(Thucydides 7.28.3)
Hoplite warfare had dominated Greek military thinking for the previous 250 years, and the principle that the state with the strongest force of hoplites was destined to win wars had been continually reaffirmed in that time. The Spartans (but not King Archidamus) had failed to realize that Pericles and the Athenians were planning a totally new strategy – a mainly defensive war, avoiding pitched hoplite battles (but using sea-borne raids as the offensive element of their strategy), thus limiting the effectiveness of Sparta’s main military strength.
The Athenians knew that it would be a long, hard struggle – a defensive war would inflict more damage on Attica than they could inflict in return on the enemy, and would create the unpleasantness of over-crowding behind the Long Walls every summer. It would also be a much tougher war than the First Peloponnesian War because this time the Spartans were at full strength, had no Helot problem to distract their military forces and had easy access through the Megarid to launch their annual invasions. Pericles’ speech to the Athenian in 432 gives his reasons for believing in ultimate victory, but there is no mention of a quick or easy victory, rather that the Athenians ‘will win through’ (1.144.1). In many ways it would be extremely difficult for the Athenians to win a war by the traditional method – a land invasion of the Peloponnese, a defeat of the hoplite forces of the Peloponnesians and the taking of Sparta by storm. On the basis that no sensible power deliberately provokes a defensive war but rather is forced into war to defend itself, the Spartans should be blamed for the outbreak of the war.
Bibliography
Cartledge, P. Sparta and Lakonia, pt 3, ch. 12.
Hornblower, S. The Greek World 479–323 BC, ch. 8.
Kagan, D. The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, chs 10, 11, 13–20.
Lewis, D. M. CAH vol. 5, 2nd edn, chs 6.4, 9.1.
Meiggs, R. The Athenian Empire, ch. 10.
Powell, A. Athens and Sparta, ch. 4.
Rhodes, P. J. ‘Thucydides on the causes of the Peloponnesian War’, Hermes 115.
Robinson, C. E. History of Greece, ch. 11.
de Ste. Croix, G. E. M. The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, chs 1–8.
18
PERICLES AND THE NATURE OF ATHENIAN POLITICS
It is important at the outset to understand the nature of Athenian politics and of political organizations in the fifth century. There were no political parties, in the modern sense, with distinctive political philosophies and party structures. Political groupings in Athens centred on certain outstanding individuals – usually wealthy aristocrats, at least in the first half of the century. The ancient writers refer to these factions as ‘those around so-and-so’, and the core of a typical faction would be constituted from relatives, close friends and immediate supporters. In a society that lacked political parties and their organization, ‘philia’ (political friendship) was absolutely crucial as the basis of political organization. However, political success for an ambitious politician depended upon reaching out to a wider constituency and attracting outsiders, beyond the ‘philoi’ (friends), to his policies. This required good oratory, generosity to his fellow citizens, success in military affairs and in public service, and an attractive character; a well-judged marriage would also bring the support of another powerful political faction. In addition, coalitions were often formed between factions usually to achieve a specific political objective – for example, although Nicias and Alcibiades were political enemies, their factions united c.416 to secure the ostracism of Hyperbolus (Plutarch, Nicias 11). But these coalitions were fleeting, for as soon as the immediate political objective had been achieved, they would often split and form coalitions with other factions in pursuit of a different aim. This constant flux and interaction between the factions must be borne in mind throughout this chapter, if the personalities and political issues are to be understood. The idea that in fifthcentury Athens there existed only two or three ‘parties’, or that a few prominent individuals were the only important politicians, or that Pericles was the unchallenged leader of Athens from 444/3 to his death, must be resisted, as the literary sources concentrate solely on the prominent politicians of the first rank, and dismiss or diminish the standing of other important politicians, who are known from the finds of ‘ostraka’ (see ‘ostracism’ in Chapter 7).
Pericles’ early career to 444/3
Pericles first makes his mark in Athenian politics as the chief assistant of Ephialtes. His background, like the other prominent politicians of the first two-thirds of the century (499–430), was aristocratic. Xanthippus, his father, was a politician of the first rank in the 490s and the first half of the 480s; he secured the prosecution of Miltiades in 489, was ostracized in 484, but was recalled to win fame as one of the two commanders-in-chief of the victorious Greek forces at the battle of Mycale in 479 against the Persians. Agariste, his mother, was descended from the powerful and influential Alcmaeonid family. Such family connections were the ideal basis for a career in politics. In 463, Pericles prosecuted Cimon, after his return from the siege of Thasos, on a charge of corruption – he alleged that Cimon had it within his power to attack Macedonia but had been bought off by King Alexander (Plutarch, Cimon 14). This case was clearly politically inspired by the democratic reformers against their leading political opponent, and, although Cimon was acquitted, the trial raised Pericles’ profile in Athenian public life.
Success soon came to the ‘democrats’ with the passing of Ephialtes’ reforms in 462/1, with Pericles playing a major role in the introduction of state pay for jury service in the ‘Heliaea’ (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 27.3). The assassination of Ephialtes soon after his reforms provided an opportunity for Pericles to advance his political career, but the view of Plutarch (Pericles 16) that he dominated Athenian politics for 40 years must be rejected. Athens’ involvement in the First Peloponnesian War (462/1–446/5) brought to prominence in the 450s other men of military ability: Leocrates who defeated the Aeginetans and besieged their city in c.459 (Thuc. 1.105.2; AE 39 p. 26), Myronides who defeated the Corinthians at Megara in c.459 and the Boeotians at the battle of Oenophyta in c.457 (Thuc. 1.105.3–106.2; AE39 p. 26; 1.108.2–3; AE39 p. 27) and Tolmides who circumnavigated the Peloponnese and defeated the Sicyonians in c.456 (Thuc. 1.108.5; AE39 p. 27). The first reference to Pericles as a general in this war comes with his leadership of another Athenian campaign against Sicyon in c.455/4 (Thuc. 1.111.2–3; AE39 p. 28). Therefore Pericles had no monopoly of power in the 450s, and it is very likely that he, being a competent rather than an outstanding military man, concentrated on domestic politics in this decade, consolidating Ephialtes’ reforms by the extension of pay for public office.
By the end of the 450s, Pericles’ political standing had risen and thus provided him with the means to exercise a greater influence in the city’s affairs. He was undoubtedly aware that the Athenian defeat in Egypt in 454 was due to an over-ambitious foreign policy and accepted that there was a need to fight on one front at a time. The Persians’ recent success in Egypt made them the first priority, but a full-scale military offensive would leave Athens exposed and vulnerable to a Spartan attack. In these circumstances, Pericles was willing to put aside his former opposition to Cimon, who was so influential with the Spartans (see Chapter 15 and the five-year truce with Sparta, 451–446), and formed a political alliance with his faction. As a gesture of goodwill Pericles is said to have moved the decree for the early recall of Cimon from ostracism:
Some writers say, however, that the decree for Cimon’s recall was not introduced by Pericles until a secret agreement had been made between them through the help of Elpinice, Cimon’s sister, that Cimon should set sail with two hundred ships and take command abroad in order to reduce the territory of the King of Persia, while Pericles should possess supreme authority at home.
(Plutarch, Pericles 10)
If this is true, then the coalition was a division of power with each leader exercising his specialist talent and implementing his prefer
red policy. Cimon was free to pursue his traditional anti-Persian policy and to utilize his outstanding skills as a general, but in return he accepted the constitutional reforms of 462/1 and allowed Pericles pre-eminence in domestic policy. This political alliance may have been strengthened in the traditional manner – the marriage of Pericles’ relation, Isodice, to Cimon. However, the death of Cimon, the military success against the Persians at Cyprus and the chance to end hostilities with Persia in 449 led to a major rethink by Pericles. It was his change in foreign policy and his plans for the use of the allies’‘phoros’ in the post-Persian war period that led to the break-up of the coalition.
The main opposition came from a kinsman of Cimon, Thucydides son of Melesias (probably also related to Thucydides the historian). Three chapters in Plutarch’s Life of Pericles (11, 12 and 14) are the main source for the issues of dispute between the two leaders. These chapters, especially chapter 12, are without doubt dramatically presented, and include much moralizing, rhetoric and anachronisms, but it is reasonable to accept that there is an underlying foundation of fact – the decree of Pericles (mentioned in a commentary on one of Demosthenes’ speeches), authorizing the immediate use of 5,000 talents and a further 3,000 talents later on the building programme, and the commencement of the building of the Parthenon in 447, support Plutarch’s account chronologically and factually. Although not mentioned by name, Thucydides is clearly the leading protagonist in the accusation against Pericles for his abuse of allied funds:
They said: ‘The Greeks must be insulted by this appalling act of arrogance and consider it to be clear-cut tyranny, when they see us covering our city with gold and beautifying it … with the tribute, taken from them by force, for the war against Persia.’
(Plutarch, Pericles 12)
According to the above quotation, the opposition was criticizing Pericles, not about the collection of phoros nor the possession of the Empire (Cimon had after all been the architect of its creation), but about the immorality of using allied phoros to finance an Athenian building programme. Pericles’ answer to such charges was to stress that the allies paid for protection and, so long as the Athenians fulfilled this obligation, they had every right to use the surplus income for the benefit of Athens:
‘They only supply money, which does not belong to those who give it, but to those who receive it, provided they supply the services for which they were paid. It is right, after the city has equipped itself sufficiently with the necessary resources for the war, to turn its surplus to public works … which, inspiring every skill and setting every hand to work, would turn almost the whole city into wage-earners.’
(Plutarch, Pericles 12)
Such a moral objection, no matter how genuinely felt, was unlikely to have won much support in the ‘Ecclesia’, but it may well be that the real underlying issue was about foreign policy – Thucydides was opposing Pericles’ policy of peace with Persia, and his diversion of valuable, financial resources from campaigning against the Persians.
Far more disturbing to Thucydides and his faction than the morality of the building programme and the peace with Persia were Pericles’ proposals to use public funds to create economic security for the lower classes:
Thucydides and his supporters were constantly condemning Pericles for wasting public money and destroying the national revenue.
(Plutarch, Pericles 14)
‘Misthophoria’ (payment for public service) had set a precedent for providing paid employment for the poor, but Pericles’ proposals for the use of public funds on a massive scale to create an ‘emmisthos polis’ (a city of wage-earners) went much further, and was the issue that caused the greatest fear and hostility among the wealthy. The upper classes in general had come to terms with the political consequences of Ephialtes’ reforms, in part because their financial and social superiority, reflected in their private benefactions and largesse to the Athenian poor, had encouraged a grateful electorate to give them a monopoly of the top political positions. Cimon was renowned for his personal generosity, offering his land’s produce to all, providing daily meals and giving money donations to the poor (Plutarch, Cimon 10), and others of his class in the same way used their wealth to advance their political careers. But Pericles’ proposals, targeting the resources of the state specifically on the needs of the poor, and removing the opportunities for public works by wealthy citizens, marked a watershed in Athenian public affairs. It is now that the beginning of class division and conflict, culminating in the ideological clash (stasis) between democrats and oligarchs after Pericles’ death, is first observed and is reflected in Plutarch:
For there was from the beginning a fatal flaw, as can be found in iron, giving a hint of the differences between the aims of the democratic and the aristocratic parties
(Plutarch, Pericles 11)
Plutarch in the above quotation was not describing the creation of two new political parties but the division of Athens on the basis of class and broad attitudes. The term ‘demos’ (the people) had until now covered the whole body politic, i.e. all those, whether wealthy or poor, who had the right to attend the Ecclesia, pass judgement in the Heliaea and enjoy all the benefits of Athenian citizenship; but now the term acquired political/factional overtones, and was used to describe ‘the masses’ or ‘the common people’, especially the poor. In a full ‘radical’ democracy this huge majority of citizens could impose its legislative will against the wishes of the upper class. This upper class – the propertied class that lived off its wealth without the need to work for a living – began to evolve a more clearly defined political identity and set of values, and to use appropriate language to reflect their superiority, moral and political, over the lower classes. Thus they often referred to themselves as the ‘kaloikagathoi’ (‘the noble and the good’,or simply ‘gentlemen’) as well as using other such terms as the ‘beltistoi’ or ‘aristoi’ (the best men) or the ‘eugeneis’ (the well-born) or the ‘gnorimoi’ (the notables) or the ‘chrestoi’ (the useful); by contrast, their contempt for the lower classes is shown in such descriptions as ‘ochlos’ (the mob) or the ‘penetes’ (the poor) or ‘poneroi’ (the worthless) or ‘phauloi’ (the vulgar) or the ‘deiloi’ (the cowardly) – the Old Oligarch, writing his rightwing political pamphlet probably in the 420s, fills his work with these terms (Lactor 2). It was this ‘mob’, using its political muscle in the Ecclesia, which was going to pass Pericles’ proposed legislation and thereby assert their political and economic dominance in Athens. The building of the Long Walls had already caused concern, giving the urban lower classes military security but leaving the landed estates of the rich vulnerable to invasion; but economic security, provided by the state and Pericles, would remove the kaloikagathoi’s last political advantage – the private funding of public works to gain popularity and thus election to high public office.
Equally worrying to Thucydides was Pericles’ central role in this legislation and his ensuing popularity – the tyranny of the Peisistratids in the sixth century (see Chapter 6) was still remembered with fear by the upper classes, as they and their property were most at risk in a coup. Pericles’ policies and tactics roused their suspicions about his ultimate intentions:
The aristocrats, seeing that Pericles was already the most important man among the citizens, wanted to set someone up in opposition to him in the city and to blunt his power so that it did not become totally one-man rule.
(Plutarch, Pericles 11)
Pericles’ opposition to the upper class (although coming from their ranks) and his championing of the needs of the poor had, in their eyes, all the hallmarks of tyranny. The split between the two factions had now become very marked, and in these circumstances there was always a danger that this political division might undermine the stability of the state. But the Athenians possessed an effective method of resolving such political problems, and therefore in 444/3 the primacy of Pericles’ policies was confirmed by the ostracism of Thucydides, son of Melesias (Plutarch, Pericles 14).
Pericles’ career, 444/3–429
It is from the ostracism of Thucydides in 444/3 that we enter upon the period that is often called in modern scholarship ‘Periclean Athens’, when Pericles and his policies (according to the sources) dominated the political scene at Athens until his death in 429:
For as long as he had the leadership of the city in peace-time, the city was wisely led and safely guarded, and it was at its greatest under him.
(Thucydides 2.65.5)
Thucydides had the greatest respect for Pericles and considered his leadership, based upon his sterling qualities of intelligence, integrity, incorruptibility and strength of character (Thuc. 2.65.8), to be cast in the traditional aristocratic mould; in Thucydides’ opinion, it was Pericles’ less well-born and less well-bred successors, adopting methods of ‘demagogy’ in their ambitious pursuit of the leadership of the people, who brought about the defeat of Athens (Thuc. 2.65.10–13). However, other literary sources strongly disagree with Thucydides’ assessment of Pericles:
Socrates: ‘But tell me this: are the Athenians said to have become better because of Pericles or exactly the opposite – to have been corrupted by him? I’ve heard that Pericles made them lazy, cowardly, talkative and greedy, by being the first to introduce state pay.
(Plato, Gorgias 515e)
In Socrates’ (or Plato’s) view, Pericles was as much a ‘demagogue’ as his successors, and his leadership was achieved and maintained by manipulating and corrupting the demos (the common people). When Plutarch came to write the Life of Pericles in the first to second century AD, he was faced with two conflicting traditions, and he attempted to resolve this dilemma by dividing Pericles’ career into two distinctive periods – a ‘demagogic’ phase until Thucydides’ ostracism and a second ‘statesman-like’ phase until his death.
Aspects of Greek History (750–323BC) Page 48