Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC)

by Terry Buckley

  Nevertheless, Cleisthenes balanced the power of the archons and the Areopagus by increasing the power and authority of the Boule of 500 and the Ecclesia. The evidence about the powers of the new Boule, which replaced Solon’s Boule of 400, and about the method of appointment is very scanty, and therefore inferences have to be drawn from knowledge of its later and better-documented history. Each tribe supplied 50 councillors, with every deme supplying its quota to the tribal contingent according to its size (Ath. Pol. 43.2, 62.1). These tribal councillors were either directly elected by the demes or, after a preliminary selection, were chosen by the drawing of lots. It is not known whether or not the ‘thetes’ were eligible to stand for the Boule of 500, but the absence of state pay would have ensured the smallness of their numbers; it was the middle class who supplied most of the councillors and which was the dominant force in this institution.

  The Boule of 500’s chief function was probouleutic, namely to prepare the agenda for the Ecclesia by holding a preliminary discussion of all proposed legislation and policies, and then submitting them as motions for decision by the people. This control over the agenda gave the middle classes the opportunity to influence and shape the direction of Athenian policy. Although Solon’s Boule of 400 had possessed this same function, the infrequent meetings and the very modest status of the Ecclesia (see below) in the first half of the sixth century and under the tyranny provided little scope for the Boule to develop into an institution of genuine importance. However, the increase in the authority of the Ecclesia under Cleisthenes directly affected the power and prestige of the Boule of 500 which cooperated with the top public officials in the running of the state. It may also, under Cleisthenes’ reforms, have gained the power to receive foreign embassies in order to establish their reasons for coming to Athens (Herodotus 9.5.1); and to conduct the ‘dokimasia’ of the newly chosen councillors (a preliminary investigation to confirm their legal right to hold office).

  Solon had opened up membership of the Ecclesia (Assembly) to the thetes, the lowest class of Athenians, and had probably confirmed its legal right to elect all the important public officials and to make the final decision on important issues such as war, peace and alliances. However, there was little scope for the Ecclesia (Assembly) to become an effective legislative body, with full sovereignty, while the aristocratic public officials and the tyrants consulted it only as a last resort. It is important to note that Aristotle did not include the control of legislation by the common people as one of Solon’s three most democratic reforms (Ath. Pol. 9.1). Cleisthenes changed all that when he took the people into partnership and ‘handed over the control of the state to the common people’ (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 20.2). His decision to take his proposed reforms to the Ecclesia (Assembly) for ratification via the Boule, thus directly involving the common people in the legislative process, set a precedent that henceforth all legislation would be legally valid only if approved and passed by these two institutions. It was this radical step and its political consequences for the future government of Athens, if it was allowed to become the dominant principle of political life, that compelled Isagoras to summon the Spartans.

  It was about the time of Cleisthenes that the new political concept of ‘isonomia’ (political equality) made its appearance and continued until it was replaced in the fifth century by ‘democratia’ (the power of the people). There is good reason to believe that Cleisthenes used this word to define the essence of his new constitution and as a political propaganda slogan behind which the Athenian people could unite in order to secure constitutional reform. To achieve isonomia, Cleisthenes increased the legislative authority of the people: as a result there was an equal balance of power, a ‘political equality’, between the aristocratic public officials, who initiated policy and carried it out, if approved, and the Ecclesia and the Boule, which had the sovereign authority to pass or reject all such proposals. It is probably the case that Cleisthenes was also responsible for the new formal Athenian word for a statute, namely ‘nomos’ in place of the older ‘thesmos’. The latter word was used to describe laws that had been imposed upon the people by the ruling aristocracy (or by the gods); whereas nomos refers to laws that became ‘the norm’ or ‘the custom’ after they had been agreed by the people in their democratic Ecclesia. The increased participation of the common people in political decision-making must have led Cleisthenes to provide for regular meetings of the Ecclesia, probably ten per year, in addition to the annual electoral assembly and to the special meetings, summoned by the public officials.

  Cleisthenes, intentionally or not, was the ‘father of democracy’. His reforms were primarily designed to fragment the power of the aristocratic-led factions that had plagued Athenian public life throughout the sixth century, and to end the political monopoly of the upper classes in the passing of legislation. If Aristotle is correct in assigning to Cleisthenes the introduction of the law of ostracism (Ath. Pol. 22.1 – see Chapter 8), whereby an Athenian could be exiled for ten years upon the vote of his fellow citizens, then this measure was also inspired by the desire for political stability and by isonomia: the people would have the opportunity to judge between the conflicting policies of aristocratic leaders, and have the power to remove the less or least favoured politician before the issue at stake spilled over into civil strife, as happened in the case of Cleisthenes and Isagoras, or even tyranny. However, the wide-ranging powers of the archons and other public officials, the restriction of these offices to wealthy citizens of the two top classes, and the retention by the aristocratic Areopagus, consisting of ex-archons with membership for life, of jurisdiction over crimes against the state and of conducting the public officials’ ‘euthuna’ (an official review of their year in office) were considerable impediments to the realization of full democracy. Genuine ‘political equality’,as understood by the Athenians who voted for the reforms of Ephialtes in 462/1 and by their descendants, existed not only when all citizens, rich or poor, could participate on an equal footing with each other in deciding public policy and passing legislation, but also when they had the equal right and opportunity to hold public office themselves and to conduct the euthuna of public officials to make them accountable to the people as a whole for their official actions. Cleisthenes supplied the means for the Athenians to gain the necessary political maturity over the next half century to remove these constraints in 462/1, and thus he established the foundations for the later reforms of Ephialtes and Pericles that completed the development of full democracy (see Chapter 13).

  Bibliography

  Hignett, C. A History of the Athenian Constitution, ch. 6.

  Lewis, D. M. ‘Cleisthenes and Attica’, Historia 12 (1963).

  Moore, J. M. Aristotle and Xenophon on Democracy and Oligarchy, pp. 235–43.

  Murray, O. Early Greece, 2nd edn, ch. 15.

  Ostwald, M. CAH vol. 4, 2nd edn, pt 2, ch. 5.

  —— From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law, pt. 1.1.

  —— Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy, pt 2, ch. 3, pt 3, chs 1 and 2.

  Rhodes, P. J. Commentary on the Aristotelian ‘Athenaion Politeia’, pp. 240–62.

  Stanton, G. R. Athenian Politics c. 800–500 BC A Sourcebook, ch. 5.

  —— ‘The tribal reform of Kleisthenes the Alcmeonid’, Chiron 14 (1984).

  8

  ATHENIAN POLITICS FROM CLEISTHENES TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE PERSIAN WAR

  The sources

  It is difficult to analyse the internal politics of Athens during this period due to the fact that the available literary evidence is both scanty and non-contemporaneous. The main source is Herodotus (484–420s), but he was not an Athenian and not primarily interested in politics, so he provides only glimpses, not a continuous account, of the political issues and disagreements which were current during these years; he concentrated on the military expansion of the Persian empire and its inevitable conflict with Greece, culminating i
n the Persian War of 480–479. Aristotle in the Ath. Pol. (see Chapter 1) provides evidence for clashes between the supposed political factions in the 480s, but his account is very brief (Ath. Pol. 22) and his statement of motives suspect. Apart from his mention of the institution of the ‘bouleutic oath’ to be taken by the councillors of the Boule of 500 and the election of the ten ‘strategoi’ (generals), one from each tribe, his main emphasis is on the use of ostracism for political purposes. Therefore, it is a good starting-point to examine the procedure and the history of this institution.

  Ostracism and its use in the 480s

  Every year the issue of whether to hold an ostracism or not was placed on the agenda of the ‘Ecclesia’ (Assembly); if a majority of the citizens present voted in favour, it was held in the eighth prytany (the Athenian year was divided into ten prytanies). Every citizen was then given the opportunity to write down on a piece of pottery the name of the citizen whom he most desired to be removed from Attica – the Greek word for a piece of pottery or potsherd was ‘ostrakon’ (plural ‘ostraka’) and thus gave its name to the institution. A minimum of 6,000 votes had to be cast in the ‘Agora’ (the market-place of Athens) for the ostracism to be valid, and the person with the most votes cast against him was exiled from Attica for ten years. The ostracized person was given ten days to put his affairs in order before the ostracism was implemented. During the ten years of exile he had full control over his property and his income, and was allowed to be in contact with his family and friends, provided that he remained outside Attica. Ostracism could take place only once a year, and only one citizen could be ostracized per year. At the end of his ten-year exile, the citizen could return home and resume his full rights of citizenship.

  Although most of the sources, including Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 22.1), name Cleisthenes as the author of the law of ostracism, a fragment of Androtion, one of the fourth-century Atthidographers (local historians of Athens) which has been preserved by a much later lexicographer Harpocration, appears to disagree:

  In his second book Androtion states that Hipparchus was a relative of the tyrant Peisistratus, and was the first man to be ostracized. The law of ostracism was first laid down at that time through suspicion of Peisistratus’ supporters; for he had become tyrant when he was the leader of the people and a general.

  (Androtion, FGrH III B 324 F6)

  However, if this passage is compared to Aristotle’s(Ath. Pol. 22.3), the similarity of the texts is so marked that it appears that Aristotle used Androtion as his source for the institution of ostracism. Therefore it would seem that Harpocration has produced a shortened and garbled version of Androtion’s text – a view that is further reinforced by his use of the unusual expression ‘laid down’–and has apparently confused the first use of ostracism (488/7) with the date of its introduction (508/7). If this is so, then there is no conflict between Androtion and the other four sources (Aristotle, Vaticanus Graecus, Philochorus and Aelian).

  There are two schools of thought concerning Cleisthenes’ motive for introducing this law. The first holds the view that Cleisthenes was moved by a high-minded desire to bring political stability to Athens. His clash with Isagoras over the introduction of democratic reforms (see Chapter 7) had resulted in the invasion of Attica by a Spartan army under King Cleomenes who attempted to interfere directly and forcefully in the constitution of Athens. Ostracism was introduced, therefore, to prevent a potential conflict from reaching such a crisis point, as had happened in the dangerous rivalry between Cleisthenes and Isagoras, or even to thwart a renewed bid to establish a tyranny by ostracizing one of the political leaders. Aristotle in the Ath. Pol. (22.3) states that the example of Peisistratus, who had abused his position as popular leader and ‘strategos’ (general) to become tyrant, had produced among the people a suspicion of those in power, and that ostracism had been enacted to stop such an occurrence in the future. Aristotle adds further emphasis to this in the Politics:

  Whenever someone (either one man or more) becomes greater in power than is appropriate in the city or in the constitution of the state, such excessive superiority usually leads to one-man rule or oligarchy. On account of this some states have ostracism, such as Argos and Athens.

  (Aristotle, Politics 1302b)

  The second school of thought believes Cleisthenes planned to use ostracism as a factional political weapon to be wielded against political enemies, weakening the opposing faction by the removal of its leader. Aristotle in the Ath. Pol. can also be used in support of this interpretation, as he claims that Cleisthenes’ primary purpose in proposing this law was to get rid of Hipparchus (22.4); and in the Politics (1284b) he confirms that some states ‘use ostracisms for factional purposes’.

  The first opinion is to be preferred, as ostracism was not an easy weapon to use for the elimination of political opponents. There was only one opportunity provided each year, and there was the further difficulty of trying to persuade the people to vote for the holding of an ostracism. In addition, it was a risky business as the people might vote for the ostracism of the instigator and not his intended victim. There was probably a better chance of ruining the career of a political opponent by prosecuting him in the courts, as happened in the case of Miltiades at the hands of Xanthippus in 489 (see below). However, the ostracism of Hyperbolus c.418/7 shows that this institution, once established, could be used for ‘factional purposes’: his attempt to have Nicias ostracized backfired, when Nicias and Alcibiades formed a temporary coalition and directed their supporters to vote ‘for’ Hyperbolus. It could also be used as a fallback measure if a prosecution failed, as seems to have happened in the case of Cimon who was ostracized in 462/1 after surviving a prosecution for corruption by his opponents in 463 (see Chapter 11).

  It is useful to investigate the ostracisms of the 480s and the motives alleged by Aristotle in the attempt to discover the main political issue that split the opposing factions in the last years of the sixth century and the 490s:

  The first man to be ostracized was one of his [i.e. Peisistratus’] relations, Hipparchus, son of Charmus of the deme of Collytus, on account of whom Cleisthenes had especially passed the law, wanting to exile him. For the Athenians had allowed the friends of the tyrants, all those who had not shared in their wrongdoing during the troubles, to live in the city, benefiting from the customary mildness of the people. Hipparchus was the leader and the chief of this group (22.4). … And Megacles, son of Hippocrates of the deme of Alopece, was ostracized. For three years they ostracized the friends of the tyrants, against whom the law had been passed. After this in the fourth year, if anyone seemed to be more powerful than the rest, he was removed; and Xanthippus, son of Ariphron, was the first of those to be ostracized who were unconnected with the tyrants (22.6).

  (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 22.4–6)

  Therefore Aristotle identifies two groups who were ostracized and distinguishes between the motives for their ostracism: first, ‘the friends of the tyrants’; second, those ‘unconnected with the tyrants’, which includes Xanthippus in 485/4 and Aristides in 483/2.

  Aristotle has singled out Hipparchus, the son-in-law of Hippias the Peisistratid, as the leader and spokesman of ‘the friends of the tyrants’, but this alleged motive for his and the others’ ostracisms does present difficulties. It seems unlikely that there was any serious or substantial support for Hippias by 488/7, as Cleisthenes’ democratic reforms had been in operation for the past twenty years and the principle of ‘isonomia’ (political equality) had been firmly established. If tyranny was restored, these political benefits would be removed from the people. In addition, Hipparchus had been elected by the people to the top civilian political post, the eponymous (chief) ‘archon’, in 496/5, and he was unlikely to have achieved this position of power by standing on a pro-tyrant platform, whether explicit or implicit. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that Hipparchus was such a powerful political figure in 508/7 that he became the prime target for Cleisthenes’ law. If he had been so prominent and
so pro-tyranny at that time, Cleisthenes would have found little difficulty in engineering his ostracism then or soon after, while the memory of the tyrants was so fresh and the Tyrannicides, Harmodius and Aristogeiton, were being hailed as national heroes. Yet Aristotle wants his readers to believe that it was the people’s ‘customary mildness’ that postponed Hipparchus’ day of reckoning for twenty years, and presumably their forgiving generosity that rewarded him with the top archonship. Therefore, ‘friends of the tyrants’ seems at first sight an unsatisfactory explanation for the ostracism of Hipparchus and the other two.

  However, the link between Hippias and the Persians may supply the clue to the issue that dominated Athenian politics and led to these ostracisms. In other words, it was not simply that they were ‘friends of the tyrants’, but friends of the ex-tyrant Hippias whose ambition to be restored to his former position of power was being actively supported by the Persians. Thus it may be that the issues of tyranny and of a cooperative policy towards Persia became connected in the minds of the people. The archaeological finds from the Kerameikos, the potters’ quarter to the north-west of the Agora in Athens, reinforce this belief. Up to 1967, 1,658 ostraka had been found in the Agora and on the Acropolis, but the Kerameikos excavations unearthed a further 4,463 ostraka of which a large number date to the 480s before the destruction of Athens by the Persians in 480. These finds have been most revealing: apart from eleven ostraka for Hipparchus and 2,216 (previously fifteen) for Megacles, son of Hippocrates from the deme of Alopece, who was Cleisthenes’ nephew and leader of the Alcmaeonids, 789 ostraka (previously only three) were discovered with the name Callias, son of Cratias, also from the deme of Alopece which was the city headquarters of the Alcmaeonids; four of these ostraka call him a ‘Mede’ or ‘Persian’, and one ostrakon has a drawing of him in Persian clothes – he is almost certainly the third ‘friend of the tyrants’ who was ostracized in 486/5.