(Diodorus 11.70.3–4; AE40 pp. 28–29)
Diodorus dates these reactions of the allies to 464/3, i.e. just as the siege of Thasos was coming to an end. Without doubt, Athens’ behaviour towards Thasos had particularly shocked the allies and a majority felt oppressed by Athenian rule. However, revolt in the 460s was not a wise move as Athens was free to suppress them with ease. The outbreak of the First Peloponnesian War in 462/1, when the Athenians were fully stretched fighting the Peloponnesians, acquiring a ‘Land Empire’ and campaigning in Egypt, provided the ideal opportunity for the dissident allies.
Athenian foreign policy after 462/1, probably reflecting the political success of Ephialtes and the defeat of Cimon, now encompassed more ambitious goals than campaigning against Persia and gaining a greater control over the League. Alliances with Argos, Thessaly and Megara, and the campaigns against Aegina and in central Greece at Tanagra and Oenophyta, culminating in the ‘Land Empire’,reflect the Athenians’ new territorial objectives (see Chapter 15). This warfare in mainland Greece would have roused little interest among the League allies, but they are found fighting alongside the Athenians at the battle of Aegina (1.105.2; AE39 p. 26) and at the battle of Tanagra (1.107.5–108.1; AE39 pp. 26– 27). This must have caused great resentment within the League, as such warfare had little to do with the original aims of the Delian League. Even the Egyptian expedition, although more in keeping with the original aims, would not necessarily have been more attractive to the allies owing to its distance from the Aegean and the length of the campaign. Some of the allies would have seen this as an ideal time to revolt, since the Athenians would have found it very difficult to bring them back into line while fighting on so many fronts.
The defeat of the Greek forces in Egypt in 454 affected Athens’ relations with the League allies, but there is disagreement about the size of the defeat and the way that the allies and the Athenians responded to it. Some modern historians (e.g. Meiggs) believe that the Athenians suffered a terrible defeat in Egypt, losing most of the 200 ships that sailed there c.460 and the majority of the 50 ships sent as a relief force. As a direct consequence of this disaster there was widespread dissatisfaction among the allies leading to numerous revolts, which forced the Athenians to intensify their rule (‘arche’) by adopting harsher methods of control. The basis for this belief comes from Thucydides’ description of the end of the campaign:
So it was that after six years of war Greek fortunes and forces were destroyed. Of the many men involved a few were saved by marching through Libya to Cyrene, but the greatest part of the force perished.
(Thucydides 1.110.1; AE39 p. 27)
Thucydides’ choice of language, so similar to his description of the later overwhelming defeat of the Athenians in Sicily in 413, leaves the reader in no doubt that he believed that the Athenian losses were on a massive scale. Opponents of this view, however, argue that either Thucydides was wrong about 200 ships being sent originally to Egypt from Cyprus, or he omitted to mention the withdrawal of most of the fleet, or simply he was mistaken about the scale of the defeat, having little opportunity to check his sources (being exiled from Athens in 424) and being only a child in 454.
Other historians believe that the Athenians suffered a serious setback in 454 but not a crippling disaster. It is believed that the greater part of the original 200 ships had returned to Greece after the initial victory, and that perhaps only 50 ships were left in Egypt, which were lost in the final conflict together with the majority of the 50 ships coming as a relief force. This much smaller defeat seems to have had little effect upon the Athenians’ dominant control over the allies, but did lead to them carrying out a general reorganization of the League, which had been weakened by revolts (often inspired by the Persians) from early in the 450s. Evidence for this point of view also comes from Thucydides in his description of the campaigns at Megara and Tanagra. At the time of the siege of Aegina (c.459/8), the Athenians were so hard-pressed by a lack of manpower that they were forced to send the youngest and oldest of their troops to defend Megara (1.105.3–4; AE39 p. 26), but in c.457 before the battle of Tanagra:
The Athenians marched out against them (i.e. the Spartans) in full force with a thousand Argives and contingents from the other allies to give a total force of 14,000 men.
(Thucydides 1.107.5; AE39 p. 27)
This change in the manpower situation can be explained by reinforcements coming from Egypt. It is also suggested that a funeral ‘stele’, which records the names of the dead from the Erechtheid tribe, gives further support to this point of view:
These men died in the war: on Cyprus, in Egypt, in Phoenicia, at Halieis, on Aegina, at Megara, in the same year
(ML 33.1–4; AE42 p. 29)
If it is reasonable to assume that this list is in chronological order, then the mention of Phoenicia after Egypt can be used to argue that these men were killed on the return journey from Egypt (after the initial victory there) via Phoenicia to Athens.
Further evidence to support this view comes from Thucydides’ statement that the Athenians captured 70 Aeginetan ships at the battle of Aegina (1.105.2; AE39 p. 26). The Athenian fleet must have exceeded a hundred ships at the sea-battle in order to win such a resounding victory, and it is doubtful whether the Athenians possessed the military resources to fight simultaneously on two fronts on such a large scale. The statement of Justin, who in the third century AD wrote an epitome of Pompeius Trogus’ Philippic Histories, adds credence to the view that the majority of the ships had returned early in the 450s:
Then for a short time, because they had sent the fleet into Egypt, the Athenians were weak and therefore were easily defeated, when fighting in a sea-battle. Then later after the return of their men the Athenians, increased in the strength of their fleet and army, renewed the fighting.
(Justin iii. 6.6)
Finally, there is cited the evidence of Ctesias, a Greek doctor working at the Persian court c.400 and claiming to have consulted official Persian records, who states that there were only 40 ships present in the Egyptian campaign, that the name of the commander was Charitimides and that there were 6,000 survivors (63–67). On the basis of this evidence, it would seem that the Athenians had little to fear from dissident League members, and that their actions in the late 450s were more concerned with tightening-up the League and the removal of Persian influence, especially on the coast of Asia Minor. Opponents of this view, however, stress the unreliability of Ctesias and Justin – Ctesias makes serious errors and omissions in his narrative of events both in the Egyptian expedition and elsewhere in his Persica, and his numbers have to be treated with the greatest caution; Justin is a very late historian, and his summary of this period of Greek history is chronologically confused.
The use of epigraphic evidence becomes essential in charting the hardening of Athenian attitudes towards the allies in the late 450s and early 440s. The suppression of allied revolts in this period of time led the Athenians to infringe the autonomy of a greater number of states in a greater number of ways than had been witnessed before in the Greek world. However, there is a difference of opinion about Athens’ relations with the allies in the late 450s, which is reflected in the interpretation of the Erythrae Decree, usually dated to 453/2. It is clear that there had been at Erythrae in Asia Minor a political struggle between League loyalists and medizers (supporters of a pro-Persian policy), who had gained the upper hand, revolted from the League and established a pro-Persian tyranny. The Athenians had put down the revolt, probably in 452, and the regulations, contained within this decree, impose upon the Erythraeans a democratic constitution and an Athenian military garrison. Some historians believe that the revolt was a direct result of the Athenian disaster in Egypt and therefore a tough, imperialistic solution was required. Athenian ‘episcopoi’ (overseers) organize the establishment of the first democratic Boule, aided by the Athenian ‘phrourarch’ (garrison commander), who is also given an important political role in the appoint
ment of future ‘Boulai’ (Councils) at Erythrae, and there is a strong military presence:
The [Inspectors] and Garrison Commander are to draw lots and set up the current council; in the future the council and the Garrison Commander [15] to do this not less than 30 days before the term of office expires.
(ML 40; AE216A p. 113)
These decisions had been taken at Athens and not in consultation with the allies. Furthermore, it is the Athenians who would have the final say on internal political decisions of Erythrae:
[25] … and I will not drive out any of those who have stayed without the agreement of the Council of the Athenians and the People.
The alternative interpretation of these events and the purpose of the decree is that Erythrae and others had been in revolt from the early 450s, provoked by Athens’ aggressive campaigns (especially the Egyptian expedition) and aided by Persian encouragement. Persia through its western ‘satraps’ (provincial governors) had been very active in the 450s in an attempt to regain control of the League allies on the coast of Asia Minor in order to draw the Athenians away from helping the rebel leader Inaros in Egypt. A further example of this pressure comes from the Athenian decree, passed in 451/0, which praised Sigeum on the Hellespont for its continuing loyalty and promised protection ‘against anyone on the mainland’–pre-sumably not only a reference to the Persians but also to pro-Persian Greeks (IG i.32). Therefore the installation of the garrison at Erythrae was intended more as a safety measure against any future Persian attack than as a specifically imperialist measure. In the same way, the political role of the phrourarch (garrison commander) was to vet the incoming Boule for covert pro-Persian sympathizers, who may have escaped the immediate purge after Erythrae’s recovery by the Athenians. It is argued that, since garrisons were installed at Erythrae in 453/2 and at Miletus possibly in 450/49 (AE218 p. 115) but, after peace was made with the Persians in 449, not at Colophon c.447/6 (after its revolt had been put down – see below), the primary purpose of these military installations was to afford protection from Persia, and should not be seen as an intensification of Athenian rule. Furthermore, unlike later decrees, the Delian League allies are mentioned:
The people are to swear the following: I will not revolt [from the Athenian People nor from the allies] of the Athenians,
(ML 40; AE216B p. 114)
In 454/3, the Delian League treasury was probably moved from Delos to Athens either through a genuine fear for its safety after the defeat in Egypt or as a pretext to gain control of the League’s finances, and the tribute lists (ATLs) begin from this period – List I records the phoros paid for the year 454/3, List 2 for the year 453/2, etc. In List 4 (451/0) and in List 5 (450/49), a significantly large number of islands appear on the lists for the first time. The reasons for this are also a source of dispute – for some historians, these islands had been withholding their phoros through discontent with Athens and were finally forced to pay up in 451/0 and 450/49 by Athenian military action; for others, these islands had still been supplying ships in the late 450s, and are recorded on Lists 4 and 5 because they became phorospaying allies for the first time. However, there is little disagreement about Athens’ final, intensive phase of imperialism from 450/49 to 446/5.
The Athenians and their allies won a decisive victory on Cyprus against the Persians (1.112.1; AE39 p. 28) c.450, and possibly in the spring of 449 a peace treaty was concluded between them. There is controversy over whether a formal peace treaty, known as the ‘Peace of Callias’ by its modern supporters, was signed, but it is agreed that fighting did come to an end between the two combatants at this time. Therefore the primary purpose of the League – war with Persia – had come to an end, and many allies would have entertained hopes of being released from their League obligations and Athens’ increasing imperialism. The introduction of the Athenians’‘cleruchy’ policy in 450, on the eve of peace with Persia, clearly shows that they had no intention of releasing their control over the allies. A cleruchy was a settlement of Athenian citizens who, while retaining their citizenship, were sent out to take over a confiscated portion of allied territory. The presence of cleruchies among dissident allies was very effective in maintaining imperial control:
[5] In addition, Pericles sent 1,000 kleroukhoi to the Khersonese, 500 to Naxos, half that number to Andros, 1,000 to Thrace. … [6] He did this … , by planting settlers alongside the allies, to make them fearful and provide a guard against any revolution.
(Plutarch, Pericles 11.5–6; AE231 p. 119)
There is no Tribute List 6 (449/8), and it is generally believed that the Athenians, with regard to the peace with Persia, declared a postponement in the collecting of phoros until a policy for the future was decided upon. Linked to this is a decree, normally referred to as the Congress Decree, which was proposed by Pericles in the spring of 449. He proposed to hold a congress, to which all the Greeks were invited to send representatives:
to discuss: the Greek temples, which the Persians had burned down, and the sacrifices, which they owed to the gods, … and the sea, that all might sail about with impunity and keep the peace [of Callias?]
(Plutarch, Pericles 17.1; AE65 pp. 40–41)
Apart from an attempt by the Athenians to claim the religious leadership of Greece, the main objective of this decree was to provide a new mandate for the Delian League and for the collection of phoros. It is hardly surprising that the Spartans led the opposition to the Congress (Plutarch, Pericles 17.4; AE65 p. 41), since it would be held in Athens, the majority of the destroyed temples to be rebuilt were Athenian, and the freedom of the seas would be enforced for the most part by an Athenian fleet – funded in part by the Peloponnesians! It seems hard to believe that Pericles did not foresee this outcome, but the failure of the Congress to found a new league gave him the opportunity to keep the old League in operation and re-impose phoros for 448/7. As a consequence of the failure of the Congress Decree, Pericles, in c.449, proposed a decree (the evidence for which comes from a papyrus of the second century AD that appears to contain a commentary on Demosthenes’ speech against Androtion) to use at once 5,000 talents and after that a further 3,000 talents, all from the Delian League funds, to finance a massive rebuilding programme of Athenian temples. The beginning of the 440s is attractive for the dating of this decree, since we know from surviving accounts that the construction of the Parthenon began in 447/6. Also, opposition to the Periclean building programme, almost certainly led by Thucydides, son of Melesias, was at its most forceful in the mid-440s (see Chapter 18).
There follows a series of exceptionally tough Athenian decrees, but the dating of two of them – the Cleinias Decree and the Coinage Decree (also known as the Standards Decree) – is a subject of intense scholarly debate (their content and possible dating are discussed at the end of this section). However, the Colophon Decree and the Chalcis Decree have been placed more confidently in c.446. After 449, the Athenians took tough, coercive action against the dissident allies who, resenting the re-imposition of phoros and Athenian imperial behaviour, revolted from the Delian League. The harshness of Athenian imperialism in this period is reflected in the Colophon Decree (ML 47; AE219 p. 115) – there is no certain date but it seems very similar in tone to the Erythrae Decree, the Miletus Decree and the Chalcis Decree, all of whose dates can be securely fixed to around this time. Colophon paid 3 talents in the first assessment period (454–450) but its absence from the Tribute Lists of 450/49 to 447/6 strongly suggests that it had been in revolt. After crushing the revolt the Athenians confiscated some of the Colophonians’ territory, sent out settlers (either loyal Colophonians or Athenians) and established a democracy. Also Colophon’s new phoros payment was set at 1½ talents, reflecting the new settlement on its land. The regulations, contained within the decree, are harsh:
and I will not revolt [from the Athenian People either] by word or deed, [neither I myself nor will I be persuaded to do so by anyone else], and I will love the [Athenian Pe
ople and I will not] desert and [I will not subvert] democracy [at Colophon – neither] myself nor will I [be persuaded] to do so [by anyone else]
(ML 47; AE219 p. 115)
The oath is far tougher than the Erythrae decree, demanding loyalty in word and deed – thus limiting freedom of speech. There is probably no mention of the ‘allies’ (unlike in the Erythrae Decree) which is in keeping with other decrees of this period, where the following formula was becoming commonplace: ‘the cities which Athens controls’, although the earliest of these decrees are honorific rather than imposing regulations.
The Chalcis Decree was probably passed in 446, after the suppression of the revolt of Euboea (ML 52; AE78 pp. 44–45). The Chalcidians’ oath is far more detailed than the Erythraean and Colophonian oaths:
[21]. …’I will not revolt from the people of Athens by any means or device whatsoever, neither in word nor in deed, nor will I obey anyone who does revolt, and if anyone revolts I will denounce him to the Athenians, and [26]. … I will be the best and fairest ally I am able to be and will help and defend the Athenian people, in the event of anyone wronging the Athenian people, and I will obey the Athenian people’.
(ML 52; AE78 p. 44)
Not only do the Chalcidians swear to avoid revolt in word and in deed, but even agree to betray their fellow citizens to the Athenians, if they should have rebellious ideas. In addition, the oath of loyalty is taken solely to the Athenians, and there is the explicit promise to help the Athenians in the event of an attack. In an amendment to a second decree, Athens directly interferes with the autonomy of Chalcis’ judicial and political system:
[lines 70–80] Chalcidians should themselves subject their officials to scrutiny on Chalcis, just as the Athenians at Athens, except in cases involving exile, execution or loss of civic rights. On these matters there should be reference to Athens to the court of the Thesmothetai in accordance with the People’s decree.
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 29