Such a sharp, dramatic change of leadership style is too simplistic to be accepted, but Plutarch is right to see the dual nature of Pericles’ leadership – the factional leader, advocating popular policies to win over the support of the demos, and the loftier, aristocratic statesman, proposing policies for the good of the whole of Athens – and there is an evolution from one to another. Pericles was perhaps the first politician to realize fully the need to take the demos into account, and throughout his political career he never lost sight of the need to win over the demos in the Ecclesia. Certainly his policies and his political style in the earlier part of his career, as he struggled to make a name for himself against other aspiring politicians, could appear ‘demagogic’:
Pericles’ resources were insufficient for this kind of lavishness [i.e. Cimon’s private generosity from his wealth] and so Damonides of Oea advised that … since he could not compete with regard to his private wealth, he should give to the people their own property; and Pericles introduced state pay for the jurors.
(Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 27.4)
In addition, his building programme of the 440s and its underlying motivation, i.e. his belief that it was the state’s responsibility to provide full employment for the masses (Plutarch, Pericles 12), made him appear to many as a ‘philodemos’ (demos-lover – see next section). He was just as capable as Cleon of making a grandiose, extravagant gesture before the people. Thucydides had accused him of squandering public money on the building programme, and so Pericles asked the opinion of the people in the Ecclesia. When they replied that he had spent far too much, he replied:
‘Alright then, don’t let it be charged to your account but to mine, and I will have my own name inscribed on the public buildings.’
(Plutarch, Pericles 14)
As Pericles’ policies and advice over the years proved second to none, his status as a leader grew. His power of oratory, his firm grasp of complex financial and administrative details, his knowledge of Athens’ resources and his incorruptibility encouraged the people to give more weight to his views, and so he evolved as the pre-eminent politician of the age with a gravitas to match. However, Thucydides’ words about Pericles’ dominant position within the state can give a misleading picture of Athenian politics in the 430s (although he does appear here to be commenting more on the quality of effective leadership than the nature of the constitution):
What appeared to be a democracy was in reality the rule by the leading citizen.
(Thucydides 2.65.9)
Pericles could never take the demos and its decision-making power in the Ecclesia for granted, and he had to convince them every time of the worth of his proposals. There is no better example of this than the debate in the Ecclesia after Sparta’s ultimatum in 432, when Pericles had to produce effective arguments against his opponents who were in favour of revoking the Megarian Decree and attempting to find some compromise with the Spartans. His careful and perceptive analysis of Sparta’s intentions and his proposals to meet Sparta’s demands won the day, but it was no foregone conclusion (Thuc. 1.139.4–145). In the second year of the war, owing to their misfortunes, the Athenians sent an embassy against Pericles’ wishes to Sparta to sue for peace (Thuc. 2.59.1–2), and soon after they deposed and fined him (Thuc. 2.65.3). For all his influence and power, Pericles was as accountable to the people as any other public official in the democracy. In addition, the idea that Pericles’ leadership faced no opposition after the ostracism of Thucydides in 444/3 does not accord with the evidence of Plutarch and Diodorus.
The opposition to Pericles
Plutarch, in his discussion of the Megarian Decree, states that most writers blamed Pericles for preventing the decree from being revoked (Pericles 31). He then gives a summary of the explanations that were put forward for Pericles’ motives in opposing the Megarians. However, in the rest of chapter 31 and in chapter 32, he recounts at length the most commonly accepted explanation – that Pericles’ political position was so threatened by ‘the opposition’ attacks on his friends and himself that he deliberately provoked the Peloponnesian War by refusing any concessions over the Megarian Decree in order to save his political career. The friends concerned were Pheidias, Aspasia and Anaxagoras, who were part of Pericles’ intellectual circle and had a position of influence with him. The first attack was against Pheidias, the sculptor of the cult statue of Athena for the Parthenon, who was prosecuted on a charge of stealing gold from the statue. The prosecutor was Menon, an artist working with Pheidias, but it is clear that he was acting on behalf of others:
Some of the people were attempting through him [i.e. Pheidias] to test the mood of the people in a case that involved Pericles.
(Plutarch, Pericles 31)
Pericles had foreseen the possibility of such a charge and had ensured that the gold could be removed from the statue for weighing, and thus Pheidias’ innocence was proved.
The opposition, however, was undeterred and prosecuted Pheidias for a second time on a charge of impiety – for representing himself and Pericles as Greeks in the battle with the Amazons, depicted on Athena’s shield. ‘About the same time’, in the crucial words of Plutarch (Pericles 31), the comic poet Hermippos accused Pericles’ mistress, Aspasia, of impiety – although the specific grounds are not clear. Immediately after this Diopeithes brought forward a decree, authorizing the prosecution of all those who did not believe in the gods or taught about the heavens – the purpose of this decree was to damage Pericles through his association with the philosopher Anaxagoras. Finally, Dracontides brought in a decree that Pericles’ financial accounts in connection with the building programme should be deposited with the Boule, and that the jurors should pass judgement on Pericles with voting-ballots that had lain on the altar of Athena. Hagnon, a political ally of Pericles, persuaded the people to remove this religious element and to try the case in the ordinary, secular manner. Pericles allegedly managed to save Aspasia by an untypical display of emotion and a personal appeal in court, but he had to smuggle Anaxagoras out of the city, and:
As he had already upset the people through Pheidias and was afraid of his own trial, he set ablaze the war that was threatening and smouldering, hoping to cast off the charges against himself and discourage the jealousy, since in the midst of great danger the city would entrust itself to him alone on account of his great reputation and power.
(Plutarch, Pericles 32)
Diodorus has a very similar account to Plutarch’s, with the variation that Pericles’ case was about the misuse of imperial funds and Aspasia is not mentioned (Diodorus 12.38–39), but clearly both writers are using a common source.
Plutarch informs us that these attacks on Aspasia, Anaxagoras and Pericles happened ‘about the same time’ as the prosecution of Pheidias for impiety, and that Pheidias’ case was directly linked with the Megarian Decree in 432 – hence the commonly believed accusation that Pericles opposed the repeal of the decree to save his political skin. Although there is some confusion about the details in each of the cases, it is generally accepted that these attacks did take place, and their chief objective was to discredit Pericles and remove him from the leadership of the people. The key question is: who was behind these attacks? If the link between the attacks and the Megarian Decree is accepted, then it has been suggested that Thucydides, son of Melesias, had renewed his opposition to Pericles in an attempt to avoid war with Sparta, since he would have returned from ostracism in 434/3. However, there is very convincing evidence that the dating of these attacks on Pericles and his friends should be placed in 438/7, and that there is no connection between the attacks and the Megarian Decree.
The main point of reference is the attack on Pheidias, as all the others are ‘about the same time’. It is here that the evidence of Philochorus, a much-respected Atthidographer (fourth-century writers of Athenian histories), is crucial – he states that Pheidias’ prosecution took place in 438/7 and that Pheidias fled to Elis where he worked on the statue of Zeus (FGrH 328 F121). As
Athena’s statue was dedicated in 438/7, this would be the logical and most opportune time to launch a prosecution for embezzlement, and when that failed, for impiety against Pheidias. Philochorus’ evidence, combined with Plutarch’s, demands that the other attacks took place at about the same time, and there is strong circumstantial evidence to support this view. The investigation of Pericles’ accounts, authorized by the decree of Dracontides, must refer to his position as one of the board of supervisors of Athena’s statue, and as Pheidias’ immediate superior. This was a concerted attack on both Pheidias and Pericles, and their handling of the financial accounts of the statue, which would explain the religious dimension of Dracontides’ decree concerning the sanctified voting-tablets, since the case involved theft of sacred materials. Aspasia’s prosecution is also appropriate in 438/7, one year after the suppression of the revolt of Samos. Aspasia came from Miletus, whose dispute with Samos over the possession of Priene had drawn in the Athenians that led to Samos’ revolt in 440. The campaign proved to be difficult and the Athenians had to endure heavy casualties before Samos was defeated (Thuc. 1.115.2–117.3; AE64 pp. 39–40). It was widely believed that Aspasia had persuaded Pericles to intercede on behalf of Miletus, and thus her unpopularity in Athens in the immediate aftermath of the war would have been at its greatest, leaving her vulnerable to a political prosecution.
If 438/7 is accepted for the date of these attacks, then Thucydides, son of Melesias, must be discounted as Pericles’ opponent since he was still ostracized. In addition, the nature of the attacks – anti-intellectual and protective of traditional religion through prosecutions on the grounds of impiety – would also suggest a different source for the opposition to Pericles than the kaloikagathoi. This direct appeal to the ultra-conservative views on traditional religion of the demos (Ephialtes in his reforms had virtually left the religious powers of the ‘Areopagus’ untouched, as he did not wish to alienate the demos and lose his chance to remove the Areopagus’ secular powers) is much more in keeping with the style of the new politicians, the so-called ‘demagogues’ (see next section), emerging in the 430s. The rise, the methods and the influence of this new type of politician are the main theme of Aristophanes’ Knights, and he particularly concentrates on ‘the leather-seller’ Cleon, who came to prominence in the first year of the war and who dominated Athenian politics in the 420s after Pericles’ death. However, Aristophanes (Knights 128ff.) mentions two predecessors of Cleon –‘the oakum-seller’ Eucrates and ‘the sheep-seller’ Lysicles who must have been politically active in the 430s, as Cleon must have been, if we are to discount a sudden, meteoric rise to fame in 431. Their opposition may have been based on Pericles’ cautious (in their estimation) policy with regard to the allies and the Spartans, or their dislike of Pericles’ aristocratic circle of friends, who formed ‘The Establishment’ and occupied the most important offices of state, or just personal ambition to replace him as the ‘prostates tou demou’ (leader of the people), or a combination of all three. One or more of them may be the shadowy figures, who encouraged Menon to accuse Pheidias in order to test Pericles’ popularity; also the comic poet Hermippos, who prosecuted Aspasia for impiety, is found at the beginning of the war criticizing the cowardice of Pericles and supporting Cleon (Plutarch, Pericles 33); and oracle-mongering, as practised by Diopeithes and the author of the decree against Anaxagoras, was used on many occasions by the demagogues (Aristophanes, Knights 997ff.).
It would seem that Pericles’ leadership emerged relatively unscathed from these attacks in 438/7, for Hagnon, his political associate, was appointed to found the vitally important colony of Amphipolis c.436 – a very prestigious appointment, reflecting the dominant influence of Pericles’ faction. Thucydides the historian, even allowing for his pro-Periclean sentiments, stresses Pericles’ pre-eminence in the conduct of Athenian affairs leading up to the outbreak of the war, evidence of which is reflected in the Athenians’ acceptance of his advice concerning Sparta’s ultimatum (Thuc. 1.145). Even after his deposition and fining in 430, possibly masterminded by Cleon:
Not much later, as a crowd a mob habitually does, they elected him again as general, and entrusted the whole conduct of affairs to him.
(Thucydides 2.65.4)
His death in 429 marked the end of an exceptional period of leadership in Athenian history, and it is likely that in the following years the inability of any one politician to achieve such a sustained dominance in the Ecclesia was a return to a more normal state of political affairs.
Finally there remains one last question: what was the original source for the charge, which had gained such widespread acceptance among later generations, that Pericles ‘set ablaze the war that was threatening and smouldering’ because of Pheidias’ conviction and his fear for himself? Thucydides’ evidence marked Pericles out as the main opponent of revoking the decree; and the source for the damning tradition against Pericles comes almost certainly from the comic poets, especially Aristophanes. The Peace of Nicias, which was signed in 421 and brought the Archidamian War to an end (see Chapter 19), had been agreed in principle when Aristophanes staged his Peace in spring of that year. It is in the dialogue between Hermes, the Chorus and the hero Trygaeus that a comic explanation of the cause of the war is introduced:
Chorus: ‘But where has Peace been hiding from us for such a long time? Tell us this, most kindly of the gods.’
Hermes: ‘Most wise farmers, listen to my words if you wish to hear why she departed. Pheidias, by his wrongdoing, first began the trouble. Then Pericles, being afraid of sharing his fate and dreading your character and your ferocious temper, before he himself suffered something terrible, set the city ablaze by throwing in a spark called the Megarian Decree.’
(Aristophanes, Peace 601–9)
There was nothing new in 421 about the Megarian Decree and Pericles’ opposition to it being an immediate cause of the war, but the specific connection with Pheidias and his prosecution does appear to have been Aristophanes’ invention:
Trygaeus: ‘By Apollo, I have never heard of these things from anybody, nor that Pheidias had any connection with Peace.’
Chorus: ‘Nor did I until just now. That is why she (Peace) is so beautiful, because she is his relation. How many things escape our notice.’
(Aristophanes, Peace 615–18)
Even the imagery of fire, which is so distinctive in Aristophanes’ play, has been maintained in the tradition that Plutarch recorded five to six hundred years later – a testament to the fact that a scurrilous story about a famous person is often more interesting and worth recalling than the sober truth.
The demagogues
In the 430s and especially after Pericles’ death, Athens saw the rise of a new type of politician, often referred to as ‘demagogues’ by hostile literary sources. Their non-aristocratic background and their political methods marked them out as different from their predecessors. Traditionally, ambitious men had gained positions of political importance by the support of their philoi (friends); by judicious marriage to the daughters of other powerful political families; by military and public service, usually holding the post of ‘strategos’ (general); and by forming coalitions with like-minded aristocrats and their factions. Such men had the leisure, the wealth and, most of all, the organization to wield a political influence that was disproportionate to their actual numbers. The demos (the sense of being identified politically with the common people/the penetes (the poor) is to be assumed in the rest of this section), were too disparate and too disorganized to translate their superior numbers into dominance of the Ecclesia, except in exceptional circumstances when a major issue caught their attention. Otherwise, in the more routine but still important matters of state, they tended to be influenced by leaders of the organized aristocratic factions. It was the new politicians, who saw the potential of the demos and forged them into a more potent political force. Their opportunity came in the second half of the fifth century with the dramatic increase in imperial demands placed upon
the Athenians, the growing confidence of the demos in the Ecclesia and Heliaea, and the possibilities offered by ‘isegoria’ (equal right to speak) in shaping state policy.
The Athenians faced a formidable task in exercising control over a growing empire with its attendant responsibilities but using the political structure of a small city-state. The use of lot for the majority of offices, the limitation on tenure of office and the collegiate principle (i.e. having more than one colleague in public office with equal authority) were useful for protecting the democracy at home from its political enemies, but were unsuitable for administering a powerful empire. There was a need for some politically active citizens to provide leadership, and this was satisfied by the ‘demagogues’ (literally, leaders of the people) or ‘prostatai tou demou’ (champions of the demos). When these new leaders, some of whom had acquired their wealth from business and not only from agriculture, made direct appeals to the demos in the Ecclesia and proposed policies to their benefit (i.e. of the demos), the kaloikagathoi or ‘best people’ strongly disapproved, and thus the term ‘demagogue’ gradually acquired its derogatory meaning as a leader of the democratic faction.
The new politicians gained their position of political influence by possessing certain skills and by winning over the mass allegiance of the demos. The fundamental skill was to be an effective orator in the Ecclesia, able to put one’s views with clarity and vigour, and to ward off an opponent’s attacks and discredit his arguments – the term ‘rhetor’, meaning literally ‘he who speaks’, came to mean politician in the late fifth century. They had to possess a mastery of finance and administration so that they could impress the demos, who had neither the time nor the commitment to master such complex details, but who needed this information to make their decisions. In addition, the new politicians needed to have a good grasp of foreign affairs, especially knowledge of the Empire, which was supplied by their ‘xenoi’ (friends) in the allied cities. It was to these ‘rhetores’, and not to the public officials, that the demos usually looked for expert advice. However, it was the methods employed by these new politicians to gain the allegiance of the demos that provoked the greatest hostility and disdain from the kaloikagathoi and their likeminded supporters, such as Aristophanes and Thucydides. Their opposition to and prejudice against these so-called demagogues can best be seen in the career of Cleon.
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 49