Pakistan- the Balochistan Conundrum

by Tilak Devasher

  In late 2017 Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, who took over as prime minister after the Supreme Court disqualified Nawaz Sharif in July 2017, announced an ‘equalization package’ for Balochistan, the estimated value of which was reported to be Rs 20 billion over a span of ten years. It was meant for the provision of gas, electricity, education and clean drinking water.37 However, it was unlikely that a cash package of this sort would placate the Baloch who were looking not for handouts but for their rights.38 Moreover, what was notable was that the Centre would only contribute half the money, with the balance to be made up by the provincial government. It was also a bit late in the day for the PML-N government, which at that time had only a few months left of its mandated time, to realize that basic services were needed in Balochistan.

  The basic problem with all the ‘packages’ has been that they ignore why the Baloch were so alienated. There has been little understanding of the strong perception among the Baloch that they have been and are being treated as a colony, unable to use their own resources for their own benefit. As the News puts it, ‘Tackling that requires not just a package of economic development but political reforms. That would require the state to listen to Balochistan’s leaders rather than just announcing a package and believing that will solve problems that have existed for decades.’39

  The task for the government is quite clear. According to the World Bank–sponsored Balochistan Economic Report, mentioned in an earlier chapter, the province needs 158,000 jobs and a growth rate of 6.5 per cent annually to lift a significant percentage of the poverty-stricken population above the poverty line. Unfortunately, the growth rate in Balochistan is only 2.9 per cent. To bring Balochistan up to the level of other provinces would require massive investments in a wide variety of sectors. However, given Balochistan’s geography and demography, no political government in Islamabad has been willing to make such investments. For a politician, greater investment in Balochistan does not translate into electoral gains given that Balochistan sends only twenty MNAs (sixteen general seats and four reserved seats for women) to parliament. The return on the investment is much higher in high-density provinces like Punjab and Sindh. Not surprising, therefore, Balochistan has remained neglected, underdeveloped and marginalized. It risks continuing to face the same fate under any government.40

  This is also borne out by the fact that the mainstream political parties of Pakistan do not really consider the province to be a stakeholder in the power structure of Pakistan. In fact, these mainstream parties like the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), various shades of the Muslim Leagues and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) have little roots in the province. The parliamentarians of these parties also do not take the authority of the parties’ central leaderships seriously. Balochistan governments are perceived as pawns of the establishment.41 As a result, all the major political parties have restricted themselves to only maintaining a token presence in the province. The absence of the federal parties’ involvement in the politics of Balochistan is one of the elements preventing normalcy to return to the province.

  Since assuming office in 2013 and till his removal in July 2017, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif hardly held any political gathering in the province. His visits to Balochistan were fly-in-fly-out ones to inaugurate a few projects. Other central leaders of the PML-N also did not bother to visit the province and involve themselves in its politics. A few PML-N leaders did visit Quetta prior to the Senate election in March 2015 to ensure that candidates who were nominated got votes. This marked the apathy of the PML-N towards the politics and problems of Balochistan. Prime Minister Abassi visited in January 2018 to try and unsuccessfully prevent the collapse of the PML-N government in the province.

  The PPP has not behaved any differently with Balochistan. The PPP’s tenure as the government in the province from 2008 to 2013 was marked with corruption, bad governance and nepotism. Once it was booted out of power, the interest of the central leadership in the province dwindled. In February 2017 Asif Zardari visited Balochistan for the first time since his tenure as president ended, primarily to meet the potential ‘winning horses’ from Balochistan.

  The attitude of the PTI has not been any different. It conducted a political gathering in Quetta in April 2012 but since then Balochistan has fallen off its radar. Even during the dharna politics of the PTI, the party’s leadership from Balochistan was not involved. The central leadership showed little commitment to strengthen the political structure of the party in Balochistan. After becoming prime minister, Imran Khan visited the province a few times to inaugurate some projects but had done little else.

  The nationalist and religious parties based in Balochistan have maintained a similar stance. The Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP) and National Party are two parties that play the Pashtun and Baloch ethnic card respectively. These parties remained busy enjoying the bounties of the government and their political activities were restricted to attaining maximum benefits till the end of their tenure.

  The Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazlur (JUI-F) was the leading opposition party in the province. It has a vast network in the province—mainly through religious seminaries. However, the party was in the government at the federal level so they were not involved in any serious political activities that aimed to challenge the provincial government. This only left the Balochistan National Party–Mengal (BNP–M), which is also a nationalist party, but with limited representation even in Balochistan it proved to be ineffective.

  The nationalist parties of Balochistan have their influence only at the provincial level. They do not exert any influence at the federal level given the small share of Balochistan in parliament. On the other hand, the major problems of Balochistan are federal-centric in nature and cannot be solved at the provincial level. If the mainstream political parties of Pakistan keep on ignoring Balochistan, the problems in the province are unlikely to be resolved.42

  The cynicism of the Baloch is not surprising given the fact that they have seen Islamabad-based leaders mouthing homilies without taking action on the ground. For example, soon after he assumed power, Gen. Musharraf promised to alleviate the growing sense of deprivation among the smaller provinces and he even offered an apology to the people of Balochistan for ‘past mistakes’. Similarly, President Asif Ali Zardari started off with a public apology to Balochistan and promised to reverse the wrongs of the past, adding that his Baloch roots would reinforce his commitment to that goal. However, on the ground nothing much changed. If anything, ‘the situation in Balochistan is worse than before and the Baloch insurgency is a throwback to their armed struggle in the 1970s, during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s tenure’.43 The situation under Imran Khan, at the time of writing, is no different.

  According to Mushahid Hussain, ‘These recurring problems, during different governments, point to a deep-seated mindset which is a major impediment to granting the Baloch their legitimate rights under the 1973 Constitution as equal partners of the federation.’ According to him, it was this mindset that impelled rulers like Bhutto and Musharraf to commit monumental mistakes in Balochistan, including the tragic killing of the sons of Sardar Attaullah Mengal in 1975 and Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006. He calls this mindset ‘not only colonial, callous and bureaucratic, but it is also outmoded, refusing to reason with those who dare to challenge the status quo’. He admits that the track record of the federal government in dealing with Balochistan was truly abysmal, irrespective of whether the ruler was in khaki or in mufti.44

  18

  The Response of the Army

  THE RESPONSE OF THE ARMY is fundamental to the situation in Balochistan. Despite the restoration of democracy in Pakistan, the Baloch issue continues to be handled militarily rather than politically.

  The army’s approach to the situation in Balochistan is dictated by three factors: one, the insecurity bred by the knowledge that the people of Balochistan have not embraced Pakistan wholeheartedly since its forced accession in 1948. Two, the continuing hangover of the creation of Bangladesh. The trau
ma of the secession of East Pakistan has been such that the army fears that it could be repeated in Balochistan. Thus, the ruling elite, especially the army, has become increasingly wary of accommodating even legitimate ethno-national demands, seeing dissent as a threat to the integrity of the country. Three, the army refuses to comprehend that the persisting Baloch insurgency is due to the legitimate grievances of the Baloch. Instead, the security establishment has sought to mask the demands by projecting disaffection as externally sponsored to destabilize Pakistan or to disrupt the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

  The army has thus sought to crush any national movement believing that the only way to deal with dissent is ‘a military solution’, i.e., a physical suppression coupled with a media blackout on developments there. As has been well put, the Pakistan army, ‘… has earned the dubious distinction of being an army that keeps trying to conquer its own people when they refuse to follow its diktats.’1 It is this simplistic militarized approach to security in Balochistan that has become ingrained in the mindset and is in reality a fundamental part of the problem and not a solution.2 The army’s continuing domination of the polity even when it is not in power has ensured that a change in policy over handling Balochistan is unlikely.

  Musharraf exemplified the mentality of the army. Ruling out any compromise with ‘miscreants’ trying to sabotage peace and development in Balochistan, he reiterated, in an address to the nation, that ‘… the time has come to end the sway of these sardars and establish the writ of the government to protect national assets and installations … there will be no political settlement with these cruel Baloch sardars who remained involved in anti-government, anti-democracy and even anti-state activities in the past’.3

  Currently, the construction of the Gwadar deep-sea port, the CPEC and the need for the protection of the Chinese has given the army a further excuse to accelerate the military operation against the Baloch.

  Army Tactics

  The Army has adopted several tactics to tackle the insurgency.

  Use of Excessive Force

  Force, much more than required, has been indiscriminately used by the army. Several commentators and organizations have testified to this. As Selig Harrison noted, ‘The wanton use of superior firepower by the Pakistani and Iranian forces, [during the 1973–77 insurgency] especially the indiscriminate air attacks on Baluch villages, left a legacy of bitter and enduring hatred. Since nearly all Baluch felt the impact of Pakistani repression, the Baluch population is now politicized to an unprecedented degree. In mid-1980, I found a pervasive mood of expectancy among the Baluch, a widespread desire to vindicate Baluch martial honour, and a readiness to renew the struggle when and if circumstances appear to be favourable.’4 The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reported that ‘indiscriminate bombing and strafing’ by F-16s and Cobra gunships are again being used to draw the guerrillas into the open. Six Pakistani army brigades, plus paramilitary forces totalling some 25,000 men, are deployed in the Kohlu mountains and surrounding areas where the fighting is most intense.’5

  Kill-and-Dump and Enforced Disappearances6

  In addition to brute force, the army has also resorted to abductions or enforced disappearances, killing hapless individuals and then dumping their bodies—acts that are widely referred to as kill-and-dump operations. The corpses invariably bear marks of severe torture. Such victims have included students, doctors, lawyers and journalists—the emerging middle class—who have been detained by intelligence agencies without being produced before any court of law. The exact number of such enforced disappearances is disputed but would run into thousands. The army has, of course, denied any involvement in these kill-and-dump operations.

  Downplaying the Insurgency

  Many a time the army has sought to downplay the insurgency asserting that actually there was no insurgency. It has even denied that the army was deployed in Balochistan, saying that it was merely using the Frontier Corps to run a police operation to stem violence. For example, Maj. Gen. Shaukat Sultan, the former director general, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), in an interview to Daily Times on 15 September 2004 said that no military operation was taking place in Balochistan and that life there was normal. Whenever a terrorist attack occurred, the provincial government called out troops to aid civil authority.7 More recently, the then commander, Southern Command, Lt Gen. Aamer Riaz told a gathering, ‘There is no insurgency in Balochistan, but a bit of misguided militancy.’8

  From the perspective of the Pakistan Army a ‘military operation’ takes place when tanks and helicopters as well as weaponry are employed to accomplish a goal. On the other hand, the Baloch equate extra-judicial killings, disappearances, and even the checking at check posts with ‘operation’.9

  Islamization

  Another element of the army’s strategy has been to try and supplant the Baloch ethnic identity by a common Muslim identity through Islamization. Like the rest of the country, Balochistan too could not escape Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization zeal. However, as discussed in an earlier chapter, in the past decade there has been an obvious effort to radicalize the province using Deobandi groups as well as the Ahle Hadis Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD)/Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). For example, during the earthquake of October 2015 only the JUD was allowed to be on the frontline of relief efforts.10 The state has encouraged the Deobandi and Salafi militant organizations to operate in the nineteen Baloch districts of Balochistan, especially in the districts of Mastung and Lasbela. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, some Brahvi youth have reportedly joined the sectarian groups and are being used to target the Shia Hazaras and the Baloch nationalists.

  The state has ‘inserted’ JuD assets in Balochistan as a means of countering nationalist/separatist sentiment. It even deployed its favourite ‘strategic asset’, viz., Jamaat-ud-Dawa chief Hafiz Saeed to control the situation in Balochistan. He visited Quetta in December 2016 and was accorded full protocol. However, his presence did not create many waves in Balochistan.11

  Counter-Nationalists

  Another strategy adopted by the army is to employ counter-nationalists. An organization, Tehreek-e-Nefaz-e-Aman Balochistan (TNAB; movement for the restoration of peace in Balochistan), has been formed by intelligence agencies to crush the national movement. TNAB is said to be the armed wing of Mutahida Mahaz Balochistan (United Front of Balochistan), a political party headed by Siraj Raisani, the brother of the former provincial chief minister Aslam Raisani. The armed wing claims to have support of the establishment to restore peace in Balochistan.12 Interestingly, Aslam Raisani, who was a Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) candidate for the July 2018 elections, was killed in a suicide blast at a political rally in Mastung on 13 July 2018. More than 130 people were also killed in the terrorist incident believed to have been carried out by the Daesh.13

  The HRCP noted another armed vigilante outfit calling itself the Baloch Musallah Difa’a Tanzeem that was openly threatening the people with dire consequences if they tried to register cases with the police about disappearances or recovery of dead bodies of missing persons. The threats were made on the phone by callers who claimed to be Baloch. However, when addressed in the local Balochi or Brahvi languages, they failed to answer. This led the people to believe that they were not Baloch. The police have not made even half-hearted efforts to investigate the cases or even question the accused in cases where the families of the missing persons had revealed that personnel of security agencies were responsible for the abduction of their relatives.14

  The army has naturally denied such allegations. Despite this, reports in the Pakistani media continue to highlight the use of ‘death squads’, resembling the notorious Al Shams and Al Badr militias that the Pakistan Army had used during the Bangladesh liberation war in 1971.15

  A representative of one of the political parties told the HRCP that such extremist elements had scores of cars with tinted windows, which passed unchecked through different check posts in the province. It was claimed that some of them carried cards stampe
d by the intelligence agencies that served as permits for illegal weapons and unregistered cars.16 In one case in Mastung, residents nabbed an attacker who was carrying an ISI identity card. Some senior public figures confirmed this incident in their interviews with the fact-finding mission.17 A lawmaker said that even if such extremists were caught by the police and produced in court, they were released due to lack of evidence and were back roaming the streets within days. Not even one of these state-sponsored elements had been tried in court despite hundreds of violent incidents, and attacks continued despite the presence of thousands of Frontier Corps and police personnel in the province.18

  Some, if not all, of these outfits have links with sectarian terrorist elements. Many of them have joined the ISIS and the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LeJ) and have become an even bigger threat to the state than the Baloch insurgents. In five recent attacks claimed by the Islamic State (ISIS) in 2017 over 220 people were killed and many more injured.

  One of these proxies—Shafique Mengal—who was used to target Baloch militants went rogue after he was discarded. He went on to assume a prominent position in the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi al-Alami that has been responsible for several terrorist incidents in Balochistan.

  The ‘Foreign Hand’

  When the insurgency began, Musharraf and the army described it as the work of a few ‘miscreants’, the reference being to a few tribal sardars. However, when the insurgency spread to non-tribal areas the narrative started changing to the ‘foreign hand’. The public was informed that foreign powers, especially India, had set out to impede the development of the Gwadar port and the CPEC. The state’s information machinery kept releasing stories that emphasized Indian ‘interference’ in Balochistan’s affairs.19 However, as the Daily Times commented aptly, ‘It is not enough to simply outsource responsibility to CPEC—as if this is a one-size-fits-all panacea for every occasion. No, the Pakistani state must get its own house in order. And that means not only focusing on the front lawn seen mostly by visitors. But that back garden, too. For both fall within the picket fencing of national borders.20