The Politics of Aristotle

by Aristotle

  But I hesitate to say another word, lest I should seem to be writing for effect, [5] bringing forward proofs of facts which are fully known as though they were not generally admitted. I will therefore say no more, after mentioning only one topic, in enlarging on which one might spend one’s whole life, namely, that reason is the thing wherein we are superior to all other animals; and we who have received the highest honour which heaven can bestow will have this above other men. For all [10] animals display the appetites and desire and the like, but none save man possesses reason. Now it would be most strange if, when it is by virtue of reason alone that we live happier lives than all other animals, we should through indifference despise and [15] renounce that which is the cause of our well-being. Though you have long been exhorted thereto, I urge you to embrace with the utmost zeal the study of reasoned speech. For just as health preserves the body, so is education the recognized preserver of the mind. Under its guidance you will never take a false step in anything that you do, but you will keep safe practically all the advantages which [20] you already possess. Moreover, if physical sight is a pleasure, to see clearly with the eyes of the soul is a thing to be admired. Again, as the general is the saviour of his army, so is reason, allied with education, the guide of life. These, then, and like [25] sentiments I think I may well dismiss at the present moment.

  In your letter you urge me not to let this book fall into other hands than yours, and this knowing full well that, just as parents love their own offspring more than supposititious children, so those who have invented something have more affection [30] for it than those to whom the discovery is merely imparted. For men have died in defence of their words, as they have died for their offspring. For the so-called Parian sophists, because what they teach is not of their own production, in their gross indifference feel no affection and barter it away for money. For this reason I exhort [35] you to watch over these precepts, that while they are yet young they may be corrupted by no moneys, and, sharing in your well-ordered life, when they come to man’s estate, may win unsullied glory.

  Following the lesson taught by Nicanor, we have adopted from other authors anything on the same subjects which was particularly well expressed in their [1421b1] treatises. You will find two such books, one of which is my own, viz. the Oratorical Art which I wrote for Theodectes, while the other is the treatise of Corax. The other points connected with public and forensic exhortations have all been dealt with [5] specially in these treatises. So in these commentaries written expressly for you you will find material for amplifying these two treatises. Farewell.]

  1 · Public speeches fall into three classes, deliberative, epideictic, and [10] forensic. They are of seven kinds, being employed in persuasion, dissuasion, eulogy, vituperation, accusation, defence, and inquiry either by itself or in relation to something else. Such are the different kinds of discourses and their number. We shall employ them in public harangues, in lawsuits about contracts, and in private [15] conversation. We shall treat of them most conveniently if we take them each separately and enumerate their qualities, their uses, and their actions. And first let us discuss persuasion and dissuasion, since they are used most of all in private [20] conversations and in public harangues. To speak generally, persuasion is an exhortation to some choice or speech or action, while dissuasion is the prevention of some choice or speech or action. Such being the definition of these things, he who [25] persuades must show that those things to which he exhorts are just, lawful, expedient, honourable, pleasant, and easy of accomplishment. Failing that, when he is exhorting to that which is difficult, he must show that it is practicable and that its execution is necessary. He who dissuades, by pursuing the opposite course, must exert a hindering influence, showing that the proposed action is neither just nor [30] lawful nor expedient nor honourable nor pleasant nor practicable; if he cannot do that, he must urge that it is toilsome and unnecessary. All actions can have both these sets of attributes applied to them, so that no-one who can urge one of these two sets of fundamental qualities is at a loss for anything to say. It is for these qualities therefore that those who seek to persuade or dissuade must look. I will now attempt [35] to define them one by one and show whence we shall supply them for our discourses.

  That which is just is the unwritten custom of all or the majority of men which draws a distinction between what is honourable and what is base. We may take as examples the honouring of parents, doing good to one’s friends, and returning good to one’s benefactors. These and similar duties are not enjoined upon mankind by [1422a1] written laws, but they are observed by unwritten custom and universal practice. So much for just actions.

  Law is a common agreement made by the community, which ordains in writing how the citizens ought to act under every kind of circumstance.

  [5] Expediency is the safeguarding of existing advantages, or the acquisition of those not already possessed, or the riddance of existing disadvantages, or the prevention of harm which threatens to occur. For individuals you can divide up expediency according as it applies to the body or the soul or external possessions. [10] For the body, strength, beauty, and health are expedient; for the soul, courage, wisdom, and justice. External possessions are friends, wealth, and property. The contraries of these are inexpedient. For a community such things as concord, strength for war, wealth, a plentiful supply of revenue, and excellence and abundance of allies are expedient. In a word we look upon anything of this kind as [15] expedient and the contrary as inexpedient. Honourable things are those from which good repute and creditable distinction will accrue to the doers. Pleasant things are those which cause joy. Easy things are those which are accomplished with the least expenditure of time, trouble, and money. Practicable things are all those which admit of performance. Necessary things are those the execution of which does not [20] depend upon us but takes place as it were by some necessity divine or human. Such, then, is the nature of things just, lawful, expedient, honourable, easy, practicable, and necessary.

  It will be easy to speak about such subjects by the use of the considerations mentioned above and by ones analogous to them and by ones opposed to them and [25] by employing judgements pronounced by the gods or by men or by judges of repute or by our opponents.

  We have already described the nature of that which is just. The following are cases where there is an analogy to that which is just: ‘As we consider it just to obey [30] parents, on the same principle it behoves sons to imitate the actions of their fathers’; or again, ‘As it is just to do good in return to those who do good to us, so it is just to abstain from harming those who have done us no ill’. It is by this method that we must get analogies to justice. Then we ought to make it plain from contraries in the [35] following way: ‘As it is just to punish those who do us a wrong, so it behoves us to do good in return to our benefactors’. You will discover what is just in the judgement of men of repute by a consideration such as the following: ‘Not only do we hate and do harm to our enemies, but the Athenians also and the Lacedaemonians judge that it [40] is just to punish their enemies’. By following this system you will often discover What is just. [1422b1]

  We have already defined the nature of that which is lawful. When it serves our purpose we must introduce the law itself, and any case of analogy to the written law. For example, ‘As the lawgiver punishes thieves with very serious penalties, so we [5] ought to inflict heavy chastisement on those who deceive, for they steal away the understanding’; or again, ‘Just as the lawgiver has made the nearest relatives the heirs of those who die childless, so I ought in the present case to have authority over the possessions of a freedman; for since those who set him free are dead and I am the [10] nearest relative of the deceased persons, I am justified in assuming control over their freedmen’. This is an example of the way in which an analogy to that which is ordained by law is obtained. The following is an illustration of what is contrary to that which is lawful: ‘If the law prohibits the distribution of public property, it was [15] clearly t
he judgement of the lawgiver that all who divide up such property are doing wrong; for if the laws ordain that those who govern the state well and justly should be honoured, they clearly regard those who make away with public property as deserving of punishment’. The nature of the lawful is thus clearly shown by taking [20] cases of the contrary. It can be demonstrated from previous judgements by a consideration such as this: ‘Not only do I hold that the lawgiver made this law to cover such cases as these, but on a former occasion, when Lysithidas gave an explanation similar to that which I am now putting forward, the jury voted in favour [25] of this interpretation of the law’. By this method we shall often be able to demonstrate what is lawful.

  The nature of the expedient itself has already been defined. We must, as in the cases already mentioned, introduce the expedient, wherever it is available, into our arguments and often bring it to light, pursuing the same method which we [30] employed for the lawful and the just. The following would be instances of analogies to the expedient: ‘As in war it is expedient to station the bravest men in the front rank, so in the state it is advantageous that the wisest and justest men should be the leaders of the people’; or again, ‘As it is expedient for the healthy to be on their [35] guard against disease, so too in communities which live in harmony it is expedient to provide against possibilities of faction’. By following this method you will be able to make many analogies to the expedient. The expedient will also be clear if you take [40] contrary cases such as the following: ‘If it is advantageous to honour good citizens, it would be expedient also to punish the wicked’; or again, ‘If you think it inexpedient that we should make war unaided on the Thebans, it would be expedient to make [1423a1] the Lacedaemonians our allies and then make war on the Thebans’. This is the method by which you will demonstrate the expedient by arguing from the contrary. You can discover what has been judged to be expedient by judges of repute by [5] considerations such as the following: ‘The Lacedaemonians, when they had conquered the Athenians, thought it expedient not to enslave their city, and on another occasion the Athenians and Thebans, when it was within their power to depopulate Sparta, thought it expedient to allow the Lacedaemonians to survive’.

  [10] By pursuing this method you will have plenty to say about the just, the lawful, and the expedient. You must employ the same methods in the case of the honourable, the easy, the pleasant, the practicable, and the necessary. We shall thus have abundant material on these topics also.

  2 · Next let us determine the number and character of the subjects which we [15] discuss in the council-chamber and in the popular assembly. If we have a clear knowledge of these, the actual circumstances will provide us with something appropriate to say on each occasion when we are giving advice. If we have long been familiar with the characteristics common to each class of subject, we shall always be able to apply them readily in practice. We must therefore distinguish the various [20] subjects about which all men hold public deliberation.

  To sum the matter up, there are seven subjects on which we shall speak in public. For whether we are addressing the council or the people, we must necessarily deliberate and speak about either sacred rites or laws or the political constitution or [25] alliances and contracts with other states or war or peace or the provision of resources. These, then, are the subjects about which we shall deliberate and address the people. Let us take each of them separately and see how they can be treated in a speech.

  There are three ways in which we must deal with the subject of sacred rites; for [30] we shall urge either that they ought to be retained in their existing form, or that they ought to be changed so as to be more magnificent or else less sumptuous. When we are maintaining that the existing form should be retained, we should derive material from the argument of justice, urging that it is regarded by all men as unjust to transgress the customs of our forefathers, and that all the oracles [35] command men to make their sacrifices according to the usages of their forefathers, and that it is of the utmost importance that the religious observances should be continued which were prescribed by those who originally founded cities and set up temples to the gods. On the ground of expediency we shall urge that, if the sacrifices are offered according to ancestral usage, it will be expedient either for individuals or [1423b1] the community at large in view of the payments of money which will be involved, and that it will benefit the citizens by creating a feeling of self-confidence; for if heavy-armed troops, horsemen, and light-armed soldiers join in a religious procession, the citizens, priding themselves on such things, would feel greater confidence [5] in themselves. It can be urged on the ground of what is honourable, if it results in the spectacle of splendid festivals2; on the ground of pleasure, because a variety in the sacrifices to the gods is introduced into the spectacle; and on the ground of practicability, if neither defect nor excess has characterized the celebration. Thus when we are speaking in support of the existing state of affairs, we must pursue our [10] inquiry by the above or similar methods and treat the question under discussion as the nature of the subject permits.

  When we are advising a change to greater magnificence in the celebration of sacred rites, we shall have a plausible pretext for altering ancestral usages, if we urge that an addition to existing rites involves not their destruction but their [15] extension; again, that it is reasonable to suppose that the gods too are more favourably disposed to those who honour them more; again, that even our fathers used not to perform their sacrifices always in the same way, but regulated their service to the gods, both as a community and as private individuals, according to the [20] occasion and their own prosperity; again, that this is a principle which we follow in all other matters in the government of our cities and our private establishments. You must also mention any advantage in brilliance or enjoyment which is likely to result to the city from the alteration, following the methods which we have described above.

  When we are urging a reduction of the scale of our sacred rites, we must in the [25] first place direct our remarks to the circumstances of the moment and show in what respect the citizens are less prosperous now than formerly. Next we must show that it is reasonable to suppose that the gods rejoice, not in the costliness of the sacrifices, but in the piety of those who offer them; again, that both gods and men deem those who do anything beyond their means to be guilty of great folly; next, that public [30] expenditure is not merely a personal question but depends on prosperity and adversity. These and others of the same kind are the arguments which we shall offer on the subject of sacrifices.

  But in order that we may know how to give some indications and offer rules as [35] to the conditions of the ideal sacrifice, let us define it thus: the best sacrifice of all is one which is pious towards the gods, moderate in costliness, splendid from a spectacular point of view, and likely to bring advantage in war. It will be pious [1424a1] towards the gods, if ancestral usage is not violated; it will be moderate in costliness, if the accompaniments of the ceremony are not all wasted; it will be splendid from a spectacular point of view, if gold and such things as are not actually consumed are [5] used lavishly; and it will be advantageous for war, if horsemen and infantry in full panoply accompany the procession. By following these rules we shall best provide for the service of the gods. From what has been said above we shall know how to speak in public about the performance of sacred rites of every kind.

  [10] Let us next deal similarly with laws and the political constitution. Laws may be briefly described as common agreements made by the community which define and ordain in writing how the citizens should act under various circumstances.

  In democratic states legislation ought to provide for appointment by lot to the less important and the majority of the offices (for thus faction will be avoided), [15] while the most important magistrates should be elected by the votes of the multitude. In this way the people, having the power to bestow honours on whomsoever they like, will not be jealous of those who obtain them, while the more prominent men will be encou
raged to practice virtue, knowing that it will be to their advantage to have a good repute among their fellow-citizens. Such are the laws [20] which ought to be laid down regarding elections in a democratic state. It would be a lengthy task to go into detail about the rest of the administration. But, to put the matter briefly, care must be taken that the laws may prevent the multitude from entertaining designs against the possessors of property and may instil into the [25] wealthy citizens an eagerness to spend money in undertaking public burdens. The laws will ensure this if certain distinctions are set aside by law for the owners of property in return for their expenditure in the service of the state, and if the laws [30] show more consideration for the tillers of the soil and the sailors among the poorer classes than for the poor; so that the rich may willingly serve the state, and the people may prefer work to dishonest means of gain. In addition stringent laws must be laid down forbidding the distribution of lands and the confiscation of the [35] property of those who have served the state, and heavy penalties must be imposed on those who commit these transgressions. Also public land in a good position in front of the city must be set apart for the burial of those who are killed in war, and their children must be supported at the public expense until they grow up. Such must be the character of legislation in a democratic state.