The Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin

by Harriet Beecher Stowe

  sition by the following humane and sensible remarks:--

  A being, ignorant of letters, unenlightened by religion, and deriving but little

  instruction from good example, cannot be supposed to have right conceptions as to

  the nature and extent of moral or political obligations. This remark, with but a

  slight qualification, is applicable to the condition of the slave. It has been just

  shown that the benefits of education are not conferred upon him, while his chance of acquiring a knowledge of the precepts of the gospel is so remote as scarcely to

  be appreciated. He may be regarded, therefore, as almost without the capacity

  to comprehend the force of laws; and, on this account, such as are designed for

  his government should be recommended by their simplicity and mildness.

  His condition suggests another motive for tenderness on his behalf in these

  particulars. He is unable to read; and holding little or no communication with

  those who are better informed than himself, how is he to become acquainted with

  the fact that a law for his observance has been made? To exact obedience to a

  law which has not been promulgated, which is unknown to the subject of it, has

  ever been deemed most unjust and tyrannical. The reign of Caligula, were it

  obnoxious to no other reproach than this, would never cease to be remembered

  with abhorrence.

  The lawgivers of the slave-holding States seem, in the formation of their penal

  codes, to have been uninfluenced by these claims of the slave upon their com-

  passionate consideration. The hardened convict moves their sympathy, and is to

  be taught the laws before he is expected to obey them; yet the guiltless slave is

  subjected to an extensive system of cruel enactments, of no part of which pro-

  bably has he ever heard.

  Parts of this system apply to the slave exclusively, and for every infraction a

  large retribution is demanded; while with respect to offences for which whites as

  well as slaves are amenable, punishments of much greater severity are inflicted upon

  the latter than upon the former.

  This heavy charge of Judge Stroud is sustained by twenty

  pages of proof, showing the very great disproportion between

  the number of offences made capital for slaves, and those that

  are so for whites. Concerning this, we find the following cool

  remark in Wheeler's Law of Slavery, page 222, note.

  Much has been said of the disparity of punishment between the white in-

  habitants and the slaves and negroes of the same State; that slaves are punished

  with much more severity, for the commission of similar crimes, by white persons,

  than the latter. The charge is undoubtedly true to a considerable extent. It

  must be remembered that the primary object of the enactment of penal laws is

  the protection and security of those who make them. The slave has no agency

  in making them. He is, indeed, one cause of the apprehended evils to the other

  class, which those laws are expected to remedy. That he should be held amenable

  for a violation of those rules established for the security of the other is the

  natural result of the state in which he is placed. And the severity of those rules

  will always bear a relation to that danger, real or ideal, of the other class.

  It has been so among all nations, and will ever continue to be so, while the

  disparity between bond and free remains.

  The State v. Mann, Dec. Term, 1829. 2 Devereux's N. Carolina Rep. 263.

  A striking example of a legal decision to this

  purport is given in Wheeler's Law of Slavery, page

  224. The case, apart from legal technicalities, may

  be thus briefly stated:--

  The defendant, Mann, had hired a slave-woman for a year.

  During this time the slave committed some slight offence, for

  which the defendant undertook to chastise her. While in the

  act of doing so, the slave ran off, whereat he shot at and

  wounded her. The judge in the inferior Court charged the jury

  that if they believed the punishment was cruel and unwarrant-

  able, and disproportioned to the offence, in law the defendant

  was guilty, as he had only a special property in the slave. The

  jury finding evidence that the punishment had been cruel, un-

  warrantable, and disproportioned to the offence, found verdict

  against the defendant. But on what ground? Because,

  according to the law of North Carolina, cruel, unwarrantable,

  disproportionate punishment of a slave from a master, is an

  indictable offence? No. They decided against the defendant,

  not because the punishment was cruel and unwarrantable, but

  because he was not the person who had the right to inflict it,

  “as he had only a special right of property in the slave.”

  The defendant appealed to a higher Court, and the decision

  was reversed, on the ground that the hirer has for the time being

  all the rights of the master. The remarks of Judge Ruffin are

  so characteristic, and so strongly express the conflict between

  the feelings of the humane judge and the logical necessity of a

  strict interpreter of slave-law, that we shall quote largely from

  it. One cannot but admire the unflinching calmness with which

  a man, evidently possessed of honourable and humane feelings,

  walks through the most extreme and terrible results and con-

  clusions, in obedience to the laws of legal truth. Thus he

  says:--

  A judge cannot but lament when such cases as the present are brought into

  judgment. It is impossible that the reasons on which they go can be appreciated,

  but where institutions similar to our own exist, and are thoroughly understood.

  The struggle, too, in the judge's own breast, between the feelings of the man

  and the duty of the magistrate, is a severe one, presenting strong temptations to

  put aside such questions, if it be possible. It is useless, however, to complain of

  things inherent in our political state; and it is criminal in a Court to avoid any

  responsibility which the laws impose. With whatever reluctance, therefore, it is

  done, the Court is compelled to express an opinion upon the extent of the do-

  minion of the master over the slave in North Carolina. The indictment charges a

  battery on Lydia, a slave of Elizabeth Jones. * * * The inquiry here is, whether

  a cruel and unreasonable battery on a slave by the hirer is indictable. The judge

  below instructed the jury that it is. He seems to have put it on the ground that

  the defendant had but a special property. Our laws uniformly treat the master,

  or other person having the possession and command of the slave, as entitled to

  the same extent of authority. The object is the same, the service o the slave;

  and the same powers must be confided. In a criminal proceeding, and, indeed, in

  reference to all other persons but the general owner, the hirer and possessor of

  the slave, in relation to both rights and duties, is, for the time being, the owner.

  * * * But upon the general question whether the owner is answerable crimi-

  naliter for a battery upon his own slave, or other exercise of authority of force

  not forbidden by the statute, the Court entertains but little doubt. That he is so

  liable has never been decided; nor, as far as is known, been hitherto contend
ed.

  There has been no prosecution of the sort. The established habits and uniform

  practice of the country in this respect is the best evidence of the portion of power

  deemed by the whole community requisite to the preservation of the master's do-

  minion. If we thought differently, we could not set our notions in array against

  the judgment of everybody else, and say that this or that authority may be safely

  lopped off. This has indeed been assimilated at the bar to the other domestic rela-

  tions; and arguments drawn from the well-established principles, which confer and

  restrain the authority of the parent over the child, the tutor over the pupil, the

  master over the apprentice, have been pressed on us.

  The Court does not recognise their application; there is no likeness between

  the cases; they are in opposition to each other, and there is an impassable gulf

  between them. The difference is that which exists between freedom and slavery,

  and a greater cannot be imagined. In the one, the end in view is the happiness

  of the youth, born to equal rights with that governor on whom the duty devolves

  of training the young to usefulness in a station which he is afterwards to assume

  among freemen. To such an end, and with such a subject, moral and in-

  tellectual instruction seem the natural means, and, for the most part, they are

  found to suffice. Moderate force is superadded only to make the others effectual.

  If that fail, it is better to leave the party to his own headstrong passions, and the

  ultimate correction of the law, than to allow it to be immoderately inflicted by a

  private person. With slavery it is far otherwise. The end is the profit of the

  master, his security, and the public safety; the subject, one doomed, in his own

  person and his posterity, to live without knowledge, and without the capacity to

  make anything his own, and to toil that another may reap the fruits. What moral

  considerations shall be addressed to such a being to convince him, what it is im-

  possible but that the most stupid must feel and know can never be true, that

  he is thus to labour upon a principle of natural duty, or for the sake of his own

  personal happiness? Such services can only be expected from one who has no

  will of his own; who surrenders his will in implicit obedience to that of another.

  Such obedience is the consequence only of uncontrolled authority over the

  body. There is nothing else which can operate to produce the effect. The

  power of the master must be absolute, to render the submission to

  the slave perfect. I most freely confess my sense of the harshness of this

  proposition. I feel it as deeply as any man can; and as a principle of moral

  right, every person in his retirement must repudiate it; but, in the actual con-

  dition of things, it must be so; there is no remedy. This discipline belongs

  to the state of slavery. They cannot be disunited without abrogating at once

  the rights of the master, and absolving the slave from his subjection. It con-

  stitutes the curse of slavery to both the bond and the free portions of our popu-

  ation; but it is inherent in the relation of master and slave. That there may

  be particular instances of cruelty and deliberate barbarity, where in conscience

  the law might properly interfere, is most probable. The difficulty is to deter-

  mine where a Court may properly begin. Merely in the abstract, it may well be

  asked which power of the master accords with right. The answer will probably

  sweep away all of them. But we cannot look at the matter in that light. The

  truth is, that we are forbidden to enter upon a train of general reasoning on the

  subject. We cannot allow the right of the master to be brought into discussion

  iu the courts of justice. The slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible that

  there is no appeal from his master; that his power is, in no instance, usurped

  bn, is conferred by the laws of man at least, if not by the law of God. The

  danger would be great, indeed, if the tribunals of justice should be called on

  to graduate the punishment appropriate to every temper and every dereliction of

  menial duty.

  No man can anticipate the many and aggravated provocations of the master

  which the slave would be constantly stimulated by his own passions, or the insti-

  gation of others, to give; or the consequent wrath of the master, prompting him

  to bloody vengeance upon the turbulent traitor; a vengeance generally practised

  with impunity, by reason of its privacy. The Court, therefore, disclaims the

  power of changing the relation in which these parts of our people stand to each

  other.

  * * * * * * * * *

  I repeat, that I would gladly have avoided this ungrateful question; but being

  brought to it, the Court is compelled to declare that while slavery exists amongst

  us in its present state, or until it shall seem fit to the legislature to interpose

  express enactments to the contrary, it will be the imperative duty of the judges

  to recognise the full dominion of the owner over the slave, except where the exercise

  of it is forbidden by statute.

  And this we do upon the ground that this dominion is essential to the value of

  slaves as property, to the security of the master and the public tranquillity, greatly

  dependant upon their subordination; and, in fine, as most effectually securing the

  general protection and comfort of the slaves themselves. Judgment below re-

  versed; and judgment entered for the defendant.

  No one can read this decision, so fine and clear in expres-

  sion, so dignified and solemn in its earnestness, and so dreadful

  in its results, without feeling at once deep respect for the man

  and horror for the system. The man, judging him from this

  short specimen, which is all the author knows,* has one of

  that high order of minds which looks straight through all

  verbiage and sophistry to the heart of every subject which it

  encounters. He has, too, that noble scorn of dissimulation,

  that straightforward determination not to call a bad thing by

  a good name, even when most popular, and reputable, and

  legal, which it is to be wished could be more frequently seen,

  both in our Northern and Southern States. There is but one

  sole regret; and that is, that such a man, with such a mind,

  should have been merely an expositor, and not a reformer of

  law.

  * We except the State of Louisiana. Owing to the influence of the French

  code in that State, more really humane provisions prevail there. How much

  these provisions avail in point of fact will be shown when we come to that part of

  the subject.

  * More recently the author has met with a passage in a North Carolina

  newspaper, containing some further particulars of the life of Judge Ruffin,

  which have proved interesting to her, and may also to the reader.

  We publish below the letter of Chief Justice Ruffin, of the Supreme Court,

  resigning his seat on the Bench.

  This act takes us, and no less will it take the State, by surprise. The public

  are not prepared for it; and we doubt not there will scarcely be an exception to

  the deep and general regret which will be felt throughout the State. Judge

  Ruffin's great and un
surpassed legal learning, his untiring industry, the ease

  with which he mastered the details, and comprehended the whole of the most

  complicated cases, were the admiration of the Bar; and it has been a common

  saying of the ablest lawyers of the State, for a long time past, that his place on

  the Bench could be supplied by no other than himself.

  He is now, as we learn, in the sixty-fifth year of his age, in full possession of

  his usual excellent health, unaffected, as far as we can discover, in his natural

  vigour and strength, and certainly without any symptom of mental decay. Forty-

  five years ago he commenced the practice of the law. He has been on the Bench

  twenty-eight years, of which time he has been one of the Supreme Court twenty-

  three years. During this long public career he has, in a pecuniary point of view,

  sacrificed many thousands; for there has been no time of it in which he might not,

  with perfect ease, have doubled, by practice, the amount of his salary as judge.

  “Gentlemen: I desire to retire to the walks of private life, and therefore pray

  your honourable body to accept the resignation of my place on the Bench of the

  Supreme Court. In surrendering this trust, I would wish to express my grateful

  sense of the confidence and honours so often and so long bestowed on me by the

  General Assembly. But I have no language to do it suitably. I am very sensible

  that they were far beyond my deserts, and that I have made an insufficient return

  of the service. Yet I can truly aver that, to the best of my ability, I have admi-

  nistered the law as I understood it, and to the ends of suppressing crime and

  wrong, and upholding virtue, truth, and right; aiming to give confidence to

  honest men, and to confirm in all good citizens love for our country, and a pure

  trust in her law and magistrates.

  “In my place I hope I have contributed to these ends; and I firmly believe that

  our laws will, as heretofore, be executed, and our people happy in the administra-

  tion of justice, honest and contented, as long as they keep--and only so long

  as they keep--the independent and sound judiciary now established in the consti-

  tution, which, with all other blessings, I earnestly pray may be perpetuated to the

  people of North Carolina.