A Brief History of Britain 1851-2010

by Jeremy Black

  There was a related Scottish narrative, not least with an emphasis on William Wallace, Robert the Bruce, and the ‘war of independence’ from England from the 1290s. This was not in the Victorian period and early twentieth century a form of victim history in which all ills were blamed on England, but rather an account of why Scotland was a fit partner in Union, and not a colony.

  An idealization of democracy as inherently British, or English and Scottish, was in line with the politics of the spreading franchise: the extensions of the right to vote were seen as arising naturally from the country’s development. To offer another historical strand, empire was given an historical component by being presented as both apogee and conclusion of an exemplary historical process begun with ancient Rome.

  This sense of superiority and the positioning of Britain in an exemplary fashion as the end-product of historical progress were also reaffirmed through a combination of the notion of Britain as the leader of civilization with the precepts of Social Darwinism: the idea of an inherent competitiveness leading to the survival of the fittest, which was seen as a way to affirm Britain’s success. Thus, an emphasis on meritocracy in British society was linked to a confidence in Britain’s global merit. Heroic nationalism was a theme across social classes and for all generations, and the emphasis was on the obligations of the patriot (generally male, but with exemplary female equivalents, notably Britannia, Elizabeth I, Queen Victoria, Elizabeth Fry, Grace Darling, Florence Nightingale and Emmeline Pankhurst), not the rights of the citizen: in short, on fulfilling individual potential through service to a greater good.

  The literary world testified powerfully to this theme. Charles Kingsley (1819–75), a clergyman who was Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge from 1860 to 1869, wrote a number of historical novels glorifying heroes from the English past. These included Westward Ho! (1855), an account of the Elizabethan struggle with Philip II of Spain, in which the Inquisition and the Jesuits appear as a cruel inspiration of Spanish action, and Hereward the Wake (1866), about valiant resistance to the Norman Conquest. The latter is largely forgotten while the former has recently been revived by film, notably in Elizabeth: The Golden Age (2007).

  The British Dimension

  Parliamentary government was regarded as a key characteristic of Britishness, one that Britain exported to its Dominions overseas. This characterization was appropriate because Britain, established in 1707, was created by Act of Parliament, and thus by the politics that led to that Act. Britain was a parliamentary creation, unlike the very different entities of England, Scotland or Wales, the last of which had been incorporated into the English realm as a result of an Act of Parliament in 1536. Northern Ireland, linked to Britain in the United Kingdom, is a relict of the Act of Union with Ireland which came into force in 1801. Britain, the united expression of what would otherwise have been a federal state, therefore lacks a deep history comparable to England, Scotland and Wales, and much of its history is covered in this book. Indeed, much that we associate with one of the constituent parts of Britain is of no relevance for another. Magna Carta (1215), a key event in English history, means nothing in Scotland, which was then an independent kingdom, while, conversely, the Declaration of Arbroath (1320) was a key event in Scottish, but not English history.

  That is not the sole misunderstanding. There is also a tendency, both abroad and in England, to see British and English history as interchangeable, indeed of Britain as a greater or another England, both of which are far from the case. This misunderstanding is shared by many of the English. There is, of course, no perfect balance in the history of Britain. For example, the currently fashionable ‘four nations’ approach to the history of the British Isles (English, Scots, Welsh, Irish) devotes insufficient attention to England, which is by far the preponderant nation in terms of population, and increasingly so; and there is also a more general failure to devote sufficient space to the history of the localities and regions of England. The West Country, London or the West Midlands, and the outer South East, have more people than Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively, but they receive less attention in coverage of national history.

  Moreover, processes common to at least two of the parts of the British Isles, such as Roman attack, the ‘Barbarian’ invasions, feudalism, the Protestant Reformation and the civil wars of the 1640s, played out very differently in the distinct states of the British Isles, as they also did across Western Europe. Indeed, the relevant units for the Reformation are as much France and Scotland, or England and Sweden, as Britain. Thus, despite retrospective attempts to create a common memory for Britain prior to the union of the crowns in 1603 and, even more, parliamentary union in 1707, there was none.

  This is a key point in the modern struggle over national identity, as many Scots and Welsh correctly see their identity as more historically grounded than that of Britain, and indeed deploy the past accordingly. The recovery of their views is therefore important to the history of modern Britain. As a result, to begin British history prior to 1707 is a political legacy of dubious historical value, and one moreover that will look increasingly invalid as separatism increases. A focus on 1707 underlines the problematic nature of the relationship between British and Scottish history as the end then of Scottish independence and the Scottish Parliament can create among Scots a sense of loss and powerful dispossession.

  Starting British history at 1707, roughly twice the period covered in this book, puts the focus on a world that is not as remote as if searching for political or cultural origins in Anglo-Saxon (and Scottish and Welsh) forests, which was where seventeenth-century English commentators searched for the origins of English liberty. Indeed, there was much already in existence in the 1700s and, newly confirmed by the Act of Union and the politics of the surrounding decades, that was important throughout the period of this book and that seems somehow familiar now. The ideas of limited government, representative politics, accountable monarchy, the rule of law, and an absence of religious persecution (Catholics would not all have agreed), were all affirmed from 1689. Indeed, the 1701 Act of Succession that excludes Catholics from the throne remains in force. Partly as a result, these ideas have all been part of Britain’s deep history. Indeed, their roots were longer-lasting in at least part of Britain.

  Thus, the Common Law, with its stress on trial by jury and on equality under the law, both still important today, was an important aspect of English distinctiveness, and, from the twelfth century, this was true of both the content of the law and the way it was administered. English Common Law was particularly suited to the protection of rights and liberties, and it encouraged a respect for the character and continuity of English political society. At the same time, the legal tradition was very different in Scotland where there was a basis, instead, in Roman law.

  A Democratic Public History

  Looked at more positively – and the interplay of positive and critical themes and approaches is a key element in this chapter, and one that repays reiteration – legal, governmental and political practices were, and are, not simply of constitutional and political force, but also reflected and sustained assumptions that constitute essential aspects of a history and identity that was handed on to immigrants and to new generations, notably a belief in fairness and in accountability. These assumptions provide an historical basis for a democratic culture in British history and in Britain today. This culture therefore is not simply grounded in constitutional provisions such as the restrictions on royal (and thus governmental) authority that followed the expulsion of James II (of England) and VII (of Scotland) in 1688–9, the so-called Glorious Revolution. This proved the key background to the parliamentary Acts of Union and also of the political world that prevailed until mass politics and the change in the role of government brought a slower-moving governmental and political transformation from the 1900s on. Partly as a result of the handing on of a set of historically grounded values, we see a situation in which, although modern British democratic culture is not
particularly acute in its knowledge of historical facts, it reflects, nevertheless, a pervasive historicism of continuing values that are grounded in past events and practices.

  The quest for freedom, the defence of liberty, and the respect for both law and individual rights, do not provide both narrative and analysis for the entire thrust of British history, but they do manage this for important episodes of which the British are proud. These episodes are then joined to present an account of a benign progress towards liberty in what is referred to as the Whig interpretation of British history, a view that is the basis for the way in which the British have tended to present their history.

  Moreover, this quest, this defence and this respect do offer a noteworthy example both to the present and, more generally, across the world. It is the peculiar greatness of British history that those who fought gloriously for national independence, most especially in 1805 against Napoleon and, even more, in 1940 against Hitler, were also asserting values that were more noble and uplifting than those of the nation’s enemies, while also helping to forge a sense of national unity. That Napoleon and Hitler were subsequently defeated in large part by the efforts of Britain’s allies, notably Russia, Prussia and, despite being reluctant, Austria in 1812–14, and principally by the Soviet Union and the US in 1944–5, did not lessen the key role of Britain in maintaining both struggles when others did not, keeping opposition alive and also in still playing a major role at the close.

  The situation is very different now. While there was particular concern over whether the Blair and Brown governments knew how best to define and sustain a viable interpretation of the national interest and national interests, more generally the very sense of national identity is being challenged strongly. This situation has led to tension over how best to present national history. Here we are talking not only of specifics, such as the treatment of the slave trade or of imperialism, for both of which there are misguided and ahistorical apologies, but also of the general interpretation and presentation of national history, as well as of the extent to which any single nation or country could, or should, be marked out alongside the state in British history.

  In particular, the arguments for Irish, Scottish and Welsh nationalism rest partly on the notion that Britishness is an extension of Englishness – or, at least, is employed by the English to that end – and therefore that it is of limited value. This, however, is a thesis that makes little sense of the processes by which Britishness has been defined and redefined, and has included, comprehended and drawn on, more than just Englishness, which was certainly the case in the nineteenth century, but far less now. In practice, multiple identities exist; and individual identities do not necessarily exclude all others, a key conclusion for any history of modern Britain and a parallel to the situation in the US. Although many Scots claim that it is increasingly difficult because Britishness is not defined as multinational, or at least in their eyes, it is possible to be British and either English or Scottish or a Londoner or of Pakistani origins, or Catholic; and so on. Appreciating this for the present means that the past should also be seen in this light.

  Moreover, an engagement with complexity is appropriate when looking to the past. For instance, differing themes are provided by the presentation of Britain’s leading role in the Atlantic slave trade in the eighteenth century, as it is one of the ironies of British history that the country also played the leading role in ending that trade the following century, both legislating against first the slave trade and then slavery, and then using the Royal Navy and diplomatic pressure to stamp out both across the world.

  This double role indicates the extent to which the national past can resonate with very different themes. Unfortunately, in offering an overall account, both the government and much public history, notably that served up on television, consistently manifest a maladroit and misleading reluctance to accept the variety of possible interpretations. As always, what is stressed tends to reflect current interests and needs, rather than the multiplicity of differing accounts. Thus, the recent governmental emphasis in the 2000s on Britishness represents a deliberate attempt to strengthen and sustain a sense of national identity in the face of what were seen as challenging tendencies, notably the rise of radical Islam.

  Yet, at the same time, as a reminder of the range of explanations possible for many historical episodes, the policy can be discussed in terms of the determination of the Labour government of the 2000s, heavily dependent on Scottish support, to resist the separation of England and Scotland advanced by the Scottish Nationalists, as well as to oppose calls for greater commitment to English interests. As a consequence, the language of Britishness became an assertion of long-term values very much in relation to the needs of the present day, a familiar process.

  The Decline of Britishness

  With the creation in 1997 of a Scottish Parliament and Executive, however, the drift became very much away from a British identity, not least as separatism became an incremental process. Just as this identity was created by Act of Parliament so it may well be dissolved by another, with, yet again, Parliaments in Edinburgh and London playing the key role. On 24 September 2009, indeed, BBC Radio 4’s flagship Today programme referred to ‘our devolved nations’. Two years earlier, Radio 4 had dropped the UK-themed music until then played at the 6.30 a.m. start of broadcasts.

  In recent decades, the long tradition of British history that prevailed for a quarter-millennium from the Act of Union with Scotland has largely collapsed. Empire disappeared, particularly from the granting of independence to India in 1947, as, soon after, did Britain’s leading maritime role. Indeed, it became apparent that British history in many respects had meant British empire history, and much of it passed with the loss of empire. Until 1947, Britishness was quintessentially imperial, and ‘Empire’ meant an international Britishness, not an island one.

  Conversely, the late 1940s saw the beginning of a new, provincialized state which, as ‘Great Britain’, came into being to run a global colonial and trading system that has since disintegrated. As a result, the ‘Little Britishness’ characteristic of the post-war period, and associated in particular with Thatcher, is of very recent origin and not as deeply rooted as is generally implied. Looked at differently, there is still a great deal of point in England, but it is unclear how far there still is in Britain. From the Scottish perspective, Scotland has been regionalized from the 1940s as Great Britain is no longer seen as a multinational polity. There is certainly less English interest now in Scottish culture than was the case in the Victorian period. In the nineteenth century, and even the 1930s, Sir Walter Scott (1771–1832) and Robert Burns (1759–96) were very significant writers for English school curricula, but by the 1960s both had been discarded

  Moreover, as discussed in the last chapter, cultural and religious continuity was greatly compromised in the 1960s, notably with the decline in the position, popularity and relevance of the Established Churches. In addition, Americanism and globalization compromised native styles, whether in food or in diction, with all that they meant for national distinctiveness and continuity.

  Furthermore, all too much of the quest for freedom, defence of liberty, and respect for both law and individual rights has been neglected or distorted in recent decades by governmental and institutional priorities and interests. In particular, a combination of the communitarian solutions pushed by the left, the major inroads of European federalism and a lack of trust in the individual has transformed the political and legal culture of the country. For example, parliamentary government has been greatly eroded by the rise of European institutions, notably the European Parliament and courts, and by the incorporation of European law.

  Indeed, in 1993, a leading English historian, W.A. Speck (1938–), published a Concise History of Britain, 1707–1975 in which he claimed that his chronology ‘spans the whole history of Britain in the precise sense’, as membership of what became the European Union was, he argued, a partial surrender of British sovereignty. This
sense of discontinuity carried forward the 1962 remark by Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of the Labour Party, then in opposition, that such membership would mean ‘the end of Britain as an independent nation’. Thus, the recent past has very much seen a recasting of the legacy of the distant past, a recasting that has attracted limited attention, and mainly only from those critical of the process. Nevertheless, whereas some changes, notably the end of empire, have not led to much of a sense of dislocation for many Britons, particularly for the growing numbers who did not experience imperial greatness, this is not the case as far as European integration is concerned.

  A widespread failure to appreciate the extent and consequences of the recasting represents a key misunderstanding of Britain’s past. Alongside many Britons, foreigners in particular, sold by the ‘heritage industry’ an impression of ancient ceremonial, historic cities and long continuity, have often failed to appreciate that most British people neither have tea with the queen nor commit murders in picturesque villages. Midsomer Murders (1997–), for example, is highly popular in many foreign markets, including Germany and Scandinavia, as is Morse. That poverty or poor housing scarcely feature makes these series similar to more historic series, such as Poirot and Miss Marple, both based on the bestselling novels of Agatha Christie; but also reflects a different brand of escapism because Midsomer Murders is very much one located in the present. Moreover, Britons, and, even more, foreigners, frequently do not understand the extent to which there have been sweeping changes in recent decades, notably in culture, society and living arrangements.

  A widespread lack of appreciation of the extent of change is linked to a major source of criticism of Britain, namely its supposed association with outdated social and political practices, notably social division, class control and the role of the monarchy. The balanced constitution on which eighteenth-and nineteenth-century British commentators prided themselves, a constitution praised by many contemporary foreigners, is now rejected as an undesirable legacy for a democratic age. This approach has been taken further in the world of Hollywood, in which the British, those of the present and, even more, their forebears, repeatedly appear as the villainous opponents of democratic tendencies, as well as being personally, psychologically and sexually repressed and repressive.