Given their strategic interests, the British developed only the infrastructure vital to the defence of Balochistan. In contrast, due to their economic and political interests in Punjab and Sindh, the infrastructure developed in these regions favoured agricultural growth and industrialization. Such a structurally imbalanced legacy would continue after Pakistan’s creation. The post-colonial ruling elite did very little to undo the economic and political inequality among the different ethnic groups and regions. Power asymmetries among ethno-regional groups reinforced regional disparities and ensured that the distribution of resources remained biased in favour of Punjab.31 This disparity and domination of Punjab would become a major conflict driver in Pakistan.
Division of Balochistan
An adjunct to the imperial design of keeping the Russians away from India was the parcelling out of Balochistan. The British ignored all evidence of certain areas falling under the jurisdiction or influence of the Khan of Kalat as also history, geography and culture. They gifted these areas away to either Persia (renamed Iran) or Afghanistan, in a bid to placate their rulers and befriend them in apprehension of an attack from Russia. This was the ‘Great Game’ of those times and the Baloch had to pay dearly for the selfish motives of the colonial rulers.32
The Goldsmid Line divided Balochistan into two parts, giving in 1871, roughly one-fourth of Balochistan to Persia in the far west; in the north, the Durand Line assigned a small strip to Afghanistan in 1894. More border adjustments between Balochistan and Persia took place in 1896 and once again in 1905. These awards, under the so-called Anglo-Persian Joint Boundary Commission, ceded more territory to Persia and permanently divided the Baloch tribes of Siestan and western Makran. Subsequently, after its accession to Pakistan, the Baloch majority district of Jacobabad were transferred to Sindh, and Dera Ghazi Khan to Punjab.33 Thus, by 1905, the demarcation of the boundary between British India and Iran on the one hand and between British India and Afghanistan on the other had quite effectively and unalterably divided the Baloch among three states: British India, Afghanistan and Iran.
Rise of Baloch Identity and Nationalism
Baloch scholars believe that a distinctive Baloch culture, language and identity started emerging from the twelfth century onwards. According to Selig Harrison, the fiercely independent and proud Baloch were, for one, able to preserve their separate cultural identity despite continual pressures from the strong cultural influences of neighbouring Iran and Afghanistan. For another, the isolation of the various communities in Balochistan kept the Balochi language and value system insulated, which provided a unifying common denominator.34 In modern times, several factors helped break down tribal barriers. These included: improved communications, development of rudimentary infrastructure and transportation, a nascent educated middle class and, most importantly, a common sense of abandonment, political marginalization, economic disparity compared with other provinces, a perception of Punjabi colonization, the overbearing domination of civil–military bureaucracy, and the growing fear of becoming a minority in their own land.
Baloch resistance to the British had continued throughout the nineteenth century. These were, however, acts of individual tribal chiefs who felt wronged by government actions. They could not assume a national struggle primarily due to lack of communication between the Baloch tribes, lack of a proper political organization to mobilize the masses, and an adversary that had far superior weapons and resources.35
If a date is to be given to the emergence of the Baloch nationalist movement, it would be 1929 when the Anjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Balochistan (Organisation for Unity of the Baloch), a clandestine organization, was set up in Mastung. Mir Muhammad Yusuf Ali Khan Magsi, the first president, and Abdul Aziz Kurd were the two principal leaders thrown up by this movement. The Anjuman marked the beginning of a secular, non-tribal nationalist movement as opposed to the tribal movements of the past. The bulk of its leadership and membership, notes Breseeg, were largely drawn from the urban bourgeoisie, educated youth and nationalist-minded members of the clergy and tribal aristocracy.36
In 1929 Magsi published an article, ‘Faryad-e-Balochistan’, (Cry of Balochistan), in the 17 November 1929 issue of the weekly Hamdard, Lahore. In the article, he appealed to the Baloch to organize themselves for the liberation and unity of Balochistan and demanded constitutional reforms. Magsi’s article is perceived to be the first Baloch literary document in the cause of Baloch nationalism.37
The founding fathers of Baloch nationalism were influenced by the Young Turks, the Bolshevik Revolution and the nationalist movement in British India. The influence of these movements and their ideologies can be observed in the programme of the Anjuman and in the statements and writings of Magsi. To promote nationalism and patriotism, Magsi called for the Baloch people to work for the following principles and goals:38
(i) The unification and independence of Balochistan;
(ii) A democratic and socialist system guided by Islamic universalism;
(iii) The abolition of rule by tribal sardars (sardari nizam);
(iv) Free and compulsory education for the Baloch people, and equality for Baloch women; and
(v) The promotion Baloch culture.
Magsi believed that Baloch unity and the independence of Balochistan depended on socio-political changes in Baloch society. The Anjuman also opposed communalism and sectarianism, a policy that encouraged minorities such as the Zikris to support it.
The first successful nationalist campaign was launched in 1929 against state recruitment into the army that turned into an armed mutiny. The following year, in 1930, several underground political groups were formed and an anti-colonial ‘Quit Balochistan’ movement was launched. The announcement prompted the Kalat state to issue an arrest order against Magsi but he escaped to Jacobabad in the nick of time. From there he launched his nationalist agitation and financed the publication of Baloch nationalist newspapers from Karachi.
In December 1932 a three-day ‘Balochistan and All-India Baloch Conference’ was held at Jacobabad. The conference attracted prominent delegates from all over the region. The first conference was such a success that a second one was convened in Hyderabad, Sindh, at the end of December 1933. In 1934, though Magsi suggested an armed struggle for the liberation and unification of Balochistan, the leaders realized that this was a difficult task. They, therefore, supported the strengthening of the Kalat state’s legal status as a sovereign state, hoping it would become the nucleus of a larger Balochistan state after the British left. They also wanted the introduction of an elected system instead of the sardari system.39
Following the death of Nawab Magsi in the 31 May 1935 Quetta earthquake, the Anjuman was renamed the ‘Kalat State National Party’ (KSNP) on 5 February 1937. The aim of the party was to establish constitutional rule in the Khanate and create an independent, united Balochistan after the departure of the British. The party agreed with the Khan that Kalat state, like Nepal, had direct treaty relationships with London.
The KSNP did not support the Muslim League that stood for an independent homeland for India’s Muslims. In fact, with their secular, anti-imperialist and populist ideas, many of the KSNP leaders were closer to the Indian National Congress and especially to Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and other moderate Muslims, who supported a secular, federal, united India. The secularism of the Baloch together with the strong tribal bonds had ensured that in the 1940s the Islamic rhetoric of the Muslim League failed to make an impact on them.
As the British withdrawal from India started looming in the mid-1940s, a few Baloch leaders tried to generate a sense of common ethnic identity by calling for an independent Balochistan.40 However, Baloch separatism was still the project of only a few and failed to become a cohesive grass-root-level ideological movement.41
6
Accession to Pakistan
Events Around Partition
AS THE SUN BEGAN TO set on the British Empire in India, several questions arose about the status of Kalat and its future
, questions that continue to have a resonance even today. The key questions were: what would be the status of the princely state of Kalat on the lapse of British paramountcy; what would be the status of British Balochistan; how would the leased areas of Quetta, Nushki and Nasirabad be treated; would they be restored to the Khan; and what would be the future of the tribal areas in Balochistan?
Historically, the legal status of Kalat was different from that of other princely states in the subcontinent. According to Martin Axmann, ‘The relations between the Government of India and the Khanate of Kalat were, theoretically and formally up to August 1947, based on the long-standing Treaty of 1876 which committed the British in Article 3 to recognize and respect Kalat’s independence.’ He also cites the First Administrative Report of the Balochistan Agency of 1886 that stated that in 1877, Khudadad Khan (Khan of Kalat) ‘… occupied a position of a Sovereign Prince entirely independent of the British Government with which he was connected only by his treaty engagements.’1 Due to this position, the Khan did not join the Chamber of Princes in Delhi. He always maintained that Kalat was on a separate footing and not part of Britain’s Indian empire. Likewise, while the 560-odd princely states in India were clubbed as category A under the political department, states like Kalat, together with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim were clubbed in category B under the External Affairs Department of the Government of India.
Despite all the evidence to the contrary, the Government of India Act of 1935 unilaterally included Kalat among the princely states of India and sanctioned its right to be represented in the Federal legislature. The Act also formally established the province of British Balochistan.2
In protest, the Khan issued several letters to the British government demanding the restoration of his powers that had been guaranteed under the Treaty of 1876. In one such letter in July 1938, the Khan demanded the framing of a fresh treaty that would put ‘… into effect in letter, in spirit and in practice, the Treaty of 1876, which safeguarded the interests of the two Governments’ and the ‘… restrictions and conditions imposed, contrary to the terms of the Treaty of 1876 ... may be withdrawn and rescinded and the independence of the Kalat government may be honoured scrupulously in accordance with the Treaty of 1876’.3 However, all he got was a personal letter from the Crown Representative assuring him that such reaffirmation was unnecessary, and that the Viceroy recognized the Treaty of 1876 as fully valid in every respect, and that it would henceforth form the basis of the relations between the British Government and the Kalat state.4
The Khan had two memorandums formally submitted to the Cabinet Mission in March 1946 (prepared by Barristers Sir Sayyid Sultan Ahmad and Sirdar D.K. Sen but presented by M.A. Jinnah in May 1946). The first titled ‘Memorandum of the Government of Kalat’ dealt in detail with the claims of Kalat in respect of Lasbela and Kharan and the Marri and Bugti tribes.
The memo went to great pains to articulate why Kalat was not an Indian state. It argued that:
[O]n the transference of power in British India, the subsisting treaties between the Khan of Kalat and the British Government would come to an end, and whatever obligations have been imposed on the Khan by these treaties will ipso facto terminate. The consequence will be that the State of Kalat will become fully sovereign and independent in respect of both external and internal matters, and will be free to conclude treaties with any other Government or State. The Khan of Kalat and his people are most anxious that the completely independent status, which will emerge as a result of the transference of power in British India, should continue, and the State of Kalat should not be asked to come within the framework of the proposed Indian Union.5
As far as Lasbela and Kharan were concerned, the memo held that Lasbela was a district of Kalat State within the province of Jalawan while Kharan was a part of the territories of the Kalat State with its chief being one of the Sarawan sardars. Therefore, both were a part of the territories of Kalat.6
The second memo was titled ‘Retrocession of Quetta, Nushki and Nasirabad’ and concerned the return of these leased areas after the British departure. The memo stressed that although administration of these territories was vested in the British government and it was in actual possession of these areas, sovereignty of these areas remained with the Khanate of Kalat. Therefore, it was urged that before the British handed over power in India, they should formally declare that they relinquished or retroceded all their powers and authority in and over the niabats and districts of Quetta, Nushki and Nasirabad. This should be followed by the actual delivery of possession.7
As the Cabinet Mission could not find flaws with the legality of the demand, it left the issue unresolved.
As late as June 1947, Jinnah assured Kalat of the continuance and safeguard of its independent status. In a statement issued to the press on 18 June 1947 Jinnah said, ‘… I am of the firm opinion that the Memorandum of the Cabinet Mission of 12 May 1946 … nowhere makes it obligatory upon them (Indian states) to merge themselves with any Legislative Assembly, be it Indian or Pakistani.’ He added, ‘It is my personal belief that if any State wants to remain aloof, it may do so without any pressure from any quarter, whether it be the British Parliament or any political organization in the country.’8
Thus, Kalat in 1947 was not really obliged to join either India or Pakistan. When it was decided to partition India, Mir Ahmad Khan, the Khan of Kalat, claimed with some justification that Kalat was never a part of India and made it clear that he sought independence.
At a round table conference held in Delhi on 4 August 1947 and attended by Lord Mountbatten, the Khan of Kalat, chief minister of Kalat and Jinnah, it was decided that ‘Kalat State will be independent on 5 August 1947 enjoying the same status as it originally held in 1838 having friendly relations with its neighbours’.9
As a corollary to the round table conference, a standstill agreement between Kalat and Pakistan was signed on 4 August 1947 (publicly announced a week later on 11 August). Jinnah and Liaquat Ali signed on behalf of the future state of Pakistan and Sultan Ahmed on behalf of Khanate of Kalat. The operative portions of the communiqué dated 11 August 1947 are worth quoting from:
As a result of a meeting held between a delegation from Kalat and officials of the Pakistan States Department, presided over by the Crown Representative, and a series of meetings between the Crown Representative, HH the Khan of Kalat, and Mr Jinnah, the following was the situation:
The Government of Pakistan recognizes Kalat as an independent sovereign state, in treaty relations with British government, with a status different from that of Indian states.
Legal opinion will be sought as to whether or not agreements of leases made between the British government and Kalat will be inherited by the Pakistan government.10
Separately, the British informed the rulers of Kharan and Lasbela that control of their regions had been transferred to Kalat state, and the Marri and Bugti tribal regions which were under British control were also returned into the Kalat fold, thereby bringing the whole of Balochistan under the suzerainty of the Khan of Kalat.11
Mountbatten did not sign the communiqué recognizing Kalat’s independent status even though he was involved in its finalization. The minutes of his meeting with the Kalat delegation note that while the PM of Kalat had asked for a statement declaring the recognition by the Crown Representative of Kalat’s independent status, ‘the Viceroy replied that the advice which he had received on this point from the Political Adviser precluded this; in any case, a declaration by the Crown Representative would be of little value at the present time’.12
Some have, therefore, argued that though Kalat was recognized as independent, the fact that Mountbatten did not sign it made the declaration inoperative since it did not signal the recognition of the British government.13 The contrary view is that since Pakistan, the successor state, had recognized Kalat’s independence and Jinnah, its future Governor-General, had unequivocally signed it, did it really matter that Mountbatten himself had not signed the declaration
? The Kalat delegation itself did not make much of Mountbatten’s refusal to sign and thus signal the recognition of the British government. A plausible reason why Mountbatten did not sign the declaration and why Pakistan accepted Kalat’s independence pertains to the importance of the leased areas of Quetta, Nushki and Nasirabad.
In a letter to Jinnah in July 1947, Barrister M. Ziauddin explained the importance of these areas: ‘… Balochistan as a province will in any case be a liability for Pakistan, but disintegrated and shorn of the Leased Areas it will become a millstone around its neck. At the present if Pakistan loses Quetta it loses one of the most important military stations, and the strategic routes to Persia and Afghanistan … the potential mineral wealth of Balochistan exists in the tribal areas. Therefore, all the potential sources of Balochistan’s wealth will also go out under the present scheme [of retrocession].’14
According to author Yaqoob Khan Bangash, Mountbatten was not keen for Kalat to gain control of the strategic Bolan Pass and Quetta.15 Mountbatten wrote to the Secretary of State on 25 July 1947 (i.e., before the 4 August meeting):
The Kalat States’ representative claimed that they were an independent and sovereign state in treaty relations with the British Government. The Pakistan States Department readily agreed to this view since, in their opinion, the successor authorities in India would inherit any treaty obligations with foreign states on behalf of India, whereas of course the Indian Independence Bill renounces all treaties entered into with Indian states … it looks as though if the Khan of Kalat insists on his independent status it will cost him the leased territories including Quetta—a high price to pay for vanity.16
Pakistan- the Balochistan Conundrum Page 10