win prizes in their turn, as well as those speakers who excel in delivery—speeches of the written kind owe more of their effect to their language than to their thought.

  It was naturally the poets who first set the movement going; for words [20] represent things, and they had also the human voice at their disposal, which of all our organs can best represent other things. Thus the arts of recitation and acting were formed, and others as well. Now it was because poets seemed to win fame through their fine language when their thoughts were simple enough, that language [25] at first took a poetical colour, e.g. that of Gorgias. Even now most uneducated people think that poetical language makes the finest discourses. That is not true: the language of prose is distinct from that of poetry. This is shown by the state of things to-day, when even the language of tragedy has altered its character. Just as iambics [30] were adopted, instead of tetrameters, because they are the most prose-like of all metres, so tragedy has given up all those words, not used in ordinary talk, which decorated the early drama and are still used by the writers of hexameter poems. It is [35] therefore ridiculous to imitate a poetical manner which the poets themselves have dropped; and it is now plain that we have not to treat in detail the whole question of language, but may confine ourselves to that part of it which concerns our present subject, rhetoric. The other part of it has been discussed in the treatise on the Art of Poetry.

  2 · We may, then, start from the observations there made, and the stipulation [1404b1] that language to be good must be clear, as is proved by the fact that speech which fails to convey a plain meaning will fail to do just what speech has to do. It must also be appropriate, avoiding both meanness and undue evaluation; poetical language is certainly free from meanness, but it is not appropriate to prose. Clearness is secured by [5] using the words (nouns and verbs alike) that are current and ordinary. Freedom from meanness, and positive adornment too, are secured by using the other words mentioned in the Art of Poetry. Such variation makes the language appear more stately. People do not feel towards strangers as they do towards their own countrymen, and the same thing is true of their feeling for language. It is therefore well to give to everyday speech [10] an unfamiliar air: people like what strikes them, and are struck by what is out of the way. In verse such effects are common, and there they are fitting: the persons and things there spoken of are comparatively remote from ordinary life; for even in poetry, it is not quite appropriate that fine language should be used by a slave or a very young man, or about very trivial subjects: even in poetry the style, to be appropriate, must [15] sometimes be toned down, though at other times heightened. All the more so in prose, where the subject-matter is less exalted. We can now see that a writer must disguise his art and give the impression of speaking naturally and not artificially. Naturalness is persuasive, artificiality is the contrary; for our hearers are prejudiced and think we have some design against them, as if we were mixing their wines for them. It is like the [20] difference between the quality of Theodorus’ voice and the voices of all other actors: his really seems to be that of the character who is speaking, theirs do not. We can hide our purpose successfully by taking the single words of our composition from [25] the speech of ordinary life. This is done in poetry by Euripides, who was the first to show the way to his successors.

  Language is composed of nouns and verbs. Nouns are of the various kinds considered in the treatise on poetry. Strange words, compound words, and invented [30] words must be used sparingly and on few occasions: on what occasions we shall state later. The reason for this restriction has been already indicated: they depart from what is suitable, in the direction of excess. In the language of prose, besides the regular and proper terms for things, metaphorical terms only can be used with advantage. This we gather from the fact that these two classes of terms, the proper [35] or regular and the metaphorical—these and no others—are used by everybody in conversation. We can now see that a good writer can produce a style that is distinguished without being obtrusive, and is at the same time clear, thus satisfying our definition of good oratorical prose. Words of ambiguous meaning are chiefly useful to enable the sophist to mislead his hearers. Synonyms are useful to the poet, [1405a1] by which I mean words whose ordinary meaning is the same, e.g. πoρεῦεσθαι (advancing) and βαδἱζειν (proceeding); these two are ordinary words and have the same meaning.

  In the Art of Poetry, as we have already said, will be found definitions of these [5] kinds of words; a classification of metaphors; and mention of the fac
t that metaphor is of great value both in poetry and in prose. Prose-writers must, however, pay specially careful attention to metaphor, because their other resources are scantier than those of poets. Metaphor, moreover, gives style clearness, charm, and distinction as nothing else can: and it is not a thing whose use can be taught by one [10] man to another. Metaphors, like epithets, must be fitting, which means that they must fairly correspond to the thing signified: failing this, their inappropriateness will be conspicuous: the want of harmony between two things is emphasized by their being placed side by side. It is like having to ask ourselves what dress will suit an old man; certainly not the crimson cloak that suits a young man. And if you wish to pay [15] a compliment, you must take your metaphor from something better in the same line; if to disparage, from something worse. To illustrate my meaning: since opposites are in the same class, you do what I have suggested if you say that a man who begs prays, and a man who prays begs; for praying and begging are both varieties of [20] asking. So Iphicrates called Callias a mendicant priest instead of a torch-bearer, and Callias replied that Iphicrates must be uninitiated or he would have called him not a mendicant priest but a torch-bearer. Both are religious titles, but one is honourable and the other is not. Again, somebody calls actors hangers-on of Dionysus, but they call themselves artists: each of these terms is a metaphor, the one [25] intended to throw dirt at the actor, the other to dignify him. And pirates now call themselves purveyors. We can thus call a crime a mistake, or a mistake a crime. We can say that a thief took a thing, or that he plundered his victim. An expression like that of Euripides’ Telephus,