Bargaining with the Devil

by Robert Mnookin

  Eleven years later, when he finally shook off the dust of wilderness and moved into 10 Downing Street, he knew that his support in Parliament was still thin, especially in his own Conservative Party. “The strange dress, ridiculous hats, heavy drinking and pronounced speech impediment did little to encourage the Tory old guard to respect him for much more than having been proved right about the German threat.”29 Indeed, they considered him dangerously impulsive and apt to get carried away by his own rhetoric. Would he lead from the head or the heart? They feared the latter. Many in the Tory establishment saw Churchill as a “Rogue Elephant” whom the “wise old elephants”—Chamberlain and Halifax—might not be able to control.30

  During Churchill’s first two weeks as prime minister, the war went from bad to worse. Hitler conquered the Netherlands, invaded Belgium, and surged into northern France. Britain had sent troops to the continent to support the French, but they were unable to stop the German army. The United States was standing on the sidelines, rooting for Britain and France but doing little to help. Churchill wrote several personal letters to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt pleading for assistance, but none came.

  Worst of all, by May 23, 1940, the German army had surrounded the Allied troops near the French-Belgian border. Some 250,000 British soldiers appeared to be trapped, along with a roughly equal number of French troops. The British public had no understanding of just how bad things were.31 Churchill knew he would have to “prepare public opinion for bad tidings. … [W]hat was now happening in Northern France would be the greatest British military defeat for many centuries.”32 It was against this desperate backdrop that Churchill and his War Cabinet were forced to consider negotiating with Hitler.

  It was Edward, Lord Halifax who pressed for the possibility of negotiation. Like Churchill, Halifax was an English aristocrat but one with very different values and temperament. Born Edward Wood on April 16, 1881, he was the fourth son of a viscount and eventually inherited his father’s title because his three older brothers had died of childhood diseases.33 He was born without a left hand, but his life was not much affected by it.34 His family was enormously wealthy, largely because a huge seam of coal lay under a portion of their lands. Educated at Eton and Oxford, he was personally rich by the time he graduated from university because of large inheritances from a number of uncles and aunts.

  In 1909, Halifax went into politics and stood for a seat in Parliament. Thereafter, he pursued a “bright and successful” career as a Tory politician. An “intensely private man,” he was genuinely modest and “found it hard to lose his temper.”35 Like his father, he was a devout High Church Anglican who exuded moral rectitude. Most of all, he was respectable.

  Halifax’s nickname became “The Holy Fox” because he was both religious and cunning. He believed deeply in original sin. “Far from a pious blindness to the evils of the world, Halifax was [all] too keenly aware of men’s failings. He was if anything more guilty of cynicism than monkish innocence.”36 He saw himself as a pragmatist, not an ideologue. His diplomatic and political career demonstrated a willingness to “[c]ompromise, a degree of guile, and an awareness of the realities of life” that, to him, were fully consistent with his spiritual values.37 As he would later write, “Many of our intellectual difficulties come from an attempt to think that the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of this world are concerned with the same problems. … [I]n a very vital sense they are not.”38

  Halifax’s values and prejudices, however, were those of his class. He saw the world through the eyes of an English landed aristocrat, whose political goals were to safeguard Britain’s independence, continuing imperial role, and honor.39 Roy Jenkins, in his biography of Churchill, wrote that Halifax had a “resigned desire to preserve as much as he could of the England he knew and loved … the landscape, the ordered hierarchical society, the freedom from oppression or vulgar ostentation.”40 All of these factors attracted him to the possibility of a negotiated peace that would honorably get Great Britain out of a terrible war.

  That possibility arose on May 25, 1940, when Halifax held a pivotal meeting in London with the Italian ambassador to Great Britain, Giuseppe Bastianini. Halifax’s purpose was to explore whether Italy might be induced—that is, bribed—to stay out of the war. Although Italy was officially a noncombatant, it had signed a “Pact of Steel” (an alliance) with Nazi Germany and amassed twenty thousand troops on the French-Italian border. There was reason to think Italy might soon join the Nazis, invade France, and claim some booty. Perhaps, Halifax thought, Italy could be bought off at a reasonable price.

  Churchill knew about this meeting in advance and asked only that it be kept secret and that Halifax do nothing to suggest a lack of resolve on the part of Great Britain.

  But I suspect that Halifax, the “Holy Fox,” went to the meeting hoping delicately to explore a second and even more far-reaching possibility—one that he had not disclosed to Churchill or the War Cabinet. Might Mussolini play a role as mediator in facilitating negotiations aimed at ending the war? Halifax left no incriminating fingerprints, so it will never be known whether he went into the meeting wanting to plant this seed. But by the end of the meeting the idea had sprouted.

  Halifax’s written report of the meeting suggests that the Italian ambassador planted the idea. According to the report, Italy agreed to discuss its relationship with Great Britain only in the broader context of a “just and enduring European settlement.” Was Britain interested, the ambassador asked, in discussions that might include this “greater framework”? Such a conversation would involve “other countries”—which, of course, would include Germany.41 Halifax, using the double negative so favored by wily diplomats, gave the ambassador permission to inform Mussolini that “His Majesty’s Government did not exclude the possibility of some discussion of the wider problems of Europe” (emphasis added).

  Halifax presented this hot potato to the War Cabinet the next day. For three days, they would be forced to discuss his plan.

  The Deliberations

  Sunday, May 26, was anything but a day of rest for the War Cabinet. Churchill began by reporting the dire military circumstances on the ground. Belgium was about to capitulate.42 The French were close to collapse, and 250,000 British soldiers were cornered in northern France.43 Soon Britain might be facing both Germany and Italy alone.

  Against this backdrop, Halifax told the War Cabinet about his meeting with the Italian ambassador. In light of the desperate military situation, he said, British war aims had to be narrowed: it was no longer a matter of “imposing a complete defeat upon Germany but of safeguarding the independence of our own Empire and if possible that of France.”44 He thought that Mussolini wished to secure peace in Europe and that the Italians might be open to facilitating a discussion about a “general European settlement,” but that the discussion would have to include Germany.

  From the outset, Churchill was deeply skeptical. In his view, Hitler would never accept any negotiated deal unless it allowed Germany to dominate Europe, which Britain “could never accept” because it would threaten Britain’s security. “We must ensure our complete liberty and independence,” he said. But nothing was decided, and everyone left the meeting knowing the discussion would continue.

  When the War Cabinet met again in the early afternoon, the differences between Churchill and Halifax came into sharper focus. Halifax argued strongly in favor of an approach to Italy, saying that “the last thing Signor Mussolini wanted was to see” a Europe dominated by Hitler. Churchill was still skeptical, but he conceded that “the matter was one that the War Cabinet would need to consider.”45 Halifax began the first of several attempts to pin Churchill down. Given that Britain’s security and independence were in such danger, he said, “we should naturally be prepared to consider any proposals that might lead to [restoring that security], provided our liberty and independence are assured” (emphasis added). Then he asked the key question: If Churchill was “satisfied that matters vital to the independenc
e of this country were unaffected,” was he “prepared to discuss such terms?”46

  Churchill did not say no. In fact, he appeared to say yes. He said he would be “thankful to get out of our present difficulties on such terms, provided we retain the essentials and the elements of our vital strength even at the cost of some territory” (emphasis added). But he went on to add that he did not believe that such a deal was possible.

  The third meeting that day took place around dinnertime. In the interim, Churchill had met with the French prime minister, Paul Reynaud, who confirmed that the French military situation was all but hopeless. Churchill’s response to him was typically pugnacious: “We would rather go down fighting,” he said, “than be enslaved to Germany.”47

  He brought that defiant attitude back to the War Cabinet that evening, where his debate with Halifax became increasingly tense. If France collapsed, Churchill declared, Britain must not go down with her. The two nations had mutually pledged not to make a separate peace with Germany, but Churchill now wanted to release France from this treaty obligation. “If France could not defend herself, it was better that she get out of the war rather than drag us into a settlement which involved intolerable terms,” Churchill said. Churchill predicted that Hitler would demand the most outrageous terms possible—including British disarmament. There was “no limit to the terms that Germany would impose on us if she had her way.”48

  Halifax was not so sure. He saw no evidence that Germany wanted to “enslave” Britain. In fact, he didn’t think it was in Hitler’s interest to insist on outrageous terms. Halifax believed that Hitler’s primary goal—as stated—was to unite all German-speaking peoples under one roof and to create “Lebensraum” (“living room”) in the east for expansion. In order to accomplish that goal, Hitler wanted territory in Eastern Europe, not Britain. Therefore, Halifax thought, Hitler might want to stop fighting on the western front so he could focus his military power on the Soviet Union. Halifax may even have thought, why not push him in that direction? The one thing Britain and Germany shared was their hatred of the communists.

  Halifax was a balance-of-power strategist who no doubt believed that this war, like most wars, would eventually end with a negotiated agreement in which territorial concessions would be made to the stronger party. Some concessions would have to be made to Hitler, and Mussolini would expect a little pourboire for his own helpful behavior,49 but this could be accomplished by some horse-trading among colonies. So Halifax pressed his point: How could you know that Hitler would insist on outrageous terms if there was no discussion? Moreover, Britain’s interests could be declared in advance. “[W]e might say to Signor Mussolini that if there was any suggestion of terms which affected our independence, we should not look at them for a moment.” And Mussolini might well be alarmed by Hitler and “look at matters from the point of view of the balance of power.”50 Why not find out? Where was the harm in trying this approach?

  Churchill’s response suggested that he saw Hitler as a bully with boundless ambitions. “Herr Hitler thought that he had the whiphand. The only thing to do was to show him that he could not conquer this country.”

  Where was Chamberlain in all of this? He did not say a great deal at this meeting, and in historian John Lukacs’s view he “now sat on the fence.”51 But his diary entry that evening suggested he was leaning in Churchill’s direction. Chamberlain summarized the prime minister’s outlook: “[I]f we could get out of this jam by giving up Malta and Gibraltar and some African colonies he would jump at it. But the only safe way was to convince Hitler that he couldn’t beat us.”52

  Let’s step back for a moment and ask how Spock might assess the Churchill-Halifax debate to this point. The issue was: What would Hitler insist upon in peace negotiations? Churchill was assuming the worst and presenting it as fact. Although the record doesn’t show him saying this directly, he saw Hitler as a megalomaniac bent on nothing less than world domination. Churchill’s instincts had been terrific in the past, and his predictions about Hitler had so far been accurate, but he had not even come close to explaining why he thought Hitler had a vital interest in enslaving Britain and destroying its empire. Halifax, by contrast, was sticking to the known facts: The situation on the ground was dire, and it was unknown what the Germans would agree to. Why wouldn’t it be wise, and indeed honorable, to see if a settlement could be achieved on reasonable terms? Spock would consider that a logical question.

  Moreover, Spock would ask rhetorically, what was the alternative to negotiation? Continued fighting—in which the Germans would direct their formidable airpower against Britain and perhaps invade. In May 1940, the outcome of such a fight was highly uncertain. In fact, the odds were pretty clearly against Britain.

  So it was easy to imagine a negotiated deal that might serve both sides’ interests better than continued war: the Germans would get de facto control of Europe, including France, while Britain would keep its independence, its military, and nearly all of its empire (after ceding a few territorial crumbs to the Italians). There were three questions: Would Hitler agree to such a deal, would an agreement with Hitler be worth the paper it was printed on, and would the costs of that deal, including the loss of sovereignty for most of Europe, be acceptable to the British? Through bitter experience, Halifax and Chamberlain had come to share Churchill’s view that Hitler was a completely unreliable negotiating partner. Even if the war ended now, Hitler might attack Britain later.

  Spock would agree that this was a significant risk. But he would ask: Which nation, Germany or Britain, would benefit more from a hiatus in the war? Britain was not yet fully mobilized. If Hitler headed east and attacked Russia, as expected, it would absorb vast amounts of German manpower and materiel. That could only be good for Britain, which needed time to reach full strength.

  Of course, in those desperate days in May 1940, the War Cabinet meetings were too chaotic to allow for a Spock-like discussion at this level. But Halifax’s argument was strong enough to force Churchill to take another tack.

  Churchill’s second argument was that Britain must not be forced into the weak position of going to Mussolini and Hitler and asking them to “treat us nicely. We must not get entangled in a position of that kind before we had been involved in serious fighting.”53 In other words, this was not the right time to pursue negotiations because Britain had not yet proved it could put up a real fight. A willingness to engage in negotiation now would signal weakness. But perhaps after a few months of heroic fighting, Churchill suggested, the time would be ripe.

  To Halifax, this was supremely illogical: In three months, Britain might be bombed to a smoking ruin. Where would its bargaining power be then? Was Churchill seriously willing to take that risk? This was just the kind of emotional argument that Churchill’s critics dreaded. Halifax was aghast. If Britain could “obtain terms which did not postulate the destruction of our independence,” Halifax insisted, “we should be foolish if we did not accept them.” In other words, he was arguing that it would be stupid, given the situation on the ground, to turn down a negotiated deal that provided for continued British independence.

  Here again, I think Spock would say that Halifax was making more sense than Churchill. In fact, I suspect the issue of timing was a makeshift argument on Churchill’s part. True, one could always fight now and negotiate later, but Churchill had not explained why he felt justified in taking such a huge risk. Frankly, I think Halifax had Churchill on the ropes. If the analysis were to stop here, one might well conclude that wisdom would obligate Churchill to explore the possibility of negotiation by using the Italians as an intermediary.

  Perhaps sensing this, Churchill backed off and the cabinet agreed that Halifax should prepare a draft of his proposal. By the end of the evening, Halifax had produced a document that was a masterpiece of obfuscation: “If Signor Mussolini will co-operate with us in securing a settlement of all European questions which safeguard[s] the independence and security of the Allies, and could be the basis of a just
and durable peace for Europe, we will undertake at once to discuss, with the desire to find solutions, the matters in which Signor Mussolini is primarily interested.”54 This was to be coupled with a backchannel request that the United States make the first approach to Mussolini, not Britain or France. Roosevelt would inform Mussolini that the French and British would consider Italian territorial claims only if Italy stayed out of the war.

  Note that this document conflates two goals: buying Italy off to keep it out of the war, and persuading Mussolini to mediate peace. As several scholarly commentators have noted, there is an obvious tension between them. “Buying off Italy facilitated the war against Germany, Italian mediation meant its end.”55

  What was Halifax up to? I believe he was pursuing both goals and knew he had to tread carefully. The entire cabinet supported the first goal: keeping Italy out of the war. The problem was the second goal, to which Churchill was adamantly opposed. Halifax may have hoped that by emphasizing the first goal, he might keep the door open to the second.

  Monday, May 27

  Before the morning session, Halifax was in despair. He told a colleague, “I can’t work with Winston any longer.”56 A showdown was inevitable.

  But it would have to wait. The morning meeting focused on the terrible military situation on the continent. British troops were still trapped in northern France, and the prospects for evacuating them from Calais or Dunkirk were not promising. Churchill doubted he could save more than fifty thousand men. But preparations were under way. “Around the coast of Southern England, hastily improvised flotillas of small ships, trollers, tug boats, tiny motor launches—anything that was serviceable—were being assembled and setting sail to try and do their bit in rescuing the stranded army.”57