War of Frontier and Empire

by David J Silbey

  But sending troops to the Philippines went far beyond the strategic plan that had sent Dewey’s ships to Manila Bay. The Spanish fleet there presented a potential threat to the American West Coast. Destroying it as part of a campaign to liberate Cuba was a reasonable defensive maneuver to cover America’s flanks. But stepping beyond that strategy and grabbing the islands themselves was an entirely different thing.

  McKinley officially decided to put off the decision regarding the final disposition of the Philippines. But in reality he moved the nation closer to seizing them by ordering the War Department to send troops. On May 25, 1898, Brig. Gen. Thomas Anderson, a Civil War veteran, and roughly 2,500 men and officers from the First California, Second Oregon, and U.S. Fourteenth Infantry regiments boarded ships to take them to Manila. With them was sent a geologist, to evaluate the natural resources of the archipelago. Cheering crowds thronged the streets of San Francisco to see the troops off.

  The trip was not as pleasant as the departure. Crammed into freighters, the soldiers suffered from disease, seasickness, and insect infestation. The army had equipped the ships with delousers, but the machines apparently destroyed clothing as well as bugs, leaving a number of soldiers without any underwear.22 Theodore Wurm, a private in the Eighteenth U.S. Regiment, remembered:

  [We] soon got out in the Pacific and it proved rather rough. Everyone got sick the first night and plenty of water got into the port holes before being closed. The odor caused from the thousand sea sick vomiting [men] was very bad. Very few could eat or cared to see others do so.23

  The force stopped off at Honolulu to resupply, then sailed to the Spanish possession of Guam. Upon arriving there the escorting cruiser, the Charleston, fired shots over the Spanish fort. The Spanish commander—who had not gotten word of the war between the two nations—rowed out apologetically. He had no cannon to return what he presumed was a salute. The Americans brought him up to date and occupied the island before continuing on to the Philippines.

  This force was followed by two others, one of approximately 3,550 officers and men under Brig. Gen. Francis Greene, which left San Francisco on June 15, and one of about 4,800 officers and men under Brig. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, accompanied by the overall commander, Gen. Wesley Merritt, which left on June 27.

  General Merritt was experienced. He had graduated from West Point in 1860, had fought valiantly in the Civil War, and had reached the rank of brevet major general by its end. In the thirty years that followed he had fought in the West in the nearly unending series of Indian Wars. By 1898, he was, in all ways, a veteran. But while he—and his officers—had a great deal of experience in war, they had no experience and little knowledge of the Philippines. Indeed, the American officers, as Arthur MacArthur later remembered, had an “absolute ignorance” of the islands. And the information they received did not do much to alleviate that: “One writer to whom we had access” MacArthur continued, “advised all travelers to carry coffins, as few returned alive from Manila.”24

  Upon arrival the soldiers were billeted in the Spanish naval barracks on Cavite. Offshore were the hulks of the Spanish fleet sunk by Dewey, and from those hulks rose bubbles filled by the gases of decaying Spanish corpses. The smell that came ashore was pungent and omnipresent. In addition, it was the rainy season in the Philippines, making it difficult to light a fire in the near-constant rain. Though the soldiers did not have to keep warm in tropical Manila, they did need to boil their drinking water to make it potable. Without a fire, that was not possible. Potentially worse, the coffee beans issued by the quartermaster were green, and without a fire to roast them the soldiers risked going without coffee. They were confident though, despite the problems. As William Christner of the Tenth Pennsylvania put it, the soldiers “intended to take [Manila] and put it in our pockets.”25

  The political and military situation was complicated. The Spanish garrison in Manila was cut off by Dewey’s ships from supply or reinforcement. The stranglehold got tighter as American troops arrived. The Army of Liberation, as the Filipinos called their forces, had surrounded the city with roughly 13,000 to 15,000 men. Inside the old city of Manila, a similar number of Spanish troops faced them, along with anywhere between 50,000 and 70,000 civilians. Food and other necessities were in short supply. On Cavite were the American troops.

  Technically, the Americans and the insurgents were allies against the Spanish, but both sides expressed a certain amount of suspicion of each other, at levels high and low. Aguinaldo publicly professed a sunny certainty of the benign nature of American motives. In July 1898 he said in a meeting with American officers, “I have studied attentively the Constitution of the United States and in it I find no authority for colonies and I have no fear.”26 But in private, many of the Filipino leaders suspected the Americans. They found it hard to believe that the United States would not “covet this very beautiful pearl of the Orient Sea.”27

  On the American side, the generals did not think much of the insurgents, either. The second in command, Gen. Elwell Otis, offered an evaluation that many officers shared. Aguinaldo’s army, he thought, was made up of “all the robbers of the island of Luzon,” whose goal was to “kill every white man in Manila.” His view of Filipinos in general was similarly uncharitable: he thought them “ignorant and very superstitious.”28

  Nor were ordinary soldiers particularly impressed with the insurgents. Theodore Wurm wrote in his diary:

  The Insurgent is a very poor appearing soldier—They go about the very narrow and dirty streets at will with their arms. Saw Mauser and Remington Rifles and large knives of any design probably waiting to be called for duty. No system seems to be established among them. The men are small but generously well built and muscular and the majority are in need of arms. They are trying to buy any kind of fire arms from us and are offering high prices. Nearly all the natives go without shoes and their clothing is scant and of very light weight material.29

  Merritt was determined, per McKinley’s orders, that the Americans would be the ones to take Manila by themselves, without Filipino participation. But how? They had to get American troops ashore near Manila so that they could mount an assault on the city without going through the insurgent lines. Merritt did not wish to use force against the insurgents and end up fighting two armies at once.

  The break came in personal negotiations between General Greene and one of his counterparts in the Philippine forces, Gen. Mariano Noriel. Greene persuaded the Filipino to allow the American forces to occupy a portion of Noriel’s left wing, from the beach that led into Manila Bay to an inland swamp. As fighting territory, it was dismal. The American trenches filled with water almost immediately, and the mosquitoes, large and hungry in the swamp, took their toll on American hides. The Spanish position opposite was particularly strong, anchored by two large blockhouses. But the American line was anchored on the left by Manila Bay, which allowed the navy to both supply the troops and support them with gunfire.

  Once the Americans were ashore, the three forces rubbed elbows somewhat uneasily. Aguinaldo was becoming increasingly suspicious of the Americans, and the Americans were trying to figure out how to occupy Manila without allowing the insurgents inside as well. In the end it was the Spanish who provided a way. In early August, Governor-General Augustin sent a telegram to Spain asking for permission to surrender. The reply instead relieved him and put his second in command, General Jaudenes, in charge. But the new governor-general agreed with Augustin that the situation was hopeless, so he negotiated through the Belgian consul with Admiral Dewey. The result of that negotiation was, if not a complete surrender, at least an agreement that, when the Americans attacked, Spanish resistance would cease as soon as honor permitted. One observer remarked of the agreement and the resulting battle, “The tragedy lost its tragic character and became a comedy before the performance began, and the performance itself developed into pretty nearly a farce.”30

  Merritt mounted an assault on August 13, sending the American forces into the Spani
sh lines across from them, supported by the guns of Dewey’s ships. The main points of attack were Fort San Antonio Abad near the beach and Blockhouse 14 a few hundred yards inland. Both fell relatively quickly. Theodore Wurm wrote of the assault several days later in his diary:

  The greatest obstacle to overcome was in getting over the ground and ahead, the way leading over wire fences and rice and cane fields which in places was nearly impassable, the ground being covered with water to the depth of a foot or more and as much more mud underneath. A continual fire of small arms was kept up by the enemy and the bullets were [splashing] in the water under foot and too near to make one feel comfortable. No determined resistance was made by the enemy after the Fleet dislodged them from their intrenchments. It was a rout.31

  Within hours the American soldiers had secured the Spanish fortifications and accepted the surrender of the rest of the Spanish forces. But what resistance there was slowed the Americans enough so that the Filipino insurgents learned of the attack and advanced into the suburbs of Manila. They were stopped from reaching the city proper by American troops in confrontations that edged toward violence. Nonetheless, by the end of the day, the Eighth Corps controlled Manila and had managed to exclude the Filipinos from any part in that possession. One of the soldiers, Private Henry King Skilman, wrote home to his mother about the celebration:

  Just as soon as we could pull that Spanish flag down up went the Stars and Stripes, our beloved “Old Glory” and, mother dear, I never felt before like I did at that moment. The tears filled my eyes and I choked up so that I could not shout for a moment, and I knew then what it was that you felt when you told me not to forget for one moment that the most glorious thing in all the world was that same flag, and that it was my first duty to protect it at all hazards. I have not forgotten your glorious words, for the happiest moment in all my life was when I saw that flag on high. You ought to have heard the sailors cheer when it went up—that beautiful banner. … the United States is God’s country.32

  With Manila and its bay, the United States possessed the economic heart of the Philippines. Dewey’s triumph had been cemented, and, whatever else happened, Spain’s power in the Pacific was permanently crippled. The question, of course, was what should the United States do with the Philippines?

  What to Do?

  The debate at home over exactly that question had been going on with some intensity since Dewey’s victory. The Philippines themselves were not particularly well known in the United States. As the historian Richard Hofstadter later pointed out, American media attention to the Philippines in the eighty-year period from 1818 to 1898 could be measured by the number of magazine articles published on them: thirty-five.33 Despite this lack of knowledge, there was a growing sense that the United States was destined to gain expansively from the war. It was only right, National Geographic declared, that the country should “take its rightful position among the nations of the earth. … The welfare of our nation lies largely in the development of our trade with the nations south of us and countries of the Far East. … Our policy in the future must be an aggressive one.”34

  This expansionist fever had given McKinley a chance to complete the annexation of Hawaii. Getting the Senate to ratify a treaty to take the island chain remained impossible, so McKinley turned to other, somewhat dubious methods. During the late spring and early summer of 1898, he threatened to take Hawaii using his power as commander in chief. Congress capitulated, and passed a joint resolution making Hawaii part of the United States, a resolution that McKinley signed on July 7, 1898. Such a method was not without precedent; the annexation of Texas had been managed by joint resolution in 1845 at the behest of President John Tyler. Since that annexation had contributed to the sectional divisions underpinning the Civil War, it was perhaps not the best omen for the future.35

  But what to do with the Philippines? Uncertainty ruled. Even the apostle of naval expansionism, Alfred Thayer Mahan, was confused:

  Personally, I have not yet become wholly adjusted to the new point of view opened to us by Dewey’s victory in Manila. It has opened a vista of possibilities which were not by me in the least foreseen. … As it is, I look with a kind of awe upon the passage of events in which the will of man seems to count for little.36

  Nor were the politicians more certain of their ground. There is the sense of an administration that was, to an extent, figuring things out on the fly, especially with regard to the Philippines. On July 28, Charles Dawes, one of McKinley’s close political advisers, confided to his diary:

  If we could only be assured that Spain had common sense, peace and a proper Governmental policy would seem in sight. The longer war continues, the greater will be the public demand that we keep all the Philippines, not because they are deemed desirable for us so much as because another course may seem a concession to Spain. As more lives are lost, the greater will be the public desire to keep the Philippines, not so much for themselves as to punish Spain.37

  There is a plaintive suggestion in Dawes’s words of a situation only barely under control.

  The situation became more urgent in late July. The Spanish monarchy began to feel that this disastrous war would lead to an internal revolt, and concluded that they should end it quickly. Attempts to get the other great powers to bring pressure on the United States to negotiate failed. Finally, on July 22, the Spanish petitioned the administration directly for an armistice and the opening of peace negotiations. Given the overwhelming American success, that seemed logical to McKinley. But what to ask for? Cuban independence was a given. American acquisition of Puerto Rico and other Spanish islands in the Caribbean was relatively uncontroversial. The accession of an island in the central Pacific chain of the Carolines—most likely Guam—was largely favored. But what to do about the Philippines? Should the administration take nothing, take Manila and Manila Bay, or take the whole thing? At a meeting on July 30 the cabinet agreed—though not without some discussion—to take only the city of Manila and the surrounding area to serve as a naval base and economic hub. The peace negotiators, the cabinet decided, would settle the final status of the islands.

  On August 12 the Spanish and American governments signed an armistice ending hostilities, the day before distant Manila fell. The end of combat and the looming peace negotiations made the Philippine question even more critical. Other powers sniffed around the Philippines, wondering perhaps if they could snatch them away from this impudent upstart power. German warships maneuvered threateningly, hovering in the waters around the archipelago and even inside Manila Bay. Their actions after the destruction of the Spanish fleet “began to excite much interest and considerable irritation among the officers and men of the American warships. Admiral Dewey was constantly receiving reports that the Germans were not observing an attitude of strict neutrality.”38 The Germans exacerbated the situation in June by reinforcing their squadron in the South China Sea to such a point that it might have been capable of overwhelming Dewey’s should a fight break out. Such behavior by the Germans gave greater weight to the voices advising McKinley that to leave the Philippines after eliminating Spanish power would give other imperial powers—Germany, France, Britain, and Russia—the opening to snatch the archipelago for themselves.

  In addition, the Far East was a hotbed of activity, with a range of European powers squabbling over various territories and eyeing covetously the giant prize that was China.39 The Philippines would serve the United States well as a stepping-stone for influence in the Chinese situation. An American coaling station at Manila or Subic Bay would give the navy the reach it needed to have a strong say in China.

  The Naval War Board’s report, written by Alfred Thayer Mahan on August 15–20, 1898, made exactly that argument. “The future of China [is] quite the most interesting commercial question of the Pacific to us at the present moment.” For that question, “the port of Manila is very centrally situated as regards the whole sweep of the eastern coast of Asia.” The report recommended taking Manila (or Subic) Bay
and the island of Guam as a transit point to the Philippines.40

  Other voices chimed in to reinforce the argument. Dewey recommended that the navy build its base at Subic Bay, as Manila Bay would be hard to defend.41 In addition, Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge told the president, the Philippines themselves would be a valuable market:

  The time has now come when [the domestic] market is not enough for our teeming industries, and the great demand of the day is an outlet for our products. … With our protective tariff wall around the Philippine islands, its ten million inhabitants, as they advance in civilization, would have to buy our goods, and we should have so much additional market for our home manufactures.42

  Finally, it should be noted that 1898 was a congressional election year, and should McKinley dispose of the Philippines in a way that displeased the American people, the Republicans were likely to suffer at the polls. The mood in the country was decidedly imperialist and expansionist and there was little support for letting the Philippines go. Returning them wholesale to Spain was certainly not an option; after fighting a war to liberate the Cubans from Spanish tyranny, returning the Filipinos to the same tyranny would seem the height of hypocrisy. McKinley was careful to gauge public opinion in the fall of 1898, first by talking to Republican political operatives and then by touring the Midwest and giving speeches to feel out popular opinion. He used the October opening of the Trans-Mississippi and International Exposition in Omaha, Nebraska, as a place to start his tour. Among other things, the exposition offered for spectators a model Philippine village that at one point included sixteen “Manila warriors … with cannibalistic proclivities.” What McKinley found was that speaking of America’s “divine ordination” by God to assume “international responsibilities” was extremely popular at the local level.43