The Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin

by Harriet Beecher Stowe

  and the other, that it is usual for pursuers to shoot them. Indeed, we are led

  to infer that, as the shooting is the easier mode of obtaining the reward, it is

  the more frequently employed in such cases. Now, when a Southern master

  offers a reward for his runaway slave, it is because he has lost a certain amount

  of property, represented by the negro which he wishes to recover. What man of

  Vermont, having an ox or an ass that had gone astray, would forthwith offer half

  the full value of the animal, not for the carcase, which might be turned to some

  useful purpose, but for the unavailing satisfaction of its head? Yet are the two

  cases exactly parallel. With regard to the assumption that men are permitted to

  go about, at the South, with double-barrelled guns, shooting down runaway

  negroes, in preference to apprehending them, we can only say that it is as wicked

  and wilful as it is ridiculous. Such Thugs there may have been as Marks and

  Loker, who have killed negroes in this unprovoked manner; but, if they have

  escaped the gallows, they are probably to be found within the walls of our State

  Penitentiaries, where they are comfortably provided for at public expense. The

  laws of the Southern States, which are designed, as in all good governments, for

  the protection of persons and property, have not been so loosely framed as to fail

  of their object where person and property are one.

  “The law with regard to the killing of runaways is laid down with so much

  clearness and precision by a South Carolina judge, that we cannot forbear quoting

  his dictum as directly in point. In the case of Witsell v. Earnest and Parker

  Colcock, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

  “By the statute of 1740, any white man may apprehend, and moderately

  correct, any slave who may be found out of the plantation at which he is em-

  ployed; and if the slave assaults the white person, he may be

  Jan. Term, 1818. 1 Nott. & M`Cord's S. C. Rep., 182.

  killed; but a slave who is merely flying away cannot be killed

  Nor can the defendants be justified by the common law if we con-

  sider the negro as a person; for they were not clothed with the

  authority of the law to apprehend him as a felon, and without

  such authority he could not be killed.'

  “ `It's commonly supposed that the property interest is a sufficient guard in

  these cases. If people choose to ruin their possessions, I don't know what's to

  be done. It seems the poor creature was a thief and a drunkard; and so there

  won't be much hope to get up sympathy for her.'

  “ `It is perfectly outrageous--it is horrid, Augustine! It will certainly bring

  down vengeance upon you.'

  “ `My dear cousin, I didn't do it, and I can't help it; I would, if I could. If

  low-minded, brutal people will act like themselves, what am I to do? They have

  absolute control; they are irresponsible despots. There would be no use in inter-

  fering; there is no law that amounts to anything practically, for such a case. The

  best we can do is to shut our eyes and ears, and let it alone. It's the only re

  source left us.'

  “In a subsequent part of the same conversation St. Clare says--

  “ `For pity's sake, for shame's sake, because we are men born of women, and

  not savage beasts, many of us do not, and dare not--we would scorn to use the

  full power which our savage laws put into our hands. And he who goes furthest

  and does the worst only uses within limits the power that the law gives him.'

  “Mrs. Stowe tells us, through St. Clare, that `there is no law that amounts

  to anything' in such cases, and that he who goes furthest in severity towards his

  slave--that is, to the deprivation of an eye or a limb, or even the destruction of

  life--`only uses within limits the power that the law gives him.' This is an

  awful and tremendous charge, which, lightly and unwarrantably made, must sub-

  ject the maker to a fearful accountability. Let us see how the matter stands upon

  the statute-book of Louisiana. By referring to the civil code of that State, chap-

  ter 3rd, article 173, the reader will find this general declaration:--

  “ `The slave is entirely subject to the will of his master, who may correct and

  chastise him, though not with unusual rigour, nor so as to maim or mutilate him, or

  to expose him to the danger of loss of life, or to cause his death.'

  “On a subsequent page of the same volume and chapter, article 192, we find

  provision made for the slave's protection against his master's cruelty, in the

  statement that one of two cases, in which a master can be compelled to sell his

  slave, is--

  “ `When the master shall be convicted of cruel treatment of his slave, and the

  judge shall deem proper to pronounce, besides the penalty established for such cases, that the slave shall be sold at public auction, in order to place him out of the reach

  of the power which the master has abused.'

  “A code thus watchful of the negro's safety in life and limb confines not its

  guardianship to inhibitory clauses, but proscribes extreme penalties in case of

  their infraction. In the Code Noir (Black Code) of Louisiana, under head of

  Crimes and Offences, No. 55, sec. xvi., it is laid down that--

  “ `If any person whatsoever shall wilfully kill his slave, or the slave of another

  person, the said person, being convicted thereof, shall be tried and condemned

  agreeably to the laws.'

  “And because negro testimony is inadmissible in the court of the State, an

  therefore the evidence of such crimes might be with difficulty supplied, it is fur

  ther provided that--

  “ `If any slave be mutilated, beaten, or ill-treated, contrary to the true intent

  and meaning of this Act, when no one shall be present, in such case the owner, or

  other person having the management of said slave thus mutilated, shall be deemed

  responsible and guilty of the said offence, and shall be prosecuted without further

  evidence, unless the said owner, or other person so as aforesaid, can prove the

  contrary by means of good and sufficient evidence, or can clear

  Code Noir. Crimes and Offences, 56, xvii.

  himself by his own oath, which said oath every court, under the

  cognisance of which such offence shall have been examined and

  tried, is by this Act authorised to administer.'

  “Enough has been quoted to establish the utter falsity of the statement, made

  by our authoress through St. Clare, that brutal masters are `irresponsible despots'

  --at least, in Louisiana. It would extend our review to a most unreasonable

  length, should we undertake to give the law, with regard to the murder of slaves,

  as it stands in each of the Southern States. The crime is a rare one, and there-

  fore the reporters have had few cases to record. We may refer, however, to two.

  In Fields v. The State of Tennessee, the plaintiff in error was indicted in the Circuit

  Court of Maury county for the murder of a negro slave. He pleaded not guilty; and

  at the trial was found guilty of wilful and felonious slaying of the slave. From

  this sentence he prosecuted his writ of error, which was disallowed by the court

  affirming the original judgment. The opinion of the court, as given by Peck J.

  overflows with the spirit of enligh
tened humanity. He concludes thus:--

  “ `It is well said by one of the judges of North Carolina, that the master has a

  right to exact the labour of his slave; thus far, the rights of the

  1 Yerger's Tenn. Rep. 156.

  slave are suspended; but this gives the master no right over the

  life of his slave. I add to the saying of the judge, that law which

  says Thou shalt not kill, protects the slave; and he is within its

  very letter. Law, reason, Christianity, and common humanity, all

  point but one way.'

  “In the General Court of Virginia, June Term, 1851, in Souther v. The

  Commonwealth, it was held that `the killing of a slave by his master and owner,

  by wilful and excessive whipping, is murder in the first degree; though it may not

  have been the purpose of the master and owner to kill the slave.

  7 Grattan's Rep. 673.

  The writer shows, also, an ignorance of the law of contracts, as it

  affects slavery in the South, in making George's master take him

  from the factory against the proprietor's consent. George, by

  virtue of the contract of hiring, had become the property of the proprietor for the

  time being, and his master could no more have taken him away forcibly than the

  owner of a house in Massachusetts can dispossess his lessee, at any moment, from

  mere whim or caprice. There is no court in Kentucky, where the hirer's rights,

  in this regard, would not be enforced.

  “ `No. Father bought her once, in one of his trips to New Orleans, and

  brought her up as a present to mother. She was about eight or nine years old

  then. Father would never tell mother what he gave for her; but, the other day,

  in looking over his old papers, we came across the bill of sale. He paid an ex-

  travagant sum for her, to be sure. I suppose, on account of her extraordinary

  beauty.'

  “ `George sat with his back to Cassy, and did not see the absorbed expression

  of her countenance, as he was giving these details.

  “ `At this point in the story, she touched his arm, and, with a face perfectly

  white with interest, said, `Do you know the names of the people he bought

  her of?'

  “ `A man of the name of Simmons, I think, was the principal in the transaction.

  At least, I think that was the name in the bill of sale.'

  “ `O my God!' said Cassy, and fell insensible on the floor of the cabin.'

  “Of course Eliza turns out to be Cassy's child, and we are soon entertained

  with the family meeting in Montreal, where George Harris is living, five or six

  years after the opening of the story, in great comfort.

  “Now, the reader will perhaps be surprised to know that such an incident as

  the sale of Cassy apart from Eliza, upon which the whole interest of the foregoing

  narrative hinges, never could have taken place in Louisiana, and that the bill of

  sale for Eliza would not have been worth the paper it was written on. Observe.

  George Shelby states that Eliza was eight or nine years old at the time his father

  purchased her in New Orleans. Let us again look at the statute-book of

  Louisiana.

  “In the Code Noir we find it set down that--

  “ `Every person is expressly prohibited from selling separately from their

  mothers the children who shall not have attained the full age of ten years.'

  “And this humane provision is strengthened by a statute, one clause of which

  runs as follows:--

  “ `Be it further enacted, That if any person or persons shall sell the mother of

  any slave child or children under the age of ten years, separate from said child or

  children, or shall, the mother living, sell any slave child or children of ten years

  of age or under, separate from said mother, such person or persons shall incur the

  penalty of the sixth section of this Act.'

  “This penalty is a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than two thou-

  sand dollars, and imprisonment in the public jail for a period of not less than six

  months, nor more than one year.--Vide Act of Louisiana, 1 Session, 9th Legislature, 1828, 1829, No. 24, Section 16.”

  The author makes here a remark. Scattered through all the

  Southern States are slaveholders who are such only in name.

  They have no pleasure in the system, they consider it one of

  wrong altogether, and they hold the legal relation still, only

  because not yet clear with regard to the best way of changing

  it, so as to better the condition of those held. Such are most

  earnest advocates for State emancipation, and are friends of

  anything, written in a right spirit, which tends in that direction.

  From such the author ever receives criticisms with pleasure.

  She has endeavoured to lay before the world, in the fullest

  manner all that can be objected to her work, that both sides

  may have an opportunity of impartial hearing.

  When writing “Uncle Tom's Cabin,” though entirely un-

  aware and unexpectant of the importance which would be

  attached to its statements and opinions, the author of that work

  was anxious, from love of consistency, to have some under-

  standing of the laws of the slave system. She had on hand

  for reference, while writing, the Code Noir of Louisiana, and a

  sketch of the laws relating to slavery in the different States, by

  Judge Stroud of Philadelphia. This work, professing to have

  been compiled with great care from the latest editions of the

  statute-books of the several States, the author supposed to be a

  sufficient guide for the writing of a work of fiction.* As the

  accuracy of those statements which relate to the slave-laws

  has been particularly contested, a more especial inquiry has

  been made in this direction. Under the guidance and with the

  assistance of legal gentlemen of high standing, the writer has

  proceeded to examine the statements of Judge Stroud with

  regard to statute-law, and to follow them up with some inquiry

  into the decisions of Courts. The result has been an increasing

  conviction on her part that the impressions first derived from

  Judge Stroud's work were correct; and the author now can only

  give the words of St. Clare, as the best possible expression of the

  sentiments and opinion which this course of reading has

  awakened in her mind.

  This cursed business, accursed of God and man--what is it? Strip it of all its

  ornament, run it down to the root and nucleus of the whole, and what is it? Why,

  because my brother Quashy is ignorant and weak, and I am intelligent and strong

  --because I know how, and can do it--therefore I may steal all he has, keep it, and

  give him only such and so much as suits my fancy! Whatever is too hard, too

  dirty, too disagreeable for me, I may set Quashy to doing. Because I don't like

  work, Quashy shall work. Because the sun burns me, Quashy shall stay in the sun.

  Quashy shall earn the money, and I will spend it. Quashy shall lie down in every

  puddle, that I may walk over dry-shod. Quashy shall do my will, and not his, all

  the days of his mortal life, and have such a chance of getting to heaven at last as

  I find convenient. This I take to be about what slavery is. I defy anybody on

  earth to read our slave-code, as it stands in our law books, and make an
ything

  else of it. Talk of the abuses of slavery! Humbug! The thing itself is the

  essence of all abuse. And the only reason why the land don't sink under it, like

  Sodom and Gomorrah, is because it is used in a way infinitely better than it is.

  For pity's sake, for shame's sake, because we are men born of women, and not

  savage beasts, many of us do not, and dare not--we would scorn to use the full

  power which our savage laws put into our hands. And he who goes the furthest,

  and does the worst, only uses within limits the power that the law gives him!

  The author still holds to the opinion that slavery in itself, as

  legally defined in law-books and expressed in the records of

  Courts, is the sum and essence of all abuse; and she

  still clings to the hope that there are many men at the South

  infinitely better than their laws; and after the reader has read

  all the extracts which she has to make, for the sake of a common

  humanity they will hope the same. The author must state, with

  regard to some pages which she must quote, that the lan-

  guage of certain enactments was so incredible that she would

  not take it on the authority of any compilation whatever, but

  copied it with her own hand from the latest edition of the

  statute-book where it stood and still stands.

  * In this connexion it may be well to state that the work of Judge Stroud is

  now out of print, but that a work of the same character is in course of preparation

  by William I. Bowditch, Esq., of Boston, which will bring the subject out, by the

  assistance of the latest editions of statutes, and the most recent decisions of

  Courts.

  CHAPTER II.

  WHAT IS SLAVERY?

  The author will now enter into a consideration of slavery as

  it stands revealed in slave law.

  What is it according to the definition of law-books and legal

  interpreters? “A slave,” says the law of Louisiana, “is one

  who is in the power of a master to whom he belongs. The

  master may sell him, dispose of his person, his industry, and his

  labour; he can do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire any-

  Civil Code, Art. 35.

  thing, but what must belong to his master.” South

  Carolina says: “Slaves shall be deemed, sold, taken,