The Politics of Aristotle

by Aristotle

  All the various branches of oratory having now been distinguished, we must employ them, when it is fitting, either each separately or in common with one another by mingling their different qualities. For there are very great differences between them, but in actual practice they have much in common. In this respect [35] they resemble the various classes of human beings, who are partly similar and partly dissimilar in their appearance and in their looks. Having thus distinguished the various kinds of oratory, let us next enumerate the requisites which are common to all kinds and explain how they must be used.

  6 · First, then, the just, the lawful, the expedient, the honourable, the [1428a1] pleasant, and similar topics are, as I stated at the beginning, common to all the various kinds of oratory, but are chiefly used in persuasive and dissuasive oratory. Secondly amplification and minimization are necessarily useful in all kinds of oratory, but most use is made of them in eulogy and vituperation. Thirdly, there are [5] the proofs, which must necessarily be employed in every department of oratory, but are particularly useful in accusation and defence, since these need most refutation.8 Further we must deal with anticipations of arguments, postulates, reiterations, elegancies, prolixity of speech, and moderate length of speech, brevity, and method of statement. For these and similar expedients are useful in all the various branches [10] of oratory.

  7 · The just, the lawful, and the like I have already defined and explained their application; I have also dealt with amplification and minimization. I will now [15] explain the other terms, beginning with the proofs.

  Proofs are of two kinds; some are derived directly from actual words, acts, and persons, others are supplementary to words and actions. Probabilities, examples, evidences, enthymemes, maxims, signs, and refutations are proofs derived from [20] actual words, persons, and actions. The speaker’s opinions, testimonies, evidence given under torture, and oaths are supplementary proofs. We must understand the nature of each of these kinds of proof, and whence we are to derive material for [25] them, and how they differ from one another.

  It is a probability when one’s hearers have examples in their own minds of what is being said. For instance, if any one were to say that he desires the glorification of his country, the prosperity of his friends, and the misfortunes of his foes, and the like, his statements taken together will seem to be probabilities; for each one of his hearers is himself conscious that he entertains such wishes on these and similar [30] subjects. We must, therefore, always carefully notice, when we are speaking, whether we are likely to find our audience in sympathy with us on the subject on which we are speaking; for in that case they are most likely to believe what we say. Such, then, is the nature of a probability. [35]

  We can divide probabilities into three kinds. One kind consists in the inclusion in one’s speech of the feelings which are naturally found in mankind—if, for example, certain persons happen to despise or fear a certain other person, or, further, if they feel pleasure or pain or desire, or have ceased from desire, or if they [1428b1] have experienced in mind or body or one of the senses any of the feelings whereby we are all affected. These and similar feelings, being common to all human nature, [5] are well known to our hearers. Such, then, are the natural feelings which are wont to affect mankind, and for these we say that a place ought to be found in our speeches. Another division of probabilities falls under the heading of habit (which is what we do from custom), a third under that of love of gain. For we often for the sake of gain choose to act in a way which does violence to our nature and character. [10]

  With these definitions before us, when we are seeking to persuade or dissuade, we must show in regard to the subject in question that the action to which we are exhorting our hearers, or which we are opposing, has the effect which we declare that it has. Failing that, we must show that actions similar to that of which we are [15] speaking either generally or invariably turn out as we say they do. Such must be our application of probabilities in relation to actions. As regards persons you must show, if you can, when you are accusing any one, that he has often committed the act in question on previous occasions; or, if that is impossible, that he has done [20] similar acts. You must also try to prove that it was to his advantage to commit these acts; for most men, themselves preferring what is to their advantage, think that others too always act from this motive. If, therefore, you can derive an argument of [25] probability directly from your adversaries, this is the method by which you must infer it. Failing that, you must take similar persons and adduce their customary procedure; for example, when the man whom you are accusing is young, argue that he has committed acts such as persons of that age are in the habit of committing; for your accusations against him will be believed on the ground of this resemblance. [30] Similarly you will gain credence if you can show that his companions have the character which you declare him to have; for owing to his association with them it will appear likely that he has the same pursuits as his friends. Such must be the employment of the argument from probabilities by those who are accusing.

  Those who are speaking in their own defence must make it their chief object to show that none of the acts of which they are accused has ever been committed either [35] by themselves or by any of their friends or by any person who resembles them, and that it would have been of no advantage to them to commit such acts. But if you have manifestly done the same deed on a previous occasion, the fault must be attributed to your youth, or some other excuse must be introduced to provide a reasonable pretext for your having done wrong on that occasion. You must declare also that it was of no benefit to you to have acted thus at the time and that it would not have been of any advantage to you now. If no act of the kind alleged has ever [1429a1] been committed by you, but some of your friends happen to have done such deeds, you must plead that it is not just that you should be slandered because of them, and you must show that others of your associates are honest men; you will thus throw doubt on the crime of which you are accused. If they point out that other persons, [5] who resemble you, have committed the same crimes as they allege against you, you must declare that it is absurd if the fact that other people can be shown to have done wrong is to be regarded as a proof that you have committed any of the deeds of which you are accused. If, then, you deny that you have done the deed with which you are charged, you must thus make your defence by arguing from probabilities; [10] for you will then make the charge appear implausible. If, however, you are obliged to admit the charge, you must point out the resemblance of your acts to the usual practice of mankind, by stating as emphatically as possible that the majority of men, or all men, act under these and similar circumstances exactly as you have [15] done. If you cannot do this, you must take refuge in pleas of misfortune or error, and try to obtain pardon by citing the passions which are common to all mankind and make us lose our reason—love, anger, drunkenness, ambition, and the like. Such is the method by which we shall make the most skilful use of the argument from [20] probability.

  8 · Examples are actions which have taken place in the past and are similar to, or the contrary of, those about which we are speaking. They must be used when your statement is not credible and you wish to establish its truth when it does not [25] gain credence from the argument of probability; the object being that your hearers, learning that another action similar to that of which you are speaking has been carried out in the way in which you declare it to have been done, may be more ready to believe what you say.

  Examples are of two kinds; for some things turn out according to our expectations, others contrary to them. The former cause credit the latter discredit. [30] For instance, if some one declares that the rich are juster than the poor and instances certain just actions on the part of rich men, such examples are in accordance with our expectation, for one can see that most men think that rich [35] people are juster than poor people. If, on the other hand, some one shows that certain rich individuals have acted unjustly in order to get money, thus employing an example which is contrary to
expectation, he would cause the rich to be distrusted. Similarly, if any one brings forward an example of what seems to be in accordance with our expectation—for instance, that on some occasion the [1429b1] Lacedaemonians or Athenians employing a large number of allies utterly defeated their enemies—he then disposes his hearers to take to themselves many allies. For every one is of opinion that large numbers are of no small importance for winning a [5] victory. If, on the other hand, a speaker wishes to prove that numbers do not bring victory, he must give as examples occasions when the unexpected has happened, pointing out, for instance, that the Athenian exiles first seized Phyle with fifty men and then fought a battle against the far more numerous party in the city, who had [10] the Lacedaemonians as their allies, and were thus restored to their own city; or again, that the Thebans, when the Lacedaemonians and practically all the Peloponnesians invaded Boeotia, confronted them alone at Leuctra and conquered [15] the might of the Lacedaemonians; or again, that Dio the Syracusan sailed to Syracuse with three thousand hoplites and defeated Dionysius, whose forces were many times as great; and likewise the Corinthians, when they went to the assistance of the Syracusans with nine triremes, defeated the Carthaginians, although they were blockading the harbours of Syracuse with a hundred and fifty ships and held [20] all the city except the acropolis. To sum the matter up, these and similar instances of unexpected successes often serve to discredit counsels which are based on ordinary probability. Such, then, is the nature of examples. [25]

  Examples of both kinds must be employed, when we are urging what may be reasonably expected to happen, in order to show that the suggested course of action for the most part turns out in a particular way; and, when we are predicting some unexpected result, in order to give instances in which satisfactory results have accrued where they seemed to be least expected. If your adversaries use this device, [30] you must show that their instances were the results of good luck, and declare that such things happen rarely, whereas your examples are of common occurrence. This, then, is the method of employing examples. If, on the other hand, we wish to cite instances where the unexpected has happened, we must collect as many of them as [35] possible and show by enumeration that the unexpected happens quite as often as the expected. We must use not only examples derived in this way but also those based on contraries. For instance, you can show that a certain state has acted selfishly towards its allies and that their friendship has thus been dissolved, and then say, ‘We on the other hand, if we behave fairly and impartially towards our allies, shall [1430a1] keep their alliance for a long time’; or again, you can show that certain others have gone to war without due preparation and have consequently been defeated, and then [5] say, ‘If we were to go to war properly prepared, we should have better hopes of success’. You will be able to derive a number of examples from past and from present events; for actions are generally partly like and partly unlike one another. [10] For this reason therefore we shall have no lack of examples and no difficulty in contradicting those brought forward by the other side. We now know the different kinds of examples and how we are to employ them and whence we are to derive them in abundance.

  9 · Evidences exist where the direct contrary of that with which the speech is [15] concerned has occurred,9 and where the speech is self-contradictory. For most listeners conclude from the contraries which occur in connexion with a speech or action that there is nothing sound in what is being said or done. You will often discover evidences by considering whether your adversary’s speech is self-contradictory [20] or whether his action itself contradicts his words. Such is the nature of evidences and the method by which you will obtain the greatest number of them.

  10 · Enthymemes arise where contraries occur not only of the speech and [25] action in question but of anything else as well. You will often discover them by pursuing the method prescribed for the oratory of inquiry and by considering whether the speech or the actions are contrary to justice or law or expediency or to what is honourable, practicable, easy, or probable, or to the character of the speaker [30] or the nature of the circumstances. Such are the enthymemes which must be chosen for use against our adversaries. The contraries of these must be employed on our own behalf, and we must prove that our actions and words are the contrary of those [35] which are unjust, unlawful, inexpedient, and of the habits of wicked men—in a word, of those things which are considered evil. We must speak in support of each of these pleas as briefly as possible and express ourselves in the fewest possible words. This then is the way in which we shall obtain a large number of enthymemes and the best method of employing them.

  11 · A maxim is, briefly, the expression of an individual opinion on general [1430b1] matters. There are two kinds of maxims, those which are reputable and those which are paradoxical. When you are using the former, there is no need to bring forward any reasons for your statement for what you say is well known and does not excite incredulity. But when you are uttering a paradox, you must state your reasons [5] briefly, so as to avoid prolixity and not arouse incredulity. The maxims which you quote must be applicable to the circumstances, in order that your words may not seem inept and far-fetched. We shall form a large number of maxims either from [10] the peculiar nature of the circumstances or by means of hyperbole or by drawing parallels. The following are examples of maxims derived from the peculiar circumstances of a case: ‘I do not regard it as possible for a man to become a clever general if he is without experience in affairs’; or again, ‘It is characteristic of sensible men to profit by the examples of their predecessors and so try to avoid the errors of evil counsel’. Such then are the maxims which we shall form from the [15] peculiar circumstances of a case. Maxims such as the following are formed by hyperbole: ‘Thieves are in my opinion worse than plunderers; for the former carry off property secretly, the latter openly’. By this method we shall form a number of maxims by hyperbole. The following are maxims based on parallels: ‘Those who [20] appropriate money seem to me to act very like those who betray cities; for both are trusted and wrong those who have trusted them’; or again, ‘My opponents seem to me to act very like tyrants; for tyrants claim not to be punished for the wrongs which [25] they have themselves inflicted, while they demand the fullest punishment for the wrongs of which they accuse others; and my adversaries, if they have themselves something which belongs to me, do not restore it, while, if I have received something which belongs to them, they think that they ought to have it restored to them and the interest on it as well’. By following this method then we shall form a number of maxims.

  12 · One thing is a sign of another thing, but one thing taken at random is [30] not a sign of something else taken at random, nor is everything a sign of everything else; but the sign of a thing is that which usually occurs before, or simultaneously with, or after it. That which has happened is a sign not only of what has happened but also of what has not happened; and similarly what has not happened is a sign not [35] only of what does not exist but also of what does exist. One sign causes belief, another knowledge; the latter is the best kind of sign, while that which produces the most plausible opinion is second best. To put the matter briefly, we shall obtain an abundance of signs from anything which has been done or is said or seen, taking each separately and also from the greatness or smallness of the resultant [1431a1] disadvantages or advantages. We shall also derive them from testimonies and evidence and from our own supporters or those of our enemies, or from our enemies themselves; also from the challenges issued by the parties and from times and [5] seasons and from many other things. From these sources then we shall have an abundance of signs.

  13 · A refutation is that which cannot be otherwise than as . . .10 as urged by us, and on what is impossible by nature or impossible as urged by our adversaries. [10] An example of something which is naturally necessary is the statement that living creatures require food, and the like. What is necessary as urged by us is such a statement as that those who are scourged confess what their tormentors tell the
m to confess. Again, an instance of what is naturally impossible is the statement that a small child stole a sum of money, which he could not possibly carry, and went off [15] with it. It will be an impossibility as urged by an adversary, if for example, he declares that on a certain date we made a contract at Athens, whereas we can prove to our hearers that at that time we were absent in some other city. From these and similar materials we shall form an ample supply of refutations. [20]

  We have now briefly described all the proofs which are derived from actual words and from acts and from persons. Let us now consider how they differ from one another.

  [25] 14 · A probability differs from an example in this, that the hearers have themselves some notion of the probability, while examples . . .11 can be derived from contraries and from similars, while evidences can only be constructed from contrarieties of word and deed. Again, an enthymeme always has this distinction [30] from an evidence, that an evidence is a contrariety which is concerned with a word or an action, while an enthymeme selects also contrarieties connected with other kinds of things; in other words, it is impossible for us to obtain an evidence unless there is some contrariety in respect of actions or words, whereas speakers can [35] provide themselves with enthymemes from a variety of sources. Maxims differ from enthymemes in that enthymemes can be constructed only from contrarieties, whereas maxims can be enunciated both in connexion with contrarieties and also by themselves. Signs differ from maxims and all the other proofs already mentioned, [40] because, while all the others engender an opinion in the minds of those who hear them, certain of the signs cause those who judge to have a clear knowledge; also [1431a1] because it is impossible for us ourselves to provide most of the other proofs, while it is easy to obtain a large number of signs. Further, a refutation differs from a sign, because some signs cause those who hear them merely to entertain an opinion, whereas every refutation teaches the truth to the judges. Thus from what has been [5] said we know the nature of the proofs which are derived from actual words and actions and men, and the sources from which we are to derive them, and how they differ from one another.