Pakistan- the Balochistan Conundrum

by Tilak Devasher

  The moot question is whether the situation in Balochistan is irretrievable for Pakistan? Will the insurgency dissipate with economic development and improvement in social indicators? Will the state put an end to the policy of kill-and-dump and release those in illegal captivity? Will Balochistan see a lessening of the presence of security forces? Will the state ensure provincial rights and autonomy, allowing the Baloch to genuinely use their resources for their benefit first?

  While the jury is out on this, what is clear is that such measures are unlikely to be taken and will certainly not be taken simultaneously. For one thing, the military is averse to provincial rights and autonomy. For another, Pakistan has gone too far down the road in terms of commitments to the Chinese on Gwadar and the CPEC to tweak the projects to give the Baloch a stake. For most of the Baloch themselves, the struggle seems to have gone beyond economics.

  In any case, the Baloch have come to view development projects as more examples of the exploitation of the resources of Balochistan for the sake of the Punjabi state. For most of them, it is now about their honour, their survival with dignity on their own lands, about preserving their national identity, culture and language—in a word, about independence. Pushed to the wall, facing marginalization and subjugation, an increasing number of Baloch are now willing to pick up the gun for the sake of preserving their rights.

  There is also a huge trust deficit. The people in general and the militant groups in particular no longer trust the government because of the frequent betrayals, military operations and the continuing policy of systematic enforced disappearances. Blood has been spilled; among others, the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, the mysterious killing of Balach Marri, the brutal murder of three Baloch leaders in 2009 and so on. For the Baloch, revenge is a key element in their honour code, Balochmayar. Clearly, one of the biggest obstacles in stabilizing the situation is the repugnant policy of enforced disappearance and kill-and-dump.10 The trust deficit is too huge; moreover, the establishment is totally intransigent because it believes, as it did in East Pakistan, that they are powerful enough to crush people’s aspirations in Balochistan.11

  Not surprisingly, the HRCP warned that the decades-long history of neglect and betrayal combined with systematic human rights abuses carried out with impunity had made a vast number of Baloch people desperate. In such a situation ‘… a large section the Baloch youth has been driven into repudiating their allegiance to the state. When the people’s will is being broken, their voice ruthlessly stifled and their bodies charred in torture cells; where mothers are dying to hear any news of their disappeared children, the state cannot expect any other reaction but one of rebellion.’12

  There were windows of opportunities for peace in the past but were squandered through arrogance and ignorance; the best among them was the 1972-73 Attaullah Mengal government. In September 2008 the Baloch militant groups unilaterally observed ceasefire but there was no response and in January 2009 they ended the ceasefire.

  The current spate of insurgency is the fifth in Balochistan. In other words, in the seventy years since the creation of Pakistan, almost every successive generation of the Baloch have risen in revolt, having lost faith that their grievances could be addressed within the political system. Every time the Baloch have risen, they have been put down militarily without any attempt to address their basic problems and issues and without giving them an equal opportunity to become stakeholders in Pakistan. As a result, these issues have festered and erupted whenever the Baloch have thought they were strong and able to assert their rights.

  What is the likelihood of the establishment of an independent Balochistan? Despite Baloch determination and resolve to preserve their specific and unique identity and not be subsumed into a larger Pakistani identity, the political realities are indeed very challenging and pose major obstacles to the realization of their hopes. Many analysts have argued that Balochistan is an unlikely candidate for a successful separatist movement. Stephen Cohen, for example, has written that it lacks a middle class, a modern leadership, and that the Baloch are a tiny fraction of Pakistan’s population—and even in their own province are faced with a growing Pashtun population. Further, neither Iran nor Afghanistan shows any sign of encouraging Baloch separatism because such a movement might encompass their own Baloch population.13

  Selig Harrison remarked that the insurgency itself is scattered and weak but enough to keep a portion of the Pakistan Army tied down. Earlier, the insurgency was tribal-based but now, in the last decade, there has been a greater political awareness among the common people about their exploitation and hence there has been greater political mobilization. Even the moderate Baluch politicians have to articulate issues of provincial rights, missing persons, etc.14

  At present levels, therefore, the conflict is unlikely to threaten the integrity of the state. Pakistan’s military is large with well-trained troops and sophisticated weapons, making it capable of holding the country. The Pakistan Army will manage to outfight the Baloch fighters. Whether it will manage to outlast a people who are fighting to protect their identity and their homeland is a different matter altogether. What is likely is that protracted violence will continue to afflict Balochistan. The Baloch insurgents cannot defeat the army but as they have demonstrated, they can certainly defy the writ of the state, increase the cost for the army to maintain its grip on the province and prevent further exploitation of their resources.15 The resistance groups have come to view the conflict with Pakistan as a prolonged struggle and are devising appropriate methodologies, involving both political mobilization and armed resistance.16

  For Pakistan the question is what cost would it have to pay for holding on to Balochistan for the present and in the future. So far, previous military ‘victories’ have not resolved the Baloch question and there is nothing to suggest that another military ‘victory’ will either. If anything, the way the government and the army are handling mega projects, making the Baloch a minority in their own province, will increasingly ensure that in the future more and more ordinary Baloch will be alienated and take to armed insurrection.

  Thus, neither the army nor the Pakistan state can get much comfort from the situation. Even at its present level, the insurgency is enough to target various pipelines and other infrastructure that gives the impression of instability to the outside world. The Chinese would be especially worried since they are investing huge sums of money.

  A comparison with the situation in the then East Pakistan is instructive. The Bengali discontent that led to their independence in 1971 was driven by economic as well as political grievances. Baloch alienation, too, is driven by much the same grievances with the addition of historical wrongs. Speaking at a function in February 2018 in Karachi, former diplomat Jehangir Ashraf Qazi said that it was criminal governance not bad governance and sustained transfer of income from East Pakistan to West Pakistan, without benefits in proportion, that led to a kind of alienation, which was widespread and legitimate. He warned: ‘The same process is taking place in Balochistan today,’ adding that ‘unlike East Pakistan, the population in Balochistan was lesser and there was a tendency to say that they can be crushed because there are just pockets of rebellion and resistance’.17

  The difference between the two is that the Bengalis were relatively homogenous, had a significant middle class, a well-established cultural and literary life, a standardized language, a broad base of nationalist activists and a history of mass politicization that dated back to the struggle against the British Raj.18 The Baloch nationalist movement, on the other hand, was built on ‘uncertain social and cultural foundations of a fragmented tribal society’ that had only a minuscule middle class, widespread illiteracy, underdeveloped literature, only a narrow base of nationalist activists and no real history of mass participation in the political process.19 Moreover, the Bengalis obtained the support of India while the Baloch do not have a foreign backer. Resultantly, they have not been able to pose a grave threat to the Central government’s hold o
n power.

  The Baloch have, however, come a long way from the 1970s. The nature of the Baloch society is evolving. With the gradual dismantling of the age-old ‘sardari nizam’ (tribal structures), a new generation of leaders is taking root and these young and dynamic leaders are at the forefront of the Baloch struggle now. As the Foreign Policy Centre notes: ‘The Baloch have also started defining their nationhood consciously and have assumed greater international visibility now than ever before. While there are many weaknesses within the movement, the spirit of independence and the will to fight, partly induced by the undemocratic and excessive measures by the Pakistani state, may turn the tide in favour of the Baloch, but only if there is exemplary leadership, unity among the ranks, a long-term strategy and resources to keep the movement alive.’20

  Where would Balochistan be, say, ten years from now? How will its political dynamics play out when the Baloch become a marginalized and impoverished minority in their own province and the demography shifts decisively in favour of other groups? What about the Baloch youth? These questions need answers. However, answering them today can only be hypothetical given that there could be many variables in the developing situation.

  One thing that is clear is that unless resolved the insurgency in Balochistan, even at current levels, will eat the innards of Pakistan. Unfortunately, Pakistani leaders have selective memories and learn selective lessons from history. For them, there is hardly any incentive to resolve such issues, given the fact that they are invariably bailed out by the US/West (and now by China) on the one hand, and on the other, the insurgency is not of such intensity yet as to threaten Pakistan’s existence. However, what they seem to overlook is that it took nineteen years for the language riots in the then East Pakistan that broke out in 1952 to mature into the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. During this period, resentment among the Bengalis continued to grow unabated, just as it has been growing in Balochistan.

  The overall prognosis has to be that given the current military capability of the Baloch and without a catalyst like massive international support, Balochistan is unlikely to break away. However, having sustained the insurgency for over a decade, it has developed a momentum of its own. Hence, military force alone will not break Baloch resistance. Pakistan would have to be prepared for a long haul unless there is a radical change in the way the army decides to deal with the Baloch. This, at present, seems unlikely.

  For the long term, the Pakistani state will have to compromise with the Baloch. Continuing to seek a military solution to a political problem may make sense tactically in softening the opposition. But it can never be the long-term solution. One of the key factors for the future development of Pakistan would be a just solution to the Balochistan conundrum, a solution that puts the Baloch in the centre rather than the resources of the province. Failure to do so will slowly but inexorably exacerbate the crisis in Balochistan till it explodes with dire consequences for Pakistan.

  Notes

  Balochistan at a Glance

  1. Government of Balochistan: Budget White Paper 2015-16, p. 6, https://balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=1414&Itemid=677, (accessed on 27 February 2018).

  2. Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan (November 2005) cited in Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), ‘Conflict in Balochistan’, Report of the HRCP Fact-Finding Mission, August 2006, p. 39, http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/pdf/ff/20.pdf, (accessed on 3 March 2018).

  Preface

  1. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), ‘Hopes, Fears and Alienation in Balochistan’, Report of the HRCP Fact-Finding Mission, May 2012, http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/pdf/ff/12.pdf, p. 8, (accessed on 3 March 2018).

  2. Banari Mengal, ‘What have we received from the people of Pakistan except neglect and torment?’ The Express Tribune, 5 May 2015, https://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/27534/what-have-we-received-from-the-people-of-pakistan-except-neglect-and-torment/, (accessed on 27 February 2018). The author is the daughter of the president of the Balochistan National Party and a former chief minister of Balochistan, Sardar Akhtar Mengal.

  Introduction

  1. Government of Balochistan Budget White Paper 2015-16, https://balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=1414&Itemid=677, p. 5, (accessed on 27 February 2018).

  2. Around one-third of the drugs from Afghanistan are smuggled via the coastal region of Balochistan. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’s World Drug Report 2012, approximately $30 billion worth of drugs are smuggled from Afghanistan via Pakistan to other countries. Similarly, there is a substantial market for smuggling arms and weapons from Afghanistan into Balochistan and on to other parts of Pakistan. Balochistan is also the principal route for smuggling migrants from Central Asia, Afghanistan and Iran to destinations in Europe and beyond. See Ali Dayan Hasan, ‘Balochistan: Caught in the Fragility Trap’, USIP, June 2016, https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/06/balochistan-caught-fragility-trap, (accessed on 27 February 2018).

  3. Declan Walsh, ‘Pakistan’s Secret Dirty War’, The Guardian, 29 March 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/29/balochistan-pakistans-secret-dirty-war, (accessed on 27 February 2018).

  4. Naveed Hussain, ‘Fiddling While Balochistan Burns’, The Express Tribune, 14 August 2012, https://tribune.com.pk/story/422060/fiddling-while-balochistan-burns/, (accessed on 27 February 2018).

  5. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), ‘Pushed to the Wall’, Report of the HRCP Fact-Finding Mission to Balochistan, October 2009, p. 5, http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/pdf/ff/14.pdf, (accessed on 3 March 2018).

  6. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, AIML Documents, Vol. II 1924–47, Indian Edition, New Delhi: Metropolitan Book Co., 1982,

  p. 329.

  7. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad’s interview to Shorish Kashmiri for Chattan, in April 1946. Reproduced in http://www.newageislam.com/books-and-documents/maulana-abul-kalam-azad-the-man-who-knew-the-future-of-pakistan-before-its-creation/d/2139, (accessed on 27 February 2018).

  8. Adeel Khan, ‘Baloch Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan: From Guerrilla War to Nowhere?’, Asian Ethnicity, Vol. 4, No. 2 (June 2003), p. 286.

  9. Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baloch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981, p. 151.

  10. Lawrence Ziring, ‘Pakistan’s Nationalities Dilemma: Domestic and International Implications’, in L. Ziring (ed.), The Subcontinent in World Politics, New York, 1978, p. 96, cited in Urmila Phadnis, ‘Ethnic Movements in Pakistan’, in Pandav Nayak (ed.), Pakistan Society & Politics, Jaipur: South Asia Studies Centre, University of Jaipur, 1984, p. 192.

  11. Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 64.

  12. Selig S. Harrison, ‘Baluch Nationalism and Superpower Rivalry’, International Security, Vol. 5, No. 3, (Winter 1980/81), https://thebaluch.com/documents/Baluch%20Nationalism%20and%20Superpower%20Rivalry.pdf, (accessed on 3 March 2018).

  13. A Pashtun from Quetta, Mohd Isa, attended the session though.

  14. HRCP Report 2009, p. 11.

  15. Detailed in chapter 5: History till Partition.

  16. Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan: A Study of Baluch Nationalism, Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden Gmbh, 1987, pp. 191–92.

  17. ‘Interview Nawab Khair Baksh Marri’, Newsline, September 2009 https://newslinemagazine.com/magazine/interview-nawab-khair-bakhsh-marri/, (accessed on 3 March 2019).

  18. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), ‘Human Rights in Balochistan and Balochistan’s Rights’, Report of a HRCP Fact-Finding Mission, October 2003, p. 59, http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/pdf/ff/20.pdf, (accessed on 3 March 2018).

  19. HRCP Report, 2009, p. 5.

  20. Muhammad Ijaz Laif and Muhammad Amir Hamza, ‘Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan: A Case Study of Baloch Nationalism during Musharraf Regime’, Pakistan Vision, Vol. 10, No. 1, http://pu.edu
.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Artical%20-%204.pdf, (accessed on 3 March 2018).

  21. Mushahid Hussain, ‘Has the Rubicon Been Crossed’, Newsline, June 2009, http://newslinemagazine.com/magazine/the-final-showdown/, (accessed on 3 March 2018).

  22. Manzoor Ahmed and Akhtar Baloch, ‘Political Economy of Balochistan, Pakistan: A Critical Review’, European Scientific Journal, May 2015, Vol. 11, No. 14, https://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/viewFile/5688/5508, (accessed on 3 March 2018).

  23. ‘Imperialism, Oil and the Balochistan Revolution’, Jabal, July 1977, p. 6, cited in Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 171.

  24. Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 47.

  25. Malik Siraj Akbar, ‘Why Pakistan Is Embarrassed to Talk About Balochistan’, Huffington Post, 13 March, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/malik-siraj-akbar/why-pakistan-is-embarrass_b_4937159.html, (accessed on 2 March 2018).

  26. HRCP Report 2003, p. 59.

  27. Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 4.

  28. Carlotta Gall, ‘In Remote Pakistan Province, a Civil War Festers’, The New York Times, 2 April 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/02/world/asia/02pakistan.html?_r=0&pagewanted=all, (accessed on 2 March 2018).

  29. Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger, Boston: Little, Brown, 1974, pp. 63–64, cited in Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 1.

  PART I AN ANCIENT CIVILIZATION

  1: The Land

  1. Taj Mohammad Breseeg, Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development, Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2004, pp. 74–77.

  2. Imperial Gazetteer of India, Provincial Series, Baluchistan, London: Clarendon Press, 1960. This edition, Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1991, p. 13.

  3. Cited in International Forum for Rights and Security (IFFRAS), Balochistan: Denial of Destiny, London: European Media Ltd, 2012, p. 13.

  4. Talha Zaheer, ‘Learning from Alexander’, Dawn, 23 November 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/813064/learning-from-alexander, (accessed on 2 March 2018).