Pakistan- the Balochistan Conundrum

by Tilak Devasher

  To further their imperial interests, the British built railways and roads in strategic areas connecting Balochistan to British India, Iran and Afghanistan. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the total length of the railway was about 650 km. The opening of the Nushki Railway, completed in 1905, increased the total to about 775 km. The total length of roads and paths in 1903, was about 1,800 km.30 During the First and Second World Wars, new roads were built for military supply into Iran and the Middle East. Significantly, the early Baloch nationalists were aware of the importance of the communication system in the development of nationalism. Thus, the Baloch national conferences held in 1932 and 1933 demanded the construction of new roads and the opening of post offices.31 Despite this, when the British left the subcontinent in 1947, the vast province had only a limited communication system primarily for the use of the military.

  Poor communication and transport infrastructure continued to exacerbate the backwardness of the province. While the province has the largest road network in the country of 22,000 km of ‘metal and shingle’ road (40 per cent of the total in the country) most of it is in a dilapidated condition due to poor maintenance.32

  Creation of the Province

  A variety of views has been put forward regarding the national and ethnic borders of Balochistan. The Encyclopaedia of Islam says: ‘The exact boundaries of Balochistan are undetermined. In general, it occupies the south-eastern part of the Iranian plateau from the Kirman desert east of Bam and Bashagird to the western borders of Sindh and the Punjab.’33 Encyclopaedia Britannica defines the borders as stretching ‘… from the Gomal river in the north-east to the Arabian Sea in the South and from the borders of Iran and Afghanistan in the west and north-west to the Sulaiman mountains and Kirthar Hills in the east, including the region of south-eastern Iran.’34 Lord Curzon had defined Balochistan as ‘the country between the Helmand and the Arabian Sea and between Kirman and Sind.’35

  Perhaps the most striking definition was that given by Mir Nasir Khan II, Khan of Kalat (1840–75). When asked about the borders of Balochistan by the British and Afghan envoys at his court, he stated, ‘My ancestor and namesake Nasir Khan Nuri had already replied in geographical terms to a similar question long ago; and I repeat: all those regions where the Baloch are settled are a part and parcel of our State.’36

  Prior to the arrival of the British, Balochistan was divided into four princely states or regions. They were (1) Kalat (2) Lasbela (3) Makran (4) Kharan. All of them were under the Khan of Kalat when the incumbent was strong enough to assert his control. The present-day province of Balochistan came into existence in July 1970. An understanding of how its borders evolved during the British period and after the creation of Pakistan is crucial because often people get confused about the large Pashtun population in Balochistan and try and link the Pashtun Taliban to the Baloch.

  As Olaf Caroe, the British governor of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) put it, Balochistan is a misnomer: ‘The valley of Shal [Quetta], about seventy miles north of Kalat and situated at 5,500 feet [1,675 m] above sea level at the head of the Bolan Pass, is exactly on the line of ethnic division. In the centre of it is the town of Quetta. All the country to the north is a part of the Pathan belt and inhabited by Pathan tribes of which the Tarins, Achakzais, Kakars and Panris are the most important. To the south of Quetta all the people are Brahvis and Baloch.’37

  The British intervention in Balochistan—a process that would forever change its destiny—began due to the compulsions of the Great Game. The advance of the Tsarist empire into Central Asia made the British apprehensive about the safety of their Indian empire. To forestall the Russian advance towards India, the British used Afghanistan as a buffer between the two empires. For this, it became necessary to control parts of Balochistan bordering Afghanistan so as to secure lines of communication and transportation through the Bolan Pass to Chaman and beyond. The effort to ensure that Afghanistan remained a buffer led to the First Afghan War (1838–42) that proved to be a disaster for the British. The one important lesson they learnt from the movement of the ‘Army of the Indus’—the name of the British Indian force that invaded Afghanistan in 1839—was that to keep the passage through the Bolan Pass to southern Afghanistan open and safe, they had to establish some sort of control over the adjoining areas of Balochistan.

  Following the Second Afghan War (1878–79) and the Treaty of Gandamak (1879), the British annexed large parts of Pashtun territories north of the Bolan Pass that were grouped into a chief commissioner’s province called British Balochistan even though they were predominantly Pashtun areas. To further stall the potential Russian advance towards India, the British demarcated their border with Iran and Afghanistan giving away large parts of the princely state of Kalat to these two countries. This was an imperial tactic to befriend these rulers to pre-empt their joining the Russians. Under the final outcome of the boundary settlements imposed on the Baloch: (i) Seistan and Western Makran, Sarhad, etc., became part of Iran; (ii) Outer Seistan and Registan came under the control of Afghanistan; and (iii) Jacobabad, Derajat and Sibi were included in British India. In return, the Khanate of Balochistan was recognized as an independent state with the status of a protectorate.38

  Thus, under the British, Balochistan had two main administrative units—the Kalat state (75 per cent of the area and the three constituent states of Las Bella, Kharan and Makran), and areas under the British. The latter consisted of British Balochistan; areas leased by the British from Kalat and the Marri and Bugti tribal areas. A succinct picture of Balochistan during British rule is described in the 1911 Britannica:

  [Balochistan] is divided into two main divisions, British Baluchistan, which is a portion of British India under the chief commissioner, and the foreign territories under the administration or superintendence of the same officer as agent to the governor-general [AGG]. The former portion, with an area of 9,403 sq. km, consists principally of tracts ceded to the British government by Afghanistan under the Treaty of Gandamak (1879), and formally declared to be part of British India in 1887. The second class comprises three subdivisions, namely areas directly administered, native states and tribal areas. The directly administered districts include areas acquired in various ways. Some portions are held on lease from the Khan of Kalat; while others are tribal areas in which it has been decided for various reasons that revenue shall be taken. They include the whole of the Zhob and Chagai political agencies, the eastern portion of the Quetta tahsil and other tracts, among which may be mentioned the Bolan Pass, comprising 36,401 sq. km in all. The whole of the northern boundary, with the north-eastern corner and the railway which traverses Baluchistan through Quetta up to New Chaman on the Afghan-Baluch frontier, is therefore in one form or other under direct British control. The remainder of the territory (79,382 sq. km) belongs to the native states of Kalat (including Makran and Kharan) and Lasbela. Tribal areas, in the possession of the Marri and Bugti tribes, cover 7,129 sq. km.39

  Thus, it was the fear of Russian advance towards India that was the pivot for the Great Game in the nineteenth century and later, it was the Soviet quest for a warm-water port through Afghanistan and Balochistan that led to the renewed Great Game in the twentieth. Pakistan inherited Britain’s apprehensions of Russian/Soviet control of the Baloch coast that could fundamentally change the military equation in the region, quite apart from giving Moscow a powerful new launch pad for influence in the ‘wells of power’ of the Middle East.

  As Mary Anne Weaver writes, the British made the Quetta cantonment their base as also circuit houses near the frontier. However, they administered little else in Balochistan. The nawabs and sardars, who had been bolstered with the support of the Raj, had total command over their lands. ‘Quetta was a tiny outpost that the British had transformed into this Victorian sector of cricket fields, sprawling bungalows, and street lanterns that once burned coconut oil. Quetta was, after Aldershot, the largest garrison-station in the empire, and there was also the Staff Col
lege—one of only two in the entire empire.’40

  Quetta became the headquarters of the fourth division of the Western Command. In 1903, the troops consisted of three mountain batteries, two companies of garrison artillery, two British infantry regiments, three ‘native’ cavalry regiments, six ‘native’ infantry regiments and one company of sappers and miners. The total strength of troops on 1 June 1903 was 9,771—2,650 British and 7,121 ‘native’. The greater part of the garrison was quartered at Quetta and in a number of outposts; the remainder was distributed at Loralai, Fort Sandeman and Chaman, each of these stations being garrisoned by ‘native’ infantry and cavalry.41

  After the forced accession of Kalat to Pakistan in 1948, the Balochistan States Union (BSU) was established in 1951-52, wherein Lasbela, Makran and Kharan were merged into Kalat. These four territories would share a common executive, legislature and judiciary under the common constitution of Pakistan, with the prime minister a nominee of the Pakistan government. Later, the Khan and others were made to sign ‘The Balochistan States Union Merger Agreement’ that abrogated all previous agreements and treaties between the state of Kalat and Pakistan. The four states were dissolved and their rulers pensioned off, with substantial hikes in the amount of their privy purses, and the area constituted as Kalat Division. Later, Kalat Division became part of the then West Pakistan under the One Unit Scheme in 1955 while British Balochistan along with the tribal agencies became part of West Pakistan as the Quetta Division in the same year. With the abolition of the One Unit plan on 1 July 1970, the combined divisions of Quetta and Kalat came together as the newly created province of Balochistan.

  A and B Areas

  Balochistan is divided into two areas for purposes of policing—category ‘A’ and category ‘B’. The category ‘A’ areas consists mainly of towns and cities and remains under a regular police force. In 2006, as the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan noted, there were eighty-nine police stations and the sanctioned strength of the police was 19,145.42

  The ‘B’ area (almost 95 per cent of Balochistan) is under the control of the levies43 who in 2006 maintained 286 police stations and employed 13,357 personnel. By 2018, the strength of the levies went up to 23,132.44 The local sardars and civil bureaucracy dominated the levy system. The recruitment of levies was not based on merit but on the recommendation of the ‘local influentials’.45 Several political and economic interests had developed around this system.

  Under President Musharraf, in order to cut the sardars down to size, all ‘B’ areas in the province were converted into ‘A’ areas and police empowered to maintain law and order across the province. Billions of rupees were committed to streamlining the conversion but it remained controversial. Many Baloch parliamentarians expressed apprehensions about rising unemployment among those who were relieved from the levy force. They were, however, assured that the levies would be trained and inducted into the police force.46

  After the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment (2010) when powers were devolved to the provinces, the Balochistan cabinet overturned the decision taken under Musharraf to merge the two areas. Accordingly, the police force was withdrawn from ‘B’ areas and the levy force revived there. Now, levies operate in ‘B’ areas of the province and the police in the ‘A’ areas as earlier.47

  Strategic Importance

  Balochistan’s strategic importance invited the attention of the British but worked to its detriment. Under Pakistan too, it is Balochistan’s strategic and geographic importance that has again attracted attention. Once again, it is working to its disadvantage.

  With almost 44 per cent of Pakistan’s landmass, Balochistan is perhaps Pakistan’s most strategically located province. In the north, the districts of Chagai, Quetta and Zhob make up the border with Afghanistan. On the west, the districts of Makran, Kharan and western Chagai make up another border with Iran. In the east are the Pakistan provinces of Sindh, Punjab and part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). In addition, its 760-km coastline is almost two-thirds of Pakistan coastline with an approximately 180,000 sq. km exclusive economic zone that is largely untapped.

  Balochistan sits astride the Straits of Hormuz, one of the choke points of the Indian Ocean that provides access to oil tankers bound for the West, China and Japan. Nearly 40 per cent of the world’s oil supplies pass through the Straits of Hormuz. It is in every country’s interest to ensure that the shipping lines of the Persian Gulf remain open and are secured. Balochistan’s geographical proximity to the oil and gas deposits of Central Asian regions adds to its strategic importance.48 It provides the closest access point to landlocked Afghanistan, the Central Asian states and the Xinjiang province of China to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.

  Three of Pakistan’s naval bases are located on the Baloch coast—Ormara, Pasni and Gwadar. In addition to providing Pakistan with a deep-water port and the potential for millions in revenue, Gwadar provides Pakistan with strategic depth. This is something that the main naval base at Karachi does not. In fact, Karachi had been blockaded and attacked by India in the past. Chagai in Balochistan is home to Pakistan’s nuclear testing sites. Additionally, Balochistan’s immense area allows Pakistan the flexibility to scatter its nuclear arsenal and thus protect it from potential attacks.

  The proximity of the main opium producing centres in Afghanistan—the provinces of Helmand, Kandahar and Zabul—to Balochistan and the Chaman crossing makes it crucial for smuggling narcotics out of the country, as noted in the Introduction.

  Balochistan is also the place where ‘the cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy’, namely the endangered Houbura bustard is allowed to be slaughtered by Arab sheikhs, especially in the districts of Turbat, Loralai, Muskhel, Chagai and Jhal Magsi. In a review petition filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan seeking to reverse its 19 August 2015 ban on hunting the Houbara bustard, the government of Pakistan stated that inviting Arab dignitaries to hunt the bird in Pakistan was a ‘cornerstone of foreign policy’;49 and the ban on falconry hunting of Houbara bustard could further affect the already weakened relations with the Arab states. The clinching argument made by a former law minister of Pakistan as well as chairman of the Senate, Farooq H. Naek, before the Supreme Court was that hunting of the Houbara was intolerable and excruciating for India. It was India’s agenda to seek a ban on Houbara bustard hunting as foreign dignitaries were investing in Pakistan, and India did not want to see Pakistan develop.50 Faced with such ‘weighty’ arguments that the Houbara was the ‘cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy’ and the supposed involvement of India, the Supreme Court on 22 January 2016 relented and lifted the ban on hunting the endangered bird, thus restoring Balochistan’s strategic importance!

  Strategic location apart, Balochistan’s supposed treasure of minerals and energy resources is one of the major factors behind the turmoil in the province. According to a famous Baloch proverb, ‘A Baloch may be born without socks on his feet, but when he grows up every step he takes is on gold.’51 Balochistan is reputed to have vast mineral and energy resources—36 per cent of Pakistan’s total current natural gas production, as also reserves of coal, gold, copper, silver, platinum, aluminum and uranium. Reko Diq, Saindak, Sui52 and Chamalang produce a wealth of resources like copper, gold, natural gas, coal and other minerals. Reko Diq is a copper and gold mine in Chagai district with an estimated mineral resource of at least 54 billion pounds of copper and 41 million ounces of gold.53 The Saindak mine is estimated to have copper ore reserves of 412 million tonnes containing on average 0.5 gram of gold per tonne and 1.5 grams of silver per tonne. According to official estimates, the project has the capacity to produce 15,800 tonnes of blister copper annually, containing 1.5 tonnes of gold and 2.8 tonnes of silver.54 Chamalang coal mines, spread over an area of 1,300 sq. km, are located in Loralai, Kohlu and Barkhan. A total of 500 million tonnes of coal deposits have been confirmed worth over Rs 2,000 billion.55

  Balochistan’s location, adjoining Afghanistan, made it important to the US in the �
��War on Terror’ for carrying out operations against the Taliban after 9/11. Airfields in Pasni, Dalbadin and Shamsi in Balochistan were used extensively since 2001 to provide logistical support for special forces and intelligence operations. At Shamsi, CIA operatives launched drones that attacked the Taliban in Afghanistan and in the tribal belt. In addition, it has often been speculated that the US presence in Balochistan could also be due to its potential for operations against Iran’s nuclear programme. In fact, in 2006, investigative reporter Seymour Hersh had even written that US special forces had been implanted into Iran from secret bases in Balochistan.56

  Following the US campaign against the Taliban that began in November 2001, Balochistan became a significant exit route for al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters seeking safe havens in Pakistan. When the US and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops were at their peak in Afghanistan, Balochistan was also a critical link in the supply route from Karachi to Afghanistan via the Chaman border crossing.

  Decades ago, Selig Harrison had written, ‘If it were not for the strategic location of Balochistan and the rich potential of oil, uranium and other resources, it would be difficult to imagine anyone fighting over this bleak, desolate and forbidding land.’57 Since he wrote, Balochistan has become key to the energy security of Pakistan. The rising requirement for energy resources has resulted in increasing the economic and strategic salience of the province. It is this assured access to natural gas resources that is the prism through which Pakistan looks at Balochistan.

  As Robert G. Wirsing puts it, ‘… assured access to hydrocarbon or other energy resources, including both oil and natural gas, has in recent decades assumed a far greater importance than hitherto as a driver of Pakistan’s security policy, both domestic and external.’58 Energy security is now a foremost national priority. Resultantly, Balochistan’s economic and strategic importance has been enhanced exponentially making it crucial for Pakistan to deal with the growing separatism in the country.59